Abstract
Most states in the Western world maintain a no-concession policy towards terrorist groups, pirates, criminal organizations, and rogue entities, on the basis of which they refuse ransom payments, political concessions, and in many cases even direct engagement. The United States and the United Kingdom are the strictest in this regard, with many European states demonstrating a wavering stance. Even so, the United States has on several occasions since the late 1970s deviated from its strict no-concessions policy. This article suggests that since the late 2000s, the United States foresaw that dialogue and engagement with some (but not all) terrorist groups and rogue entities was inevitable to serve its foreign policy pursuits, while avoiding being seen as bending its hardline against such groups. As a result, it requested Qatar, which aspired to a regional mediator role, to allow both the Taliban and Hamas to set up representative offices on its territory and thus to open channels of communication with the United States and its allies. This is despite the fact that the United States and the U.N. Security Council had sanctioned both groups. This led to a U.S.-Taliban agreement in 2020 that allowed for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces and a subsequent rapport between the two states. It also allowed Qatar to successfully mediate four ceasefires between Hamas and Israel from 2014 until 2023. The paper suggests that this represents a paradigmatic shift from the strict no-concessions policy, suggesting that powerful states have an interest in structured (i.e., not ad hoc) mediated engagement with terror groups and rogue states, at least for short-term targets. It is hoped that such a process may be adapted for longer-term, lasting, peace agreements.