

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Volume 15
Issue 2 Spring 2015: Sustainable Development
Issues in Africa

Article 7

End Notes

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp>

 Part of the [Agriculture Law Commons](#), [Constitutional Law Commons](#), [Energy and Utilities Law Commons](#), [Environmental Law Commons](#), [Food and Drug Law Commons](#), [Health Law and Policy Commons](#), [Human Rights Law Commons](#), [Intellectual Property Law Commons](#), [International Law Commons](#), [International Trade Law Commons](#), [Land Use Law Commons](#), [Law and Society Commons](#), [Law of the Sea Commons](#), [Litigation Commons](#), [Natural Resources Law Commons](#), [Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons](#), [Public Law and Legal Theory Commons](#), and the [Water Law Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Sustainable Development Law & Policy (2015) "End Notes," *Sustainable Development Law & Policy*. Vol. 15 : Iss. 2 , Article 7.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol15/iss2/7>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

“MADE IN ETHIOPIA” – THE NEW NORM IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

Marie Durane*

Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, achieving enormous economic growth averaging 10.6% over the past decade and leading in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹ According to the 2014 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report, FDI in Ethiopia has increased by 242% from 2012 to 2013.² However, the excessive speed at which Ethiopia is seeking foreign investment into the country, specifically in the garment industry, has led to an exploitation of garment workers who are paid extremely low wages. To ensure garment workers are paid fairly, Ethiopia should establish a minimum wage law that reflects an amount that Ethiopians can actually live on.

Ethiopia is on its way to becoming the “China of Africa” of the garment industry.³ Over the past few years, the rising cost of doing business in China has incentivized manufacturing businesses, specifically clothing and textile companies, to look for cheaper alternatives in African countries.⁴ Ethiopia is attractive to foreign investors because it is an untapped resource, known as “one of the last remaining unindustrialized frontiers.”⁵ Furthermore, Ethiopia boasts a business-friendly environment, political stability, low energy cost, raw materials, lack of tariffs, and a great deal of cheap labor.⁶

However, Ethiopia lacks minimum wage laws.⁷ While the country has labor laws, which reflect international standards of labor, the law does not establish a set minimum wage except in the domestic industry.⁸ Wages are generally set by employers or by a contract agreement between employer and employee,⁹ meaning that Ethiopians in the textile and clothing industry will have to make due with whatever wages they are given or risk having no income at all.¹⁰ In fact, this is exactly what has occurred: Ethiopia now holds the title for the lowest paid garment workers in the world.¹¹ Entry-level salary for an Ethiopian factory worker is estimated to be between \$35 to \$45 per month, considerably lower than workers paid in China, \$629 a month, and Bangladesh, \$68 a month.¹² These low wages are likely due to the fact that unlike many developing countries, Ethiopia has an unparalleled comparative advantage. Not only can it offer

foreign investors an abundance of labor, but it can also offer foreign investors the ability to set their own wages.

While Ethiopia is under no legal obligation to establish a minimum wage law, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), of which Ethiopia is a member, encourages its members to adopt minimum wage laws in accordance with the 1970 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131.¹³ However, Ethiopia has chosen not to ratify this Convention, arguing that instead of setting a rigid minimum wage to address the unemployment in the country, it has created policies to attract foreign investment, which in turn will aid in unemployment.¹⁴ The government of Ethiopia argues that ratifying Convention 131 could be detrimental to employment, which is why it advocates for more flexibility in wages rather than creating a rigid national minimum wage.¹⁵ The Ethiopian government’s rationale is flawed. For young workers, who make up the bulk of factory workers in Ethiopia, setting a minimum wage would reduce unemployment.¹⁶ In a study of 31 countries during the mid-1990s in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia, higher minimum wages were shown to have a positive effect on poverty by lowering the poverty rate.¹⁷ Comparatively, the employment rate remained unchanged when the minimum wage levels were increased. With Ethiopia aggressively pursuing the textile and clothing industry, a national minimum wage is essential to protect garment workers from further exploitation of being denied a livable wage.¹⁸ Therefore, Ethiopia must establish a minimum wage law that reflects an amount sufficient to provide food, shelter, education, and socialization.

While Ethiopia has made considerable gains in reducing poverty and increasing economic growth, sustainable economic growth requires the protection of its citizens’ rights to a livable wage. The next shirt you purchase at a nominal price may say “Made in Ethiopia,”¹⁹ but your economic gain should not come at the expense of protecting the right of factory workers to earn livable wages.



*JD Candidate 2017, American University Washington College of Law

ENDNOTES: THE EMERGENCE OF RIGHT-BASED APPROACHES TO RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: FALSE START OR NEW DAWN?

¹ DELOITTE & TOUCHE, ETHIOPIA A GROWING MIRACLE 3 (2014), available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/na/Documents/strategy/za_ethiopia_growth_miracle_july2014.pdf (last visited April 15, 2015); U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, (June 2014), available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228594.pdf>.

continued on page 31

ENDNOTES: PREVENTING A RENEWABLE RESOURCE CURSE
continued from page 10

³¹ See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 59.

³² See David S. Sorenson, *Global Pressure Point: The Dynamics of Political Dissent in Egypt*, 27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 207, 211 (2003) (discussing how the Saudi regime placated the population and reduced dissent through resource distribution).

³³ See Stevens, *supra* note 21, at 17-19.

³⁴ See *id.* at 5.

³⁵ See van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 9-10 (discussing how the “rentier state” allows lower taxation and greater public spending on patronage and pacifying dissent); see also Ross, *supra* note 6, at 67 (“The idea that a rise in taxes relative to spending can produce democratizing rebellions is closely related to the notion of a political budget cycle. They both imply that citizens will support governments that provide them with more benefits and lower taxes, and try to replace ones that supply few benefits with higher taxes. If these tax rebellions occur in dictatorships, they can bring about transitions to democracy.”); see generally Ross, *supra* note 6, at 65-71 (discussing the fiscal theory to democracy, and how secrecy allows governments to hide the size of revenues from the public).

³⁶ See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 59 (“But most undemocratic oil producers, and some partially democratic ones like Iran and Venezuela, take advantage of the slippery nature of oil revenues to keep them out of the public view.”).

³⁷ See *id.* at 6 (“Secrecy is a key reason why oil revenues are so commonly squandered, why oil-fueled dictators can remain in power, since they can conceal evidence of their greed and incompetence; and why insurgents are generally reluctant to lay down their arms, because they distrust offers by the government to share their country’s oil revenues more equitably.”); see also *id.* at 59 (“Secrecy is intrinsically hard to measure. There is no easy way to document how much money a government is concealing from the public.”).

³⁸ See *id.* at 80 (noting that “among autocracies, the oil-producing states have less budget transparency”); *Id.* at 81 (“The greater the oil wealth is, the more secretive the budget.”); see also *id.* at 82-83 (“Two patterns stand out: all countries were more likely to publicly disclose their expenditures than their revenues; and even though the oil producers published their expenditures at the same high rate as the non-oil producers, they were substantially more secretive about their revenues.”).

³⁹ See *id.* at 82 (noting that “among autocracies, however, oil is associated with greater censorship”).

⁴⁰ See *id.* at 70 (“Citizens in oil-producing countries, though, cannot directly observe how much their government collects in oil revenues. They must rely on the government and media for their information.”); *Id.* at 71 (“But autocrats in the oil states have more to gain from secrecy, because it allows them to fool their citizens into underestimating the size of the government’s revenues.”); see also van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 9 (noting that as governments gain external revenue sources, they decrease taxes, and “[i]n turn, the public is less likely to demand accountability from their governments, and governments become less transparent, accountable and responsive to the societies they govern”).

