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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ARTICLES

SOLDIERS, PEASANTS, POLITICIANS AND THE WAR ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA

Jaime Malamud-Goti*

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, opinions vary regarding the government's conduct of the war on drugs. While most scholars focus primarily on economic, civil libertarian, and international relations issues, government officials concentrate on different aspects of the war. One area on which United States politicians focus a great deal of attention is the drug trade in South American countries. While American efforts to slow the drug trade in some areas have met with some success, the American strategy in Bolivia has been a complete failure.¹ Many United States

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1. See Margolis, *Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills; Peasant Beneficiaries of Trafficking Skeptical of U.S.-Aided Efforts*, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1984, at A17 [hereinafter *Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills*] (noting that Bolivia produces approximately half the world's supply of cocaine and that all efforts to control drug production had failed). Coca was grown and used in Bolivia for religious and medicinal purposes even before the time of the Incas. *Id.* at A22. The indigenous population of Bolivia continues to use it for these purposes today. *Id.* Growing and selling coca leaves for these purposes is legal. *Id.*

politicians, however, overlook the failures of the current strategy and advocate increased resources to further that strategy. They believe that better training for enforcement officers, a stepped-up United States military presence, and tougher controls against corruption will ultimately resolve the drug problem. Although there are many problems with the war on drugs in Bolivia, they cannot be attributed merely to insufficient resources. These problems, rather, indicate that current drug eradication programs are improperly planned and executed.

A brief review of the United States' strategy to address the drug trade in Bolivia raises questions about the fundamental assumptions under which it operates. U.S. politicians have a tendency to oversimplify the motives, interests, and beliefs of the parties involved in the conflict at the local level. United States policy makers initially categorized members of the drug trade into three artificial and oversimplified groups: (1) the Bolivian government, including the police and military, which supposedly intended to eradicate coca production and cocaine trafficking; (2) the cocaine traffickers, financiers, dealers, and couriers; and (3) the *campesino* coca growers, a poor group of nearly 400,000 people² who require protection in their struggle to survive. This characterization is fatally flawed, however, because it does not account for the substantial diversity of individuals and the multiplicity of interests involved in the Bolivian drug trade. Bolivia's failure to control the predominant drug activity that undermines its economy and institutions is the result of economic,³ political,⁴ and ideological factors. Furthermore,

2. *Coca Eradication: Real Possibility or Fantasy?*, ANDEAN FOCUS, June 1988, at 2 [hereinafter *Coca Eradication*]. *Campesinos* are indigenous to Bolivia. They inhabit the high valleys and the *Altiplano*. The majority of *campesinos* in Bolivia are *Quechua* and *Aymara*. Most lived on a subsistence agricultural economy until they moved into the Chapare province, in the region of Cochabamba.

3. See *Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills*, *supra* note 1, at A22 (comparing the economic benefits of growing coca and other crops). Peasants harvest coca leaves three or four times a year. *Id.* Other crops, such as oranges and coffee, can only be harvested once a year. *Id.* As a result of farmers concentrating on growing coca, parts of Bolivia have had to import foodstuffs to feed their own populations. *Id.* Residents of the Chapare must truck in rice, vegetables, and flour from markets in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and La Paz. *Id.*

4. Craig, *Illicit Drug Traffic and U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 8 WASH. Q. 105, 105 (1985). The political instability, widespread corruption, and bureaucratic ineptitude that plague Bolivian political life make consistent enforcement of the drug control laws impossible. *Id.* at 107. There have been over 180 military coups in Bolivia in 150 years. See *Bolivian President is Kidnapped, Then Freed, in an Aborted Coup*, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1984, at 8 [hereinafter *Bolivian President is Kidnapped*] (discussing Bolivia's political history in light of the abduction of President Siles-Suazo).

the Bolivian state's lack of coercive power⁵ and the multiple interests involved in the drug trade make the war approach impractical at best.

The very essence of the current war on drugs ignores the complicated, conflicting interests involved in the Bolivian situation. These interests range from the mutual antagonism born from a diversity of cultures, and the conflicting ambitions of over fifty sectoral political parties, to the vulnerability of the centralized state, and partisan policies and privileges. The history of drug enforcement in post-dictatorial Bolivia demonstrates the complexity of the players and interests involved and the corresponding defects in the American characterization. This failure to correctly assess the situation in Bolivia has resulted in the failure of almost every attempt to attack and curb illicit drug production and distribution. These attempts will continue to fail until policy makers recognize the intricacy of Bolivian politics, repeal detrimental drug legislation, and devise realistic policies to work within the complex Bolivian social and political systems.

I. DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN POST-DICTATORIAL BOLIVIA

Hernan Siles-Suazo, the first democratically elected president of Bolivia in eighteen years, held office from 1982 through 1985.⁶ During this period Bolivian policies regarding coca and cocaine production varied from a laissez-faire approach to major enforcement campaigns using the army⁷ and foreign troops.⁸ Drastic measures that earned foreign approval were severely criticized domestically by peasants, political parties, trade unions, and factions within the military.⁹ The United States pressured Siles to adopt drastic measures designed to substantially reduce coca production and cocaine traffic in his country. The

5. See Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia*, in *AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA* 459 (1979) (noting that Bolivia's economy is affected by other industrialized nations, and, as a result, political decisions are often based on relationships with those countries rather than on the needs of Bolivia).

6. Hernan Siles-Suazo, along with Victor Paz-Estenssoro, gained notoriety after engineering the 1952 revolution that brought about critical shifts in the balance of power in Bolivia through measures such as the agrarian reform of 1953.

7. Heires, *U.S. Losing War Against Cocaine Mafias*, Latinamerica Press, Dec. 20, 1984, at 1 [hereinafter *U.S. Losing War*].

8. Operation Blast Furnace, Report of Commanders Jorge Vazquez and Ricardo Lopez 1988 (available in the archives of *Gendarameria Nacional Argentina*).

9. Interview with Roger Cortez, in La Paz (Jan. 11, 1990). Cortez investigated the incident first hand. See also Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez and Buddy Bizcarra Pando, *LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA CONTRA LA AGRESION DEL NARCOTRAFICO* (1989) [hereinafter *LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA*].

extent and complexity of the Bolivian cocaine economy,¹⁰ however, made it impossible for him to meet the U.S. demands.¹¹ Siles believed that staging a major repressive campaign against the drug business at the beginning of his presidency would endanger the stability of his administration. The president's decision was influenced by the well-known involvement of highly ranked military and police officers in the drug trade during the Garcia-Meza regime,¹² as well as the potential inability of the fledgling democratic institutions to control the armed forces.

