FIFA's One Association - One Vote Rule: Does Democratic Governance Ensure Its "Corporate" Integrity?
Abstract
This article suggests that in the absence of any requirement in favor of democratic governance of corporations and non-profit entities in national law, as well as in light of a general practice of bifurcated systems (oscillating between de jure equality and power-based governance) in respect of intergovernmental organizations, a nondemocratic governance structure in international sports federations would not deviate from the general rule. What is clearly at stake in complex organizations is effectiveness in achieving the aims of the organization, irrespective if all members are satisfied. The deceptively democratic nature of sporting federations such as FIFA is very much the reason for its criticism and the basis for many of alleged or proven corruption scandals. The replacement of democratic governance with effective governance, which is the standard corporate model, has proven to be successful and resilient. This is all the more so since FIFA, the International Olympic Committee, and other sporting federations have assumed the functions of corporate actors. The article goes on to propose an overhaul to FIFA’s Congress, the entity that decides which state will host the lucrative World Cup competition. It is suggested that the one association-one rule system be replaced with regional/confederation block votes in the mold of the World Bank’s special drawing rights.
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