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NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: A QUESTION OF GOVERNANCE?

by *Clementine Burnley**

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) is a fragile post-conflict state that is immensely rich in natural resources. Effective management of its mining, oil, and forestry resources is key to its future economic progress.¹ However, the DRC is widely regarded as a textbook forum for natural resource-induced conflicts at both local and national levels.² If natural resources are the main cause of conflicts, then improving governance over those resources could reduce the likelihood of conflict. Academic studies on conflict causes could be usefully linked to research on governance to improve the management of natural resources in conflict-prone societies. For instance, studies have revealed that countries with high quality institutions dedicated to the management of valuable natural resources minimize potential problems faced by resource-rich and conflict-prone countries.³

However, natural resource management can be complex and difficult due to incongruent political, social, economic, and environmental goals even in peaceful societies.⁴ Conflict-prone societies such as the DRC present even more complex challenges given the underlying political and historical reasons for the conflicts.⁵ Despite these significant difficulties, best governance practices such as incorporating stakeholder input and financing strategies could both prevent and resolve conflicts. This article summarizes findings about a number of important external and internal factors fueling conflict, institutional and governance challenges in managing resources, and highlights a number of ways in which donor institutions have worked with policymakers to improve resource governance in the DRC. In adopting these techniques for equitable and efficient natural resource management, the DRC could achieve long-term peace and economic stability.

ARMED CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES

There is a large body of quantitative research on the external factors relevant for understanding civil conflicts at the local, national, and international level.⁶ Examples of these external factors include resources type and the characteristics of the state.⁷ These studies have focused on the access to and use of natural resources by conflict parties, especially the role of conflict financing through the exploitation of natural resources.⁸ Valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and even drug crops and medicinal plants, have been found to be prone to misappropriation.⁹ The control of these resources may allow rebels to generate conflict financing.¹⁰

Along similar lines, several quantitative political science studies demonstrated that the abundance of natural resources increases the statistical risk of armed conflict at the national level.¹¹ However, numerous other studies have criticized the robustness of such conclusions.¹² This criticism reflects flaws such as the methodology of the quantitative studies, which fail to distinguish civil war onset and ongoing civil war as equal components of civil war prevalence.¹³ Despite this flaw, these studies can nonetheless be useful in understanding how conflict makes the management of natural resources more difficult and vice versa.¹⁴

Another set of academic studies focuses on environmental scarcity and competition between groups for these natural resources.¹⁵ Increasing demand from growing populations and inequalities in the distribution of natural resources can ultimately lead to environmental degradation.¹⁶ These studies have also been criticized for methodological weaknesses, paucity of data, and according too much weight to environmental factors and too little emphasis on human factors such as technological innovativeness and ingenuity.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the concept of competition between groups over distribution of resources is pertinent to an understanding of the current, and sometimes violent, community-level conflicts over land and forest usage in the eastern provinces of the DRC.¹⁸

PAST AND CURRENT NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICTS IN THE DRC

The DRC includes most of the Congo Basin region, an area of enormous wealth in terms of biodiversity, timber, and mineral resources.¹⁹ Despite this natural wealth, however, the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with significant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly dependent upon agriculture and forestry.²⁰ Violent and non-violent conflicts linked to the use of its natural resources have historically prevented the DRC from fully utilizing its resources to generate revenue and improve quality of life for its citizens.²¹ Specifically, numerous policy reports have highlighted the role of minerals in financing the armed groups involved in the

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most recent DRC conflicts.²² Control over mining areas in the eastern provinces continues to shift between different independent armed groups and units of the Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“FARDC”).²³ The struggle for control over these resources has exacerbated conflict and created greater difficulty in managing the resources to benefit the public.²⁴