In August 1983, as pressure from the United States increased, the Bolivian government finally agreed to destroy 4,000 hectares of coca.¹³ The United States and Bolivian governments created a special anti-drug police force, the Mobil Unit of Rural Patrol (UMOPAR). The purpose of this group, known as the *Leopardos*, was to destroy the coca crops over a period of four years.¹⁴ United States State Department officials described this new special police branch as a "paramilitary group."¹⁵ The two governments designed the UMOPAR to be an elite force, and chose its members from among the most skilled law enforcement officers in Bolivia. United States forces specially trained the UMOPAR troops in jungle warfare to enable them to fight drug traffic and production more efficiently.¹⁶

The UMOPAR, however, did not confine its efforts to policing drug traffic. Three high-ranking UMOPAR officers, German Linares, Carlos Barriga, and Julio Vargas, led members of the UMOPAR and Bolivian army troops in a coup attempt on June 30, 1984.¹⁷ In the course of the takeover, UMOPAR Second Commander Linares and Colonel Mario-Rolan Anaya, Vice-President Paz-Estenssoro's army aide, abducted

10. See *Coca Eradication*, *supra* note 2, at 2 (discussing the impact of the drug trade on the Bolivian economy). Coca eradication is particularly difficult in Bolivia because of the existence of a large and powerful growers union. *Id.* One authority estimated that a comprehensive effort to eliminate the coca trade and protect the Bolivian economy would require approximately \$1 billion per year. *Id.*

11. See *id.* (noting that the impetus for change is more likely to come from the U.S. government than from the Bolivian government because of Bolivia's economic dependence on coca).

12. See J. DUNKERLEY, *REBELLION IN THE VEINS* 328-29 (1984) (discussing the reign of the Garcia-Meza regime from 1980-81).

13. See generally Van Wert, *The US State Department's Narcotics Control Policy in the Americas*, 30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFF. 1, 15 (1988) (discussing the seizures of labs, interdiction of drug shipments, and the creation and training of paramilitary groups in Bolivia responsible for the destruction of coca and the arrest of drug traffickers).

14. *Id.*

15. *Id.*

16. *Id.*

17. Vega, *Bolivia: U.S. Presses Siles to Curb Drug Trade*, Latinamerica Press, July 26, 1984, at 1 [hereinafter *U.S. Presses Siles*].

President Siles-Suazo.¹⁸ Ultimately, Siles was able to negotiate his freedom, and the plotters of the coup were forced into exile in the Argentine Embassy,¹⁹ but the incident dramatized the extent to which the drug trade continued to control Bolivian political life.²⁰ It also emphasized the threat to the democratic experiment in Bolivia if the *Leopardos* gained the support of the Bolivian army.²¹

A. THE 1984 CHAPARE OFFENSIVE

United States policy makers did not understand the fragility of the new Bolivian democracy, even in the wake of the abduction of Siles. United States Senator Paula Hawkins, a member of the Sub-Committee on Drug Abuse and Narcotics of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, complained that the newly elected democratic administration had progressed too slowly in curtailing the cocaine trade. On a visit to La Paz, Bolivia on July 8, 1984, shortly after Siles' release, Senator Hawkins warned that the United States would withhold \$58 million in aid unless Bolivia instituted significant measures to curb the drug trade.²² In response, the Siles administration attempted to change its image by placing Bolivia's Chapare²³ province under mili-

18. Interview with Enrique Valverde, in Chapare (May 26, 1990). While Linares, Barriga, and Vargas spearheaded the main force, UMOPAR Captain Ciro Gigena occupied the Ministry of the Interior. *Id.*

19. *Id.* President Siles-Suazo was successful, at least in part, because a large sector of the army opposed the coup. *Id.* See also *Bolivian President is Kidnapped*, *supra* note 4, at 1 (discussing the abduction and release of President Siles-Suazo).

20. See J. DUNKERLEY, *supra* note 12, at 328-29 (describing the influence of drug interests during the Garcia-Meza regime). Garcia-Meza's dictatorship was also known as the "cocaine dictatorship" because of the government's involvement in the drug trade. During one year of bloody rule, the organizers of the drug traffic were Interior Minister Luis Arce-Gomez and his cousin, Roberto Suarez-Gomez. Suarez was a rancher from the Beni and one of the most powerful cocaine traders in the country until he surrendered in July 1988, for reasons that remain unclear.

21. *U.S. Presses Siles*, *supra* note 17, at 2. Victor Paz-Estenssoro shared the leadership of the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR). Paz-Estenssoro served two terms as president of Bolivia in the 1950's and was succeeded by Hernan Siles-Suazo. Paz-Estenssoro was elected president for a third term in 1985, this time succeeding Siles-Suazo. Paz-Estenssoro reinstated Linares, the former rebel officer, despite his awareness of the danger the *Leopardos* could pose when they combined with the army. Linares' reinstatement demonstrated the new government's need to negotiate with the powerful drug interests in order to survive and the fragility of democracy in Bolivia. It may be presumed that this reinstatement was the consequence of the pressure exerted on Paz by sectors of the police and the armed forces. Only such pressure could explain the reappointment in light of the political affinities between Siles-Suazo and Paz-Estenssoro.

22. *Id.* at 1. Senator Hawkins further commented that the drug trade represented a significant threat to democratic institutions. *Id.*

23. *U.S. Losing War*, *supra* note 7, at 2. The Chapare province sits within the province of Cochabamba, approximately 180 miles east of La Paz and 100 miles north

tary control. The government also staged a joint anti-drug operation with 1,500 army troops and UMOPAR policemen.²⁴

The Chapare Offensive destroyed several million dollars worth of coca paste and led to the confiscation of several airplanes and weapons.²⁵ It also resulted in the arrest of some small drug traffickers, a few medium sized dealers, and nearly fifty "stompers," who process cocaine paste with their feet.²⁶ The larger drug traffickers, however, had several days advance notice of the raid and escaped before the troops stormed the region.²⁷

The Chapare Offensive created a great deal of unrest among the peasants. Peasant union organizers feared their coca crops would be the army's next target and mobilized 5,000 growers, on October 29, 1984, to blockade the major roads in the Chapare.²⁸ The unions lifted their siege only after the government promised not to destroy their coca crops.²⁹ To further ensure the safety of their plantations, however, these growers subsequently staged a hunger strike, demanding that the government withdraw the troops from the region and issue licenses to the peasants so they might continue cultivating and marketing their

of the city of Cochabamba. Formally, the province stretches from the top of the mountain chain that stands north of Cochabamba to the high chain that separates the city from the rain forest that spreads to the northern border with amazonian Brazil. Technically, the Chapare ends 100 miles north of the city of Cochabamba, at the foot of the mountains. In ordinary parlance, however, the Chapare encompasses the jungle areas of the provinces of Carrasco and Tiraque, and borders with the regions of Santa Cruz de la Sierra on the east and Isiboro Secure on the north.

