Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Non-Custodial Prevention

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PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS: THE EXPLOSION OF TARGETED, NONCUSTODIAL PREVENTION

Jennifer C. Daskal†

This Article exposes the ways in which noncustodial pre-crime restraints have proliferated over the past decade, focusing in particular on three notable examples—terrorism-related financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and the array of residential, employment, and related restrictions imposed on sex offenders. Because such restraints do not involve physical incapacitation, they are rarely deemed to infringe core liberty interests. Because they are preventive, not punitive, criminal law procedural protections do not apply. They have exploded largely unchecked—subject to little more than bare rationality review and negligible procedural protections—and without any coherent theory as to their appropriate limits.

The Article examines this category of noncustodial pre-crime restraints as a whole and develops a framework for evaluating, limiting, and legitimizing their use. It accepts the preventive frame in which they operate but argues that in some instances, noncustodial restraints can so thoroughly constrain an individual’s functioning that they are equivalent to de facto imprisonment and ought to be treated as such. Even in the more common case of partial restraints, enhanced substantive and procedural safeguards are needed to preserve the respect for individuals’ equal dignity, freedom of choice, and moral autonomy at the heart of the liberty interest that the Constitution and a just society protect.

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INTRODUCTION

Most of us intuitively think that it makes sense to deny someone an opportunity to board a plane if there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she will try to blow it up once on board. We also believe that it is reasonable to freeze an entity’s assets if it would otherwise spirit money to al Qaeda’s coffers. And we tend to agree that it is sound policy to prohibit someone with a history of sexually abusing children from working in an elementary school.

But there is a grave danger that what starts out as a reasonable-sounding security measure operates as a one-way ratchet, increasing in scope and severity over time. We have, for example, seen the lists of suspected terrorists who are prohibited from flying, opening a bank account, or entering the country swell over the last decade. Similarly, the array of offenses that trigger the label of “dangerous sex offender” has ballooned, and the severity of the associated residential and employment restrictions has increased as well. Meanwhile, getting oneself removed from such a list involves establishing a nearly impossible-to-establish fact about the future: that one will not do whatever bad act the restriction is designed to prevent.

These types of restrictions—what I call targeted, noncustodial pre-crime restraints—have proliferated over the past decade. The re-

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1 See infra notes 13, 20.
2 See infra notes 14, 107 and accompanying text.
3 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
4 The term "precrime" was coined in Phillip K. Dick’s short story, The Minority Report, first published in 1987 and made into a hit movie in 2002. See PHILLIP K. DICK, MINORITY REPORT 4 (1987). While both the story and movie focus on what is often labeled "prepun-
straints are justified by asserted security needs, based on an assessment that a particular individual or entity is likely to commit a future bad act. They are deemed preventive, not punitive, and therefore are not subject to the array of procedural protections that apply to criminal law sanctions. Because they do not involve custodial restraint or discriminate (at least overtly) based on race or gender, they are subject to minimal substantive scrutiny and minimal procedural safeguards. While most prevalent in the national security realm, they also arise in the efforts to prevent presumptively dangerous sex offenders, aliens, and spousal abusers from striking. In some cases, the restrictions are so severe that they amount to a near-total deprivation of the ability to participate in society or to live a meaningful or free life. In other cases, the restrictions are not so extensive but affirmatively restrain their targets' liberty and stamp them as a presumptively dangerous underclass.

For example, under the rubric of preventing terrorism financing, the Secretaries of State and Treasury have far-reaching authority to designate entities and individuals as "specially designated global terrorists," freeze their assets, and prohibit all transactions with the designated groups or people. For the dozen U.S.-based entities that have been listed, such a designation is an effective death knell. For U.S. residents, it is the equivalent of labeling the individual with a radioactive scarlet letter A. Designated individuals cannot buy groceries, pay their rent, or receive medical care without a license from the government. Providers of goods or services to such entities or organizations are themselves subject to listing as specially designated global terrorists as well as civil and criminal penalties. Reviewing courts in the United States have emphasized process rights, if they have exercised review at all, while continuing to defer to the Executive's determination as to the criteria for and the fact of designation. A list that designated twenty-seven individuals and entities when it was first announced by President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks has grown to more than 700 (mostly non-U.S. citizens) as of September 2013.13

The effort to control sex offenders has resulted in a combination of restrictions so pervasive that it has led to banishment from a number of towns and cities.14 Some have been forced into homelessness—living on the street or under bridges because there is no other place for them to go.15 Others can no longer take their children to play in local parks or other public places, even if they qualify for the "sex offender" label because of statutory rape as a teenager or a single, decades-old indecent-exposure conviction.16

13 See SDN Search, Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/default.aspx (last updated Nov. 14, 2013); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorist Assets Report 5 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2012.pdf ("As of December 31, 2012, a total of 731 individuals and entities had been designated . . . "). As of this writing, nine are U.S.-based entities and one is a U.S. citizen, although other U.S.-based entities and persons were previously listed. U.S. residents and citizens face criminal prosecution and possible designation if they provide any support to any of the designated entities, and individuals are, according to reviewing courts, prohibited from collaterally attacking the underlying designation. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343–46 (M.D. Fla. 2004). Foreign nationals on the list are also often subject to additional sanctions and travel bans imposed by the United Nations Security Council, their home countries, and other countries where they reside or conduct business, although aspects of this scheme have been successfully challenged in court. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union and EC Commission, 3 C.M.L.R. 46 (2008) (finding due process violations in the United Nations’ listing scheme); Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (finding that travel ban violated right to respect for privacy and family life given particular circumstances); S.C. Res. 1904, ¶¶ 20–27, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009) (responding to court challenges by, among other things, creating the Office of the Ombudsperson to deal with delisting requests).


16 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders but Raise Questions, Too, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2012, at A15 ("[A lawyer with the Orange County public de-
Many pre-crime restrictions are less comprehensive but impose significant and often underappreciated costs on the targeted individual nonetheless. The No Fly List, an FBI-managed database that lists thousands of suspected terrorists who are prohibited from traveling by plane, is one such example. In some cases, U.S. citizens and residents have been barred from returning by plane to the United States and told to take a ship instead. Meanwhile, the government refuses to acknowledge who is included on the list or to specify the standards it uses to place individuals on the list. Even those who have been turned away at the airport with a ticket in hand are told that the government can neither confirm nor deny whether they are listed individuals. Recent reporting suggests there are approximately 21,000 people on the No Fly List, including an estimated 500 U.S. citizens.

All of these restrictions share common features: they are targeted at particular individuals, entities, or categories of individuals; they impose noncustodial restrictions; and they are preventive in both purpose and effect. Because of these latter two features—their noncustodial, nonpunitive nature—courts and scholars have subjected them to significantly less scrutiny than other forms of governmental sanction. Detention and other forms of physical restraint

17 See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 26, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder] (emphasizing that “[i]t may be less convenient or more expensive to travel by ship or bus, but this factor does not impinge on the constitutional right to travel”); Peter Finn, Detained Va. Teen Set to Return to U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2011, at B1 (detailing the experiences of a teenager reportedly placed on the No Fly List).


19 Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 41 (explaining that the government does not “confirm or deny whether particular individuals are now or ever have been [included on the No Fly List] because to do so would in effect disclose the fact that the individuals in question are currently or once were the subjects of counterterrorism intelligence-gathering or investigative activity by the federal government”).

20 See Carol Cratty, 21,000 People Now on U.S. No Fly List, CNN (Feb. 2, 2012), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/02/21000-people-now-on-us-no-fly-list/; Sullivan, supra note 18. The United States does not officially disclose the numbers of people on the List, which is regularly updated.

21 A notable exception is Professor Erin Murphy’s excellent work, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1322 (2008). Murphy’s focus, however, differs from mine in that she is primarily concerned with what she calls the “technologies of control,” the links between surveillance technology and the increased tracking and monitoring of individuals. Id. at 1328–29. I, by comparison, focus exclusively on those government-imposed restraints that cross over from tracking and monitoring to imposing targeted, affirmative restrictions on what individuals can do and where they can go. I emphasize in particular the evolution,
infringe entrenched liberty interests, and government-imposed punishment triggers an array of procedural protections and is subject to clear restrictions (such as prohibitions on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment). By contrast, liberty interests that do not involve physical incapacitation or bodily intrusions are rarely considered "core" and tend to be both undervalued and undertheorized. 22 Meanwhile, the boundaries of the preventive state are ill defined and unsettled, with no clear limits as to whether, when, and how the state can engage in targeted sanctions in the name of stopping a future bad act. 23

This Article examines the category of targeted, noncustodial pre-crime sanctions as a whole, offering a framework for courts and legislators to evaluate such restrictions going forward. 24 In Part I, I detail examples of targeted, noncustodial and pre-crime sanctions that operate in a number of different contexts. Specifically, I focus on targeted financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and residential and other restrictions placed on presumptively dangerous sex offenders.

In Part II, I examine why such restraints raise particular concerns and why they have evaded sufficient scrutiny to date—reasons related to their noncustodial and preventive nature. In some, albeit limited, instances, noncustodial restraints can so fully prevent the target from living a free and meaningful life that the restraints should be consid-

22 See id. at 1326 ("[W]hereas a rich debate explores the potential for abuse of physical incapacitation, whether as a matter of criminal sanction or 'regulatory' control, a corresponding dialogue surrounding the risks posed by nonphysical ... means of control is conspicuously lacking."); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (describing freedom from physical incapacitation as a "core" liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause).

23 As Professor Carol Steiker warned well over a decade ago, the near-exclusive focus on the limits of permissible punishment left "the mistaken impression that if the state is not punishing, it is not doing anything objectionable at all." Carol S. Steiker, Forward, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 784 (1998). For an excellent, recent exploration of the many facets of state-imposed forms of coercive prevention, see generally Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013).

24 A word on scope: This Article focuses on those targeted, preventive, and noncustodial measures that are both coercive and predicated on a particularized assessment of the individual or organization’s likelihood to commit a crime or other bad act—what I call "pre-crime restraints." There is an array of other preventive, targeted, and noncustodial measures that are pre-crime but not restrictive. One expects, for example, that the FBI will make pre-crime judgments about who to target for investigations; an investigatory agency that failed to do so would not be particularly effective. My focus is on those measures that cross from tracking and monitoring into restricting and sanctioning. There also exist a number of restrictive, preventive (and at times targeted) measures that I do not consider pre-crime because they are not based on a particular individual’s or entity’s propensity to commit a particular bad act. Examples include most health and safety requirements, such as environmental regulations, general licensing requirements, and mandatory vaccination laws.
er a form of de facto imprisonment. In most cases, the restraints are partial rather than total but still significantly diminish the capacity to make choices central to a meaningful life and stamp their targets as second-class.\textsuperscript{25} Permanent restrictions on the ability to fly, for example, deny targeted individuals a central mode of transport in modern life, thereby impeding liberty interests in travel,\textsuperscript{26} choice of employment,\textsuperscript{27} and maintenance of familial and other intimate connections.\textsuperscript{28}

This Part also highlights a set of concerns common to all pre-crime restraints, whether custodial or noncustodial—namely, the risk of error and abuse, the inexorable incentives for expansion, the singling out of individuals and groups for second-class treatment, and the failure to respect individuals’ moral autonomy.

In Part III, I argue that while targeted, noncustodial pre-crime restraints can serve a valid governmental purpose, there must be effective limits on their use. Comprehensive restraints that result in near-total control over an individual’s movement and activities, such as certain financial sanctions applied to U.S. residents and the most restrictive limits placed on sex offenders, ought to trigger the same substantive limits and procedural protections that would apply if the state were seeking to detain the individual physically. They could, for example, operate as discrete gap-fillers (as is allowed with pretrial detention)\textsuperscript{29} or apply narrowly to those who pose a danger and have an additional impairment making it difficult, if not impossible, to control

\textsuperscript{25} This terminology is borrowed from Professor Martha Nussbaum’s work that discusses the ways in which a state action can lead to total or “partial” imprisonment of its citizens. Martha C. Nussbaum, Forward, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 6 (2007).

\textsuperscript{26} See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (“Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.... Freedom of movement also has large social values.”); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (describing the fundamental right to interstate travel), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).

\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 475–76 (1959) (describing liberty and property consequences of plaintiff’s chosen field of endeavor being “closed to him”). But see Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–96 (1961) (finding no due process violation where employee of government contractor was denied access to her place of employment). The difference in the two cases turns, in part, on the availability (or lack thereof) of other possible employment opportunities in the field of one’s choosing.

\textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that a city ordinance making it a crime for certain family members to live in the same household violated substantive due process).

\textsuperscript{29} This picks up on the argument made by Professor Stephen Schulhofer that “civil deprivation of liberty is permissible only as a gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal process cannot address.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on
their behavior (as is required for civil commitment of sex offenders). They could not, however, operate as broad-based and open-ended tools for managing risk. One need not agree with these specific recommendations, however, to accept the general premise: certain types of noncustodial, targeted, and preventive restrictions so dramatically restrict the ability to lead a meaningful life that they ought to trigger the same substantive scrutiny and procedural protections that apply to physical incapacitation or other bodily restraints.

