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SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMPETITION
ENFORCEMENT AT THE FCC

JONATHAN B. BAKER*

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) charge to promote the public interest in the communications sector encompasses a mandate to foster competition.1 The FCC is far from the only federal agency with an interest in competitive communications markets. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation’s generalist antitrust enforcers, also seek to ensure that communications markets (as well as all other industries) perform competitively. These Remarks explain how and why sector-specific enforcement by the FCC complements generalist competition enforcement to the benefit of competition in the communications industry. These Remarks also discuss the ways in which a sector-specific agency such as the FCC can foster competition and promote other public goals, and compare merger reviews by the DOJ and the FCC in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.2

One might expect to see little difference in how the competitive effects of mergers are analyzed at the FCC versus the DOJ and the FTC. After all, the economists at these agencies have similar training and think about industrial organization economics in the same way. Indeed, some FCC economists have previously worked at

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1. Recent FCC merger decisions, for example, routinely recite: “Our public interest evaluation necessarily encompasses the broad aims of the Communications Act, which include, among other things, a deeply rooted preference for preserving and enhancing competition in relevant markets . . . .” Applications Filed for the Transfer of Certain Spectrum Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations in the States of Me., N. H., and Vt. from Verizon Commc’ns Inc. and its Subsidiaries to FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 514 para. 12 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).

the antitrust enforcement agencies, and vice versa. Moreover, the FCC often looks to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines promulgated by the DOJ and the FTC for guidance in analyzing horizontal mergers. For this reason, among others, some commentators claim that it is unnecessary and wasteful for multiple agencies to review communications industry mergers; these commentators typically recommend that the FCC defer to the antitrust enforcement agencies.\(^3\)

This view downplays the benefits of concurrent jurisdiction over competition questions. The competition enforcers and the FCC do not necessarily see every proposed merger identically for a number of reasons unrelated to their similar approaches to analyzing the economic effects of a transaction. First, the agencies differ in the scope of their review. Both the FCC and the antitrust enforcers consider competition, but the FCC is also concerned with other public interest goals, such as protecting service quality for consumers of interstate telecommunications services, accelerating the private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications services, and ensuring that a diversity of information sources and viewpoints are available to the public.\(^4\)

Second, the agencies differ in focus. Though the antitrust enforcers learn in some depth about some industries in which investigations recur (including some aspects of communications markets), they emphasize competitive analysis. The FCC focuses on communications, though it also frequently analyzes competition questions.\(^5\)

\(^3\) See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads: American telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age 426 (2005) (“It is debateable whether the public interest demands these additional, largely unchecked layers of intervention [from the FCC’s independent merger review] beyond the basic inquiries already conducted by the Justice Department or FTC—inquiries that are considered more than adequate for other industries.”).


\(^5\) The difference in focus may be connected to a procedural difference among the agencies. The FCC must review every merger within the communications industries, as parties cannot consummate a transaction without FCC approval. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006) (forbidding license transfers unless FCC finds “that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby”). By contrast, the antitrust enforcement agencies have discretion over which mergers to investigate, are notified only as to the largest transactions before consummation, and have prosecutorial discretion to focus their resources on the transactions raising the greatest competitive concern. See generally Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts
Third, the agencies differ in the statutory allocation of the burden of proof. The antitrust enforcers must ultimately prove harm to competition to a court (though nearly all transactions that raise concerns to the DOJ or the FTC are either remedied through settlement or abandoned by the parties). By contrast, merging firms must prove to the FCC that their proposed transaction is in the public interest, and the proposed transaction is subject to appellate review (though nearly all concerns about acquisitions at the FCC are resolved by imposing conditions on the merged firm).

Fourth, the agencies differ in how they collect and test evidence. The antitrust enforcement agencies do so proactively in order to prepare for possible litigation. For example, these agencies may interview customers or depose executives from the merging firms. The FCC reviews information obtained directly from the parties, but tends to rely more than the antitrust agencies on voluntary submissions by third parties and its own expertise to test the evidence proffered by the merging firms.

Fifth, the agencies differ in their culture. The antitrust enforcers, wary of ongoing supervision of merged firms, are more skeptical of conduct relief and more inclined toward structural relief than the FCC, which has an ongoing interaction with all sectors of the communications industry. That ongoing interaction could in theory raise the risk that the sector-specific agency would be “captured” by the regulated industry, leading the agency to act to favor the interests of the industry rather than the public interest. But a sector-
specific agency can counteract a possible tendency toward systematic bias in favor of relying on evidence provided by the regulated firms. For example, the sector-specific agency may take internal steps to test evidence that are analogous to the kind of discipline the adversarial process imposes on the antitrust agencies, as with FCC Chairman Genachowski’s emphasis on transparent, fact-based, and data-driven decisionmaking processes.14

Moreover, there are benefits from placing competition review in a sector-specific agency such as the FCC. The FCC has an advantage over the generalist antitrust agencies in fostering competition in communication markets because of the FCC’s industry expertise and broad public interest mandate. These give the FCC the practical ability to take a longer view of the evolution of the industry than is possible for the antitrust agencies.15 In addition, the FCC can address potential competition issues more easily than the competition enforcers can because of the hurdles the antitrust agencies

14. E.g., Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.openinternet.gov/read-speech.html (“I will ensure that the rulemaking process will be fair, transparent, fact-based, and data-driven.”).

face in proving a potential competition case in court. These FCC advantages were evident in the way the agencies addressed the possibility of telephone industry mergers in the immediate wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. At that time, the FCC took a longer view than the DOJ and considered potential competition issues to the benefit of competition generally.