⁴¹ See van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 9-10 (discussing how citizens of resource-rich states tend to fail to demand accountability, and as a result, their governments are less accountable).

⁴² See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 63 (“But from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, a wave of democracy swept across the globe, bringing freedom to countries in virtually every region—except the petroleum-rich countries of the Middle East, Africa, and the former Soviet Union.”).

⁴³ See *id.* at 63 (“From 1980 to 2011, the democracy gap between the oil and non-oil states grew wider.”); see also *id.* (“Yet among the oil states—both in the Middle East and beyond—transitions to democracy have been exceedingly rare. Oil and democracy do not easily mix.”).

⁴⁴ See *id.* at 63 (noting that “oil has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spending, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption and incompetence”).

⁴⁵ See generally *id.*, *supra* note 6, at 86-90 (noting the erosion of democracy with multiple examples in resource-rich, but poorer countries); see also *id.* at 87 (“Empowered democratic incumbents may not necessarily want their countries to remain democratic, however. In fact, they might try to remain in power longer by making their countries more autocratic.”); see *id.* (noting that wealthy democracies have strong checks and balances, but in less wealthy democracies, “incumbents accumulate enough political influence to dismantle the checks and balances that would otherwise keep their government democratic”).

⁴⁶ See van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 4 (“The resource curse is not inevitable; ultimately, it is the result of institutional and policy failure.”); see also *id.* (discussing how “the resource curse appears particularly severe for countries with weak institutions, poor legal systems and little democracy”).

⁴⁷ See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 86-90 (discussing how the resource curse makes democracies less democratic).

⁴⁸ See *id.* at 154 (showing that resource-rich nations are almost twice as likely to suffer from civil war, particularly less wealthy nations and after 1990); see also van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 10 (noting the “strong link between dependence on natural resources and the risk of civil war and its prolongation...”); see *id.* (further noting the “...severe human rights abuses in mineral-rich developing nations”).

⁴⁹ See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 145 (“Among low-and middle-income countries oil producers are more than twice as likely to have civil wars.”).

⁵⁰ See *id.* at 147 (“Armed conflicts have a high recurrence rate. According to one study, there is a one in five chance that a conflict, once it has ended, will restart within five years.”).

⁵¹ See *id.* at 151 (“The secrecy of these revenues can also trigger conflict by making it harder for separatists and the government to strike a revenue-sharing bargain.”).

⁵² See *id.* (“In a greedy rebellion, the insurgents profit from crime, and are motivated by the chance to earn money from stolen oil, ransomed oil workers, and extortion paid by oil companies trying to avoid these and other forms of sabotage.”).

⁵³ See *id.* at 149-50 (noting that the resource-rich government offers “low taxes and large benefits,” citizens that live in the resource-rich region “would now be better off if they established an independent state, since it would provide each resident with a larger share of the oil wealth than they currently receive”).

⁵⁴ See *id.* at 153 (“Government oil revenues grew much larger in the 1970s, making it more profitable for the residents of oil-producing regions to acquire their own sovereign governments.”).

⁵⁵ See *id.* at 153 (“The rising oil prices of the 1970s also sent petroleum firms to increasingly remote and unsteady regions—for example, in Indonesia, Colombia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Yemen—thereby setting the stage for a rising incidence of both goal-oriented and greedy rebellions.”).

⁵⁶ See van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 10.

⁵⁷ See Stevens, *supra* note 21, at 27.

⁵⁸ See *id.* at 11, 18.

⁵⁹ See *id.*

⁶⁰ Many former authoritarian regimes, such as Mexico, Chile, Nigeria, and Indonesia, were able to transition to democracy. However, they may have benefited from strong institutions, lack of state capture of all resource development and a sufficiently diversified economy accompanied by certain strong macroeconomic policies. In addition, these democracies were more likely to fail, including Nigeria’s original transition in 1979. Moreover, the centralized natural resource wealth and lack of taxation preserve autocratic tendencies and undermine less wealthy democracies. See Ross, *supra* note 6, at 4; see also Stevens, *supra* note 21, at 23-24.

⁶¹ See Stevens, *supra* note 21 at 24.

⁶² See BNEF *Forecasts Big Global Investment in Clean Energy, with Eyes on Asia and Africa*, CLEANTECHIQ (July 11, 2014), <http://cleantechiq.com/2014/07/bnef-forecasts-big-global-investment-in-clean-energy-with-eyes-on-asia-and-africa/>.

⁶³ See REN 21, RENEWABLES 2014 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 13, 16, 26 (2014), available at http://www.ren21.net/portals/0/documents/resources/gsr/2014/gsr2014_full%20report_low%20res.pdf.

⁶⁴ See Justin Doom, *Africa to Add More Renewables in 2014 Than Past 14 Years*, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:00 AM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-21/africa-to-add-more-renewables-in-2014-than-past-14-years>.

⁶⁵ See *id.*

⁶⁶ See Fred Lucas, *White House Announces \$6 Billion to Promote Clean Energy in Asia*, CNSNEWS, (Nov. 20, 2012 11:58 AM), <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/white-house-announces-6-billion-promote-clean-energy-asia>; see also John Morton, *U.S.-Africa Clean Energy Finance Initiative – Supporting renewable energy to power Africa*, OPIC BLOG (Jan. 13, 2015), <http://www.opic.gov/blog/renewables/u-s-africa-clean-energy-finance-initiative-supporting->