24. *Id.* United States Ambassador Edwin Corr welcomed the initiative but denied any relationship between the operation and United States pressure on Bolivia. *Id.* Corr did confirm, however, that the United States planned to give \$58 million in aid to Bolivia. *Id.* Observers have speculated that the funds would not be blocked because there are issues more important to U.S. and Bolivian leaders than the drug problem. See Craig, *supra* note 4, at 108 (discussing Bolivian and U.S. efforts at drug control and speculating that Washington will not terminate aid to Bolivia).

25. *U.S. Losing War, supra* note 7, at 2.

26. See Healey, *Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia*, 30 J. OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFF. 105, 112 (1988) (discussing results of the Chapare Offensive); *Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 17, 1988).

27. *U.S. Losing War, supra* note 7, at 2. The government announced that the raid would take place, but waited several days before beginning the operation. *Id.* This lapse allowed 20,000 drug dealers to escape from the area. *Id.*

28. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 134-37. Five thousand peasants went on a hunger strike to protest the threat that they would only be entitled to transport five pounds of coca out of their villages. *Id.* See generally Healey, *supra* note 26, at 112 (describing the peasant blockades during the Chapare Offensive).

29. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 134-37; *U.S. Losing War, supra* note 7, at 2.

coca crops.³⁰ As a result, the administration permitted each grower to sell one twenty-five pound drum of coca per week.³¹

The failure of the Chapare campaign became apparent as cocaine production and trafficking soon resumed, and quickly attained its previous levels.³² Despite this fact, United States government officials did not question their original approach to the war on drugs. They continued to advocate further repressive campaigns as the most effective strategy to reduce the flow of cocaine from Bolivia to the United States.³³

B. OPERATION BLAST FURNACE

On April 8, 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued a secret directive declaring that drug trafficking constituted a threat to United States national security.³⁴ The president's directive immediately affected Bolivian repression efforts. From April 26 to May 6, 1986, the UMOPAR and United States military forces conducted joint maneuvers in the Santa Cruz and Cochabamba regions in preparation for the United States-Bolivian Joint Operation Blast Furnace (Operation Blast Furnace).³⁵

Operation Blast Furnace was designed to lower the market price of the coca leaf by destroying cocaine laboratories, thus reducing the demand for raw coca.³⁶ On July 18, 1986, Bolivian troops, aided by American pilots, moved into the Beni, Chapare, and Santa Cruz re-

30. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 134-37; *U.S. Losing War*, *supra* note 7, at 2.

31. *U.S. Losing War*, *supra* note 7, at 2; interview with Eudoro Barrientos, at a trade union leaders' meeting in Villa Tunari (May 29, 1990). Eudoro Barrientos, a head *cocaleros* trade union leader from Villanueva recalls that the army, in spite of the government's entitlement, had barred most of the *cocaleros*, including himself, from moving coca out of their villages. *Id.*

32. Meeting with Jorge Alderette, Undersecretary of Social Defense during the Paz-Estenssorro administration (Dec. 9, 1989); interview with Eudoro Barrientos, *supra* note 31.

33. After the sending of troops for Operation Blast Furnace, enforcement was boosted by setting up a new course for training the UMOPAR. Interview with Robert Gelbard, United States Ambassador to Bolivia (Sept. 13, 1989). Moreover, in Annex III of the 1990 Cartagena Agreement between the United States, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, Bolivia made a commitment to engage the army in drug enforcement.

34. A. TREBACH, *THE GREAT DRUG WAR* 170 (1987).

35. Commander Ricardo Lopez and Jorge Vazquez, *Gendameria Nacional Argentina*, Special Internal Report (1988) (unpublished report) [hereinafter *Gendameria Nacional Argentina*].

36. *Id.* at 22.

gions. Before the troops arrived, however, the traffickers deserted all the drug processing labs, and the troops found no narcotics.³⁷

Military experts blamed the failure of the "Americanized" enforcement techniques³⁸ on three factors. First, information was handled poorly.³⁹ Information about the operation leaked and aroused resistance from sensitized local politicians.⁴⁰ The international press reported the operation as an abuse of the United States' financial power over the Bolivian government that undermined the country's institutional life.⁴¹ Second, because drug traffickers could easily identify the aircraft used in the maneuvers, they anticipated the troop movements.⁴² Third, varying conceptions about operational procedures caused rifts among the United States Special Forces, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Bolivian UMOPAR. Experts attributed these conflicts to the different training of police and military officers whose duties overlapped, and the resulting differences in the forces' enforcement methods.⁴³

Official sources in the United States did not admit that Operation Blast Furnace failed.⁴⁴ The Reagan administration, however, responded to local public outrage by making the United States military presence

37. *Facts on File*, World News Digest, Sept. 5, 1986, at 660. At the time, the Bolivian planning minister had expressed disappointment that it had taken the U.S. troops four days after landing to begin the raids. *Id.* During this time, the major drug traffickers fled the country. *Id.*

38. See Sharpe, *The Drug War: Going After Supply*, 30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFF. 77 (1988) (discussing attempted Americanization of anti-drug operations by providing Latin America with funds, training, and equipment).

39. See Lernoux, *Cocaine Trade is Scorching the Jungle: Growing the Drug Brings Money — And With It Violence and Ecological Damage*, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1989, at 1 (stating that in 1986 U.S. troops were sent to Bolivia without the knowledge or consent of the Bolivian Congress). According to some accounts, even the Bolivian president did not know about the raid. Operation Blast Furnace was a failure because the major traffickers were tipped off in advance, and therefore only a few peasants were rounded up.