Despite a recent transition towards peace, conflict and insecurity remain in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga.²⁵ These conflicts are particularly acute in the northeastern provinces of Ituri in Orientale, and North and South Kivu, where local militia and foreign rebel forces continue to terrorize the regions.²⁶ A prime example of conflict is the Virunga National Park (“Park”) located in northeastern DRC, on the border with Uganda and Rwanda.²⁷ The Park was the site of some of the large-scale armed conflicts that occurred in the Kivu Provinces.²⁸ The 1994 Rwandan genocide and resulting refugee crisis led to the presence of about 700,000 refugees on the edges of the Park.²⁹ These displaced groups increased the consumption of resources both inside and outside the Park, furthering the impact on the environment and leading to mass deforestation.³⁰

Identity and nationality, which are linked to land and political power, have also played an important part in the different conflicts of the DRC. In the absence of alternative income-earning opportunities in the formal economy or in commerce, access to land is essential to livelihoods in DRC.³¹ There have been several historic conflicts over grazing land and land ownership between Hema and Lendu peoples in Ituri.³² These conflicts have killed 10,000 and displaced 50,000.³³ Moreover, these types of conflicts are likely to continue until those natural resources with income-generating potential, such as timber, are better managed.³⁴

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

The twin challenges of governance for the DRC are to provide security for all of its citizens and to build democratic, transparent, and accountable institutions capable of managing its enormous resource wealth for the benefit of its entire population.³⁵ Although the existing legal framework recognizes the right to use land via customary law, it also allows for land grabbing, the purchase of occupied land, and the eviction of tenants.³⁶ And since the government retains the right to define “Congolese people,” the issue of who is entitled to land rights is highly politicized.³⁷ Further tensions stem from the unclear role of formal and customary authorities.³⁸ Thus legal reform is necessary to prevent future land-grabbing opportunities that could cause armed conflict.³⁹ Legitimizing certain existing formal and customary systems of land administration, and providing a forum for land use disputes, could help diffuse both future conflicts and lay a framework for sustainable land management.⁴⁸

The demarcation of conservation areas in the DRC is also a contentious political issue. The existence of conservation areas has been linked to colonial land demarcations, which are not always understood or accepted by the communities affected.⁴⁰

In response, managers of these protected areas have engaged in participatory management methods involving local communities, such as consultations, participatory demarcation, and the creation of alternative livelihood activities.⁴¹

However, conflict exists not only over the natural resources but also over collaboration: site-specific, cross-border collaboration efforts between conservation organizations in Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda have continued during various wars at the regional level.⁴² Furthermore, the DRC continues to face significant challenges in its reform processes in all natural resources sectors.⁴³ The widespread disintegration of government functionality during the prolonged conflicts has left a legacy of bureaucratic inefficiencies in knowledge, expertise, capacity, and resourcing across all sectors.⁴⁴ These shortcomings mean that institutions often are unable to respond to the serious problems they face.⁴⁵ For instance, in the area of education, only thirty-two percent of teachers in secondary school and twenty percent of those in higher education are qualified at the level mandated by their posts.⁴⁶ Congo’s National Statistical Institute (“INS”) lacks resources to collect the necessary information by which ministries’ performance can be verified.⁴⁷ Even in areas where periodic reporting is mandatory, such as the mining industry, it is still difficult to find reliable data on mining operators, production, or exported commodities.⁴⁸

Transparency in governance remains another main challenge to effective natural resources in the DRC. The country now ranks 164th out of 178 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, while the World Bank/IFC Doing Business 2011 survey ranks DRC 175th out of 183 countries.⁴⁹ A number of authors have highlighted the negative effects of corruption on the management of natural resources in DRC.⁵⁰ For instance, policy processes are prone to disruption by politicians acting in their own, rent-seeking interests.⁵¹ Furthermore, government agents at mine sites illegally tax the operations in eastern DRC, justifying their practice by blaming the lack of monetary support from the central government.⁵²

THE NEED FOR CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE DRC

The concept of “capacity” refers to the ability of individuals and institutions to conceive and carry out decisions effectively and efficiently.⁵³ There is a clear need for institutional capacity building in the DRC to ensure compliance with the international norms and agreements relevant to environmental management.⁵⁴