- renewable-energy-to-power-africa. The U.S. has also recently pledged financial support for clean energy in the Caribbean, if corruption is addressed. See News Americas, *U.S. Pledges to Help Transform Caribbean Energy Systems*, Jan. 27, 2015, <http://www.newsamericasnow.com/u-s-pledges-to-help-transform-caribbean-energy-systems/>.
- ⁶⁷ See *Sustainable Energy Initiative (phase 3)*, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT UNITED NATIONS, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&menu=1348&nr=881> (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
- ⁶⁸ See WESTERN BALKANS INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, <http://www.wbif.eu/Energy> (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
- ⁶⁹ See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *IMPROVING STATE AID FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2* (2014) available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/016_en.pdf.
- ⁷⁰ See Christine Lins, *Special Report on Global Renewable Energy Growth: Global Renewable Energy Generation Capacity Jumps to Record Level*, GLOBAL ENERGY INITIATIVE, <http://globalenergyinitiative.org/insights/169-global-renewable-energy-generation-capacity-jumps-to-record-level.html> (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
- ⁷¹ See Ehren Goossens & Christopher Martin, *Clean Power to Shrug Off Oil Slump*, *Goldman, Deutsche Bank Say*, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2015 12:26 PM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-16/clean-power-to-shrug-off-oil-slump-goldman-deutsche-bank-say>.
- ⁷² See CHRISTOPHER BEDDOR ET AL., *SECURING AMERICA'S FUTURE: ENHANCING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BY REDUCING OIL DEPENDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 7, 10-11* (2009), available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf.
- ⁷³ See Leslie Shaffer, *Will Oil's Drop Hurt Renewable Energy?*, CNBC (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:43 PM) <http://www.cnbc.com/id/102242056>.
- ⁷⁴ See Garrett Hering, *What Plummeting Oil Prices Mean for Renewable Energy*, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2014 10:37 AM), <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/10/crude-oil-texas-renewable-energy-solar-biomass>; see also Mat Hope & Rosamund Pearce, *What Falling Oil Prices May Mean for the Future of Renewable Energy Investment*, THE CARBON BRIEF (Jan. 6 2015, 10:00), <http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/01/what-falling-oil-prices-may-mean-for-the-future-of-renewable-energy-investment>.
- ⁷⁵ See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, *WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1* (2014), available at <http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO-2014SUM.pdf>.
- ⁷⁶ See FACT SHEET: POWER AFRICA, *supra* note 15.
- ⁷⁷ See *id.*
- ⁷⁸ See *id.*
- ⁷⁹ See Julie Nania & Doug Vilsack, *Put out the Fire: Developing a Sustainable Energy Policy for All Namibians*, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 287, 297, 311, 312, 338 (2010); Osob Samantar, *RIO+20: Shining Sun and Blissful Wind: Access to ICT Solutions in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa through Access to Renewable Sources*, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 42, 42 (2012).
- ⁸⁰ See TRAVIS BRADFORD, *SOLAR REVOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL ENERGY INDUSTRY 30-43* (2006).
- ⁸¹ See *id.*
- ⁸² See *id.* at 75.
- ⁸³ See Nigel Wilson, *Top Energy Official Sacked as China's Anti-Corruption Probe Widens*, INT'L BUS. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 10:41), <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/top-energy-official-sacked-chinas-anti-corruption-probe-widens-1450240>.
- ⁸⁴ See Nick Squires & Nick Meo, *Mafia Cash in on Lucrative EU Wind Farm Handouts Especially in Sicily*, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5, 2010, 7:30 AM), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/renewableenergy/7981737/Mafia-cash-in-on-lucrative-EU-wind-farm-handouts-especially-in-Sicily.html>.
- ⁸⁵ See *id.*
- ⁸⁶ See SOUTH EAST EUROPE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY POLICY, *WINNERS AND LOSERS: WHO BENEFITS FROM HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION IN THE SOUTH EAST EUROPE ENERGY SECTOR?* 6, 12-13 (2014), available at <http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/SEE-energy-corruption.pdf>.
- ⁸⁷ See Doreen Carjaval, *With Wind Energy, Opportunities for Corruption*, NY TIMES (Dec. 13, 2009), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/world/europe/14wind.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.
- ⁸⁸ See SOUTH EAST EUROPE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY POLICY, *supra* note 86, at 12-13.
- ⁸⁹ See William Pentland, *Italian Mafia Goes Green*, FORBES (Jul. 6, 2013), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2013/07/05/italian-mafia-goes-green>.
- ⁹⁰ See Davida Wood & Bharath Jairaj, *EGI at the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference*, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Dec. 12, 2010), <http://electricitygovernance.wri.org/news/2010/12/egi-14th-international-anti-corruption-conference>.
- ⁹¹ See SOUTH EAST EUROPE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY POLICY, *supra* note 86, at 7.
- ⁹² See *id.*
- ⁹³ See RICHARD L. OTTINGER ET AL., *Case Studies of Renewable Energy in China*, in *RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 1, 3* (2013).
- ⁹⁴ See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, *BRIBERY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: METHODS, ACTORS, AND COUNTER-MEASURES 28* (2007), available at <http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-bribery-convention/44956834.pdf>; see also Elizabeth Baldwin, *The Effect of Stakeholder Involvement on Electricity Generation: An IAD Study of State Electric Sector Decision-Making* (Dec. 12, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. student-written publication, Indiana University), http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_papers/Baldwin_2013_Y673_SMCP.pdf.
- ⁹⁵ See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, *supra* note 94, at 28.
- ⁹⁶ See South East Europe Sustainable Energy Policy, *supra* note 86, at 6.
- ⁹⁷ See BENJAMIN K. SOVACOL, *ENERGY AND ETHICS: JUSTICE AND THE GLOBAL ENERGY CHALLENGE 94* (2013).
- ⁹⁸ See Ivan Ermakoff, *Patrimonial Power in the Modern World: Patrimony and Collective Capacity. An Analytical Outline*, 636 ANNALS 182, 196 (2011).
- ⁹⁹ See *id.*
- ¹⁰⁰ See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, *AFRICA ENERGY OUTLOOK: A FOCUS ON ENERGY PROSPECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 15-16* (2014), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/IEA-Africa-Energy-Outlook-2014.pdf>.
- ¹⁰¹ See FACT SHEET: POWER AFRICA, *supra* note 15.
- ¹⁰² See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, *THE EITI STANDARD 6-7* (Sam Bartlett & Dyveke Rogan eds. 2015), available at https://eiti.org/files/English_EITI_STANDARD.pdf.
- ¹⁰³ See *Objectives*, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org> (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
- ¹⁰⁴ See Daniel M. Firger, *Note. Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010*, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1049 (2010); see generally, *The EITI Principles and Criteria*, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, <http://eiti.org/eiti/principles> (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
- ¹⁰⁵ See *The EITI Principles and Criteria*, *supra* note 104; see Firger, *supra* note 104, at 1049-50.
- ¹⁰⁶ See THE EITI STANDARD, *supra* note 102, at 27; see also Firger, *supra* note 104, at 1065-66.
- ¹⁰⁷ See THE EITI STANDARD, *supra* note 102, at 46; see also Firger, *supra* note 104, at 1066-67.
- ¹⁰⁸ See PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, *supra* note 103.
- ¹⁰⁹ See generally, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, *EITI POLICY NOTE #2: GUIDANCE NOTE FOR IMPLEMENTING COUNTRIES ON PROCURING AN EITI VALIDATOR 1-2, 4-5* (2008), available at <https://eiti.org/files/document/PolicyNoteNo02.pdf>.
- ¹¹⁰ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2010).
- ¹¹¹ *Id.* at § 1504.
- ¹¹² *Id.* at § 1504(q)(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
- ¹¹³ The component of Dodd Frank was taken directly from previous attempts to pass into law stronger transparency requirements, including the Energy Security Through Transparency Act (ESTTA) of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. § 17374.
- ¹¹⁴ See Sinead Hunt, *Refining Black Gold: The Dodd-Frank Act and Corruption in the Oil Industry*, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 41, 53-55 (2011).
- ¹¹⁵ See Don Greenfield & Jay Todesco, *Petroleum Law Edition: Fundamental Aspects of Oil and Gas Revisited*, 42 ALTA L. REV. 75, 100 (2004); see also Emeka Duruigbo, *The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria's Emergence as a Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?*, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 412 (2009).
- ¹¹⁶ See Greenfield & Todesco, *supra* note 115, at 100; see also Duruigbo, *supra* note 115, at 412.
- ¹¹⁷ See Greenfield & Todesco, *supra* note 115, at 101; see also Duruigbo, *supra* note 115, at 412.
- ¹¹⁸ See Greenfield & Todesco, *supra* note 115, at 101; see also Duruigbo, *supra* note 115, at 412.
- ¹¹⁹ See discussion *supra* at GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOURCE CURSE (discussing contract arrangement change away from dominance by the Seven Sisters).

