Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Lucila Magana-Magana lived a life marked by tragedy. At the age of fifteen, Lucila was sexually assaulted and became pregnant. As a young pregnant woman with no ability to leave, Lucila was forced to live with her assailant and had more children with him until his death. After several years on her own, she entered another relationship with her work supervisor, Rafael Camacho, but that relationship soon turned abusive. Camacho became addicted to drugs and alcohol, and eventually Lucila was forced to escape the relationship. Out of fear, Lucila fled Mexico to the United States. Once again, Lucila found herself in a physically abusive relationship, this time with her husband and abuser, Clyde Wakefield. Due to the immense trauma Lucila suffered at the hands of her abusers, and because she was still enduring abuse during her immigration removal proceedings, Lucila was unable to file her Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) application within the statutory one-year period. Under the statute, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has discretion to waive that deadline when a petitioner demonstrates extraordinary circumstances. Lucila argued that the severity and immediacy of the abuse she faced constituted extraordinary circumstances that prevented her from filing on time. The BIA rejected this argument, concluding that she nevertheless had the ability to submit her application within the standard timeframe. This Comment argues that, in Magana-Magana v. Garland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held that, after the BIA has rejected a VAWA petitioner’s claim, appellate courts have jurisdiction to review a VAWA petitioner’s motion to reopen their immigration removal order based on extraordinary circumstances. Part II describes the history of VAWA and its purpose to protect immigrants from abusive spouses or parents. Part II also describes the intersection between appellate court jurisdiction and the BIA’s discretionary power. Lastly, Part II discusses the circuit split between the Ninth Circuit—which states that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review VAWA petitioners’ motions to reopen removal proceedings based on “extraordinary circumstances”—and the Seventh and Third Circuits, which do not. Part III argues that appellate courts have jurisdiction over questions about “extraordinary circumstances” in the context of removal proceedings because they are mixed questions of law and fact—not merely questions of fact. Part III additionally argues that the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Third Circuit based their decisions on outdated law, whereas the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Fifth Circuit correctly applied modern precedent. Finally, Part III argues that “extraordinary circumstances” is not a vague term that would preclude review by appellate courts, as the Seventh and Third Circuits would suggest. Part IV argues that a petitioner’s trauma and PTSD should be treated as a concrete factor when determining whether “extraordinary circumstances” prevented them from filing a motion to reopen within the one-year deadline. Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit in Magana-Magana v. Garland correctly decided that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review a VAWA petitioner’s motion to reopen their removal proceedings based on extraordinary circumstances.