40. *Facts on File*, *supra* note 37, at 660. Neighboring countries expressed concern at allowing troops into Bolivia. Opposition Members of the Bolivian Congress and the Main Labor Federation, the Bolivian Workers Central, had strongly criticized the move.

41. Interview with Ernest Machicado, Bolivian congressman (May 25, 1990); interview with Roger Cortez, former congressman and presidential candidate (Jan. 1, 1990).

42. Interview with Luncio General Anez, commander of the UMOPAR, air force pilots, and navy personnel (May 31, 1990); interview with Victor Chapare, ex-cocaine transporter (Jan. 16, 1990).

43. *Gendameria Nacional Argentina*, *supra* note 35.

44. *We Gain, They Lose*, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, pt. 5, at 4. Although administration officials, such as Edwin Meese III, claimed the campaign was a success, others questioned its effectiveness in the long run. Once the U.S. troops left, there was nothing to stop the cocaine traders from starting their operations again.

in Bolivia less conspicuous. The Bush administration has continued this policy.

C. THE HUANCHACA INCIDENT

During May 1986, retired UMOPAR Colonel Ariel Coca-Aguirre announced that drug traffickers had built sizeable hydrochloride laboratories and an airfield in the Huanchaca where air traffic could be constantly monitored. Despite Coca-Aguirre's reputed connections to a cocaine syndicate from Santa Cruz de la Sierra,⁴⁵ the DEA and the UMOPAR seriously considered his report. On August 3, a DEA aircraft ferried Coca-Aguirre and UMOPAR officers on a reconnaissance flight over the laboratories in the Huanchaca region to corroborate the report.⁴⁶

In September 1986, Noel Kempff-Mercado, a well known Bolivian botanist, and his team of three flew into the lush tropical Huanchaca region of Santa Cruz on an environmental and botanical research tour. While reports continued of large scale cocaine traffic in the area four months earlier, the group proceeded. When the expedition landed, men with automatic weapons captured the scientists and killed two of them immediately. The survivors fled to the bushes where a gang member assassinated one of them. A private aircraft pilot rescued Spanish botanist Vicente Castello, the remaining member of the expedition, who hid in the jungle for almost sixteen hours.⁴⁷

There are a number of uncertainties surrounding the Huanchaca incident. Despite rumors that an armed gang protected the cocaine hydrochloride laboratories, the Ministry of the Interior and the UMOPAR did nothing to thwart the illegal activity in the Huanchaca or to stop Kempff-Mercado's trip to the region. Coca-Aguirre's motives for reporting the illegal activities in the Huanchaca remain obscure as suspicions about his involvement in the drug trade appear to be well grounded. As a result of the Huanchaca incident, the United States arrested Coca-Aguirre's partner, Lindenberg, a United States citizen,

45. See J. DUNKERLEY, *supra* note 12, at 328 (stating that although publicly linked to the cocaine trade, Colonel Ariel Coca-Aguirre served as minister of education in the Garcia-Meza regime).

46. Testimony of Ariel Coca-Aguirre before a Bolivian congressional committee (Sept. 13, 1989); interview with Roger Cortez, *supra* note 9; see testimony of UMOPAR Colonel Ramirez before a Bolivian congressional investigative commission (Sept. 15, 1989) (corroborating Coca-Aguirre's report of drug activity in Huanchaca).

47. Interview with Hugo Cochamanidis, director of the *Direccion de la Hoja Coca* under Paz-Zamora (May 24, 1990).

and charged him with cocaine trafficking.⁴⁸ The motive behind the DEA's and UMOPAR's behavior after the assassinations, however, is also in question. Although the authorities knew immediately that the expedition failed to return to its base, the UMOPAR and the DEA waited four days before investigating the Huanchaca plateau by helicopter.⁴⁹ By the time they arrived, only vestiges of the dismantled refineries and an empty encampment remained.⁵⁰ Documents written in Spanish, English, and Portuguese found scattered at the site indicated the transnational character of the traffickers' network.⁵¹

The Bolivian Congress immediately established a committee to investigate the Huanchaca incident. Although the DEA agents refused to testify, citing diplomatic immunity, United States Embassy personnel in Bolivia submitted a report to justify the DEA's response to the Huanchaca incident. According to an Embassy spokesman, the DEA was unable to respond immediately after the incident because the only available helicopter needed a new battery.⁵²

Active members of the Bolivian congressional investigative committee received death threats to deter them from further pursuing the investigation. Shortly after the commission submitted its report to the Bolivian House, two men on a motorcycle assassinated Congressman Edmundo Salazar in his hometown of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.⁵³ Salazar was one of the most conspicuous sponsors of the probe.

The Huanchaca incident is one of the darkest anomalies in the contemporary story of the drug war in Bolivia. While such violence is common in Colombia or Peru, it is unusual in Bolivia. Violence connected to the Huanchaca incident still occurs today.⁵⁴ In January 1990, offi-

48. See Bolivian Congress Draft Resolution of Oct. 1986 (copy on file with author) (carrying the signatures of ten congressmen involved in the investigation).

49. After the Kempff-Mercado expedition inadvertently discovered the drug laboratory, the Ministry of the Interior planned a military raid on the area. Bridges, *Corruption Hampers Bolivian Antidrug Effort: Payoffs Said to Reach Top Levels of Police*, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1987, at A17. Interior Minister Fernando Barthelemy delayed the raid. *Id.*

50. *Id.*

51. Report of Bolivian Congressional Investigative Commission (copy on file with author).

52. Interview with Hugo Cochamanidis, director of *Direccion de la Coca* (May 24, 1990); interview with Carlos Arauz, then *Director del la Hoja de Coca* (Sept. 14, 1989).

53. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 154.

54. *Peasants Protest Violence in Cochabamba* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sept. 22, 1989); de Onis, *Bolivia Unions, Leftists Decry U.S. Role in Drug Raids*, L.A. Times, July 20, 1986, at 22; *Bolivia Coca Growers are Said to Ease Siege*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at 6.

cials and media investigators in Bolivia claimed that cocaine hydrochloride production in the Huanchaca area was greater than ever.⁵⁵

The Huanchaca incident is an example of the unreliability of drug enforcement agencies in Bolivia and the extent to which bribery and corruption affect the efforts of the drug control agencies. The DEA's presence did nothing to enhance the performance of the UMOPAR. Rather, both Bolivian and U.S. forces demonstrated that they were unable to perform efficiently to eliminate well-known drug processing facilities and protect the lives of innocent bystanders.