Other less extreme (and more common) restraints also warrant enhanced substantive scrutiny and procedural safeguards given the often significant liberty interest at stake, the targeted nature and stigmatizing effect of the restraints, and the risk of error. Tailored and adjudicatory restraints, rather than rule-based restraints, ought to be the norm.

In contrast to the extensive and important literature on various forms of preventive detention, there has been only limited attention to the various forms of affirmative, preventive, and noncustodial restraints that have cropped up in multiple contexts and with minimal oversight. The existing scholarship tends to look at each regime in

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the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CON-TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 85 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

30 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (emphasizing "the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment."); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82–83 (1992) (rejecting an approach to civil commitment that would permit the indefinite confinement "of any convicted criminal" after completion of a prison term).


isolation, with the predominant argument being that such restraints should be channeled through the criminal law or categorically prohibited. This Article rejects that approach. Channeling these restraints through the criminal law does little to set substantive, prospective limits on the use of such restraints given the breadth of substantive criminal law and weakness of proportionality review, and it ultimately disserves both the punitive and preventive functions of the law. Accepting the need for and legitimacy of certain preventive measures, this Article develops a framework for setting appropriate substantive and procedural limits on their future use.

I

Pre-Crime Restraints in Operation

The federal government has long had far-reaching authority to take preventive actions by, for example, revoking a security clearance in response to a perceived threat or demanding extensive conditions of pretrial release. States also have longstanding and wide-ranging power to expel a student from school for behavioral reasons, to rescind employment based on an alleged security breach, or to impose stay-away orders in domestic violence cases. These are all forms of noncustodial pre-crime restraints. Over the past decade, the number and scope of such restraints has exploded—mostly in the national security arena but also on the margins of the criminal justice system.

33 For a sampling of the literature arguing that pre-crime prevention is actually punishment in disguise, see Caplan, supra note 32, at 1255–58 (describing No Fly List as equivalent to singling out individuals for punishment); Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 32, at 1117–22; Wayne A. Logan, Populism and Punishment: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification in the Courts, 26 CRIM. JUST. 37, 37–38 (2011); Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Counterrorism, the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide: Evaluating the Designation of U.S. Persons Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 95, 97 (2011). One obvious exception is the work of Professor Murphy, discussed supra note 21.

34 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526–30 (1988) (affirming the Executive Branch’s broad discretion to deny or revoke security clearance pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act).


36 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (noting that “the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools” but finding a First Amendment violation as a result of the particular sanction imposed).

37 For a controversial example, see Lerner v. Casey. 357 U.S. 468, 474, 478 (1958) (finding constitutional the dismissal of New York state employee—an alleged communist—due to security risk).


39 The obvious historical antecedent is the Jim Crow era, in which a series of noncustodial but pervasive restrictions relegated African-Americans to an ostracized underclass.
This Part provides background on three such regimes—terrorism-related financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and restrictions imposed on sex offenders—and examines their purpose and evolution over time. Primarily descriptive, these examples provide important background for the analysis and recommendations made in Parts II and III.40

A. Specially Designated Global Terrorists

Within weeks of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush announced a plan to “starve” terrorists of funding.41 Citing the “continuing and immediate threat” of further terrorist acts, he invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 197742 and issued an Executive Order (the “SDGT Order”) that blocked the property of twenty-seven named individuals and organizations.43 Assets of these “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” or “SDGTs,” as they have come to be known, were immediately frozen.44

Because money is fungible, both the scope of restrictions and categories of persons and entities subject to such restrictions are intentionally broad. The SDGT Order prohibits “U.S. persons”—a term that covers U.S.-based entities, citizens, and residents—from providing any financial or in-kind support to the designated entities, irrespective of the purpose of the support. Financial support intended for the purchase of bomb-making tools and donations earmarked for humanitarian relief projects are equally banned. Violators are subject to civil and criminal penalties and themselves qualify for inclusion on the list due to their support of listed SDGTs.45

The myth of “separate but equal” was eventually chipped away through a series of Supreme Court rulings based on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. For a powerful argument that the racial caste system is reemerging in a new form, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 139–40 (2010) (describing the combined effect of a series of noncustodial restraints imposed on convicted felons).

40 While this Article focuses on the United States’ statutory framework for and constitutional limits to the explosion of noncustodial pre-crime restraints, there are important parallels to a range of other noncustodial targeted restraints imposed by other nations and international bodies. Examples include control orders in the United Kingdom (replaced in 2011 by “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures”) and United Nations—imposed terrorism-related financial sanctions. See, e.g., A v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (addressing control orders and use of classified evidence); infra note 51 (briefly discussing international terrorism-sanction regimes). I intend to pursue a comparative analysis in future work.

41 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-2.html (cautioning that “this is historical material, ’frozen in time’” and that “[t]he web site is no longer updated and links to external web sites and some internal pages will not work”).


44 Id.

The SDGT Order also gives the Secretaries of State and Treasury broad authority to add additional persons and entities to the list. Persons who "pose a significant risk" of committing acts of terrorism, provide financial or other material support or services to listed persons or entities, or are "otherwise associated with" listed persons meet the criteria for inclusion. Within a year, the SDGT list included more than one hundred entities and individuals. By 2006, 375 entities and individuals were so designated, and as of December 2012, 731 entities and individuals were on the list. Many of these individuals and entities are also subject to separate United Nations-imposed sanctions and associated travel bans—often at the behest of the United States.

The use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as a counterterrorism tool is not new: it has its roots in 1995 when President Clinton issued an Executive Order blocking the assets of twelve named persons who were said to "threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process" and giving the Secretaries of Treasury and State the authority to list additional individuals or entities. The post-9/11 use

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47 The term "otherwise associated with" was not defined by regulations until January 25, 2007, after a district court in California ruled that the term was unconstitutional and vague. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The regulation defines "otherwise associated with" as "(a) To own or control; or (b) To attempt, or to conspire with one or more persons, to act for or on behalf of or to provide financial, material, or technological support, or financial or other services, to." 31 C.F.R. § 594.316 (2013). The Central District of California later held that the regulation cured the vagueness and overbreadth problem. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104–07 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
48 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080; see also id. at 49,079 (listing additional criteria for designation).
49 Humanitarian Law Project, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
50 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 13, at 5.
51 See, e.g., Vanessa Baehr-Jones, Mission Possible: How Intelligence Evidence Rules Can Save UN Terrorist Sanctions, 2 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 447, 467 (2011) (describing interplay between the United States' and United Nations' terrorism financial sanction regimes). As the Treasury Department describes it:
Designat[on] . . . exposes and isolates these individuals and organizations, denies them access to the U.S. financial system, and, in the case of a UN designation, the global financial system as well. Furthermore, banks and other private institutions around the world frequently consult OFAC's SDN list and report denying listed persons access to their institutions.
52 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5079–80 (Jan. 23, 1995). Until 1995, the International Emergency Economics Act (IEEPA) had been used to impose sanctions on specific states and their nationals. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012). In Executive Order 12,947, President Clinton targeted for the first time named individuals and entities based not on their nationality but on their specific history of committing and propensity to commit specified bad acts. Later that year, he did the same with respect to certain "significant foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia." Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579, 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995). For an excellent description of IEEPA's history as well as an argument that the use of IEEPA to focus on individuals and nonstate actors is ultra
of the Act, however, has exploded in terms of numbers and scope.\textsuperscript{53} First, in a break from the Clinton-era orders, the Bush-era SDGT Order makes provision of material support or services to listed persons a ground for designation, without any requirement that the specific support or services are aimed at violence or terrorism. A person or entity could be designated for supporting a listed organization even if the support had an innocent purpose.\textsuperscript{54} Second, within weeks of the SDGT Order’s issuance, Congress amended the underlying statute to allow an asset freeze and other restrictions to be applied during the investigatory stage (a “block pending investigation”) even before there had been any designation determination, without specifying how long the freeze could remain in place.\textsuperscript{55} In at least one case, the Treasury Department maintained a block pending investigation for twenty months before a federal district court stepped in and enjoined the government from taking further action to preserve the status quo.\textsuperscript{56} Third, Congress amended the underlying statute to approve the use

\textsuperscript{53} As of December 2012, thirty-eight individuals and entities were designated as “Specially Designated Terrorists” under the Clinton-era terrorism-related orders, as compared to the over 700 individuals and entities designated as SDGTs pursuant to the 2001 designation process. \textit{See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 13, at 5.}

\textsuperscript{54} Intentional provision of support to a SDGT is a criminal law violation even if support is in the form of humanitarian aid. \textit{See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).} The same is true of support to foreign terrorist organizations designated under the parallel State Department-led designation process. \textit{See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721–22, 2729–31 (2010) (rejecting First and Fifth Amendment challenges to the criminal prohibitions on provision of training, services, expert advice, and personnel to designated terrorist organizations).} Criminal defendants and derivative listees are prohibited from collaterally attacking the underlying designation. \textit{See, e.g., United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that defendants charged with assisting terrorist organizations could not collaterally attack the designation). \textit{But see United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (contesting the notion that defendants can lawfully be prohibited from challenging an underlying designation); see also David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 147, 151–56 (2012) (providing excellent analysis of the Humanitarian Law Project case and its broader implications).}

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012)); see also John Roth et al., Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., Monograph on Terrorist Financing 99, 112 (2004) (describing a block pending investigation as requiring just a “single” piece of paper signed by the Director of OFAC but noting that the decision was usually discussed and agreed to in an interagency process).}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 870 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2009).} The assets of Al-Haramain and Global Relief Fund were blocked pending investigation for seven and eleven months, respectively. \textit{See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 986 (9th Cir. 2012); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2002).}
of classified information as a basis for the designation determination and to protect its use from disclosure in any subsequent judicial proceeding.\textsuperscript{57}

While the vast majority of the 700-plus listed entities and individuals is foreign, at least twelve U.S.-based entities and four U.S. citizens have been listed.\textsuperscript{58} For a domestic organization, a blocking order leads to the effective shuttering of its operations.\textsuperscript{59} Assets and property of the entity are immediately frozen, the entity cannot engage in any transactions, and U.S. persons and residents are prohibited from providing any goods or services to the entity. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarized in 2012, "designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct."\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, even if an organization is eventually delisted or a block pending investigation is lifted, it can be difficult for the targeted entity to access their own frozen assets.\textsuperscript{61}

For listed individuals residing in the United States, the effect is draconian. Designation effectively bars them from participating in the society in which they live but for the beneficial and discretionary modifications granted by the federal government. Listed individuals cannot buy groceries, receive medical care, or engage in a single financial transaction without a license from the Treasury Department.

\textsuperscript{57} 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. at 277-78 ("In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information . . . such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.").

\textsuperscript{58} This tally counts both the SGDT and the related Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) list and includes three entities and three individuals no longer included on the list: Salah Mohammad Salah (delisted on November 5, 2012, after having been labeled a SDT for seventeen years), KindHearts (dissolved in 2012 pursuant to a settlement agreement), Anwar al-Aulaqi (reportedly killed by drone strike in Yemen in September 2011), Garad Nor (delisted August 27, 2002), Global Services International, Inc. (an entity delisted August 27, 2002), and Aaran Money Wire Service, Inc. (same). See Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, No. 02CV789JMR/FLN, 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2003); Anti-Terrorism Designations; Anti-Terrorism Designations Removal, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-En forcement/Pages/20121105.aspx.

\textsuperscript{59} See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 979 (noting that designation "completely shuts all domestic operations"); Global Relief Found., Inc., 315 F.3d at 751 (describing a blocking order as forcing an entity to "effectively shut down its operations across the globe"); KindHearts, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (stating that blocking orders "effectively shut the organization down"); see also Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 33, at 95-96 (describing how designation destroyed Global Relief and other American-Islamic charities).

\textsuperscript{60} Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 980.

They cannot even accept gifts in lieu of payment. They are subject to near-total, albeit indirect, government control over their daily activities.

Despite these dramatic consequences, the restrictions are deemed preventive rather than punitive, civil rather than criminal. As a result, criminal law procedural protections do not apply. There is no independent adjudicator, no arraignment where the individual or entity is formally informed of the charges, no requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, no opportunity to cross-examine one’s accusers, and no chance to obtain and respond to all of the evidence presented to the fact finder. Even the less onerous procedural rights in a civil forfeiture case (including the right to conduct discovery, the presence of an independent adjudicator, and the requirement of proof based on a preponderance of the evidence) are not deemed applicable on the theory that property is not formally divested from its owner but merely subject to a temporary, albeit indefinite, freeze. And because a freeze of assets does not involve physical incapacitation, none of the procedural protections (including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard and hearings before an independent adjudicator) that apply to civil commitment are triggered.