- ¹²⁰ SEE, *THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION*, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#VOImm7A5DIU> (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
- ¹²¹ See Stevens, *supra* note 21, at 25; see generally, MICHAEL L. ROSS, *EXTRACTIVE SECTORS AND THE POOR* 6 (2001).
- ¹²² See Stevens, *supra* note 21, at 25.
- ¹²³ See *id.* at 26.
- ¹²⁴ See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, *TRACKING CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS 2013: IEA INPUT TO THE CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL 28* (2013), http://www.iea.org/publications/tcep_web.pdf.
- ¹²⁵ See Darren Taylor, *Power from Small Stream Transforms Kenyan Village*, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:28 PM), <http://www.voanews.com/content/power-from-small-stream-transforms-kenyan-village/1495449.html>.
- ¹²⁶ See Darren Taylor, *Wind Power Fans Development in Kenyan Desert*, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:16PM), <http://www.voanews.com/content/wind-power-fans-development-in-kenyan-desert/1495442.html>.
- ¹²⁷ See van Mil, *supra* note 20, at 11.

- ¹²⁸ See *id.*
- ¹²⁹ See *id.*
- ¹³⁰ See Eyene Okpanachi & Nathan Andrews, *Preventing the Oil "Resource Curse" In Ghana: Lessons from Nigeria*, 68 J. OF GLOBAL EDUC. 430, 430, 438 (2012) available at http://www.academia.edu/1829630/Preventing_The_Oil_Resource_Curse_In_Ghana_Lessons_From_Nigeria.
- ¹³¹ See Gerhard Seibert, *São Tomé and Príncipe: The Troubles of Oil in an Aid-Dependent Micro-State*, in *EXTRACTIVE ECONOMIES AND CONFLICTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH* 119, 120, 128 (Kenneth C. Omeje ed. 2008).
- ¹³² See *id.* at 119, 128-29
- ¹³³ See *id.* at 129
- ¹³⁴ See *id.* at 133.
- ¹³⁵ See FACT SHEET: POWER AFRICA, *supra* note 15.
- ¹³⁶ See *id.*
- ¹³⁷ See South East Europe Sustainable Energy Policy, *supra* note 86, at 1, 4-5.
- ¹³⁸ See *id.* at 9.
- ¹³⁹ See WORLD BANK, *REFORMING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE* 7, 9 (2000).

ENDNOTES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FUNDED BY CHINESE BANKS

continued from page 12

COMUNIDADES LOCALES, TABLA 5, 36, (Milagros Aguirre, 1st Ed. 2014); China Banking Regulatory Commission, NOTICE OF THE CBRC ON ISSUING THE GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, Article 21 (February 24, 2012), <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=3CE646AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A>.

¹⁷ China Banking Regulatory Commission, NOTICE OF THE CBRC ON ISSUING THE GREEN CREDIT GUIDELINES, Article 21 (February 24, 2012), <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=3CE646AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A>. (stating "project sponsors abide by applicable laws and regulations on environmental protection, land, health, safety, etc. of the country or jurisdiction where the project is located. The banking institutions shall make promise in public that appropriate international practices or international norms will be followed as far as such overseas projects are concerned, so as to ensure alignment with good international practices.").

- ¹⁸ WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, *EMERGING ACTORS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: CHINA*, <http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/emerging-actors-development-finance/china#project-tabs>; *Sustainable Investment in China - Three Steps towards Green Finance in China*, BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, <http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/sustainable-investment-china-article/three-steps-towards-green-finance-in-china>.
- ¹⁹ Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China, NOTIFICATION OF THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ON ISSUING THE GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND COOPERATION, Shang He Han [2013] No. 74 (February 18, 2013), <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml>.

ENDNOTES: THE EMERGENCE OF RIGHT-BASED APPROACHES TO RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: FALSE START OR NEW DAWN?

continued from page 22

dollars per day); see also The Borgen Project, *Top 10 Poverty in Africa Facts* (Nov. 2014), <http://borgenproject.org/10-quick-facts-about-poverty-in-africa/>.

- ⁹ Human Development Report 2014, *Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*, United Nations Development Programme, 8-13 (2014), available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf>; see also Sabina Alkire et. al., *Multidimensional Poverty Index 2014: Brief Methodological Note and Results*, The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 178 (June 2014), <http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Global-MPI-2014-Brief-Methodological-Note-and-Results.pdf?0a8fd7>.
- ¹⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *UN List of Least Developed Countries* (2013), <http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-Countries.aspx>.
- ¹¹ The World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (2015), <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>; Joshua A. Salomon et. al., *Healthy Life Expectancy for 187 Countries, 1990-2010: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden Disease Study 2010*, 380 THE LANCET 2144, 2155 (Feb. 2013), <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2812%2961690-0/abstract>.
- ¹² Alexeev, *supra* note 7, at 4; Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, *The Curse of Natural Resources*, 45 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 827, 827 (2001), <http://www.econ.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/EuroEconReview2001.pdf>; Leif Wenar, *Property Rights and the Resource Curse*, 36 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 5-7 (2008), <http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/territory/papers/Wenar-PropertyRightsandtheResourceCurse.pdf>; Barr Okeke & Aniche E.T., *A Critique of the Enforcement of Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Neiti) Act 2007 in Nigerian Oil and Gas Sector*, 14 BRIT. J. OF ARTS AND SOC. SCI. 98, 99 (2013), http://www.academia.edu/8712366/A-Critique_of_the_Enforcement_of_Nigeria_Extractive_Industries_Transpar

- ency_Initiative_Neiti_Act_2007_in_Nigerian_Oil_and_Gas_Sector*; Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, *Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria* 13-15 (2003), <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=16582.0>.
- ¹³ See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, *ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF OGOILAND 24* (2011) [hereinafter UNEP], available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf; see also Richard Boele et. al., *Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A Study in Unsustainable Development: I. The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for Resolution*, 9 SUST. DEV. 74, 76-78 (2001); see P.C. Nwilo & O.T. Badejo, *Oil Spill Problems and Management in the Niger Delta*, Department of Surveying and Geoinformatics University of Lagos, 568 <http://tosproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-2005>;
- ¹⁴ Dr E. A. Akpofure et. al., *The Adverse Effects of Crude Oil Spills in the Niger Delta*, URHOBO HISTORICAL SOC'Y http://www.waado.org/environment/petrolpollution/oilspills/OilSpills_AdverseEffects.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
- ¹⁵ UNEP, *supra* note 13, at 2-5; see also A.A. Fagbami, E.J. Udo & C.T.I. Odu, *Vegetation Damage in an Oil Field in the Niger Delta of Nigeria*, 4 J. OF TROPICAL ECOLOGY 61 (1988).
- ¹⁶ UNEP, *supra* note 13, at 2-5.
- ¹⁷ See generally OLUBAYO OLUUDURO, *OIL EXPLOITATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES*, 25 AFRIKA FOCUS 160, 165 (2014) (providing an account of the nature and scope of the problems discussed); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES* 112-113(1999), available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ See Peter Uvin, *From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based*

Approach: How 'Human Rights' Entered Development, 17 DEV. IN PRACTICE 597, 597–605 (2007); HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 11, 81 (Donald M. Zillman et al. eds., 2002); Amartya Sen, *Human Rights and Development*, in DEV. AS A HUMAN RIGHT: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ECON. DIMENSIONS 10 (Bård-Anders Andreassen & Stephen P. Marks eds., 2010); DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 2 (2008); RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL FINANCE 2-5 (2009); Gina E. Castillo & Marjolein Brouwer, *Reflections on Integrating a Rights Based Approach in Environment and Development* 15 IUCN COMM'N ON ENVTL. ECON. & SOC. POLICY 153 (2007), available at <http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pm15.pdf>; see Raymond C. Offenheiser & Susan H. Holcombe, *Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing a Rights-Based Approach to Development: An Oxfam America Perspective*, 32 NON PROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUARTERLY 268, 300 (2003).

