Disciplinary Privilege and the Promise of Decampment: A Response to James Thou Gathii

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DISCIPLINARY PRIVILEGE AND THE PROMISE OF DECAMPMENT: A RESPONSE TO JAMES THUO GATHII’S “THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A THIRD WORLD VIEW”

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It is an immense privilege to respond, as discussant, to James Gathii’s 2020 Grotius Lecture.¹ I have known and admired Professor Gathii and his work for decades. He is one of those people who manages to combine great accomplishment in international legal scholarship and practice with an unswerving commitment to teaching, collegiality, and mentoring. In these, and in other ways, James Gathii walks his talk. And his talk, as you have heard, is challenging.

Gathii’s lecture issues two challenges to this year’s meeting of the American Society of International Law and to the discipline and profession that it represents. The first is a challenge to the discipline’s “limited geography of places and ideas.”² Gathii asks us to scrutinize carefully the places to which we look when registering significant theoretical and doctrinal developments in international law. In

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2. Id. at 378.
particular, he asks us to note the discipline’s endemic under-attention to institutions and experts located in Africa and to legal innovations for which they are responsible. The second is a challenge to take account of that distinctive point of embarkation for work in international law that is the “subaltern epistemic location” assumed by Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). I am going to address each of these challenges, to try to amplify them a little, and to consider what they might mean for scholars writing and practicing from other epistemic locations. To do so, I want first to connect these two challenges to the theme of the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law: the promise of international law.

I. THE PROMISES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

At least two notions of the word “promise” surface in Gathii’s lecture, where they work in some tension with one another. The first is a notion of promise as a declaration or assurance made to another person or, in an older meaning, a feeling of assurance. This is the promise of contractualism. The second is an idea of promise connected to futurity. That is, promise as an indication of a future event or condition. This is the promise of counterfactualism.

As to the first, Gathii works to dislodge that sense of assurance that international law often seems to offer. Perhaps, he suggests, we should not feel so confident in the amplitude and beneficence of our discipline’s promises. More specifically, Gathii challenges that disciplinary assurance that enables “international law produced in places like Arusha” to be hidden “in plain sight”. International law, as a discipline, claims to invite engagement from all places and all peoples. Anyone willing to sign up, so to speak, is supposed to be welcome. Yet somehow, African jurists always seem to be on the outside of its promissory dealings.

As Gathii makes very clear, his point in asking among whom the promises of international law are made is not to argue for broader recognition. His argument is, rather, for resistance—that is, resistance to “knowledge production systems that silence [African jurists] and

3. Id. at 379.
5. Gathii, supra note 1, at 380.
their engagements with international law.” To put it possibly too crudely, this is an argument for anti-racism, not for racial tolerance. Gathii’s call is for action, not for permission.

Alongside this call, Gathii’s lecture also evokes a second idea of the promise of international law. He does so by refiguring the futurity with which international law is commonly invested. In his account, international law’s future promise is most apparent in the willingness of TWAIL scholars to both “struggle against the international law they were taught” and yet remain “enamored” of it—to still see it as amenable to being “rescued.” The promise of international law so rendered is not a near-neighbor of its present. The future condition of international law evoked in the “rebel imagination” of TWAIL is almost surreal in its insistence upon multiple possibilities latent in the now. And yet its engagements are also resolutely practical, as Gathii highlights when he speaks of the many ways in which TWAIL scholars are active in the practice of international law.

It is important to note that this second sense of promise is not a negation of the first. TWAIL scholars’ continued willingness to work on international law’s future does not correct or make up for the blindness of the discipline stemming from its misplaced assurance. Rather, this futurist sense of promise proceeds directly from the discipline’s confident myopia. It is precisely because the creative work of international lawyers working in Arusha has been “marginalized doctrinally and theoretically” that TWAIL scholars taking Arusha and other Third World locales as an epistemic starting point can offer

6. Id. at 388.

7. See Alana Lentin, What Happens to Anti-Racism When We Are Post-Race?, 19 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 159, 159–60 (2011) (arguing that “the problematisation of race put forward by anti-racist activists and scholars has been hampered by a post-racial agenda that participates in relativizing the experience of racism, consequently assisting in perpetuating it”); Yin Paradies, Whither Anti-Racism?, 39 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1, 4 (2016) (introducing the three key critiques of tolerance as anti-racism: (1) “[racial tolerance] is morally inadequate in that racism should be overcome rather than abided,” (2) it “perpetuates or, at least, fails to remedy the asymmetrical power relations inherent in racialized systems of disadvantage/oppression,” and (3) “it cannot be achieved in the context of ‘super-diversity’”).