A year after the legislation, AT&T, which was then a long distance company, floated the idea of merging with SBC, a large local telephone service provider and one of the regional Bell operating companies. From a purely competition perspective, even in 1997, this was a colorable possibility. Local and long distance telephone service are complements, not substitutes, and in general the antitrust scrutiny of mergers among sellers of complements is more relaxed than when the merger is horizontal (that is, among sellers of substitutes). Moreover, the 1996 Act had specified a path for local telephone service providers to enter long distance service, suggesting that Congress recognized the benefits of allowing providers to achieve scope economies in providing both services. The same legislative provisions also suggested that Congress believed that those benefits might outweigh the threat that a regulated local service provider, affiliated after merger with an unregulated long distance provider, could game the system to exercise market power. In consequence, it is possible to imagine that in 1997, an antitrust agency would have concluded on balance that competition would be enhanced by a merger between AT&T and SBC.

By contrast, the FCC, the expert communications agency, had a vision of how the communications industry should evolve. The FCC aimed in 1997 to effectuate the central thrust of the 1996 Act


19. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at § 9.4, at 392 (“Prevailing judicial opinion now seems to be that vertical mergers should be condemned only in the most extreme circumstances.”).


21. The merged firm might harm competition in the unregulated service by shifting common costs to the regulated service or by impeding or raising costs of interconnection to rivals in the unregulated service; competition problems such as these had led to the Bell System breakup.
by developing markets that would become so competitive as to permit deregulation to the extent possible. In that vision there was no place for doing what the merger threatened in part to do: re-create the dangers presented by the old AT&T, which had been broken up more than a dozen years before.

The FCC at that time saw the long distance companies, particularly AT&T (the largest one), as important potential rivals for providing local telephone service; and they saw the local telephone companies as important potential rivals for the long distance companies. The FCC’s Chairman responded to the idea of an AT&T merger with SBC by declaring that the hypothetical AT&T merger was “unthinkable.” As a result the merger did not happen for eight more years—until the industry had evolved to the point where the only concerns that the FCC and the DOJ had in their merger reviews related to the effect of the transaction on certain lines and services provided mainly to local business customers in some locations.

Bell Atlantic and NYNEX, two large local service providers (and former Bell system companies) had proposed a merger that was pending when AT&T suggested merging with SBC. In 1997, the FCC found that this merger would harm competition and secured relief. Several months earlier, by contrast, the DOJ had allowed it to proceed without challenge.

The FCC was concerned that the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger would mean the loss of potential competition to NYNEX in providing local phone service, particularly in New York City. The Commission found that Bell Atlantic was one of four significant potential rivals to NYNEX in NYNEX’s local service area, and that

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24. Id.
26. NYNEX Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. para. 44.
Bell Atlantic was actually planning to enter New York from its adjacent territory in New Jersey. The other three significant potential rivals were the large long distance providers (AT&T, Sprint, and MCI), but the FCC found that among these four potential competitors, Bell Atlantic was particularly well positioned to succeed after entry. The Commission concluded that the loss of Bell Atlantic as a potential rival would remove an important competitive restraint on NYNEX.

The FCC considered and rejected the efficiency arguments that the merging firms proffered in favor of the transaction, mainly on the ground that the efficiencies were not merger-specific. The Commission resolved its concerns about the loss of potential competition by imposing conditions that were intended to encourage entry by even more distant potential rivals, for example, by requiring the merged firm to sell unbundled network elements at forward-looking cost.

The DOJ came out differently and declined to sue, declaring that it did not believe the merger violated the antitrust laws. The DOJ statement did not provide a detailed explanation of its reasoning, consistent with the usual practice when an antitrust agency declines to sue, but the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics later suggested that the three long distance companies were roughly as good potential rivals as Bell Atlantic, and that three potential competitors were probably enough to protect competition. Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division explained that he resolved this “difficult case” against challenging the merger on the basis that “on balance the merger...

29. See id. paras. 20, 44, 73.
30. Id. paras. 105–08.
31. Id. para. 102.
32. Id. para. 168.
33. Id. paras. 13–14. Consistent with the sector-specific agency’s vision of developing more competitive communications markets, the FCC held that it in order to find the transaction in the public interest on competition grounds, the Commission needed to be convinced that the merger “will enhance competition.” Id. para. 2.
34. Press Release, Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, supra note 27.
was likely to benefit consumers in that the resulting efficiencies would lead to improved services.\textsuperscript{36}

One interpretation of the different outcomes is that the two agencies simply disagreed about whether the remaining potential competitors provided a sufficient competitive constraint and on how seriously to take the efficiency claims. But when disagreements between the DOJ or the FTC and an industry regulator occur, it is unusual to observe the sector-specific agency acting more aggressively to protect competition than the antitrust agency, so it may be that the DOJ’s analysis of the facts was colored by the practical difficulty an antitrust enforcement agency would face in overcoming the legal hurdles involved in proving a potential competition case to a federal judge.\textsuperscript{37}

This story illustrates the importance to competition policy of concurrent merger review by a competition enforcement agency alongside a sector-specific agency. In examining telephone industry mergers after the 1996 Act, concurrent review added to competition enforcement; its benefit was not simply from the ability of the expert agency to consider important non-competition public interest goals. The sector-specific agency has the expertise and ability to take a longer view of how the industry should evolve, allowing it to identify and address competitive issues that go beyond the practical ambit of antitrust enforcement. By drawing on the strengths of the sector-specific agency and the competition agency, concurrent review can thus enhance competition enforcement as a whole.


\textsuperscript{37} In discussing the Justice Department’s review of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics hints at such a concern. Joskow, \textit{supra} note 35, at 188–89. \textit{Cf. Nuechterlein \& Weiser, supra} note 3, at 424 (“[A]ntitrust authorities may block mergers to protect ‘potential’ competition only in the narrowest of circumstances.”).