¹⁸ Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., *Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission*, May 1-June 9, Jul. 11-Aug 13, 2006, A/CN.4/L.682; see also Campbell McLachlan, *The Principle Of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) Of The Vienna Convention*, 54 INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 279 (2005); see Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, *The Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology? Between Evolution and Systemic Integration*, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 631 (2010).

¹⁹ See Thomas Greiber et al., *Conservation with Justice: A Rights-Based Approach*, 71 IUCN ENVTL. POLICY AND LAW PAPER 23-34 (2009) (discussing the implementation of HRBA); see Chilenyé Nwapi, *A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in Nigeria*, 54 J. Afr. L. 184, 206-11 (2010); see Jakob Kirkemann Boesen & Hans-Otto Sano, *The Implications and Value Added of a Rights-Based Approach*, in DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, 45 (Bård-Anders Andreassen & Stephen P. Marks eds., 2010), <http://www.intersentia.com>; REBECA MACIAS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: A THEORY AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 10-11 (2010); Fergus MacKay, *Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review*, 4 SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY 43, 50-54 (2004).

²⁰ Clarence J. Dias, *Understanding the UN Common Understanding on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Programming*, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: LAW, POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 5-7 (C. Raj Kumar & D.K. Srivastava eds., 2006); see also U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Claiming the Millennium Development Goals: A Human Rights Approach*, UN/ HR/PUB/08/3 (2008), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Claiming_MDGs_en.pdf.

²¹ See U.N. HRBA Portal, *The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding among UN Agencies* (2003), available at <http://hrbportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies>; see also Dias, *supra* note 20, ; see also Greiber, *supra* note 19,

²² See U.N. HRBA Portal *supra* note 21.

²³ Open Letter from the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner to All Permanent U.N. Missions (30 Mar., 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.wecf.eu/download/2012/April/3003HCLet_AllPermMissions_GVANYork_Rio20.pdf.

²⁴ See Dias, *supra* note 20; see HRBA Portal, *supra* note 21 (According to the United Nations, other elements of good programming practices that are also essential under an HRBA include: i) People are recognized as key actors in their own development, rather than passive recipients of commodities and services; (ii) Participation is both a means and a goal; iii) Strategies are empowering, not disempowering; iv) Both outcomes and processes are monitored and evaluated; v) analysis includes all stakeholders; vi) Programmes focus on marginalized, disadvantaged, and excluded groups; vii) The development process is locally owned; viii) Programmes aim to reduce disparity; ix) Both top-down and bottom-up approaches are used in synergy; x) situation analysis is used to identify immediate, underlying, and basic causes of development problems; xi) Measurable goals and targets are important in programming; xii) strategic partnerships are developed and sustained; xiii) programmes support accountability to all stakeholders).

²⁵ See UN HRBA Portal, *supra* note 21.

²⁶ TOM BLOMLEY, PHIL FRANKS & MAKSHA RAM MAHARJAN, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE, FROM NEEDS TO RIGHTS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE

APPLICATION OF RIGHTS BASED APPROACHES TO NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN GHANA, UGANDA AND NEPAL 10-15 (2008); ANITA CHERIA & SRIPAPHA PETCHARAMESREE, ACTIONAID, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT: RESOURCE BOOK 2-4 (2004).

²⁷ Boesen & Sano, *supra* note 19.

²⁸ See OLUFEMI O. AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2012).

²⁹ UN HRBA Portal, *supra* note 21.

³⁰ *Id.*, MARGUERITE GARLING, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ENHANCING ACCESS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT REPORT (2003); Francesco Francioni, *The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law*, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (2007).

³¹ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework*, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.

³² *Id.* at 19-20.

³³ U.N. Secretary-General, *Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights: Rep. of the Secretary-General*, U.N. Doc. A/ HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie), available at <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf>; see also U.N.E.P. Finance Initiative in Partnership with U.N. Global Compact, Principles For Responsible Investment, <http://www.unpri.org/> (2005) (providing a framework incorporating environment, social and governance considerations into mainstream investment practices).

³⁴ SEE AFR. COMM'N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, RESOLUTION ON A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE (2012) [HEREINAFTER AFR. COMM'N RESOLUTION], [HTTP://WWW.ACHPR.ORG/SESSIONS/51ST/RESOLUTIONS/224/](http://www.achpr.org/sessions/51st/resolutions/224/).

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ The weight attached to soft law instruments is discussed in subsequent parts of this Article. See *infra* at Political Will.

³⁸ See U.N. Conference on Sustainable Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 20-22, 2012, ¶¶ 9, 31, 227, 228, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/16 (2012), available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf>.

³⁹ *Id.*; see also, U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., *The Need for a Rights-Based Approach to Sustainable Development* (June 14, 2012), <http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=1000&nr=390&menu=126>.

⁴⁰ U.N. Env't Program, *Outcome Document of the High Level Expert Meeting on the New Future of Human Rights and Environment: An Agenda for Moving Forward* (Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 2009), available at www.unep.org/environmental-governance/Portals/8/documents/Events/OutcomeDocumentHumanRightsEnvironment.pdf.

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ See Org. of Am. States [OAS], *Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador"*, at 1 (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador].

⁴⁴ U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, *Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters*, June 25, 1998 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Protocol], available at <http://www.uncece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf>.

⁴⁵ League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html>.

⁴⁶ Org. of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 24, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. CAB/LEG/67/3 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].

⁴⁷ See *id.* (mainstreaming human rights considerations into the design and approval of resource extraction projects is not directly addressed in any article of the Banjul Charter).

⁴⁸ Aarhus Protocol, *supra* note 44.

⁴⁹ Banjul Charter, *supra* note 46.

⁵⁰ AFR. COMM'N RESOLUTION, SUPRA NOTE 34.