Rather, designation determinations are made solely within the Executive Branch, with Treasury and State Department officials acting as the functional prosecutor, fact finder, and review board. In some

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63 See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 55, at 81 (describing a U.S. citizen subject to a blocking order who was placed for five months in the “unenviable choice of starving or being in criminal violation of the OFAC blocking order” until a lawsuit prompted the United States to issue him a license “to allow him to get sufficient money to live”). Discretionary government relief can come with so many strings attached as to make it noneffective: Mohammad Salah, a designated SDT, was granted a license to work and pay for “normal living... expenses,” but the license required that income be deposited in a bank account and imposed such onerous reporting requirements that the only bank willing to open such an account closed it after three years. Complaint at 8–9, Salah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 1:12-cv-07067 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2012). While the impact on foreign-based entities and individuals is less extreme, such entities and individuals often find themselves subject to United Nations and other foreign partner-imposed sanction regimes and travel bans as well, usually at the United States’ behest. See supra note 13.
64 For an argument that these restrictions should be deemed punitive, at least when applied to U.S. persons, see Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 33, at 97.
65 See Roth et al., supra note 55, at 50–51 (“[W]hen a freeze separates the owner from his or her money for dozens of years, [the difference between an IEEPA freeze and civil forfeiture order] is a distinction without a difference.”).
66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (permitting the blocking of an organization’s assets as soon as an organization is designated as a foreign terrorist organization, without providing any mechanism for independent review).
67 Id. (authorizing the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, to “designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization”).
cases, entities and individuals have been notified via publication on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) website or via press release.\(^{68}\) While U.S.-based entities are entitled to an opportunity to review the unclassified record,\(^{69}\) there is no right to any sort of administrative hearing at which the entity or individual may cross-examine its accusers. Entities and individuals must apply for licenses just to obtain the services of an attorney.\(^{70}\)

Court review is post hoc, based solely on a record compiled by the Executive Branch and extremely deferential. The courts require little more than a “reasonable relation” between the facts in the record and the designation determination,\(^{71}\) and even probative information that has come to light after the record has been closed generally will not be considered.\(^{72}\) Reviewing courts have repeatedly emphasized the “extreme” deference due to the Executive Branch given that the terrorist finance designations operate at the “intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law.”\(^{73}\) The deference extends to both the Executive’s fact finding and the nature and scope of the designation scheme itself. It is what I call an Executive Branch-imposed, individualized restraint, with comprehensive effect.

To the extent courts have pushed back, they have focused primarily on procedural rights and thus have left the overall scheme intact. In \textit{Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Treasury}, for example, the Ninth

\(^{68}\) \textit{See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that no prior notice was provided to Al-Haramain before its assets were blocked and a press statement was issued); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing plaintiff as being "made aware of his designation by a Department of the Treasury press release posted on the Internet").


\(^{70}\) 31 C.F.R. § 595.506 (2013); \textit{see also KindHearts}, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (finding that OFAC’s refusal to allow entity to use blocked funds to pay attorney fees was arbitrary and capricious).

\(^{71}\) Two courts have also ruled that probable cause is required to support the initial designation decision. \textit{Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc.}, 686 F.3d at 993; \textit{KindHearts}, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 881–82. These rulings also suggest—but do not conclusively require—that the government either provide the designated entity or individual unclassified summaries of any classified evidence relied upon or allow cleared counsel to review it. That said, at least one district court has since concluded that “OFAC has no obligation to offer unclassified summaries or access to cleared counsel” and that alternative “mitigation measures” could suffice. \textit{Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury}, No. 3:07-CV-01155, 2012 WL 6203136, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2012); \textit{see also Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft}, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that government should be prohibited from relying on classified evidence and failing to impose any disclosure obligations).

\(^{72}\) \textit{See, e.g., Kadi v. Geithner}, No. 09-0108, 2012 WL 898778, at *11 (D.D.C Mar. 19, 2012) (refusing to consider a corrected document since the correction postdated the agency’s decision and was therefore not part of the record).

\(^{73}\) \textit{Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc.}, 686 F.3d at 979 (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); \textit{see Kadi}, 2012 WL 898778, at *6.
Circuit concluded that the government violated an Oregon-based entity’s due process rights by failing to provide over a span of four years the reasons for its designation.\textsuperscript{74} It also ruled that the government violated the entity’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to obtain a warrant before seizing its assets. But ultimately the court found both errors harmless.\textsuperscript{75} Going forward, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling obliges the government to obtain a warrant before seizing an entity’s assets; to provide a “terse and complete statement of [the] reasons” for designation, although even that requirement can be waived based on a showing of undue burden;\textsuperscript{76} and to make available unclassified summaries of the classified information relied upon, provide a mechanism by which cleared counsel could review the classified information, or adequately defend their failure to do so (presumably on national security grounds).\textsuperscript{77} As long as these basic procedural requirements are met, the deferential standard of review applies.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, the broad designation criteria, expansive set of restrictions, and administrative fact-finding process are left largely unchecked. Entities and individuals can still be effectively shut down based merely on a probable cause or reasonable basis finding by the Executive Branch, without any independent, de novo court review.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{74} The court found that “[i]n the entire four-year period, only one document could be viewed as supplying some reasons for OFAC’s investigation and designation decision.” 686 F.3d at 985. As a result, Al-Haramain was forced to guess at the reason for designation: “Some of those guesses ended up being correct . . . and some of those guesses ended up being incorrect.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 995 (concluding that “no exception applies to OFAC’s warrantless seizure of AHIF-Oregon’s assets and the seizure is not justified under a ‘general reasonableness’ test”). The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded, however, that the due process error was harmless and remanded to determine what, “if any,” remedy was required in response to the Fourth Amendment violation. \textit{Id.} at 1001. On remand, Al-Haramain conceded that the Fourth Amendment violation was harmless given the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the administrative record supported designation. \textit{Al-Haramain}, 2012 WL 6203136, at *6–7. The Ninth Circuit also separately concluded that the prohibition on coordinated advocacy with Al-Haramain violated the First Amendment. \textit{Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc.}, 686 F.3d at 1001.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Id.} at 986.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id.} at 983 (recognizing that “disclosure may not always be possible” but emphasizing that “[i]n many cases . . . some information could be summarized or presented to a lawyer with a security clearance without implicating national security” and putting the burden on the government to “defend[ ]” the failure to do so).

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id.} at 979 (reiterating “that our review—in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law—is extremely deferential” (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).

\textsuperscript{79} As of this writing, I am aware of only one other case in which the court has found that the designation process violated an entity’s constitutional rights. In KindHearts, as in \textit{Al-Haramain}, a district court found a due process and Fourth Amendment violation but rejected other challenges to the designation scheme itself. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2009). The case ultimately settled in November 2011, but it was in many ways a Pyrrhic victory: KindHearts agreed to dissolve itself in exchange for being permitted to spend its frozen assets and for
For scholars like Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, such deference—particularly in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks—is both inevitable and beneficial.\(^8\) In a 2009 article, Posner and Vermeule describe the Executive asserting broad power to respond to a crisis and the legislature and courts invariably acquiescing to a significant degree.\(^8\) They further posit that once the crisis passes, "legality and legitimacy will once again pull in tandem; courts then have more freedom to invalidate emergency measures, but it is less important whether or not they do so, as the emergency measure will in large part have already worked, or not."\(^8\)

But this analysis discounts the ways in which these "emergency" measures become embedded into the legal framework, and the normative implications are troubling. Once the immediate crisis has passed, courts are, as Posner and Vermeule suggest, more likely to engage. But, with some notable exceptions,\(^8\) courts tend to push on the edges only, emphasizing process-based rights while leaving broad policies in place.\(^8\) Thus, what starts out as emergency lawmaking often becomes institutionalized. This is a disturbing state of affairs. Once the crisis passes, it is critically important that courts, as well as

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80 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1679.
82 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1659–60.
83 A quadruplet of Supreme Court post-9/11 cases comprise a noteworthy repudiation of the Executive’s "emergency" detention and trial policies. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (holding that denial of habeas corpus to Guantanamo Bay detainees violated the Suspension Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006) (declaring unlawful the military commissions created by Executive Order); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (requiring that citizen-detainees be provided a "meaningful opportunity" to challenge the basis of detention and concluding that had not taken place in petitioner’s case); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004) (holding that statutory writ of habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo Bay detainees). But as Posner and Vermeule point out, even these cases focused primarily on process rights, failed to order the release of any petitioner, and, at least in the case of Hamdi, broadly affirmed the Executive Branch’s asserted authority to detain pursuant to the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1618–19.
84 Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 1617–19 (discussing how courts "reassert themselves, at least symbolically" in the aftermath of a crisis but noting that there are "sharp pragmatic limits on what courts are willing to do when faced with executive claims of security needs").

legislators, take a hard look at emergency measures—particularly those that impose targeted, affirmative restraints. With respect to the financial sanction regime, review has focused almost exclusively on procedural issues, with little in the way of substantive limit setting.

B. No Fly List

The No Fly List has the purpose of preventing would-be terrorists from using airplanes as weapons or otherwise threatening the safety of other passengers on board. Persons on the No Fly List are prohibited from boarding a U.S.-based air carrier or any plane transiting through the United States or over U.S. airspace.

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the precursor to the No Fly List had just twelve names on it. As of February 2012, the List reportedly included 21,000 names, including approximately 500 U.S. citizens. In several instances, U.S. citizens and long-time U.S. residents have been prohibited from flying home to the United States, presumably

85 Posner and Vermeule’s equanimity may stem from the way in which they approach the problem. In describing the Executive’s response to the 2009 financial meltdown and the 2001 terrorist attacks as part of the same phenomenon, they gloss over the key distinction between the two: in 2009, the Executive responded with a targeted infusion of government assistance, whereas in 2001, the Executive responded by targeting individuals and entities for sanction. While it may be both appropriate and advantageous that courts defer to the Executive’s assessment of how best to allocate discretionary financing—and, in fact, Posner and Vermeule point to the destabilizing market effect of having courts second-guess those determinations, see id. at 1658—government interventions that impose targeted, affirmative restraints can have long-standing consequences for individual liberty interests and warrant enhanced scrutiny as a result. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 32, at 242 (describing and lauding Treasury’s ability to bypass ossifying constraints of administrative law but warning that this “sort of independence is problematic when civil liberties are at stake,” as exemplified by the IEEPA sanction regime).


88 See Cratty, supra note 20; Sullivan, supra note 18. According to a 2012 GAO report, the number of U.S. persons—defined as citizens and legal permanent residents—“more than doubled” after the December 2009 attempted attack on an airliner headed toward Minneapolis. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-476, Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions Since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts 14 (2012), available at http://www .gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf. An earlier report from the DOJ Inspector General describes the list as having over 71,000 “records” in July 2006, although a review led to a reduction to approximately 34,000 by the end of 2007; it is unclear whether there is a one-to-one correlation between records and individuals on the list or whether a single individual might have been described in several records. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Audit Div., Audit Report 07-41, Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, at xiii (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/ a0741/final.pdf [hereinafter DOJ 2007 Audit]. The United States does not officially disclose the number of people on the list.
because of their inclusion on the List. Others are barred from traveling by plane to go on business trips or to visit loved ones far away. Like the financial sanction regime, it is an Executive Branch-imposed, particularized restraint, notable because of the extreme level of secrecy.

The United States refuses to confirm or deny whether specific individuals are on the No Fly List, even to those who show up at an airport with a ticket in hand and are told they cannot board their scheduled flight. The Deputy Director of Operations of the Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains the No Fly List, warned in a 2010 court filing that disclosure could result in targeted individuals and associated terrorist groups taking steps to "avoid future detection, destroy evidence, coerce witnesses, change plans from what is known by law enforcement or intelligence agencies, . . . recruit new members[,] . . . or circumvent enhanced airline or border screening procedures." This is claimed to hold true even if the individual has already attempted to board a plane and been prohibited from doing so. To date, no court has ordered disclosure.


90 Latif, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3 (explaining that an individual prohibited from boarding an airplane is not at any point during the administrative grievance process told whether or not he or she is on the No Fly List or in the broader Terrorist Screening Database). While maintenance of the No Fly List or its functional equivalent is mandated by Congress, the specifics in terms of design and implementation are a matter of executive discretion. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (2012) (requiring that the Transportation Security Administration, a subset of the Department of Transportation, identify individuals "who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security" and "prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual" but failing to define the threat standard or any other specifics about the initiative).

91 Declaration of Christopher Piehota at 12–13, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010). The website of the Terrorism Screening Center, the organization that maintains the No Fly List, similarly asserts that "[d]isclosure of [No Fly List] information would tip off known or suspected terrorists, who could then change their habits or identities to escape government scrutiny." It also fails to differentiate those persons who have no reason to believe they are on the List and those who have shown up at an airport and have been told they cannot board their flight. See Terrorist Screening Center Frequently Asked Questions, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lsb/tsc/tsc_faqs (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).