D. THE CHAPARE REVOLT⁵⁶

Until mid-1988, engineers from *Direccion de Reconversion Agricola* (DIRECO), the technical Bolivian bureau in charge of coca eradication and substitution, used herbicides despite the government's pledge to the peasants that it would not use chemicals to destroy coca.⁵⁷ The use of herbicides caused severe unrest among coca growers. Peasants alleged that DEA officials in the Chapare instructed the DIRECO staff to use the herbicides.⁵⁸

The turmoil created by the use of these herbicides escalated. Unionized growers in the Chapare became openly hostile toward DIRECO, the UMOPAR, and United States advisers in the Cochabamba region. A belligerent campaign, organized by Julio Rocha,⁵⁹ a top union leader, started with road blocks, followed by an invasion of the UMOPAR outpost of Villa Tunari on June 27, 1988.⁶⁰ According to official sources, four *campesinos* died in the clash and two others were reported missing.⁶¹ Eyewitnesses to the clash, trade union leaders, local journalists, and politicians all claim that at least twenty more unarmed peasants drowned in a nearby river while attempting to escape an attack by the UMOPAR and the DEA.⁶² Guillermo Bedregal-Gutierrez, the foreign minister of Bolivia at the time, claimed that the peasants

55. Interview with Elva Morales, journalist, in Chochabamba (Jan. 17, 1990); interview with Enrique Valverde, *supra* note 18.

56. *Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 17, 1988).

57. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 18.

58. *Government Against Herbicides in Coca Eradication*, *supra* note 56.

59. Interview with Elva Morales, *supra* note 55; interview with Roger Cortez, *supra* note 41.

60. *Government on a Collision Course With Coca Growers*, ANDEAN FOCUS, June 1988, at 7.

61. *Details on Clash* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 29, 1988); *Resolution on DEA Expulsion* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 29, 1988).

62. Interview with Roger Cortez, in La Paz (Jan. 9, 1990); interview with Elva Morales, *supra* note 55.

proceeded to forcibly occupy the DEA headquarters,⁶³ but this is unconfirmed.

The turmoil demonstrated that whether driven by cocaine organizations⁶⁴ or their own sectoral interests, growers would not surrender their coca crops without fierce resistance. While the peasants left the UMOPAR barracks shortly after the violence ended, active hostilities ceased only after the government promised to limit its original eradication plan.⁶⁵ On July 19, 1988, the Bolivian Congress passed drug legislation that made the use of defoliants and herbicides illegal in Bolivia.⁶⁶ This law restricted the means of eradication to inefficient manual procedures. Thus, coca growers have demonstrated that as an organized force, they have enough political power to influence and restrain the Bolivian government.

Although the Paz-Estenssoro administration, which took office in 1985, was more dedicated to fighting the drug war than the previous Siles administration, it also found itself caught between United States diplomatic pressure and a force of organized *campesinos*. Instead of eradicating seventy percent of the coca crops, as advocated by the United States, the Paz-Estenssoro administration lowered the target to fifty percent.⁶⁷ The amount expected to be eliminated is actually much lower. To ease tensions at home, Paz-Estenssoro's foreign minister, Bedregal-Gutierrez, appealed to the Reagan administration to allow a more "flexible" policy in order to avoid social conflicts with producers.⁶⁸ Bedregal's appeal illustrates the Paz-Estenssoro administration's lack of the necessary coercive power to stage a drastic policy to substantially reduce coca crops, even where such a policy was needed to obtain United States aid. There is no indication that the current Paz-Zamora administration will be more successful.⁶⁹

63. LA LUCHA BOLIVIANA, *supra* note 9, at 270.

64. Paz-Estenssoro's officials accused Rocha of having close connections with the drug traffickers. Anibal Aguilar, Undersecretary for Alternative Development in Paz-Estenssoro's administration, formally accused Julio Rocha of being involved in drug trafficking.

65. Interview with Jorge Alderete, *supra* note 32; interview with Eudoro Barrientos, in Villa Tunari (May 25, 1990).

66. Law No. 1008 of July 1988.

67. *U.S. vs. Coca Farmers*, ANDEAN NEWSL. Sept. 12, 1988, at 1.

68. *Id.*; *Government To Ask U.S. To Change Coca Demands* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, July 29, 1988); Tyler, *Drug Plan Snag For Bolivia*, Financial Times (London), June 25, 1987, at 4; address by Dr. Guillermo Bedregal, Foreign Minister of Bolivia, National Press Club Conference (Oct. 3, 1988).

69. Interview with UMOPAR captain Ayala, in Chimore (May 29, 1990); interview with NAU official Gustagvo, in Chimore (May 28, 1990).

E. THE SANTA ANA DE YACUMA INCIDENT

In early 1989, the UMOPAR and its DEA advisers flew by helicopter into Santa Ana de Yacuma in the Beni, where the DEA had spotted the two most notorious drug traffickers in Bolivia: Jorge Roca, also known as *Techo de Paja*, and Ali Parada.⁷⁰ The traffickers fired at the UMOPAR as they landed. When the UMOPAR fired back and shot two adversaries, the gang distributed arms among the villagers to resist the police raid. Soldiers from a naval base a few kilometers north of the village then approached the location and opened fire upon the UMOPAR personnel. As the shootout expanded, it became a confusing battle between the *Leopardos* and a combination of naval forces, drug traffickers, and villagers. After the UMOPAR killed two villagers, the rest of the villagers joined the battle *en masse*.⁷¹ The outnumbered *Leopardos* retreated to find shelter at the naval outpost where they had been attacked earlier.

There is evidence that United States forces played an active part in this incident. Hugo Duque, an Ecuadoran United States Air Force officer, sustained minor injuries while allegedly shooting at the villagers from a helicopter. Duque was ferried to the Belgian hospital in Cochabamba where he received special medical attention for a scratch on his temple.⁷² Upon his release from the hospital he was evacuated to either the United States or La Paz.⁷³ Some UMOPAR personnel with much more serious injuries were simply taken to the infirmary in the naval outpost.