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ *Id.*

- 54 *Id.*
- 55 *Id.*
- 56 Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.
- 57 *Id.*
- 58 See R. Macias, *Public Participation in Energy and Natural Resources Development: A Theory and Criteria for Evaluation*, 10 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE (2010) (discussing the importance of a legal threshold in energy discourse); see also S. Caney, *Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility and Global Climate Change*, 18 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 747-775 (2005); S. Caney, *Global Justice, Rights and Climate Change* (2006) 18 CAN. J. OF L. AND JURISPRUDENCE 255-278 (2006); see also Int'l Council on Human Rights Policy [ICHRP], *Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide*, 18 (2008).
- 59 Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.
- 60 SEE EMILY GREENSPAN, OXFAM AMERICA, FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT IN AFRICA: AN EMERGING STANDARD FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY PROJECTS 10-11 (2014), AVAILABLE AT [HTTP://WWW.OXFAMAMERICA.ORG/STATIC/MEDIA/FILES/COMMUNITY-CONSENT-IN-AFRICA-JAN-2014-OXFAM-AMERICAAA.PDF](http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/community-consent-in-africa-jan-2014-oxfam-america.pdf) (PROVIDING DETAILED SUMMARIES OF PRIOR REGIONAL EFFORTS IN AFRICA); SEE ALSO M. BROWN, DEVELOPMENTS: RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINING SECTOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (2010), AVAILABLE AT [HTTP://WWW.MAYERBROWN.COM/FILES/PUBLICATION/](http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/publication/) (LAST VISITED APR. 15, 2015).
- 61 See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.
- 62 U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Africa, *ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States*, <http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-0> (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (naming the ECOWAS member-nations as Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo).
- 63 Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], *On the Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector*, C/DIR.3/05/09, art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 ECOWAS Directive], available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/directives/ECOWAS_Mining_Directives.pdf
- 64 See Greenspan, *supra* note 60 at 10.
- 65 See 2009 ECOWAS Directive, *supra* note 62, at art.16(3).
- 66 *Id.*
- 67 *Id.*
- 68 *Id.*, at art. 16(4)
- 69 *Id.*, at art. 1
- 70 *Id.* art.6(3).
- 71 GREENSPAN, *supra* note 60, at 10.
- 72 2009 ECOWAS Directive, *supra* note 62, at art. 22(3).
- 73 Sixth Ordinary Session of the Pan-African Parliament Recommendations and Resolutions, PAP(2)/RECOMS/(VI) 4 (2012) [hereinafter Recommendations and Resolutions], available at http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/Documents/FINAL%206Th%20Session%20Recoms%20&%20Resolutions_EN-bm.pdf
- 74 *Overview of the Pan-African Parliament*, PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/AboutPAP_GeneralOverview.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
- 75 *Id.*
- 76 Recommendations and Resolutions, *supra* note 73, at 5. (noting with deep concern the recent rise of large-scale land acquisitions also known as 'land grabbing' and the impact of domestic and Foreign Direct Investment in land, water and related natural resources).
- 77 *Id.*, at 6.
- 78 *Id.*
- 79 *Id.* at 5 (noting that the Pan African parliament is "fully alarmed by the negative impacts on human rights especially on women, including unequal access to land and disruption of access to water).
- 80 See PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, MAKING INVESTMENT WORK FOR AFRICA – A PARLIAMENTARIAN RESPONSE TO "LAND GRABS" 4-6 (2011), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/land_grabs_africa_en.pdf.
- 81 *Overview of the Pan-African Parliament*, *supra* note 74.
- 82 See AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN MINING VISION (2009), available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf.
- 83 *Id.*
- 84 See *id.* at 39-43 (referencing Annex I "Initiatives in Search of a New Social Contract to Mine").
- 85 *Id.* at 12, 34.
- 86 *Id.* at 33.
- 87 Addis Ababa Declaration on Building a Sustainable Future for Africa's Extractive Industry – From Vision to Action, African Union, AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development 2nd Ordinary Session, EX. CL/749(XXI) (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://webmail.africa-union.org/Lilongwe_July_2012/EX%20CL%20749%20%20.
- 88 *Id.* at 3.
- 89 *Id.*
- 90 SEE AFR. COMM'N RESOLUTION, *SUPRA* NOTE 34; SEE ALSO MINING WORKING GROUP, A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO RESOURCE EXTRACTION IN THE PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3 (2014), AVAILABLE AT [HTTP://MININGWG.FILES.WORDPRESS.COM/2014/05/ADVOCACY-BRIEF.PDF](http://MININGWG.FILES.WORDPRESS.COM/2014/05/ADVOCACY-BRIEF.PDF); BROWN, *SUPRA* NOTE 60, AT 2.
- 91 See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.
- 92 *Id.*
- 93 *ID.*
- 94 E. Brown Weiss, *On Being Accountable in a Kaleidoscopic World*, 104 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 477, 479-81 (2010); Edith Brown Weiss et al., *The World Bank Inspection Panel: Participation and Accountability*, in ENVISIONING REFORM: ENHANCING UN ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 272 (Sumihiro Kuyama & Michael Ross Fowler eds., 2009); SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD & HANS-OTTO SANO, HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS IN DEVELOPMENT 34-36 (2010).
- 95 See generally MICHAEL HAMMER & ROBERT LLYOD, ONE WORLD TRUST, PATHWAYS TO ACCOUNTABILITY II: THE 2011 REVISED GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK REPORT ON THE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION AND THE NEW INDICATOR FRAMEWORK (2011).
- 96 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, *Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right of Everyone to Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health*, U.N. Doc. A/58/4 27 (Oct. 10, 2003).
- 97 A good example is the World Bank Inspection Panel which was established by the World Bank in September 1993 to serve as an independent investigative forum through which individuals or communities who believe that they are, or are likely to be harmed, by a World Bank funded project to bring their concerns directly before the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank. See *Panel Mandate and Bank Policies*, THE WORLD BANK, <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Panel-Mandate.aspx> (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (providing the Resolutions which created the Panel).
- 98 For example, one of the strongest criticisms against the World Bank Inspection Panel is the lack of independence in its review process. To guarantee independence, a review panel should have full control over what it wishes to investigate in accordance with its own procedures after receiving a public request, without having to wait for the approval of a higher authority. See D. Clark, *The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability*, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 219-20 (2002); Dana Clark, *The Rise and Fall of Accountability*, 6 WATERSHED 52, 52-55 (2001) (providing examples of lack of control in the World Bank Inspection Panel review process); D. Bradlow, *The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights*, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 76-77 (1996).
- 99 "Free refers to a process that is self-directed by the community from whom consent is being sought, unencumbered by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally imposed." UN-REDD PROGRAMME, GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 18 (2013).
- "Prior" is a requirement that "information be provided before activities can be initiated, at the beginning or initiation of an activity, process or phase of implementation, including conceptualization, design, proposal, information, execution, and following evaluation." *Id.* at 19. Information should be given well in advance to provide time for stakeholders to understand, access, and analyze information on the proposed activity. *Id.* "Informed" refers to the full disclosure of the intent and scope of the projects and policies. This element focuses on "the type of information that should be provided prior to seeking consent and also as part of the on-going consent process." *Id.* Information should be "accessible, clear, consistent, accurate, and transparent," and should be delivered in appropriate language and format. *Id.* "Consent" refers to the decision made by indigenous peoples and other local communities reached through their customary decision-making process. "Consent must be sought and granted or withheld according to the unique formal or informal political-administrative dynamic of each community." *Id.* at 20. Such consent must be freely and collectively given. *Id.* Decision-making must be by consensus and must be transparently made. There should be the absence of coercion, bribery, or manipulation in the

decision-making process.

¹⁰⁰ SEE AFR. COMM'N RESOLUTION, *SUPRA* NOTE 34.

¹⁰¹ UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17-18 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf?v=1392752313000/_jcr:system/jcr:versionStorage/53/b6/9c/53b69c6d-0745-4070-99b2-68e02dde1b99/1.4/jcr:frozenNode.

¹⁰² *Id.* at 17.

¹⁰³ S. Walker, *Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade-Related Policies, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE LAW* (M. Gehring & M. Cordonier-Segger, eds., 2005).

¹⁰⁴ AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, OUR RIGHTS, OUR FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACHES IN IRELAND: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 1 (2005) (quoting Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, comments at 2nd Interagency Workshop on Implementing a Rights-based Approach in the Context of UN Reform from May 2003).