At the individual level, capacity building refers to the processes of teaching and skills training.⁵⁵ At the local and national institutional level, improvements to the functioning of institutions and capacity of administrators could help civil services better use revenue and natural resources to reduce poverty.⁵⁶ Increasingly, administrators are using capacity building to encourage ownership through participation and mutual exchange of knowledge.⁵⁷ Building individual capacity in terms of natural resource management would involve increasing the level of expertise in its legal, scientific, or technical aspects.⁵⁸ For example, increasing expertise in the implementation and monitoring of regulatory compliance or increasing awareness of

the conflict risk in managing natural resources would increase the government and different communities' ability to address these conflicts.⁵⁹ Moreover, increasing scientific expertise in the geological field would allow DRC's institutions to improve their negotiating power with extractive industry counterparts.⁶⁰ Similarly, capacity building for local businesses could help to promote the development of homegrown industries in the minerals sector.⁶¹

On the international level, governance initiatives relevant to the environment in the DRC are conditioned by the various international treaties and environmental agreements to which the country is a signatory.⁶² These initiatives and treaties specify actions to protect the DRC's biodiversity, endangered species, timber, and wetlands as well as to mitigate climate change.⁶³ USAID and the European Development Fund both have agreements with the DRC to fund such programs, which encompass regional conservation and production areas.⁶⁴ Given this outside support for local and national institutions, it is vital to create an implementation framework that creates coherent sector-wide programs.⁶⁵

Specifically, the DRC is currently developing a governance framework for the forestry sector.⁶⁶ The population is highly dependent on the forestry sector and, although precise data is uncertain, the expansive forests of the DRC provide a wide array of benefits, including timber for domestic use and export, fuel wood, a variety of forest foods and medicines, and a carbon sink for sequestration programs.⁶⁷ It is estimated that the DRC's timber resources are equal to that of all other African countries combined and the timber industry is expected to benefit from increasing demand in China and India.⁶⁸ Therefore, this sector is a high priority for reform.⁶⁹ The ongoing forestry reforms are part of the preparation of a national strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation ("REDD"), by the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (known by the French acronym "MECNT").⁷⁰ The DRC's 2002 Forest Code is an important first step in both regulating an important resource and creating an implementation framework for fund programs such as REDD.⁷¹

BEST PRACTICES OF POST-CONFLICT NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Land use conflicts between different resource users and managers have often arisen in eastern DRC. And although individual organizations managing land within or adjacent to protected areas have each addressed the conflicts differently, a number of good practices have been proven to reduce usage conflicts.⁷² Such practices include devolving rights to local communities, diversifying economic activities around protected areas, improving land use planning and zoning, securing tenure to land and resources, ensuring stakeholder participation in resource management, integrating policies relating to natural resources, and legitimizing community-based management initiatives.⁷³ Given the success of these tactics, many national programs in the DRC are beginning to embrace these concepts.

Accordingly, donors and the government of the DRC are working together to build institutional and individual capacities for participatory management of natural resources in various sectors.⁷⁴

FORESTRY

In the forestry sector, the International Development Association and the Global Environment Facility are supporting the Forest and Nature Conservation Project to provide infrastructure, equipment, training, and project coordination at the national level for the MECNT, regional, and provincial management bodies.⁷⁵ Implementing best practices will strengthen MECNT's institutional capacity to as well as community participation in sustainable forest management.⁷⁶ Striving for similar goals, WWF and United Nations Human Settlements Programme ("UN-HABITAT") are collaborating to manage conflicts linked to land tenure bordering protected areas in eastern DRC, combining participatory demarcation with conflict mediation and land administration.⁷⁷

To facilitate best practices, it is important to recognize that the external economic environment, such as levels of direct foreign investment and variability in price of commodities, is largely outside the control of the Congolese.⁷⁸ However, Congolese policymakers and administrators can nonetheless control how revenues and investments are managed.⁷⁹ Improvements to the institutional governance systems for resource revenues have focused on increasing efficiency in three dimensions: management, allocation of revenue, and distribution of benefits.⁸⁰