The naval officer who initiated the attack upon the UMOPAR and their United States allies claimed that he thought a foreign force was invading Bolivia. It is unlikely, however, that the court probing the Santa Ana incident believed him. Rather, news circulated in the region that the UMOPAR had executed a wounded peasant, creating speculation that the officer fired to defend the drug trade or to protect peasants' lives, or both.⁷⁴ The incident in Santa Ana de Yacuma strongly suggests that the United States Embassy's plan to permanently engage the Bolivian army and United States Special Forces in the drug war

70. Interview with a UMOPAR officer who participated in the episode, in Chimore (May 29, 1990); interview with Enrique Valverde, *supra* note 18; interview with Elva Morales, *supra* note 55.

71. Interview with Elva Morales, *supra* note 55; interview with Enrique Valverde, (May 4, 1990).

72. Interview with a Paraguayan nurse who ushered Duque to the ward, at the *Hospital Clinica Belga* (Jan. 15, 1990).

73. Interview with Elva Morales, *supra* note 55.

74. Interview with Roger Cortez, *supra* note 41.

will complicate and aggravate enforcement in Bolivia, rather than improve it. New actors engaging in drug enforcement probably will add their own conflicting interests to an already complex situation.

F. SUMMARY

The 1984 Chapare Offensive, the failure of Operation Blast Furnace, the Huanchaca incident, the 1988 Chapare revolt, and the Santa Ana de Yacuma incident all illustrate that drug enforcement attempts in Bolivia have failed to produce any positive results. The 1984 Chapare Offensive had no lasting impact on drug eradication efforts. Rather, the peasant protests and demonstrations caused government officials to issue licenses that allowed the peasants to continue selling coca. Operation Blast Furnace was planned and executed for the purpose of destroying drug processing laboratories. When Bolivian troops arrived at their targeted areas they found that the laboratories had already been relocated. The failure of government forces to take action against a well-known laboratory in the Huanchaca region resulted in the deaths of Noel Kempff-Mercado and two of his fellow scientists. The 1988 Chapare Revolt created a further obstacle for drug enforcement personnel. The peasant revolts forced the Bolivian Congress to outlaw the use of herbicides on coca crops. The efforts of the DEA in Santa Ana de Yacuma were a futile attempt to capture well-known drug traffickers, that only resulted in a confusing battle between UMOPAR personnel, DEA officers, Bolivian naval forces, and peasants. These incidents exemplify the failure of the war strategy and make it clear that the failures are not a consequence of any deficiency in resources. Indeed, even the addition of foreign enforcement agents did not improve the situation. The war approach to the Bolivian drug problem will never attain results that either the United States or Bolivia desire.

II. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE COCAINE INDUSTRY IN BOLIVIA

After the mid-1980's, the relationship between coca growers and cocaine businessmen changed significantly, making efforts to create effective policies for curbing the production of coca and cocaine paste more difficult. While enforcement efforts in the Chapare continued to fail, the cocaine paste industry became, in large part, a "cottage industry"

run by the peasants of the Chapare. Today, cocaine paste production is as widespread as it is unsophisticated.⁷⁵

There are two main reasons for the "decentralization"⁷⁶ of cocaine paste production: First, the government's focus on small cocaine paste producers has forced small farmers to begin producing cocaine. Demand for coca declined as a consequence of enforcement actions against small producers. As a result the price of the coca leaves no longer yields enough money to support a farmer, driving many peasants who were otherwise reluctant to engage in risky farming operations to begin producing cocaine.

Second, traffickers from Santa Cruz and the Beni have realized the benefits of passing the burden of paste production and transportation from the large trade centers to the peasants in the Chapare. Small growers began stomping their own leaf into paste, smuggling the necessary sulfuric acid and kerosene into the Chapare, and purchasing chemicals at increased costs in the local market. As a result, Bolivian drug enforcement officials became concerned about the participation of previously innocent peasant coca growers in the lower echelons of illicit cocaine trafficking networks.⁷⁷

United States officials in Bolivia are finally aware of the dynamics of the situation now that most coca growers are also small drug producers. They realize that enforcement created a strong incentive to produce drugs instead of other crops. Paradoxically, enforcement attempts have led an even greater segment of the population to constantly violate the drug laws.

75. *Rural Leader on Reduction in Cocaine Production* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sept. 14, 1989). Plastic sheets are used both to create a floor on which coca leaves are trampled to make cocaine paste, and to protect the paste from the dirt that drifts in with the breeze. Paper, usually toilet paper, is used to dry the paste. In 1988, President Paz-Estenssoro's Undersecretary for Coca Eradication led this author inside a police checkpoint shed on the road from Cochabamba to the Chapare. The variety of confiscated items collected by the authorities included: gasoline tanks, empty drums, plastic sheets, toilet paper, car batteries, and kerosene lanterns. Some growers have their own cement *secaderos* (drying platforms); the rest dry their leaf on the road in front of their houses.

76. R. Cortez, *Informe Parlamentario del Caso Huanchaca*, Oct. 27, 1986 (unpublished Bolivian Congressional Commission Report).

77. The villages of Sinahota, Ivirgarzama, Valle Sajta, and Eterazama are a few of the notable points in the Chapare where peasants transport their cocaine sulphate despite the widespread presence of enforcement officers.

III. U.S. AND BOLIVIAN REACTIONS TO DEFEAT IN THE "WAR ON DRUGS"

In September 1989, Ambassador Robert Gelbard privately announced that there would be a change in the enforcement strategy by late 1989.⁷⁸ The new strategy would concentrate on cocaine refineries and large drug transactions. In addition, he discussed the construction of a new intelligence center in the Beni region of the Amazon to make the new strategy possible.⁷⁹ With more accurate intelligence data, drug enforcement operations could target identified airfields and large laboratories, rather than allow the UMOPAR and DEA to squander time and fuel targeting small-scale coca paste producers.⁸⁰

As a part of the new drug policy envisioned by United States officials, drug enforcement agents will monitor thousands of small producers.⁸¹ To implement the new policy, the United States government advocates the regular involvement of the Bolivian army in anti-narcotics operations, despite the general fear that the army will become as involved in the drug trade as the UMOPAR.⁸² While the U.S. Ambassador does not discount this apprehension, he maintains that the best solution is to escalate enforcement efforts.⁸³ Consistent with this policy, United States Army leaders advocate an extension of the Special Forces beyond the limited role of training local agents. Colonel William Depalo of the United States army recently announced that Bolivian army officers will receive training to combat drug trafficking at the School of the Americas in Georgia.⁸⁴ In addition, the United States plans to join the Bolivian army and the UMOPAR in cocaine eradication operations. This move directly contradicts prior assertions of Presi-