¹⁰⁵ For example, Bruno Simma has suggested a system of Human Rights Audit, that would be a joint undertaking of foreign investors and host States, to survey the host State's human rights treaty commitments especially in the field of economic and social rights and methods for implementing such commitments (such as doctrines of incorporation or transformation). See Bruno Simma, *Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?*, 60 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 573, 595-96 (2011). According to Simma, the ultimate result of conducting a 'human rights audit' would be a better definition of the landscape of the foreign investor's 'legitimate expectations' in a way that would not leave excessive *ex post* discretion to arbitrators, should investor-host State disputes arise in the future. *Id.* On the one hand, foreign investors would be able to better estimate and prepare for alternative scenarios of regulatory measures which the host State might take to vindicate its economic and social human rights obligations, and on the other, host States would not be unduly constrained from defining their public policy agenda as a result of investment protection guarantees within foreign investment contracts and their corresponding treaties. *Id.* As Simma notes, "human rights audit . . . would not be the same as 'human rights impact assessments'. Those are of a much broader scope, spanning inter-disciplinary approaches, very detailed and fact-intensive". *Id.* at 594. HRIA discussed here would go beyond evaluating human rights instruments or measuring compliance, it includes on-the-ground assessments of human rights issues in a project and providing holistic solutions on how to avoid unintended impacts.

¹⁰⁶ See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ See Taiwo Makinde, *Problems of Policy Implementation in Developing Nations: The Nigerian Experience*, 11 J. Soc. Sci. 63, 64-68 (2005) (explaining implementation problems and factors which can lead to an implementation gap).

¹¹⁰ Raymond C. Offenheiser & Susan H. Holcombe, *Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing a Rights-Based Approach to Development: An Oxfam America Perspective*, 32 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 268, 274 (2003).

¹¹¹ See D. Olawuyi, *Recognizing the Intersections between Human Rights and the Environment in Legal Education and Training*, 1 ASIAN J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 103, 103-113 (2014) (expanding the discussion of the capacity to institute reforms).

¹¹² See generally Jorge Daniel Taillant, Found and Advisor, Center for Human Rights and Environment, Forging Stronger Cooperation Between Human Rights and Climate Change Communities (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Seminar2012/DanielTaillant_24Feb2012.pdf (discussing the diversity of issues facing the human rights and climate change communities).

¹¹³ CARLOS LOPES AND THOMAS THEISOHN, OWNERSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND TRANSFORMATION: CAN WE DO BETTER FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT? 1 (2003).

¹¹⁴ See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.

¹¹⁵ See generally John-Mary Kauzya, LOCAL GOVERNANCE CAPACITY BUILDING FOR FULL RANGE PARTICIPATION: CONCEPTS, FRAMEWORKS, AND EXPERIENCES IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 5-6 (2003), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2003/esa03dp33.pdf> (discussing capacity building in local governance); Benno J. Ndulu, *Editorial: Capacity For Economic Research and the Changing Policy Environment in Africa*, 25 WORLD DEV. 627 (1997) (discussing capacity gaps in economic research in Africa).

¹¹⁶ Brigitte Hamm illustrates this with the example of an expert from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development ("BMZ"), who

notes that development experts in his ministry lack knowledge of human rights and thus they are not in a position to implement the HRBA. Brigitte Hamm, *A Human Rights Approach to Development*, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1005, 1023 (2001).

¹¹⁷ JOACHIM THEIS, *Promoting Rights-Based Approaches, in PROMOTING RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES: EXPERIENCES AND IDEAS FROM ASIA AND THE PACIFIC* 13 (2004), available at www.crin.org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/promoting.pdf; Hamm, *supra* note 116, at 1023-25.

¹¹⁸ See Christopher McCrudden, *Mainstreaming Human Rights* 16 (Univ. of Mich. Sch. Of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 47, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=568642.

¹¹⁹ See NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, *Regional Development Efforts, in NIGER DELTA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN* 102, 102 (2006). See generally, Jennifer Hopfensperger, *Oil Dividend Management in Nigeria: A Case for Democratic Reforms within the Niger Delta Development Commission*, 5 J. OF INT'L POL'Y SOLUTIONS, 79, 79-91 (2006).

¹²⁰ See Vivien Foster & Nataliya Pushak, *Nigeria's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective* 12-15, 18, 20, 23-25 (World Bank Sustainable Dev. Dep't, Working Paper 5686, 2011), available at <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5686>.

¹²¹ See *The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies*, UN PRACTITIONERS' PORTAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACHES TO PROGRAMMING, <http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies> (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).

¹²² See generally *id.*

¹²³ See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, *International Soft Law*, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 174-75, 183-84 (2010) (defining soft law as those legal instruments that are not directly enforceable in courts and tribunals but nonetheless have an impact on international relations and, ultimately, international law. Broadly put, soft law instruments include resolutions and declarations of the United Nations and its organs, normative recommendations, declarations of principles, codes of conduct, codes of practice, Programmes of Action (PA) and other non-treaty obligations which do not create binding obligations, but often propose guidelines and rules of behavior which are important and useful for responding to emerging challenges. Soft law is often contrasted with hard law); C Redgwell, *International Soft Law and Globalization*, Ch. 5, pp. 89-107, in B. Barton, A. Lucas, A. Ronne & D. Zillman, eds., *Alternatives to Regulation in Energy and Natural Resources Law* (OUP 2006); A. Boyle, *Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law*, 48 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 901-913 (1999); D. Tillinghast, R. David, & H. Higenberg, *A Fresh Look at Soft Law*, 3 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 502 (1999); DAVID FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 12 (2006); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); P. Dupuy, *Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment* 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 422-25, 428-31 (1991).

¹²⁴ For example, resolutions have been described as attempts to impose norms of international law on dissenting minorities and to change radically the way in which international law is made. See O. Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice* (1991) (describing resolutions as attempts to impose norms of international law on dissenting minorities and to change radically the way in which international law is made); see also Anne Peters & Isabella Pagotto, *Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance: A Legal Perspective* 4 (New Modes of Governance Project, Project no. CIT1-CT-2004-506392); F. Snyder, *Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community*, in S. Martin (ed.) *The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël* (Springer 1994) 198. See D. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* 12 (CUP 2006) (discussing the normative effects and importance of UN Resolutions and Declarations).

¹²⁵ See Forsythe, *supra* note 123 (discussing the normative effects and importance of UN Resolutions and Declarations).

¹²⁶ Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.

¹²⁷ See generally *id.*

¹²⁸ ROSSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 8-10 (Oxford University Press 1995).

¹²⁹ See *id.* at 891.

¹³⁰ See Timothy Meyer, *Soft Law as Delegation*, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 888, 891 (2009). See also Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, *International Soft Law*, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 171 (2010); Alan E. Boyle, *Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law*, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 901, 902 (2009); Hartmut Hillgenberg, *A Fresh Look at Soft Law*, 10 EUR. J. OF INT'L L., 499, 502 (1999); ROBERT ANDOMO, *The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the Development of Universal Norms in Bioethics*, UNESCO (July 2007), <http://>

www.unesco.de/1507.html.

¹³¹ See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34

¹³² See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999) (illustrating an example of Nigeria's Constitution requiring treaties be enacted by the National Assembly in order to have the force of law).

¹³³ See Maria Lee, et al., *Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure*, 25 J. OF ENVTL. L., 33, 33 (2012) (discussing how unreasonable public participation rights may become a "simple bureaucratic hurdle, frustrating for all concerned."); See also, Maria Lee & Carolyn Abbot, *The Usual Suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus Convention*, 66 MOD. L. REV. 80, 82-83 (2003); Julia Black, *Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II*, 21 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 33, 33 (2001); Julia Black, *Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I*, 20 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 597, 597 (2000).