8. Gathii, supra note 1, at 408.

9. Id. at 408.
something other than an affirmation of the pre-existing order: something that smacks of the future.\textsuperscript{10}

What, then, is this other future that international law might yet promise? And how might we get there, if we seek to do so? To think through these questions, let us return, now, to the two senses of location—and prospects for relocation—that James Gathii offers in his talk. The first is geographic and the second, epistemic.

\textbf{II. THE LOCATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW}

The promise of international law that Gathii calls forth is geographic not historic. That is to say, the alternative future of which he speaks is spatial rather than sequential in its relationship to the present. The work required to arrive at this other place is redistributive, rather than developmental. This futurity is not a matter of advancement. It is not a condition toward which we may expect, almost inevitably, to progress.\textsuperscript{11} Instead, the anti-compartmental, intersectional approach to international law of which Gathiis speaks—this is already here, already in practice. We can, so to speak, go there.

Likewise, the promise of listening to and learning from jurists working in Arusha is not the promise of cosmopolitan erudition. This is not the Grotius Lecture as travelogue. Rather, its promise depends on displacement and replacement. It seems to me that by proposing that international lawyers learn more from legal work ongoing in Arusha, Gathii is not asking for a dash of African jurisprudence to be included in the existing international legal canon in some taste-enhancing way. I hear him saying, in effect, international lawyers: move aside, decamp. There is another canon from which we may learn. There is another ground from which to begin. But, in order to do so, we must give up some of the things we know, practice, and teach. We must cut some ties, break some bonds, and relinquish some powers that we relish. We must rehinge the discipline on another pivot of places and ideas and then do so again and again. That is, we who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Id. at 383.
\item \textsuperscript{11} THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCOURSE VII (2009) (observing that the idea of progress as a natural and ineluctable force is ubiquitous within the discipline of international law— a narrative which Gathii’s lecture rejected).
\end{itemize}
live and learn in places like Washington DC, Geneva, New York, Paris, London, and The Hague—or, in my case, the somewhat less central location of Sydney—must try to take other places and traditions as keystones for our work, or defer to those who do. In my case, I hear this as a call to center First Nations jurists and envoys as founding thinkers of the international in settler colonies like the one I inhabit.¹²

That other pivot is the distinct epistemic location of which TWAIL is a marker in Gathii’s lecture. Again, TWAIL is not, by Gathii’s description, just one perspective among many. It is not an ornamental enhancement to international law’s décor. It is an entire world—at once, both material and ideal. TWAIL has an account of sources and sovereignty, self-defense and self-determination, the law of the sea and the laws of war. It offers far more than tweaks and add-ons. TWAIL is at least as general a world view as that of so-called “general” international law routinely set out in textbooks. And like all world views, it has blind spots and biases embedded within it. TWAIL cannot claim to be outside of power. On the contrary, TWAIL scholarship is often highly self-critical. At its most cogent, it is as intolerant of its own complicities and chauvinisms as it is intolerant of so much of international law’s tepid ambivalence toward power and privilege.

¹² See RAVI DE COSTA, A HIGHER AUTHORITY: INDIGENOUS TRANSNATIONALISM AND AUSTRALIA (2006) (observing that First Nations peoples in Australia were engaged in transnational relations long before colonial displacement, but were compelled to reinvent their transnationalism from the 1970s onwards as part of a global movement oriented around international institutions); Mark McMillan, Koowarta and the Rival Indigenous International: Our Place as Indigenous Peoples in the International, 23 GRIFFITH L. REV. 110, 117–18 (2014) (characterizing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 as a meeting point of law for indigenous people outside of the Anglo-Australian legal system); Mark McMillan & Sophie Rigney, The Place of the First Peoples in the International Sphere: A Logical Starting Point for the Demand for Justice by Indigenous Peoples, 39 MELB. U.L. REV. 981, 992 (2016) (arguing that indigeneity was developed as a means of stabilizing the international order and justifying colonial expansion, but that this and other fundaments of the modern international remain open to First Nations’ reinvention).
III. THE POLITICS OF PRIVILEGE

If TWAIL scholarship makes knowledge otherwise—that is, in a register of relentless anti-subordination—then what does that scholarship demand of international lawyers proceeding from other epistemic locations and in other registers?