92 See, e.g., Scherfen v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 WL 456784, at *8 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (accepting without analysis the government's assertion that plaintiffs' watch-list status—of which the No Fly List is a subset—cannot be
Even the criteria for placement on the No Fly List are deemed "sensitive security information"—meaning that the criteria cannot be publicly disclosed, including to those who have been prohibited from boarding a plane. In publicly released documents, government officials describe the No Fly List as a subset of the government's broader database of "known or suspected terrorists" but do not state what constitutes a "known or suspected terrorist," let alone the additional criteria required for inclusion on the No Fly List. Whatever the criteria, a "reasonable suspicion" standard applies.

An individual who has been denied boarding is told to fill out a complaint through the Department of Homeland Security's Travel Redress Inquiry Program. But the individual must guess as to whether he or she is in fact on a No Fly List, what the criteria are for inclusion, and what the factual bases are for determining that the individual meets those criteria. An internal review then follows. At the conclusion of the process, the individual is issued a letter saying either: "we can neither confirm nor deny any information about you which may be within federal watchlists" and that "[t]his letter constitutes our final agency decision;" or "no changes or corrections are warranted at this time" and the decision will be final in thirty days unless the individual files an administrative appeal within that time.

Both letters disclosed and offering to write a separate opinion that "will be unavailable for inspection by the public or by [plaintiffs or their counsel] to address the underlying factual issues). See, e.g., Latif, 2013 WL 4592515, at *2 ("The federal government does not release its minimum, substantive, derogatory criteria for placement on the No Fly List nor the 'Watchlisting Guidance' created for internal use by intelligence and law-enforcement communities."); 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5 (2013) (defining sensitive security information); Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 8-11 (asserting that the No Fly and Selectee criteria are "sensitive security information" and are therefore protected from public release).

See Declaration of Christopher Piehota, supra note 91, at 3.

Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012). Internal audits also have revealed a number of quality control problems with both the No Fly List and the underlying database of known or suspected terrorists. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing errors and misidentifications associated with the No Fly List and underlying databases); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 09-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES 36, 41 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf (finding that the FBI improperly failed to remove individuals from the underlying database of known or suspected terrorists in 8% of cases and made untimely removals of others); DOJ 2007 AUDIT, supra note 88, at 31, 34-35 (finding high rate of errors and inconsistencies in underlying databases of known or suspected terrorists); id. at 33 n.50 (describing database management difficulties causing individuals inappropriately being included on the No Fly List for up to nine months).

Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126. According to a Department of Justice Inspector General report, approximately 45% of 310 records reviewed pursuant to redress procedures between 2005 and 2007 were either modified or removed entirely from the No Fly and related selectee lists. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 52.

Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126.
also inform the recipient that he or she can appeal a final agency decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or the circuit court where the individual resides. By design, the letters do not reveal whether the individual is or was ever on the No Fly List or whether he or she will be permitted to fly in the future.

In August 2013, an Oregon district court concluded that the No Fly List—at least applied to plaintiffs who wished to travel internationally—violated their constitutionally protected interest in international air travel, but it deferred a final ruling as to the underlying procedural due process claim. Notably, the court rejected the government’s assertion that there was no liberty interest at stake, because, in the government’s words, there is “no right to . . . the most convenient means of travel.” In evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs were never provided any information about why they were prohibited from boarding flights, never told whether they are in fact on the No Fly List, and never provided an opportunity to contest their placement on the List. Ultimately, however, the court decided it could not adjudicate the adequacy of the procedures provided until it learned more about the separate statutorily established circuit court review process. It thus deferred final ruling on the procedural due process claim.

As a subsequent court filing makes clear, however, the circuit court review process is hardly sufficient to satisfy the requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard that the Oregon

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98 Citing 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2006), the government has argued that litigants are obliged to bring substantive and procedural due process challenges to the No Fly List in either the D.C. Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals where they reside. See, e.g., Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126 (quoting federal agency’s letter to plaintiffs indicating that “[f]inal determinations are reviewable by the United States Court of Appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110”). Two Ninth Circuit panels have rejected that claim, allowing suits to proceed in district court. Id. at 1127; Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2008). Other courts, however, have mandated that challenges to the No Fly List and related selectee lists be brought exclusively in the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-00050-(AJT/TRJ), 2011 WL 3820711, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2011) (concluding that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over TSA letters under 49 U.S.C. § 46110); Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (same). No circuit court has yet ruled on such a challenge, although as of this writing, there are three cases pending. See Latif v. Holder, No. 5:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *13 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013).

99 See Latif v. Holder, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3 (“[A]t no point in the available administrative process is a complainant told whether he or she is in the or a subset of the TSDB [Terrorist Screening Database] or given any explanation for his or her inclusion on such a list.”).

100 Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 24–25.

101 Id. at 8–9 (concluding that placement on the No Fly List "severely restrict[s]" the ability to travel internationally, emphasizing the importance of international travel in the "modern world," and rejecting the government’s assertion that there is no right to the most convenient means of travel).
district court rightly identified as essential.\textsuperscript{102} The litigants' joint stipulation of facts establishes that even at the circuit court review stage, the government does not inform the petitioners whether or not they are on the No Fly List, the government's reason for including individuals on the List, or any of the underlying information or evidence relied on in making the List.\textsuperscript{103} The circuit court review is thus based on an ex parte review of the administrative record; those challenging their placement on the list are granted access to only those portions of the record that they themselves had submitted.\textsuperscript{104}

No other court has reached the substantive merits of a No Fly List challenge, due in part to confusion over the appropriate forum for challenging the No Fly List. Cases have bounced back and forth between district and appellate courts, with litigants arguing about what court the case belongs in and whether individuals have standing to sue.\textsuperscript{105} In Part III, I outline the approach that reviewing courts ought to apply.

C. Sex Offender Residential, Employment, and Related Restrictions

All fifty states have in place some form of what are commonly referred to as Megan's Laws—laws that impose a variety of reporting, residential, employment, and other similar restrictions on persons convicted of a wide array of sex and other related offenses.\textsuperscript{106} The specifics vary from state to state, but the general impetus and trend are consistent: they are intended to protect children and other innocent victims from dangerous sexual predators, and they have grown more onerous and all-encompassing over time. What started out as registration requirements for small classes of sex offenders have expanded to include those convicted of a vast category of offenses, including consensual sex between teenagers (defined as statutory rape), a range of other offenses committed by juveniles, and offenses that do not involve sexual activity or motivation, such as public urination.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[102] Id. at *10.
\item[104] Id.
\item[105] See, e.g., Latif, 686 F.3d at 1126–27 (discussing procedural history to No Fly List challenge); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2012) (same).
\item[106] The name is based on the registration law first passed by New Jersey in response to the 1994 abduction, sexual assault, and murder of a girl named Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender. See Megan's Law by State, KLAAS Kids Found. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.klaaskids.org/meganslaw/.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Federal law now requires, as a condition of receiving certain funding, that states gather and make public detailed information about a wide category of offenders and conduct in-person verifications of all such offenders, with the frequency depending on the offense level.\(^\text{108}\)

Over the past several years, a growing number states and municipalities have implemented a dizzying array of residential, employment, and other restrictions on offenders' activities as well.\(^\text{109}\) In Oklahoma, for example, registered sex offenders—a class that ranges from persons convicted of violent sexual assaults of strangers to those convicted of indecent exposure—\(^\text{110}\) are prohibited from living with a minor child; living within 2000 feet of any school, childcare center, playground, or park;\(^\text{111}\) loitering within 500 feet of any school, childcare center, or park;\(^\text{112}\) working in any capacity with children;\(^\text{113}\) engaging in ice cream truck vending;\(^\text{114}\) or living in a residence with another convicted sex offender.\(^\text{115}\) In July 2012, a change in the definition of “residence” meant that seventy men who had been living in a mobile home community in Oklahoma City, where they received church-provided rehabilitation and other services, were forced to

\(^{108}\) In-person verification is required every three, six, or twelve months depending on the offense level. See The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2012); see also id. § 16911 (defining class of individuals subject to reporting requirements to include certain juveniles and those convicted of kidnapping and false imprisonment of minors even if there was no sexual abuse or sexual motivation); id. § 16915 (establishing duration of reporting period as lasting fifteen years to life, depending on the offense level); United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502 (2013) (upholding application of SORNA to members of the military, including those who had completed their sentence prior to SORNA’s enactment); The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,090–70 (July 2, 2008) (obliging states to post extensive information about sex offenders).

\(^{109}\) This is a rapidly evolving area of law, with new initiatives being proposed across the country and court challenges to such restrictions pending in many jurisdictions. This subpart is not meant to provide an authoritative description of each and every development but to illustrate the general trends and highlight some of the notable initiatives and court rulings.

\(^{110}\) Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57 § 582 (West 2012) (listed offenses subject to registration includes indecent exposure, as defined at id. tit. 21 § 1021).

\(^{111}\) Id. tit. 57 § 590.

\(^{112}\) Id. tit. 21 § 1125.

\(^{113}\) Id. tit. 57 § 589.

\(^{114}\) Id. tit. 21 § 23001.1.

\(^{115}\) Id. tit. 57 § 590.1.
leave their residence.\textsuperscript{116} When the church responded by replacing the trailers with single-person tents, the city asserted a zoning violation and forced the men off the property.\textsuperscript{117} Many reportedly had no place to go.\textsuperscript{118}

These restraints differ in important ways from the terrorism-related financial sanctions and the No Fly List in that they are imposed after a criminal conviction; the fact triggering the issuance of the restraint has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an independent adjudicator. They also differ from the financial sanctions and No Fly List in that they are undifferentiated and imposed on broad classes of convicted persons, without any individualized assessment of risk. But while they are distinguishable in design and implementation, they share the same, key preventive purpose as the Executive Branch–imposed, national security–related restraints. They are—with a few limited exceptions—imposed as a regulatory matter, separate and apart from the criminal sentence, with the sole purpose of preventing, or at least minimizing, the risk of future bad acts.\textsuperscript{119} Like the terrorism-related financial sanctions and the No Fly List, they single out particular individuals for enhanced restrictions on what they can do and where they can go based on an assessment of future dangerousness. They are a court-adjudicated, rule-based (undifferentiated) form of pre-crime restraint.

Moreover, while the restraints are motivated by a legitimate concern about the safety of innocent children, they are generally imposed without any clear assessment of their efficacy or need—often with severe consequences. While designed to keep children safe from the unknown pervert, they fail to address the most prevalent form of sexual harm to children—abuse by family members or other adults already known to their victims.\textsuperscript{120} Several studies suggest that the laws may not even be effective at reducing recidivism and may, in some

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} See Juliana Keeping, \textit{Dozens of Sex Offenders May Have to Leave Trailer Park Ministry}, NewsOK (July 2, 2012), http://newso.k.com/dozens-of-sex-offenders-may-have-to-leave-trailer-park-ministry/article/3688988.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} See Keeping, supra note 116.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} According to statistics compiled by the Department of Justice, less than seven percent of sex crimes against juveniles are committed by strangers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, \textit{Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics} 1, 10 (2000).
\end{itemize}
cases, even exacerbate recidivism by creating a sense of nothing to lose.121  

Meanwhile, sex offenders have been forced out of jobs, evicted from their homes, and prevented from entering an array of public places.122 In 2008, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting registered sex offenders from entering any public park. The plaintiff was a disabled stroke victim who wanted to continue his regular outings with his mother to the local park.123 Several cities in Orange County, California, have banned convicted sex offenders from entering public parks, beaches, harbors, or other public spaces—ordinances that are now the subject of ongoing litigation. One plaintiff completed his sentence over fifteen years ago, subsequently married, and is now raising a family, yet is still barred from going with them to public parks and beaches.124 While at least one city has repealed the laws in response to the litigation, others continue to defend them or make moderate adjustments to allow for case-by-case exemptions.125

121 See, e.g., Kristen Zgoba et al., N.J. Dep't of Corr., Office of Policy & Planning, Megan's Law: Assessing the Practical and Monetary Efficacy 1, 32, 39–42 (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/225370.pdf (stating that Megan's Law is ineffective at reducing reoffenses); Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 207, 208 (2011) (finding that neither overall rates of sex offenses nor recidivism rates decline in response to registration and notification requirements); see also Maia Szalavitz, Registries Don't Keep Sex Offenders from Restricted Areas, TIME (Feb. 1, 2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/02/01/registries-dont-keep-sex-offenders-from-restricted-areas/ (describing enforcement difficulties given numbers subject to the restrictions and scale of the restrictions). Other studies, however, have found notification and registration requirements to contribute to an overall decrease in sexual offenses, even if recidivism rates are unaffected or possibly even increase as a result of these restrictions. See J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161, 164–65, 192 (2012) (noting that while the result may be an overall decrease in sex crimes, recidivism rates may increase as a result of notification laws).