¹³⁴ See Goddy Osa Igbaekemen et al., *The Effect of Corruption on Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria*, 10 CANADIAN SOC. SCI. 149, 149-50 (2014).

¹³⁵ See INT'L CRISIS GRP., *THE SWAMPS OF INSURGENCY: NIGERIA'S DELTA UNREST* (2006) (illustrating an example of Nigeria's oil conflict, protests, violence, and kidnapping that have perennially halted oil exploration processes and have significantly reduced government income from the oil sector), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/The%20Swamps%20of%20Insurgency%20Nigerias%20Delta%20Unrest.pdf>; OIL AND INSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA: MANAGING THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF PETRO VIOLENCE 13, 23 (Cyril Obi & Siri Aas Rustad eds., 2011); see also Anca M, Cotet & Kevin K. Tsui, *Oil and Conflict: What does the Cross-Country Analysis*

Really Show, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 49, 49-80 (2013); Augustine Ikelegbe, *The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria*, 14 NORDIC J. OF AFR. STUD. 208, 208-233 (2005).

¹³⁶ See NGO DIPLOMACY: THE INFLUENCE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (Michele M. Betsill & Elisabeth Corell eds., 2007); Michele M. Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, *NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis*, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 65, 65-85 (2001); Chad Carpenter, *Business, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate*, 77 INT'L AFF. 313, 313-28 (2001); Elisabeth Corell & Michele M. Betsill, *A Comparative Look at NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate Change*, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., 86, 86-107 (2001); Bas Arts, *The Political Influence of Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions* (1998); KAL RAUSTIALA & NATALIE L. BRIDGEMAN, *NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME* 1-35 (2007). See generally SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR, ET AL. PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: LEGAL BASIS AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE (2002); Steinar Andresen & Lars H. Gulbrandsen, *The Roles of NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance, in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE*, 1, 169 (Hovi, Stokke, & Ulfstein eds. 2005).

¹³⁷ See Afr. Comm'n Resolution, *supra* note 34.

¹³⁸ See *id.*

¹³⁹ See *id.*

ENDNOTES: THE ABSENCE OF NORTHERN NIGERIA'S SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE RISE OF BOKO HARAM

continued from page 23

¹ See Tim Cocks & Alexis Akwagyiram, *Nigeria's Buhari Wins Historic Election Landslide*, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/us-nigeria-election-idUSKBN0MR0VN20150331>.

² See Robin Denselow, *Nigeria's New President Muhammadu Buhari- The Man Who Jailed Fela Kuti*, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/apr/01/nigerias-new-president-muhammadu-buhari-is-the-man-who-put-fela-kuti-in-jail>.

³ See *To The Victor the Toils*, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21647666-low-oil-price-has-revealed-grave-problems-africas-biggest-economy>.

⁴ See Denselow, *supra* note 2.

⁵ See William Wallis, *Blighted Economy in Nigeria's North Fuels Brutal Insurgency*, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 13, 2014), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1fc5b242-daa7-11e3-a448-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3WShuIBCz>.

⁶ See John Campbell, *Why Nigeria's North South Distinction is Important*, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 7, 2011), <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/why-nigerias-north-south-distinction-important/p24029>.

⁷ See *id.*

⁸ See *id.*

⁹ See *id.*

¹⁰ See *id.*

¹¹ See Lynn Taylor, Note, *Boko Haram Terrorism: Reaching Across International Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in the Humanitarian Crisis*, 21 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (Fall 2014)

¹² Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region*, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER SENTINEL (Oct. 31, 2014), <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region>.

¹³ See Taylor, *supra* note 11, at 4.

¹⁴ See *id.*

¹⁵ See Zenn, *supra* note 12.

¹⁶ Bina Shah, *Boko Haram Beyond Nigeria: Girls' Education Under Threat*, AL-JAZEERA (Jun. 3, 2014), <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-nigeria-education-20146363912922864.html>.

¹⁷ Chineme Okafor, *Nigeria: Rebuilding the Ruins*, ALL AFRICA (Apr. 2, 2015), <http://allafrica.com/stories/201504020741.html>.

¹⁸ See Eve Conant, *Nigeria's Schoolgirl Kidnappings Cast Light on Child Trafficking*, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (May 15, 2014), <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140515-nigeria-girls-boko-haram-child-trafficking-world/>.

¹⁹ See Zenn, *supra* note 12.

²⁰ See Taylor, *supra* note 11, at 14.

²¹ UNICEF, *Millennium Development Goals*, <http://www.unicef.org/mdg/education.html> (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).

²² See Taylor, *supra* note 11, at 11.

²³ See *id.* at 13.

²⁴ See *id.* at 11.

²⁵ See Taylor, *supra* note 11, at 14.

ENDNOTES: "MADE IN ETHIOPIA" – THE NEW NORM IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

continued from page 24

² UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION, *THE WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 74* (2014) available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf. (last visited April 15, 2015) (noting that FDI into the country has increased by \$674 million between 2013 and 2014).

³ Elizabeth Cline, *Will Ethiopia Flourish or Suffer Under Fast Fashion*, SOURCING JOURNAL ONLINE (October 3, 2014), <https://www.sourcingjournalonline.com/will-ethiopia-flourish-suffer-fast-fashion-cline/>.

⁴ Simona Foltyn, *Ethiopia: Booming business, underpaid workers*, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Dec. 9, 2014), <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/12/ethiopia-booming-business-underpaid-workers-20141228732485264.html>.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*; ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT AGENCY, *INVEST IN ETHIOPIA: AN INVEST-*

MENT GUIDE TO ETHIOPIA 6 (2013), available at http://ethemb.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Investment_Guide-2013.pdf; INVEST IN ETHIOPIA, TEXTILES: INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 1, available at http://ethemb.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Textiles_2010.pdf (last visited April 15, 2015).

⁷ INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, *NATIONAL LABOUR LAW PROFILE: FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA*, http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_158894/lang-en/index.htm (last visited April 15, 2015).

⁸ Foltyn, *supra* note 4, at 3.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ NATIONAL LABOUR LAW PROFILE, *supra* note 7, at 18.

¹¹ Nathan Siegel, *The Next Shirt You Buy May Say 'Made in Ethiopia.'* *Here's Why*, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (October 28 2014), <http://www.npr>.

org/2014/10/28/359655632/the-next-shirt-you-buy-may-say-made-in-ethiopia-heres-why; *Foltyn, supra* note 4, at 3 (showing that Ethiopian garment workers earn between \$37 and \$53).

¹² *Foltyn, supra* note 4, at 3.

¹³ C131–Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970, International Labour Organization, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312276 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).

¹⁴ INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, MINIMUM WAGE SYSTEMS 185 (2014), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_235287.pdf.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.* at 11.

¹⁷ Catherine Saget, *Is the Minimum Wage an Effective Tool to Promote Decent Work and Reduce Poverty? The Experience of Selected Developing Countries*, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_142310.pdf (last visited April 15, 2015)

¹⁸ Richard Anker, *Estimating a Living Wage: A Methodological Review*, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE (2011) (defining livable wage as a wage “that workers and their families should be able to afford a basic, but decent, life style that is considered acceptable by society at its current level of economic development. Workers and their families should be able to live above the poverty level, and be able to participate in social and cultural life.”).

¹⁹ Siegel, *supra* note 11, at 1.