International efforts have focused on supporting transparency in revenue management and restricting the financing of armed groups.⁸¹ The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ("EITI") tries to increase transparency surrounding resources exploitation, revenue generation, and budget allocations.⁸² The DRC has been classified by the EITI as "close to compliant."⁸³ Transparency initiative objectives support the disclosure of information for the extractive industry and civil stakeholders' demands for accountability from policymakers and institutions.⁸⁴ However, it will take time for capacity building to redress the current imbalance between levels of influence by state and civil society actors.⁸⁵ At the moment, capacity and knowledge gaps on the part of civil society mean that it is difficult for civil stakeholders to hold institutions and political actors accountable for their actions.⁸⁶

MINING

Trade restrictions have also been introduced to reduce availability of resource-based financing to conflict actors.⁸⁷ For example, the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds is an intergovernmental process established to regulate and reduce trading in diamonds from rebel-controlled areas.⁸⁸ This and other similar initiatives require companies to report whether their supply chain contains minerals sourced from conflict zones that may have contributed to the financing of armed groups.⁸⁹ This, in turn, requires due diligence and traceability mechanisms to distinguish between "clean" and "dirty" minerals.⁹⁰

In the DRC, a number of traceability initiatives already exist at the national, regional, and international levels. At the national level, the DRC's Mining Law of 2002 requires community consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies and the government, and revenue transparency through adherence to EITI guidelines.⁹¹ The publication of the 2010 Mining Contracts Review, carried out to determine benefits of these contracts to the DRC, is still in progress.⁹²

At the regional level, several regional groups have adopted traceability and accountability mechanisms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), for example, has drawn up auditing guidelines for mineral processors.⁹³ The International Conference of the Great Lakes has also committed to a regional certification mechanism, which provides a clear procedure and adequate records of mineral origins.⁹⁴ The International Tin Research Initiative has also improved due diligence, traceability, and certification processes for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.⁹⁵ However, these traceability initiatives in DRC ultimately face difficulties linked to cost, implementation, monitoring, human capacity, and resource gaps.⁹⁶

National initiatives supplement industry-led and regional traceability schemes. In the United States, the recent 2010 Conflict Minerals Provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies to represent accurate information regarding the source and supply chain of certain minerals.⁹⁷ The German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources has supported the establishment of Certified Trading Chains.⁹⁸ These initiatives would assist in reducing resource-based financing to conflict actors through international trade channels.⁹⁹

There are some examples of good non-renewable resource management in from countries of the global north. Norway, for example, has successfully used macroeconomic tools to guide oil revenues, domestic oil retention, and revenue utilization, avoiding the potentially harmful effects of equitable redistribution.¹⁰⁰ In this way, Norway has managed to avoid the typical problems of an oil economy, such as the boom-bust cycle and wealth concentration.¹⁰¹ Despite the fact that the two countries differ in their government accountability systems and transparency, Norway's solutions may provide guidance to the DRC.¹⁰² Combining Norway's approach with transparency and accountability initiatives could provide a better system for managing non-renewable resources.¹⁰³

The challenge for the DRC is to improve the workings of institutional and political processes at both the national and the local level to ensure that natural resources are used in a sustainable manner to improve the lives of communities. International examples of successful resource management are often supported by international organizations and private nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). The World Heritage Institute (UNESCO), Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature ("ICCN"), and local NGOs are currently collaborating on "Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict: Protecting World Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo."¹⁰⁴ That project, which has been running since 2000 with multi-donor funding, supports not only the key financial, logistical, and technical sectors, but also provides access to the higher political decision-makers at the national regional and international levels.¹⁰⁵

Another example, the World Wildlife Fund's ("WWF") Eco-Makala Project, has responded to the deforestation by refugees in the southern part of the Virunga National Park in North Kivu Province by introducing legal fuel wood plantations.¹⁰⁶ The WWF project increases the availability of sustainable energy for the area around Goma and to reduce rural poverty in Masisi and Rutshuru.¹⁰⁷ The United States Agency for International Development ("USAID") Central Africa Regional Program on the Environment is helping to support the WWF, demarking protected areas using a combination of participatory methods, mapping, and GIS tools.¹⁰⁸ The project works with local communities and chiefs, restricting access to certain areas in order to sensitize communities to the benefits of maintaining biodiversity in their surrounding areas.¹⁰⁹ Conservation International is supporting the ICCN to jointly manage resource reserves with local communities in the Equateur Province to provide livelihood alternatives and also to track deforestation.¹¹⁰