125 See Jaimee Lynn Fletcher, H.B. Changes Sex Offender Ordinance After Lawsuit, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ordinance-408906-sex-beach.html. Moreover, exemptions previously offered by Orange County appear to be stingily guarded, with fourteen out of fifteen requests turned down as of May 2012. Those whose applications were rejected reportedly included a commercial fisherman who required access to the harbor to work, a locksmith who worked by the harbor and claimed to have had a clear record for twenty-eight years, and someone who wanted to attend a memorial service for his Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor. See Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders but Raise Questions, Too, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, at A15.
The scope of the restrictions also has become increasingly onerous over time. What started out as buffer zones of 1000 feet or less have expanded to 2000 feet or more in several states. Prohibited areas have grown from “school” and “child care zones” to include set distances from swimming pools, skating rinks, parks, bus stops, and video arcades. In many municipalities, these buffer zones are coupled with “dispersion” statutes that seek to control the spatial density of offenders by, for example, limiting the number of offenders that can live within a particular residential structure. In other areas, designated offenders are relegated to a small sliver of a city where they are permitted to live. Offenders have been kicked out of their homes and sometimes rendered homeless as a result; in some cases, entire towns and municipalities effectively have been placed off-limits to registered offenders.

Kansas provides a notable exception. After considering a report of the Kansas Sex Offender Policy Board, the Kansas state legislature chose not to impose residential restrictions on offenders and explicitly prohibited municipalities from doing so as well. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4913 (West 2011).


See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he restricted areas in many cities encompass the majority of the available housing in the city, thus leaving only limited areas within city limits available for sex offenders to establish a residence.”); In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 37 (Cal. 2010) (describing how after initially being told that San Francisco was completely off limits, petitioner was informed of a “small area” where he could live, but housing prices were prohibitively high); In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that residential restriction “eliminates nearly all existing affordable housing [as applied] in San Diego County”); review granted and opinion suspended, In re Taylor, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Ky. 2009) (describing the “constant threat of eviction”); Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (detailing residential restrictions that “effectively . . . banished” parolees from Manhattan).

See, e.g., In re E.J., 223 P.3d at 46 (describing petitioners’ claim that housing restrictions rendered them homeless but also noting that many others found compliant housing); In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 70, 73 (describing petitioner, who was prohibited from living with her sister-in-law or in any women’s shelters, as living in alley with 15 to 20 other homeless registered sex offenders and finding that as of February 2011, 165 out of 482 registered sex offenders on parole in San Diego were homeless or with “no resi-
Lists of prohibited employment similarly have expanded to include bans not only on working directly with children but also on working in certain geographic areas where children might congregate. In another relatively recent development, several states now require certain offenders to wear GPS devices, which impose restrictions on movement and establish de facto curfews given the need to be home at certain hours in order to recharge the devices. Sometimes the decision to require the use of a GPS is made on an individualized basis, but often it is imposed without any particularized assessment of the threat posed.

The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether, and under what circumstances, such residential, employment, and other restrictions on offenders' movements are constitutionally permitted. While the Court's twin rulings in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe and Smith v. Doe have been widely credited with paving the way for such restrictions, both cases involved registration and dissemination schemes only. In Smith, the Court explicitly emphasized that "offenders . . . are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision" as relevant to its finding that Alaska's registration and verification scheme was nonpunitive and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. And in Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Court addressed procedural due process issues only—explicitly leaving open the possibility of future substantive due process claims.
A small handful of state courts have since concluded that increasingly restrictive aspects of the registration scheme as well as associated residential and employment restrictions are in fact punitive and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on both state and federal law grounds.\textsuperscript{139} But federal appellate courts and other state courts have disagreed.\textsuperscript{140} Meanwhile, successful ex post facto claims only preclude the retroactive application of such restrictions; they do not restrict their prospective use.

Meanwhile, appellate courts have—in the limited circumstances where the issue has been raised—rejected broader claims that the restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause, substantive due process rights, or the Eighth Amendment.\textsuperscript{141} That said, a California appellate court recently issued a notable ruling striking down blanket residential requirements as violating the right to travel.\textsuperscript{142} Emphasizing that

\textsuperscript{139} See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E. 2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (finding ex post facto violation under state constitution); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 2009) (finding ex post facto violation under both state and federal constitutions); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (finding an ex post facto violation under both the state and federal constitutions); F.R. v. St. Charles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 301 S.W.3d 56, 66 (Mo. 2010) (finding laws punitive and in violation of ex post facto clause of state constitution); State v. Williams, 952 N.E. 2d 1108, 1115 (Ohio 2011) (holding that retroactive application of registration requirements on persons who committed sex offenses prior to enactment of the statute violated the state constitution).

\textsuperscript{140} See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding Arkansas law); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding Iowa law); In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 47 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting ex post facto challenges); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (same); Boyd v. State, 960 So. 2d 717, 719–20 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (rejecting claim that application of statute was excessively punitive such as to constitute an ex post facto violation).

\textsuperscript{141} See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Imposing Residency Restrictions on Registered Sex Offenders, 25 A.L.R. 6th 227, 232–35 (2007) (collecting cases). A small number of cases have held restrictions imposed on sex offenders to be unlawful in their prospective use. See, e.g., Doe v. Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a ban on offenders entering the library violated their First Amendment rights but paving the way for the imposition of such a ban in the future, noting that “it is not difficult to imagine that the ban might have survived [on a different record], for we recognize the City’s significant interest in providing a safe environment for its library patrons, especially children”); Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676, 679 (Ga. 2008) (concluding that registration requirements were unconstitutionally vague as applied to the homeless); Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 740–41 (Ga. 2007) (holding that a provision requiring the plaintiff to vacate his home after a child care center moved within the exclusion zone constituted an unlawful taking); Elwell v. Twp. of Lower, 2006 WL 3797974, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 22, 2006) (finding that the prohibitions, which prevented plaintiff from taking his children to the school bus or to school, “substantially intruded upon significant family matters involving private and personal choices about how to raise and care for children” and therefore violated petitioner's substantive due process rights).

\textsuperscript{142} In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 85 (Cal. App. 2012), review granted and opinion suspended, In re Taylor, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (Cal. 2013). While In re Taylor addressed the application of residential restrictions to parolees in San Diego, the underlying statute applies to all registered sex offenders throughout California, not just those on parole and in San Diego. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (West 2006) (prohibiting all registered sex
the residential restrictions contributed to homelessness, prevented parolees from getting the treatment services they needed, and separated families, the court concluded that the restrictions intruded on important liberty interests and were not narrowly tailored to the asserted government interest in protecting children from recidivist offenders.\textsuperscript{143} The ruling, which is as of this writing suspended pending review by the California Supreme Court, would allow parole officers to impose such restrictions on an individualized basis, but prohibits their blanket application to all registered sex offenders without a particularized evaluation of threat and need.\textsuperscript{144} This is an approach that I strongly endorse, as explained in more detail in Part III.

D. Other Examples—A Pre-Crime Typology

The financial sanction regime, No Fly List, and sex offender restrictions illustrate a broader trend in which legislators and Executive Branch officials increasingly target particular individuals or classes of individuals with preventive and noncustodial restraints, all based on a presumed propensity to commit a future bad act. Other analogous examples include firearm restrictions imposed on convicted felons and other classes of presumptively dangerous individuals;\textsuperscript{145} no-contact orders issued in response to allegations of domestic violence;\textsuperscript{146} supervised-release conditions imposed on presumptively dangerous aliens;\textsuperscript{147} pilot-license revocations based on a "suspected" security threat;\textsuperscript{148} and security-clearance revocations based on "a recent or re-

\textsuperscript{143} In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83.

\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 83–84.

\textsuperscript{145} 18 U.S.C. § 992(g) (2012). Often referred to as "felon-gun" restrictions, the restrictions actually cover a broader class of individuals. In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia went out of his way to note that the Court's striking down of a prohibition on handgun possession did not "cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).


\textsuperscript{148} 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(c) (2013) (describing threat assessment standards for aliens holding or applying for FAA certificates, ratings, or authorizations); 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115 (2013) (describing threat assessment standards for U.S. citizens). An initial threat finding leads to an immediate loss of license. Citizens are, by statute, entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge of any final orders, at which they are entitled to unclassified summaries of any classified information relied upon. 49 U.S.C. § 46111 (2006). Aliens, by contrast, are not entitled to an administrative law judge hearing and need not be provided summaries of the classified information. Court review is concentrated in the Court of Appeals, with deference given to any agency finding supported by "substantial evidence." 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) (2006).
curring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior."\textsuperscript{149}

The details vary significantly from program to program, and the specifics are important. Broadly speaking, there are two contrasting models of pre-crime restraints. One, which I call the tailored, adjudicatory model, requires individualized assessments of risk and is premised on a view of human nature as malleable and subject to rehabilitation and reform. It is based on a particularized assessment of risk and recognizes—at least in theory—that changed circumstances, including rehabilitation of the target, can eliminate or sufficiently reduce the risk the restraint is designed to address. Restraints are thus designed to last no longer than the risk posed; they are time-limited and subject to regular, periodic reviews. In the most protective form, the restraints are court-imposed or at least subject to de novo court review as a means of minimizing bias, error, or outright abuse. It is the approach I argue we should be moving toward—as I discuss in more detail in Part III—although the difficulty of predicting risk and costs to the target's moral autonomy should give us pause even in the exercise of these types of restraints.

The other, which I call the rule-based model, is imposed on all persons with certain features, without individualized assessment of risk. Under the rule-based model, the fact that some percentage of individuals with certain characteristics is likely to commit a future bad act becomes a justification for imposing restraints on all people who possess those characteristics. As the gravity of the future bad act increases, the acceptable ratio of innocent to bad actors increases, resulting in a greater proportion of persons who never would have committed any future harm being subject to extensive preventive restraints. Because rule-based restraints are imposed on all individuals who satisfy a particular, cognizable set of facts, judicial review is either nonexistent or limited solely to the question as to whether or not the predicate facts are met, without any individualized assessment of risk. Sex offender restrictions, felon-gun restrictions, and certain no-contact orders (imposed on all accused of certain types of offenses) are classic examples of rule-based restraints.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{149} See 32 C.F.R. § 147.2(d) (2013) (describing criteria for granting and revoking security clearances).

\textsuperscript{150} Several scholars have also noted the ways in which adjudicated, particularized restraints actually operate as rule-based restraints in disguise. \textit{See, e.g., infra} notes 184, 186. Actuarial prediction models, for example, take a number of identified factors, feed them into an algorithm, and predict risk, essentially assuming that the dominant group characteristics translate onto a particular individual in a predictable way. If given conclusive weight, these seemingly individualized restraints can also operate as rule-based restraints, imposing certain preventive restraints on all persons possessing particular characteristics without any individualized assessments or adjustments.
Most pre-crime restraints encompass some features of both the rule-based model and the tailored, adjudicatory model. Terrorism-related financial sanctions and the No Fly List, for example, are based on individualized assessments of a particular individual or entity’s propensity to commit a bad act, thus adopting a key feature of the adjudicatory model. But, at least with respect to the terrorism-related financial regime, the criteria for being subject to the restraint are so broad as to defy any notion of narrow tailoring. (The criteria for placement on the No Fly List also appear broad, given the numbers reportedly on the list, although they remain unknown.) Moreover, there is no independent adjudicator to help correct any errors or abuse. The absence of any time limits or meaningful periodic review provisions further suggests a rule-based vision of targets as incapable or unlikely to change—or, at the very least, an unwillingness to give the targets an opportunity to act differently than predicted due to a high level of risk-aversion.

II

THE LIBERTY INTERESTS AND RISKS OF EXPLOSION

Over the past decade, there has been extensive attention to various forms of preventive detention—including law-of-war detention,\(^1\) the preventive tilt of the criminal justice system,\(^2\) immigration detention,\(^3\) and civil commitment regimes.\(^4\) Meanwhile, it is often assumed, without much analysis, that noncustodial restraints are a

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\(^1\) See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1108-46 (describing evolution and institutionalization of law of war detention after September 11, 2001); Cole, supra note 31, at 725-32 (discussing legal questions surrounding military detention of enemy combatants); Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the "War on Terrorism": Normalizing the Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 36-42 (2012) (discussing the law of war detention after 9/11).

\(^2\) See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1092-95 (discussing the difference between the "preventive" state and the "punitive" state). The normative consequences of this move are the topic of an ongoing and debate. Compare Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) (arguing in favor of separating preventative and punishment functions), and Steiker, supra note 5, at 814 (arguing for a distinct role for punishment based on, among other things, its retrospective nature and blaming function), with Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 122 (2005) (arguing that "individual prevention should become the predominant goal of the criminal justice system"); see also Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and Limits, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 542, 563-71 (2012) (exploring these issues).