78. Interview with Robert Gelbard, *supra* note 33.

79. *Id.*

80. *Id.*

81. *Id.*

82. *Id.*

83. *Id.*

84. *Fuerza Anti-Droga Libero a Narco Implicado en Casa Huanchaca*, ULTIMA HORA, Jan. 19, 1990, at 9. The School of the Americas trains officers of military and authoritarian regimes in specialties such as "interrogation techniques" and "domestic intelligence." L. SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 167 (1987). Argentines, Guatemalans, Chileans, and officers from other dictatorial countries in the region exchanged experiences with their U.S. colleagues. *Id.* The school was based in Panama between 1977 and 1984 as a result of a bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States. *Id.* According to the original agreement, the school would operate in Panama for ten years. *Id.* The school left Panama in 1984, however, as new democracies spread out in Latin America. *Id.* Since 1985, the school has been set up provisionally in Fort Benning, Georgia. *Id.* Today, most Latin Americans view the school as an anathema. *Id.* The school, for example, has taught the armies to perform torture efficiently. *Id.*

dent Paz-Zamora that the Bolivian army's intervention in the drug war was unnecessary because of the existence of the UMOPAR.⁸⁵

As of January 1990, only a dozen soldiers from the United States Army's Special Forces remained in the Chapare. These troops share a barracks compound in Chimore with the United States Border Patrol, the DEA, and the UMOPAR. The Special Forces must confine their mission to training the *Leopardos* in jungle warfare rather than actual field operations.⁸⁶ The Border Patrol instructs the local police at customs checkpoints where drugs, chemicals, and drug processing tools are smuggled in and out of the Chapare region.

In addition to its basic intelligence duties, the DEA advises and largely commands the UMOPAR in its operational maneuvers.⁸⁷ To transport drug enforcement personnel into the jungle, the Bolivian air force uses six helicopters on loan from the United States.⁸⁸ Although these helicopters display the Bolivian flag, agreements with the United States require that they fly with at least one DEA official on board.⁸⁹

The Bolivian Air Force and Navy play only a secondary role in anti-drug law enforcement.⁹⁰ The Air Force's primary role is to transport

85. Before meeting with President Bush on May 8, 1990, President Paz-Zamora declared that he was against calling the army into the "war on cocaine" because such a step would bring about uncalled for violence. Paz said he could not adopt a measure his country did not need. In May 1990, Minister Guillermo Capobianco declared to the press that the army was not necessary. He stated that the UMOPAR will never be surpassed by the traffickers and that, therefore, there was no need to appeal to the army.

86. See Klare, *Scenario For A Quagmire: Fighting Drugs With The Military*, THE NATION, Jan. 1, 1990, at 8 (discussing U.S. training programs for counter-insurgency tactics). Since 1988, DEA agents have been training South American forces on drug raids. *Id.* It should be noted that Administration officials have left the door open for future troop commitments. *Id.* When questioned about this, William Bennett, the nation's drug czar at that time, refused to take this option off the table. *Id.*

87. See *Coast Guard Specialists Operating Inside Bolivia*, U.P.I., Nov. 28, 1989 (explaining how specially trained Coast Guard units are aiding Bolivian drug enforcement agents in their anti-narcotics campaigns). In 1989, the U.S. Coast Guard formed the Drug Interdiction Assist Team, which trains its members in guerrilla warfare techniques. *Id.* This group is an offshoot of Operation Snowcap, a joint agency effort linking the Coast Guard, DEA, and State Department with South American governments such as Bolivia. *Id.*

88. See *Bolivia Receives Two U.S. Helicopters*, U.P.I., Aug. 28, 1989 (discussing transportation facilities for Bolivian drug enforcers).

89. *Coast Guard Specialists Operating Inside Bolivia*, *supra* note 87.

90. See Traiwor, *In Bolivian Drug War, A Question of Will*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at 22 (noting that apart from the small navy and air force detachments that assist the police, the Bolivian armed forces are involved in combating drugs). The army is divided over how involved it should be, because the drug issue is not considered important by many Bolivians. *Id.* Recently, however, the Bolivian army has become more active in the drug war. *Id.*

UMOPAR and DEA officers.⁹¹ According to Ambassador Gelbard, Air Force pilots are remarkably efficient in managing Huey helicopters.⁹² The Bolivian Navy is responsible for monitoring ports and boat traffic on the wide Amazon rivers in the eastern lowlands and ferrying personnel in and out of the Beni, where the lack of roads limits land access. The Army's drug enforcement role is generally limited to a few large scale operations such as the takeover of the Chapare in October 1984.⁹³

Despite the importance of the UMOPAR as the local drug law enforcer in the joint United States-Bolivian plan, the organization is ill equipped due to the interference of the zealous Bolivian military forces. In an effort to maintain its traditional clout, the Army induced Bolivia and the United States to limit UMOPAR resources to a level lower than the Army's.⁹⁴ As a result, while the UMOPAR received privileged training from the DEA, the Special Forces, and the Border Patrol, its operating capacity was handicapped because its obsolete World War II carbines and precarious communications equipment hindered the execution of assignments.⁹⁵ Patrols were often unable to communicate with one another, and the lack of sophisticated radio equipment impeded efficient operations against drug traffickers in the mountainous jungle areas of the Chapare and the Amazon rain forest in both the Beni and northern Santa Cruz regions.⁹⁶

The reputation of UMOPAR and DEA agents varies tremendously in Bolivia. Coca growers in the Chapare charge that the UMOPAR forces harass and pillage them, often with the support of the DEA. High ranking interdiction officials complain that these agencies lack efficacy.⁹⁷ These officials claim that the UMOPAR and DEA agents do

91. *Id.*

92. Interview with Robert Gelbard, *supra* note 33.

93. See *supra* notes 22-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Chapare Offensive).

94. *Bolivian Military Requests Withdrawal From War on Drugs*, 15 DEFENSE FOREIGN AFF. WEEKLY 6 (1989). In August 1989, the Bolivian armed forces requested deactivation from the nation's drug war. *Id.* The request was due to the fact that UMOPAR is under police, rather than military control. *Id.*