With normalization of relations between the DRC and Rwanda, and integration of some armed groups into the state army and police forces, the most important conflict management processes affecting the Kivu Provinces have taken place at the national and international level.¹¹¹ Security sector reform is also ongoing, but still leaves much to be desired.¹¹² The most immediate challenge for policymakers is to end illegal control over, and taxation of, mining, both by the Congolese army and by armed groups.¹¹³ This would require bringing areas currently under the control of armed groups under state control through military action or negotiation.¹¹⁴

Additionally, the government needs to stop those at the highest military and political levels from seizing the profits from minerals. A number of specific recommendations have been made by expert organizations working in the field of safeguards, advocating the monitoring and inspection systems for mining areas where the Congolese military are deployed and reinforcement of military sanctions to end impunity and increase accountability in army units.¹¹⁵

CONCLUSION

The theories of environmental scarcity and of natural resources wealth as conflict causes in the DRC are well documented. What remains unclear, however, is why large-scale armed violence persists in some eastern provinces of the country, while other, equally resource rich provinces, such as Katanga and the hinterlands of the Kivu Provinces, escape such violence.¹¹⁶ This suggests that additional tensions, such as those between industrial and artisanal miners and those linked to local socioeconomic factors are of the utmost relevance.¹¹⁷

This article has described the consequences of prolonged instability for natural resource management in the DRC. Further, natural resources management remains a low priority for

political actors, many of whom favor the consolidation of power and wealth.¹¹⁸ The presence of those stakeholders who instigate and profit from instability constitutes the major obstacle to effective natural resources management and to improvements in overall governance in the DRC.¹¹⁹

The political, economic, and social contexts in which natural resources are used and the manner in which resources are managed is paramount to prevent and manage conflicts at all levels. The nature and scale of the conflicts described in this paper are each different and, therefore, the management approaches correspondingly different.

This article has also outlined a number of ways in which donor institutions have worked with policymakers to improve resource governance in the DRC. The initiatives described support alternative income opportunities for local communities, redistribution of revenues from some extractive industries, and

prevention of local resources usage conflicts. Many of the natural resources management activities have had active participation of communities as a key component.

Governance objectives are often broadly formulated to strengthen institutions, build institutional and human capacity, and improve rule of law. These broad aims, while useful as guiding principles, remain extremely abstract. Successful governance, however, requires specific measures and binding timeframes for implementation in order to reform key areas such as the accurate monitoring and legal enforcement of natural resources management strategies. While the institutional structures and processes may already be in place, it will still take a long planning process, significant additional resources, and political will to achieve the needed transparency and accountability for the management of all natural resources sectors in the DRC. 

Endnotes: Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A question of Governance?

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⁴ See PETER J. BALINT ET AL., *WICKED ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: MANAGING UNCERTAINTY AND CONFLICT* (2011).

⁵ See Philippe le Billon, *The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts*, 20 *Pol. GEOGRAPHY* 562-66 (2001), <http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/ecowar.pdf>.

⁶ See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, 56 *OXFORD ECO. PAPERS* No.4 563 (2004) (arguing that economic reliance on primary commodity exports and large diaspora increases risk of conflict).

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⁸ See Indra de Soysa, *Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War*, 39 *J. OF PEACE RESEARCH* 395, 404-05, 413 (2002). See also Collier & Hoeffler, *supra* note 7, at 1.

⁹ See generally UNITED NATIONS, *supra* note 2.

¹⁰ See UNITED NATIONS, *supra* note 2, at 20.

¹¹ See Collier & Hoeffler, *supra* note 7; see also Le Billon, *supra* note 5.