\(^4\) See, e.g., Janus & Logan, supra note 31, at 321-25 (discussing due process concerns with respect to civil commitment of sexually violent predators); Schulhofer, supra note 29, at 94-96 (arguing for commitment of sexually violent predators only in limited cases); see also Klein & Wittes, supra note 31, at 87 (cataloguing various forms of preventive detention).
permissible alternative to custodial restraints that are prohibited. In its 2001 decision in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that aliens could not be detained pending deportation if the deportation was no longer reasonably foreseeable; at the same time, it explicitly mentioned, albeit in dicta, the availability of alternative forms of noncustodial restraint.\(^{155}\) In the Court’s words, the “alien’s release may and *should* be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.”\(^{156}\) The unambiguous message: noncustodial restraints are permitted under circumstances where custodial ones are prohibited.\(^{157}\)

But the favoring of noncustodial restraints as an alternative to custodial ones masks the important substantive and procedural liberty interests at stake and ignores the dangers associated with all pre-crime restraints, whether they be custodial or not. To some extent, this oversight is understandable: After all, who would not choose release with restrictions over incarceration, as the *Zadvydas* Court suggested? But the choice is rarely such an easy one-for-one. In part because noncustodial restraints are perceived as less invasive, they are imposed on a much broader swath of the population that would be—or could be—subject to physical incarceration, persist for protracted periods of time, and are imposed with much less process than carceral restraints. What if, for example, the question is five *months* in prison or five *years* subject to extensive restrictions on where one can go and what one can do? Then the choice is no longer so obvious.\(^{158}\)

In this Part, I explore both the often underappreciated liberty interests affected by noncustodial restraints and the general costs of all pre-crime restraints, thus offering a lens through which to better evaluate the interests at stake when the state engages in targeted pre-crime prevention.

A. The Invasion of Liberty

Physical incarceration has, for good reason, long been understood as the quintessential deprivation of liberty. It removes detainees from the polity, subjects them to control by others, and denies them the ability to live their own lives in the manner they choose. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined physical incarceration as the “paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint,”\(^ {159}\) freedom from which is at the “core of the liberty protected

\(^{155}\) *See* 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

\(^{156}\) *Id.* at 700 (emphasis added).

\(^{157}\) The *Zadvydas* court did emphasize that such noncustodial restraints need to be “appropriate” but did not define the term. *Id.*

\(^{158}\) Professor Murphy makes this point as well in *Paradigms of Restraint*, supra note 21, at 1323.

\(^{159}\) *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).
by the Due Process Clause.”\textsuperscript{160} The deprivation is so visceral and obvious that there is rarely any explanation as to why this is so.

In a few limited cases, the Supreme Court has similarly recognized the devastating effect of targeted, noncustodial restraints—but this recognition is generally limited to the extreme situations in which the individual is formally stripped of legal status or physically removed from the polity.\textsuperscript{161} As the Court concluded in its 1958 decision in \textit{Trop v. Dulles}, forced statelessness violates the Eighth Amendment: “There may be involved no physical mistreatment . . . . There is instead the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”\textsuperscript{162} Deportation has similarly been described as depriving individuals “of all that makes life worth living.”\textsuperscript{163} Affected individuals maintain their nationality and remain physically free but are stripped from their family, friends, employment, and the polity of their choosing. These individuals are divested of the context that gives them and their lives meaning and told to start again in a place that they have not been to in years and feels foreign to them, even if it is their legal home.

What the Court has failed to recognize is the ways in which noncustodial restraints can, and often do, deprive a target of the capacity

\textsuperscript{160} Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). One explanation as to why this liberty interest is “core” is the often-cited historical and textual one—that “liberty” should be interpreted as it was in 1789 or possibly 1868, when it was understood as referring exclusively to “liberty of the person” or freedom from physical restraint. See Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 440 (1926). But even accepting the accuracy of the historical analysis, this approach fails to explain why freedom from physical restraint was deemed a core liberty interest and what underlying interests are at stake. See Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1897 (2004) (forcefully rejecting the idea that “courts more or less passively identify a set of personal activities in which individuals may engage free of government regulation . . . derive[d] from American constitutional text and tradition”); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{161} By comparison, violations of bodily integrity are more readily recognized as intrusions on established rights given the overt way in which they inflict pain or intrude in one’s physical space in a way that is easy to identify and measure. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (holding that forced surgical removal of a bullet for evidentiary purposes violates an individual’s interest in bodily integrity and therefore his Fourth Amendment rights); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173 (concluding that forced stomach-pumping of a suspected drug user is “brutal conduct” that violates due process).

\textsuperscript{162} 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Court went on to call it “a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development . . . . In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.” Id. at 101–02; see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that forced statelessness violates the Fourteenth Amendment).

\textsuperscript{163} Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)); see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty.”). Deportation is less extreme than forced statelessness, as the affected individual retains some legal status.
to lead a meaningful and free life, treat him as second-class citizen, and deny his moral autonomy, even if they do not place him behind bars, formally strip him of legal status, or physically remove him from the polity. This section will address each of these deprivations in turn.

1. De Facto Incapacitation

In the words of Professor Martha Nussbaum, people can be so restricted from "select[ing] modes of activity that are central to a life worthy of human dignity" that they are more "like prisoners" than "free people." The imprisonment can be near total, prohibiting a broad range of functioning, or partial, affecting discrete but central components of a meaningful life. Critically, physical incapacitation is not required.

This, of course, requires a theory of what makes a life worth living, and here Supreme Court jurisprudence provides the key guidance. At various points, with varying degrees of emphasis, and with various textual hooks, the Court has identified the capabilities to move freely, travel, maintain familial association free from state interference, enter into intimate relationships, pursue one's cho-

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164 Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 6. Professor Nussbaum also makes a compelling argument as to how the Declaration of Independence reflects the central idea of equal dignity and equal entitlement. See id. at 50–51.

165 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999) ("[A]n individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is 'a part of our heritage.'") (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).

166 See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1486–87 (2012) (describing restriction on international travel as a "new disability" and a "harsh penalty, made all the more devastating if it means enduring separation from close family members living abroad"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (describing a fundamental right to interstate travel but declining to ascribe the source of the right to a particular constitutional provision); id. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right to travel interstate is a 'fundamental' right which, for present purposes, should be regarded as having its source in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ("The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.").

167 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (describing the "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life [as] one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

sen vocation, as central liberties that the Constitution protects. As Professor Laurence Tribe has cogently argued, what unites these various cases is larger than and conceptually different from their parts. What matters is the individual's ability to participate in the polity and to self-govern—to be given the freedom to make the choices that are central to defining and expressing oneself and to making life meaningful.

In some cases, pre-crime restraints can so thoroughly deprive an individual of the capacity to participate in the polity and define him- or herself free from state interference that they impose a form of near-total imprisonment. U.S. residents subject to the financial sanction regimes, for example, may be physically free, yet they are effectively barred from engaging in the society in which they live. They cannot partake in a single financial transaction without government approval. Even the ability to buy groceries, make rent payments, pay for gas, or buy a school uniform is dependent on a government license and thus becomes a matter of state control.

169 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (describing "the right to . . . follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference [as] within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment" (citations omitted)); cf. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 437 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–99 (1961) (holding that summarily imposed restrictions which prevented plaintiff from accessing her place of employment did not violate plaintiff's due process rights given the availability of other possible places of employment).

170 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (describing the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").

171 See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 & n.26 (1977) (describing the liberty "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). This list also has obvious parallels with the list of protected rights under human rights law. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 22, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19 (describing right to work, including the "the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012) (defining "major life activities" as that term is used in the Anti-Discrimination Act to include "communicating, and working"); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1) (2013) (adding "interacting with others" as among the "major life activities" protected by the Anti-Discrimination Act).

172 Tribe, supra note 160, at 1941–42; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 805 (1989) (describing the ways in which "state control over the quotidian, material aspects of individuals' lives—even where the people have democratically imposed such control themselves—deprives them of th[e] freedom [to self-govern]"). While Rubenfeld is examining the right to privacy, his analysis can be extended to claims like those made in this Article that largely sound in substantive due process.
The combination of residential, employment, and other restrictions on movement imposed on presumptively dangerous sex offenders has a similarly pervasive impact—relegating them to small slivers of land where they can live, barring their movement, restricting their employment, limiting their choice of homes, and indirectly yet severely limiting their ability to participate in important ways in their children’s lives.

In other instances, noncustodial restrictions impose a form of partial imprisonment, impeding discrete components of a free and meaningful life. The effect of the No Fly List, for example, is not as restrictive as the most severe sex offender–related restrictions but has a significant and underappreciated impact on substantive liberty interests nonetheless. In prohibiting an important mode of transportation, it restricts and potentially eliminates the ability to “attend funerals and weddings of family members, tend to vital interests, or respond to family emergencies” in a timely manner.\(^{173}\) It also significantly curtails the ability to pursue a profession of one’s choosing. Even if travel is not a regular part of one’s job responsibilities, occasional trips to conferences, trainings, or other professional gatherings may be required, and transport by car, bus, or boat may not be reasonably viable alternatives.

When evaluated in social and historical context, with an understanding of the central role plane travel has assumed in modern life, it becomes obvious that the prohibition on flying significantly intrudes on liberty interests that the Supreme Court has recognized as important, even if not fundamental, including the ability to maintain familial connections, other associations, and employment of one’s choosing.\(^{174}\) The prohibition’s effect is significantly greater than the government’s description of a “right to the most convenient means of travel” suggests.\(^{175}\)

2. **Second-Class Treatment**

Most targeted pre-crime restraints also interfere with the important liberty interest in being treated with equal dignity.\(^{176}\) While not

\(^{173}\) Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1487 (2012); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (noting that the freedom to travel internationally “may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads”).

\(^{174}\) See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.

\(^{175}\) Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Latif v. Holder, supra note 17, at 24; see Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013) (rejecting the government’s argument as applied to international travel by stating: “Although there are perhaps viable alternatives to flying for domestic travel within the continental United States such as traveling by car or train, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention that international air travel is a mere convenience in light of the realities of our modern world”).

\(^{176}\) The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Windsor provides additional support for the liberty interest in being treated with “equal dignity.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681
the principal purpose of most targeted restraints, the effect is to single out particular individuals or classes of individuals, precluding them from engaging in activities that others can do freely and thereby stamping them with a badge of inferiority.177 As Professor Michael C. Dorf has persuasively argued, "the designation as a sex offender truly comes close to a designation of second-class citizenship," thereby raising equal protection concerns.178 The same can be said of "specially designated global terrorists" and other subjects of targeted prevention.179

This is not to suggest that all targeted restraints operate in this way. When the state imposes criminal penalties, it sanctions conduct, not personhood (at least in theory).180 But the shift in focus from past acts to the future carries with it a shift in emphasis from conduct to character. In imposing restraints in response to perceived future threats, the state conveys its assessment that the targets are insufficiently trustworthy—and therefore less deserving—than the vast majority of the populace not subject to such restraints on their activities

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177 This is an obvious distinction between the pre-crime examples discussed here and the DOMA struck down in Windsor. In Windsor, the Court emphasized that both the "principal purpose" and the effect of DOMA were to "impose inequality." Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. Most pre-crime restraints have a primary purpose of preventing crime or other bad acts, with a key effect being a denial of equal treatment and dignity.

178 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1267, 1340 (2011). While Professor Dorf was specifically focused on the registration requirements, his statement is even more apt when one considers the array of residential, employment, and other restrictions that accompany the designation. As Professor Dorf goes on to argue, this does not mean that such designations ought to be categorically prohibited, but there needs to be much better means-ends tailoring. See id. at 1340–42. This is an issue I return to in Part III.

179 This concern about second-class treatment applies to those pre-crime restraints that prohibit individuals from doing what all other members of society do freely, such as engaging in basic financial transactions or going to a public park; it does not apply to the denial or rescinding of a specially granted license, such as a security clearance or pilot license revocation.

180 Id. at 1311 ("Imprisoning persons for murder, rape, and robbery, and branding them felons, no doubt expresses a view about the inferiority of the conduct in which murderers, rapists, and robbers engage, without thereby expressing a view about the inherent moral worth of the perpetrators.").
or movements. The state signals an implicit, or at times explicit, finding of moral depravity or lack of control.

Moreover, this is not simply a case of expressive harm or stigma standing alone. The badge of dangerousness is coupled with affirmative restrictions that prevent the targets from engaging in activities that other members of society can freely do, thereby raising both equal protection and due process concerns.

3. Respect for Moral Autonomy

The imposition of pre-crime restraints also undercuts a central aspect of individual liberty by failing to respect the moral autonomy of the targeted individual. This point is often made by retributionists and quasi-retributionists and is one to which consequentialists lack a persuasive response. Even if one could imagine an idealized world with an extremely low rate of predictive error, the preventive nature of the restraint precludes the individual from taking steps to defeat the prediction and make the "right" moral choice. As the philosopher Saul Smilansky has argued, "there is categorically still time, a 'window of moral opportunity' for the would-be offender. This moral opportunity needs to be acknowledged."