95. See Painter, *Bolivian Struggles in War on Drugs*, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 6, 1989, at 6. (discussing the UMOPAR's lack of resources). According to one UMOPAR official, his unit was fighting with M1 rifles from the Korean War. *Id.* Meanwhile, the drug traffickers had access to the latest submachine guns. *Id.* Furthermore, UMOPAR lacks radar facilities to track light planes crossing Bolivia's 3,100 miles of borders. *Id.* The one radar station based in La Paz covers only one-seventh of the border and does not include the eastern regions of Beni and Santa Cruz, where most of the drug ferrying occurs. *Id.*

96. Interview with Major Arana, UMOPAR, in Villa Tunari (Sept. 1989).

97. Interview with Elva Morales, in Cochabamba (Jan. 15, 1990); interview with two members of the San Miguel's *Cocaleros* Union (Sept. 16, 1989).

not deal with the substantial cocaine transactions that take place right in front of them on the other side of the barbed wired outposts of Chimore, Villa Tunari, and Ivirgarzama. Enrique Valverde, local head of the Bolivian State Department's Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) in Cochabamba, and Carlos Arauz, director of the Bolivian Coca Interdiction Office during Paz-Estenssoro's administration, reported, for example, that Arauz personally arrested an aircraft pilot who made two daily flights at specified times to collect basic coca paste. The airstrip where the airplane landed is located no more than three miles away from the Chimore compound. Although Valverde consistently reported these flights to the UMOPAR and the DEA, they took no action.⁹⁸ These types of incidents illustrate the incompetence of Bolivian and United States drug enforcement officials who fail to raise concern in the high political circles of La Paz.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The failure of U.S. and Bolivian drug repression efforts is the result of several factors that are easy to identify but difficult to suppress. These factors include: widespread opposition to drug eradication programs by the Bolivian peasants; corruption among government leaders, inefficient handling of information by the UMOPAR, the DEA, and the Bolivian military; the failure of U.S. and Bolivian government forces to respond quickly to reports of drug trafficking; and rivalry between the UMOPAR and the Bolivian military. It also shows that U.S. enforcement agents in Bolivia pursue goals other than winning the war on drugs. Thus far, drug policy has centered around destroying drug processing laboratories, to reduce the demand for raw coca, and crop substitution programs,⁹⁹ while in practice enforcement has persecuted coca stompers and small time brokers. The United States and Bolivia need to reevaluate their policy and implement programs that will address the core issues facing the Bolivian government. They must develop comprehensive programs that avoid taking away the peasants' livelihood without providing alternative ways for the peasants to provide for themselves and their families. Without the support of the peasants, the drug traffickers have no means of providing coca leaves to the drug processing laboratories, and ultimately to the drug consumers in

98. Interview with Carlos Arauz, *supra* note 52; interview with NAU agents in Bolivia (Sept. 16, 1989).

99. See Craig, *supra* note 4, at 106 (referring to bilateral agreements between Washington and La Paz which were intended to combat the drug trade by instituting drug control and crop substitution programs).

Bolivia and abroad. The peasants have proven to be a formidable force in the drug war. The only way that the Bolivian government can resolve the cocaine problem is to institute programs that take into consideration the needs of the peasants.

A. CROP SUBSTITUTION

Crop substitution programs alone will never be sufficient to decrease the incentive for the Bolivian peasants to grow and sell coca leaves. Coca provides the most profitable business to small farmers because coca grows easily and produces a valuable traditional crop. Any crop substitution program will require financial subsidization to induce farmers to participate. The governments of the United States and Bolivia should develop a program that includes direct payments for crops other than coca, and assistance in transporting and marketing these crops.

B. IMPLEMENT NEW REGULATIONS

The Bolivian legislature could implement laws that would protect peasants who grow a limited amount of coca, but prevent peasants from processing the coca into cocaine paste. Paste production involves the use of chemicals such as kerosene and sulfuric acid. Stringent regulations on the sale of chemicals that are used in paste processing would prevent many of the peasants, who now find paste production to be relatively cheap and easy, from becoming involved in the more advanced aspects of the drug trade.

C. PROSECUTION OF VIOLATORS

People who are arrested on drug violations are often not prosecuted vigorously.¹⁰⁰ The Bolivian judiciary should allocate additional resources to prosecuting those accused of drug offenses. The Bolivian legislature should also implement regulations that allow for increased opportunities for drug traffickers to be extradited to the United States for trial.

D. INCREASED MONITORING OF U.S. FUNDS

The U.S. and Bolivian governments should implement procedures to track the funds sent by the United States for drug eradication pro-

100. See *Bolivian Army Carries Drug War to Hills*, *supra* note 1, at A22 (relating an incident in which two suspected drug traffickers were arrested, but later released because of lack of evidence against them).

grams. By forcing expenditures to be approved by U.S. embassy personnel, it is possible to prevent the money from ending up in the pockets of government and military officials. The United States should also monitor the projects that involve U.S. funding, and only continue those projects that are successful.

V. CONCLUSION

A. THE U.S. SIDE

Repressing a growing number of legally defined drug offenses becomes an impossible endeavor because agencies that deal with it are either too small to be effective or too big to be controlled by the state. Regular police forces are not designed to manage the increased number, perhaps three-fold or even more, of law breakers in the Americas. If, however, enforcement agencies are swollen to meet the imposing numbers of drug offenders, they become too large to remain loyal to their targeted goals as defined by top political officials. Thus, experience shows that in Bolivia, U.S. drug enforcement related agencies have developed their own strategies in the pursuance of their sectoral interests. The deregulation of drug legislation demands serious consideration. The task will require a sizeable dose of imagination and creativity.

B. THE BOLIVIAN SIDE

“War” implies that there is a winner and a loser, not that there might be a tradeoff of interests. There are several factors contributing to the complexity of interests that make the war approach to the drug problem in Bolivia inappropriate. A lack of sufficiently coercive state institutions has resulted in an illegal sector too large to be excluded from joint, concerted policies. As Bolivia’s economic and political life centers around the cocaine trade, it has been impossible to achieve the consensus necessary to produce the economic and political shifts necessary to reduce cocaine production. Only by implementing new legislation that addresses the needs of the peasants and providing new economic incentives will the Bolivian government be able to fight the drug problem and win the support and respect of all sectors of Bolivian society.