One answer could be nothing at all. TWAIL scholarship does not come begging at the door of non-TWAIL scholars. TWAIL scholarship does not need to integrate or collaborate. There is quite enough energy and heterogeneity within the “movement-of-sorts” that is TWAIL in order to sustain and grow it. Gathii’s lecture, and the accompanying bibliography, make this very apparent.13

Gathii’s lecture is, however, more generous and open-doored than that. It is addressed, in part, to those “interested in engaging with and learning from this scholarship” and keen to “diversify their syllabus and curriculum.”14 This suggests a second possible answer: listen, learn, and move out of the way.15 Delete core texts from the syllabus. Try inserting African jurists, Indigenous jurists and others working from subaltern locales at the heart of the international law canon, whether in teaching or in practice. Also, Gathii seems to be suggesting, do not presume to know what TWAIL scholars are on about or assume that they all agree—read the work. James Gathii’s lecture has provided us all with many authors and texts to follow up on.16 In part, this lecture has been an invitation to a kind of virtual study group.

Yet, as the Indian literary theorist Gayatri Spivak has cautioned, to

13. See generally Gathii, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 414.
15. Listening, in this context, has relatively little to do with the kind of exchange of arguments and counter-arguments routinely enacted in legal practice and scholarship. It recalls, rather, the “insurgent,” uneasy listening of James Baldwin. See Ed Pavlić, Who Can Afford to Improvise? James Baldwin and Black Music, the Lyric and the Listeners 164, 166, 292–93 (2016) (suggesting that “insurgent listening” of a kind encouraged by the lyric tradition of black music, enables people to touch the turbulence of life and “prompts us to listen more closely to what’s going on within, between, and around us”); Shana L. Redmond, Of Treads and Thunder: The Insurgent Listening of Lorraine Hansberry and James Baldwin, 49 Black Scholar: J. Black Stud. & Research 51, 52–53 (2019) (arguing that insurgent listening is “the strategic, interdisciplinary, and multimethod curation of the world as sound” or an attempt at reordering).
16. See generally Gathii, supra note 1.
listen for the subaltern voice entails more than fixating on concrete experiences of the oppressed.\textsuperscript{17} The subaltern epistemic location that Gathii invokes is irredeemably heterogenous. It is not one place, one viewpoint, one voice. It is not a place of powerlessness. It is also not a place of distinctive black genius—the figment of apologetic fantasy of which the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe is so scathing.\textsuperscript{18}

No, the epistemic location that Gathii wants to allow those of us embarking from other locations to encounter may, in his rendering, be inviting and hospitable. But it is neither abject nor celestial. It is fraught.

Those of us reading and writing from other epistemic beginnings must engage, I think, with humility. We will make mistakes. Goodness knows, I have. Our good intentions will not insulate us from responsibility. The history of racism is replete with good intentions and good manners. Taking up the challenge of anti-racism, with TWAIL scholars as main-stage interlocutors—this requires far more than benevolence, far more than incremental reform. It demands redistribution and handover. It requires breaking things, but doing so with care and insight, not in the Silicon Valley mode. Read and listen, but also—reallocate resources and devolve power. This is something of what I hear James Gathii saying to me and to other international lawyers. This is the promise that I hear him offering. International law’s future may be already here—just not in the places and ways in which we tend to look for it.

I am grateful to James Gathii for relocating and recalling the promise of international law. These are troubled and troubling times, but they are also times at which fundamental, structural change seems

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{See} Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, \textit{Can the Subaltern Speak?}, in \textsc{Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture} 271, 275 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1998) (recognizing the role that intellectuals’ experience plays in disclosing the experiences of the oppressed); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, \textit{Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular}, 8 \textsc{Postcolonial Stud.} 475, 475 (2005) (“Subalternity cannot be generalized according to hegemonic logic.”).

\textsuperscript{18} \textsc{Achille Mbembe}, \textit{On the Postcolony} 12 (2001) (“To secure emancipation and recognition, [many African thinkers] thought, required the production of an apologetic discourse based on rediscovery of what was supposed to be the essence, the distinctive genius, of the black ‘race.’”).
within reach and indeed already underway—change that would be well informed by the TWAIL commitment to anti-subordination. That is, if we are collectively up to the task of realizing this moment’s promise.