Unless the individual lacks the capacity to make autonomous choices, as in the case of the truly mentally ill, preventive restraints violate their targets' moral autonomy. These restraints assume a fixed future and destroy the opportunity for individual self-determination—precluding the possibility that individuals can demonstrate their moral goodness and choose a course of action that differs from the prediction. Such restraints can only be justified by a purely deterministic view of individual action or a decision that respect for moral autonomy needs to give way to a different set of interests, such as protection of the nation's or community's safety. Such a decision must be made with an accurate weighing of the individual interest, risk of

181 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 152, at 144–45 (noting inaccuracies of predictive tools but evading questions about the ways in which a preventive model of criminal justice denies individual autonomy to act differently than predicted).
182 Saul Smilansky, The Time to Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50, 52 (1994). Although Smilansky was discussing preventive punishment, the observation applies to all preventive, targeted restrictions of liberty, even if they are ostensibly deemed nonpunitive.
183 Actuarial modeling, for example, as employed in the sex offender commitment context is implicitly based on a deterministic view of human behavior. Psychologists and psychiatrists evaluate a number of factors to determine an offenders' likelihood of reoffending: if person A has X characteristics, he will do Y with a certain degree of certainty. See, e.g., Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually Violent Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 609, 625–26 (2006) ("The actuarial risk assessment instruments used to predict sexual recidivism are based primarily on static factors."). These models fail to account for the moral autonomy of individuals and the fact that they may act differently than predicted.
harm, and normative principle at stake. When dealing with unpopular groups, such as sex offenders or alleged terrorist financers, however, there is a significant risk that the risk of harm will be overvalued and the individual interest undervalued.

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In sum, noncustodial pre-crime restraints impinge on the target's liberty interests in a number of important ways—imposing a form of de facto imprisonment (either partial or total), stamping the target as having less than equal worth, and denying the target respect for his moral autonomy. It is not the case—as current doctrine often assumes—that there is an on-off switch by which preventive detention impinges on an array of important substantive liberty interests, whereas restraints that fall short of incarceration are so minimally intrusive that they are of minor constitutional significance at best. Various preventive noncustodial restraints might nonetheless be permissible, but there ought to be a much more thorough means-ends inquiry than currently takes place. This is a point which I return to in Part III.

B. The Risk of Error and the One-Way Ratchet

Even if the liberty intrusions of noncustodial restraints were properly calibrated, the targeted, preventive nature of the restraints present an independent set of concerns—concerns borne out by an examination of the financial sanction regime, No Fly List, and sex offender restrictions. This is so for three primary reasons: the risk of error and abuse, the inherent difficulty of disproving a propensity to do something bad, and the incentives to overreach.

1. Predictive Errors

Pre-crime restraints are premised on predictions about the future—predictions that are rife with uncertainty and error. Even when the most sophisticated actuarial or clinical assessment tools are employed, the ability to predict that a particular individual will commit some future bad act inherently involves guesswork and false posi-

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184 Whether or not this concern also applies to the restrictions imposed on entities, such as targeted financial sanctions, depends on whether one views an entity as a moral actor, a topic which is the subject of extensive philosophical debate and which I do not wade into here. See Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/#1 (describing the debate). The concerns about error and overreach, however, clearly apply to restraints imposed on entities and may seem independently sufficient to justify heightened scrutiny of these restraints as well.
Even the best risk-assessment tools assume some percentage of false positives—meaning that they are designed with the knowledge that they will capture some individuals who would never engage in the activity designed to prevent. The broad, subjective criteria that the Executive Branch employs in the application of national security–related restraints exacerbate the risk of error. Under the terrorism financial sanction regime, for example, individuals and entities can be defined as a “specially designated global terrorist” based solely on an Executive Branch determination that the entity or individual “pose[s] a significant risk of committing[ ] acts of terrorism.”

There are no actuarial models or empirically tested criteria for identifying who might in fact pose a security threat. Determinations are purely a matter of executive discretion.

Moreover, even if targeting decisions are based on empirically sound criteria and made in good faith, the incentives push in favor of expansive application. Pre-crime restraints are put in place to protect public safety and implemented with that primary motivating principle in mind. If there is doubt in a particular case, the incentives are on the side of imposing the restraint. The Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration admitted as much in explaining a pilot revocation decision: “[B]ecause it would be very difficult to avert harm once a terrorist had control of an aircraft, I concluded that it was important to err on the side of caution in determining whether [the pilots] . . . pose a security threat . . . .” This same fear of an unaverted harm haunts all security-minded officials. Simply put, the preventive mindset turns the criminal law adage that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free” on its head.

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185 There is a rich body of literature on the difficulties of accurately predicting future dangerousness. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/Disease jurisprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1081–82, 1125 (2011) (summarizing the literature and suggesting that risk assessments are improving in accuracy but emphasizing the limited ability to predict accurately, the problems of applying group data to make individualized predictions, and the incentives in favor of false positives). For a powerful argument against the reliance of actuarial models to predict future risk, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (providing a number of reasons to challenge the “actuarial paradigm”).


188 This is not to say that an actuarial or empirically tested method would solve the problem of both false positives and false negatives. See supra notes 181–84.

189 Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting the Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration).

A lack of any meaningful independent review further increases the likelihood of error or abuse. The mere fact, or likelihood, of independent review serves as a moderating influence, providing a strong incentive for the decision makers to act in a way they can justify to a court or analogous review board. Independent oversight also serves an important educative function, helping to ensure that officials learn about and take steps to correct errors. In its absence, ineffective or unnecessary restraints are much more likely to persist. Blatant discrimination or other abuses are also left unchecked. Of course, the effectiveness and stringency of this review depends on the breadth of the substantive rules: if the substantive rules are excessively broad, review will do little to rein in executive overreaching and false positives, even if it might still uncover outright abuse.

Undifferentiated, rule-based restraints, such as those employed on sex offenders, dispense with individualized predictions altogether, thereby imposing restraints on a large number of individuals who never would have committed the bad act the restraints are designed to prevent. Research on sex offenders indicates, for example, that recidivism is fairly low as compared to other convicted offenders and that the majority of sexual assaults is committed against an intimate and known victim. Assuming this data is even remotely accurate, most of those subjected to residential and employment restrictions pose no risk of reoffending at all, and even fewer pose a risk of stranger assault, which is what the residential and employment controls are designed to prevent.

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191 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 227, 243 (2006) (describing how lack of oversight exacerbates the risk of mistake, "politically motivated self-dealing, and outright malfeasance" in Executive Branch implementation of targeted restraints).

192 See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released From Prison in 1994, at 24 (2003) (study of nearly 10,000 sex offenders in fifteen states, 5.3% of whom were rearrested for a sex crime within three years); Francis M. Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in Sex Offender Laws: Failed Policies, New Directions 17, 39–40 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2006) (describing a range of studies showing recidivism in the 2.5% to 27% range); see also infra note 121 (citing studies on recidivism rates). The studies vary significantly in how they define recidivism, the time period they study, and the data sources they use. Most of these studies took place before the introduction of residential, employment, and other restraints imposed on sex offenders; more robust and informative studies are needed to study the effect of such restraints. The studies also do not distinguish between assaults by known assailants, such as friends or family, and assaults by strangers, the latter of which is the focus of most sex offender restrictions.

193 See Richard G. Wright, Introduction: The Failure of Sex Offender Policies, in Sex Offender Laws: Failed Policies, New Directions, supra note 192, at 3, 4 (describing "the impact of the tragic, high-profile, stranger-predator sexual assault" as "[a] dominant factor in the passage of these ineffectacious sex offender laws").
2. Delisting Difficulties

It is incredibly difficult to disprove a propensity to do harm, even when there is a fair and transparent process that allows one to do so. The precautionary impulse that leads officials to err on the side of restraint in the initial designation decision is exacerbated in the delisting context. Here, the ghost of Willie Horton haunts every public official. What if the “freed” individual commits the bad act the restraint was designed to prevent? In such a situation, there is a failure not just of omission but also of commission. Except in the relatively rare cases of particularly sympathetic targets, Executive Branch officials have strong incentives to maintain restraints and few incentives to lift them.

Placing delisting decisions before a judge with life tenure or other independent adjudicators freed from the political process can minimize but will not eliminate the incentives in favor of maintaining the restraint. Just as it is impossible for the Executive to prove that an individual will engage in whatever future bad act the restraint is designed to prevent, so too is it impossible for the individual to prove that he will not do so. Judges, likewise, do not want to be responsible for lifting a restraint on someone who commits a future bad act and, as a result, often defer to Executive Branch determinations on matters of national and community security.

This is not to say that the Executive Branch and courts never take steps to winnow down lists of individuals and entities subject to precrime restraints. But the general trend is one of dramatic growth. Since 2001, the total number of SDGTs has grown from 27 to over 700, with only a few dozen individuals and entities being delisted, as


195 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1380 (2009) (surveying a range of national security–related cases and describing courts as often being “loath to question the judgment of executive officials when push comes to shove”).

196 Internal Executive Branch reviews and court orders have, for example, led to the release or transfer of over 600 Guantanamo Bay detainees, all of whom were being held for preventive purposes. See, e.g., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. Times, projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo, (last accessed Sept. 14, 2013) (detailing history of detainee population at Guantanamo). But in recent years, Congress has imposed a number of restrictions on the transfers, making it politically and legally difficult for the Obama Administration to take steps to move out even those that have been cleared for transfer. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 1027-1028, 126 Stat. 1632, 1914-17. This is a classic example of the political and logistical difficulties associated with undoing a restraint that has already been put in place.
far as can be discerned from publicly available documents. The number of individuals on the No Fly List reportedly has grown from 12 to 21,000 in that same time period, and the number of sex offenders registered nationally has grown to over 700,000.

3. Incentive to Overreach

Whereas adjudication of guilt with respect to a past act presents a binary choice—the individual either engaged in the conduct or did not—adjudication of risk presents adjudicators with a sliding scale, with no clear definition of what characteristics are deemed risky and no limits as to how much risk is too much. In the words of John Stuart Mill: "[T]here is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency."

This problem is exacerbated in the case of an unknown but potentially grave or catastrophic harm. In such a situation, the precautionary principle justifies the application of increasingly broad measures designed to preempt an expanding number of potential risky actors. For undifferentiated rule-based restraints, this means an increasingly loose fit between the risk and the restraint. Thus, even if only a small fraction of sex offenders is likely to offend in the future, the risk posed by the few—coupled with the difficulties of accurately predicting who will offend in the future—is deemed to justify the imposition of broad restraints on significant numbers of persons who

197 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13, at 5. Information about delisted individuals and entities is based on a review of the Federal Register. See, e.g., Unblocking of One Individual Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Executive Order 13,224, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,234, 25,234 (Apr. 27, 2012) (removing name from SDGT list). In some cases, individuals were delisted only after they were deceased. Other delistings were prompted by litigation. See, e.g., ROTH ET AL., supra note 55, at 84–85 (describing delisting of three Swedes, two U.S.-based entities, and one U.S. citizen after a lawsuit was filed and international pressure was brought to bear). It is also possible that others were delisted without any corresponding report in the Federal Register.

198 See supra note 20. A report from the Inspector General suggests that in 2006, the list skyrocketed to over 70,000 "records" before being cut about in half. DOJ 2007 AUDIT, supra note 88, at 31–32. It is not clear, however, what is meant by "record." It is possible, for example, that multiple records targeted a single individual with only slight variations in spelling or other identifying information.

199 See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Map of Registered Sex Offenders, available at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PagedList=1545 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). Only a portion, however, are subject to the residential, employment, and other restrictions that are the subject of this Article.

200 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 145 (1865).

pose no such risk. For individualized, adjudicatory-type restraints, it means increasingly broad—and often malleable and poorly tailored—criteria for concluding that a specific individual poses a risk. Moreover, as potential targets discover or are perceived to have discovered ways to evade existing restraints, as occurs every time a previously convicted sex offender reoffends or a threat to aviation security is revealed, the natural governmental response is to increase the scope and intensity of the restraints so as to encompass more would-be evaders.

The broad restrictions imposed on would-be financers of terrorism, the post-2009 growth in the No Fly List, and the expanding list of triggering offenses and restrictions imposed on sex offenders are all examples of the precautionary principle in practice. The result is an expansive and expanding set of pre-crime restraints.

III

PRE-CRIME RESTRAINTS: UNDERSTANDING AND SETTING SOME LIMITS

Given the important liberty interests at stake and the risks of error and overreach, this Part suggests a set of limits that ought to apply to the government’s use of targeted pre-crime restraints. As an overarching principle, this Article recognizes the government’s legitimate interest in—and the courts’ approval of—certain targeted preventive actions outside of or on the margins of the criminal justice system. At the same time, however, it calls on courts and legislators to demand a much more narrow tailoring of restraint to perceived need than has generally taken place to date.