¹² See Nicholas Sambanis & Ibrahim Elbadawi, *How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War*, 46 *J. of Conflict Resolution* 307-34 (2002); see also James Fearon, *Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War*, 49 *J. of Conflict Resolution* 483-507 (2005); see also Håvard Hegre & Nicholas Sambanis, *Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset*, *J. of Conflict Resolution* 508-35 (2006).

¹³ Sambanis & Elbadawi, *supra* note 13, at 307.

¹⁴ See Le Billon, *supra* note 5, at 563-66.

¹⁵ See MICHAEL RENNER, *FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL: ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE, SOCIAL CONFLICT, AND THE NEW AGE OF INSECURITY* (1996); see also THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, *ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY AND VIOLENCE* (1999).

¹⁶ See RENNER, *supra* note 16, at 36, 59.

¹⁷ See Nils P. Gleditsch et al., *Armed conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset*, 39 *J. OF PEACE RESEARCH*, 615-37 (2002).

¹⁸ See generally Collier & Hoeffler *supra* note 7. See also International Peace Information Service (IPIS), *The Complexity of Resource Governance in a Context of State Fragility: The Case of Eastern DRC* 8, 54 (Nov. 2010), http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_reports.php?&lang=en.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, *Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Sept. 30, 2011), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm>.

²⁰ See Peter Bofin et al. (eds.), *REDD Integrity: Addressing governance and corruption challenges in schemes for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation* 25 (2011), <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3967-redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and.pdf>.

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²³ IPIS, *supra* note 19, at 10.

²⁴ *Id.* at 68-69.

²⁵ *Id.* at 8, 54.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ José Kalpers, *Volcanoes under Siege: Impact of a Decade of Armed Conflict in the Virungas*, *WORLDWILDLIFE.ORG*, <http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publications/africa/144/titlepage.htm> (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).

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²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.*

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³⁴ See Forests Monitor, *The Timber Trade and Poverty Alleviation in the Upper Great Lakes Region 8-9* (2007), <http://www.forestsmoitor.org/en/reports/556666>.

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³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.* See also IPIS, *supra* note 19, at 71.

³⁸ USAID, *supra* note 35.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ See Kalpers, *supra* note 28.

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² See *CONNECTIVITY CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT: A GLOBAL GUIDE* 73, 76 (Graeme L. Worboys et al. eds., 2010).

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- 47 *Id.* at 4.
- 48 See IPIS, *supra* note 19, at 10.
- 49 See Bofin, *supra* note 21, at 26.
- 50 *Id.*
- 51 *Id.* at 27.
- 52 See IPIS, *supra* note 19, at 62.
- 53 See WORLD BANK INSTITUTE, *Overview of WBI's Capacity Development and Results Framework* (June 1, 2011), http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/Overview%20of%20CDRF_June1.pdf.
- 54 *Id.*
- 55 *Id.*
- 56 *Id.*
- 57 *Id.*
- 58 *Id.*
- 59 *Id.*
- 60 See USAID, *supra* note 35.
- 61 See IPIS, *supra* note 19, at 67, 71-72.
- 62 See The Congo Basin Forest Partnership, *The Forests of the Congo Basin – State of the Forest 2006*, 17-18 (2006), <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-state-of-forests-congo-basin-2006.pdf>.
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- 64 *Id.*
- 65 See Laurent Debroux et al. (eds.), *Forests in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Analysis of a Priority Agenda* 56 (2007).
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- 67 *Id.* at 21-24.
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- 70 See Bofin, *supra* note 21, at 24-25.
- 71 *Id.* at 30.
- 72 See PATRICIA KAMERI-MBOTE ET AL., EFFECTIVE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION: TETHERING PLURAL LEGAL NORMS IN DIVERSE CONTEXTS IN EASTERN AFRICA (2007), <http://www.asareca.org/paap/uploads/publications/Effective%20Natural%20Resource%20Management%20for%20Conflict%20Prevention.pdf>.
- 73 See *id.*
- 74 See United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa: Transforming a Peace Liability into a Peace Asset, Cairo, Egypt, June 17-19, 2006, https://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Africa_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov%2017.pdf.
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