Abstract
The continued blocking of Appellate Body members to the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism has thrown the multilateral trading system’s most important governing body into an existential crisis. As a precondition for resuming the WTO’s dispute settlement functions, the United States has insisted that WTO Members agree that the “essential security exception” under Article XXI(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 is wholly self- judging and thus nonjusticiable. This article argues that the U.S. position is unsupported by the text, context, object and purpose, and negotiating history of Article XXI. Moreover, the U.S. position poses dangerous consequences to the future relevance and legitimacy of the rules-based trading system. Continued insistence of Article XXI’s nonjusticiability by the United States would thus be misguided, and indeed risks only worsening the current crisis.