Having just highlighted the many incentives that operate in favor of expansion, I acknowledge that effective limit setting will not come easy. That said, courts can provide, and already have provided, critical oversight with respect to analogous forms of preventive detention—limits that can readily be transposed onto comprehensive, noncustodial restraints. Responsible legislators and Executive Branch offi-

202 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 15, at 271–75 (noting that many residency restrictions on sex offenders “are driven by public perceptions fueled by media attention to sensational sex crimes” and that recidivism rates among sexual offenders are much lower than generally assumed).
203 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 18 (discussing marked expansion of the No Fly List in reaction to the failed bombing of a Detroit-bound jetliner in 2009 and noting that the government “lowered the standard for putting people on the list”).
205 See, e.g., Klein & Wittes, supra note 31, at 123–69 (describing jurisprudence on preventive detention pursuant to criminal justice, immigration, and civil commitment authorities).
cials also have an important role to play. The following is directed at both.

A. Punishment or Prevention?

There is a growing body of literature arguing that what I call pre-crime restraint is actually “punitive prevention” and ought to either be channeled through the criminal law or categorically prohibited. While these arguments have merit, they fail to squarely grapple with the pressing question of what forms of preventive state action are, and should be, permitted.

As applied to undifferentiated restraints imposed after a criminal adjudication—the case for most sex offender–related restraints—the reclassification of preventive restraints as punitive would prohibit their retroactive application, without imposing any meaningful limits on their prospective use. It would also have the negative consequence of further blurring the preventive and punitive functions of the law, with an almost inevitable mismatch between these functions. Absent a reform of criminal law to fully embrace the preventive purpose, criminal punishments will persist either too long or not long enough to achieve the preventive goals.

See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 252, 259 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (“To dispense with the adjudicated crime destabilizes. It is what makes 'punitive preventive measures’ seem so dangerous.”); Janus, supra note 119, at 577 (warning against what the author calls “radical prevention”). For a sampling of the literature arguing that pre-crime prevention is actually punishment in disguise, see supra note 33.

See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113-14 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Alaska’s sex offender registration and notification scheme is punitive but suggesting it was a permissible punishment going forward). While there is a possibility that some narrow subset of restrictions might be deemed to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the vast majority of the restraints likely would survive a court challenge. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare.”).

As many scholars have noted, the increasingly utilitarian-minded, preventive focus of the criminal justice system has undermined the blaming and censoring function of punishment and thereby diluted one of its most important purposes. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 661 (2012) (arguing that the criminal law should only punish culpable acts but that other preventive restraints on liberty may be justified to deal with what they label “culpable aggressors”); Robinson, supra note 152, at 1432 (warning that the preventive shift of the criminal justice system “perverts the justice process and undercuts the criminal justice system’s long-term effectiveness in controlling crime”); Steiker, supra note 5, at 814 (arguing that permitting punishment outside the “special [criminal] procedural regime” undermines “the usefulness of having a separate criminal process as a forum for blaming”). But see Slobogin, supra note 152, at 122 (arguing that the preventive tilt of the criminal justice system should be embraced).
As applied to national security, immigration-related, and other Executive Branch-imposed restraints, a punishment frame would almost certainly provide prospective, procedural benefits, resulting in enhanced criminal law procedural protections and increased transparency as to the nature of the triggering action or offense. Such procedural safeguards likely would yield concrete effects: helping to catch outright errors, such as misidentification of a target, and presumably leading to a lower incidence of such restraints. That said, many of these same preventive measures likely would be redefined as punishment imposed in response to a range of inchoate and broadly defined crimes.209 This could ultimately put targets in a worse-off position, subjecting them to the long-term grip of the criminal justice system when a temporary, short-lived preventive restraint might have addressed the state's underlying security concern.210

From the perspective of promoting national and community security, such a shift also threatens to unduly tie the state's hands, leaving critical threats unchecked. This Article focuses on the overlooked liberty interests, risks of error, and pressures for expansion associated with targeted, preventive restraints. But it does not deny the state's important interest in minimizing the risk posed by dangerous individuals to other innocent bystanders—including in situations where criminal prosecution is not immediately feasible. Imagine, for example, a foreign partner provides credible information to the intelligence community that a particular individual plans to detonate a commercial airliner. In such a case, the government has a strong, and justifiable, interest in preventing that individual from boarding a plane or at least subject him or her to extensive and potentially time-consuming preboarding screening even if the Department of Justice has not yet gathered enough usable evidence to build a criminal case.

In what follows, I assume that targeted, noncustodial preventive restraints can serve a legitimate government interest. I argue, however, that there ought to be much more meaningful limits on their use and procedural protections in place than currently exist.


210 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 39, at 139–40 (describing pervasive and invasive collateral consequences imposed on convicted criminals); Chin, supra note 14 (same).
B. To the Courts

1. Near-Total Restraints

A searching inquiry into the liberty interests at stake should lead courts to recognize the way in which comprehensive, noncustodial restraints can impose a form of de facto imprisonment. The terrorism-related financial sanctions as applied to U.S. residents and most extreme restrictions imposed on sex offenders fall into this category. They should be treated as analogous to—and subject to the same limits as—preventive detention. Just as the state is, outside the context of wartime detention, prohibited from subjecting individuals to indefinite physical commitment based on a finding of dangerousness alone, so too should the state be prohibited from imposing comprehensive and indefinite noncustodial restraints solely on a theory that the individual or entity poses a future risk.

Implicit in this approach to preventive detention is an appreciation of the significant liberty interests at stake, the ways in which preventive restraints fail to respect the moral autonomy of individuals, and the need for strict limits on their use. The Supreme Court, for example, has concluded that a prior conviction alone cannot justify indefinite, preventive detention. Preventive detention based on dangerousness alone is permitted in limited situations only: when it is time-limited (such as for material witness or pretrial detentions), based on a narrow tailoring of the government interest and preventive restraint, and subject to a series of procedural safeguards, including individualized assessments and court oversight.

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211 Of course, even wartime detention is limited in time by the duration of the actual armed conflict. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) ("It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.").


213 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the limits placed on preventive detention are in practice as effective as they are in theory, or even ideal as a matter of theory. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 23, at 781–92 (offering a powerful critique of the Court's reasoning in Hendricks); see also Eric S. Janus, Failure to Protect: America's Sexual Predator Laws and the Rise of the Preventative State 27 (2006) (arguing that the "judicial promises of principled limitations" with respect to civil commitment for sex offenders "are belied in application"). These limits do, however, establish a set of substantive constraints, even if excessively elastic, for when preventive detention can be applied. Even these arguably modest limits do not apply to targeted preventive measures that fall short of physical incapacitation.

214 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (requiring findings of "mental abnormality" and dangerousness to justify indefinite involuntary commitment post-conviction); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (holding that status as a deportable alien alone cannot justify indefinite detention).

215 Although the Supreme Court has never in a majority opinion claimed to apply "strict scrutiny" to the review of preventive detention, it has in practice required a narrow
Comprehensive noncustodial restraints should be subject to these same limits. Such restraints would be permissible in two circumstances. First, they could be applied as an alternative to otherwise sanctioned forms of preventive detention, such as civil commitment, detention of presumptively dangerous aliens, or pretrial detention, but only for so long as and subject to the same procedural requirements applied to the equivalent form of preventive detention. Second, they could be permitted in additional, limited situations if narrowly tailored to a discrete and compelling government need, time-limited, and subject to court oversight, regular reviews, and individualized assessments, among other procedural safeguards.

Under this approach, the most onerous residential, employment, and other related restrictions on sex offenders would be subject to the same substantive and procedural limits that apply to the civil commitment of sex offenders. Consistent with the Supreme Court holdings in *Kansas v. Hendrick*\(^{216}\) and *Kansas v. Crane*,\(^{217}\) these restrictions could be upheld only if based on an individualized assessment of dangerousness and a finding of mental abnormality making it seriously difficult for the individual to control his behavior.\(^{218}\) Adjudications would take place before an independent adjudicator; the burden would be placed on the government to prove that the criteria are met by clear and convincing evidence; and the targeted individual would be entitled to counsel, present evidence, and cross-examine the government's witnesses.\(^{219}\) Regular reviews would help to ensure that the conditions justifying the restraints persist. Other less restrictive conditions imposed on sex offenders that do not amount to near-total control could be imposed without meeting all of these requirements, but there would need to be a much more nuanced means-ends tailoring than currently takes place, as discussed below.

Similarly, the comprehensive prohibitions imposed on U.S. residents labeled as “specially designated global terrorists” would only

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\(^{216}\) 521 U.S. at 369.

\(^{217}\) 534 U.S. at 413.

\(^{218}\) To reiterate, I do not suggest that these systems of preventive civil commitment are ideal—particularly as a matter of practice. But they do impose important limits on who can be subject to these restraints and, at least in theory, take into account the moral autonomy of their targets. *See supra* note 211.

\(^{219}\) *See, e.g.*, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof in involuntary commitment adjudications).
be upheld if the government were able to establish that the prohibitions are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and that less restrictive means are unavailable. Given expansive terrorism statutes that permit prosecution and pretrial incapacitation of persons alleged to have provided material support for terrorism and allow for the issuance of civil injunctions to prevent future violations of the material support laws, it is hard to imagine how the government could establish that the current regime is both needed and narrowly tailored. While some such sanctions might be permissible as a gap-filler (i.e., to prevent a suspect group or individual from financing terrorism during the early investigatory stages of a case in instances where the availability of civil injunctions is determined to be insufficient), it is hard to explain a legitimate government need for such comprehensive financial sanctions beyond such limited stopgap measures. Moreover, if such a stopgap measure were adopted, it should be time-limited. The government should be required either to bring a criminal case or to lift the restriction, as is the case with pretrial detention and material witness warrants.

One need not agree, however, with the specifics to accept the basic insight: certain noncustodial pre-crime restraints impose such pervasive restrictions on the ability to lead a free and meaningful life that courts should treat them as a form of de facto imprisonment, triggering the same substantive and procedural rights that apply to preventive detention. The debate then shifts to an argument as to the appropriate substantive and procedural limits that apply to the core deprivation of liberty brought about by preventive detention, whether de jure or de facto. The outcome of that debate controls and sets the limits for preventive detention and the equivalent forms of

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220 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting provision of material support to terrorism); id. § 2339B (prohibiting provision of material support or resources to designated terrorist organizations); id. § 2339C (prohibition against the financing of terrorism). Subsection 2339B(c) explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to seek a civil injunction whenever it "appears" that an individual is engaging in or "about to" engage in a violation of the prohibition against providing material support to a designated terrorist organization. Id. § 2339B(c). Subsection (f) includes protections against the disclosure of classified evidence. Id. § 2339B(f).


222 Analogous claims have been made in the context of habeas litigation, with registered sex offenders asserting constructive custody based on onerous registration and reporting requirements. Although such claims have been rejected, courts have not yet adjudicated a case in which the petitioner was subject to pervasive residential restrictions and limitations on his or her movements in addition to registration requirements. See, e.g., Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 392, 397–398 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing cases); see also id. at 345–49 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (offering powerful argument as to why registered sex offender should be deemed to be "in custody" for purposes of habeas jurisdiction).
noncustodial restraint. Pervasive noncustodial restraints can no longer be left unregulated or subject to bare rationality review simply because they do not physically place an individual behind bars.\textsuperscript{223}

2. Partial Incapacitation

Most noncustodial pre-crime restraints are not so comprehensive that they can be fairly analogized to de facto imprisonment. But they too should be subject to heightened substantive scrutiny and procedural limits. Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, courts should demand a tailored, adjudicatory model, which will help to reduce the risk of error and better reflect the moral autonomy of its targets, even if it cannot fully cure the problem of false positives. Such an approach concededly may increase the number of false negatives given the near-impossibility of complete accuracy in the prediction of risk. But some degree of risk assumption is both necessary—and inherent—in any society that calls itself free; efforts to eliminate all risk lead toward a totalitarian society in which the government attempts to maximize security by maximizing control.\textsuperscript{224}

Substantive Limits

As described in detail in Part II, partial, targeted restraints deny their targets respect for their moral autonomy and equal treatment, treating them as less worthy than those not subject to the restraint, stamping them as dangerous, and failing to give them an opportunity to make the “right” choice and thereby prove their moral worthiness. This in and of itself should prompt additional scrutiny by courts. A more searching inquiry will also reveal the way in which many such restraints infringe specific, substantive liberty interests that the Supreme Court has declared worthy of protection, thus triggering due process concerns.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{223} See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 1121 (2009) (describing “arbitrary and capricious review whose intensity has been dialed down to a minimum”).

\textsuperscript{224} That said, there are an array of risk-prevention initiatives that are not coercive and targeted, ranging from the simple self-protection measures like installation of alarm systems to traffic-control measures to early childhood education. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & Dimitriy V. Masterov, The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young Children 12 (Comm. for Econ. Dev., Invest in Kids Working Group, Working Paper No. 5, 2004), available at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Invest/FILES/dugger_2004-12-02_dvm.pdf (noting that “[o]ne of the best-established empirical regularities in economics is that education reduces crime” and presenting evidence that investment in early childhood education can reduce crime).

\textsuperscript{225} See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text. Professor Murphy discusses equal protection analysis as a possible doctrinal hook for evaluating these types of restraints, highlighting the ways in which targeted preventive measures should be understood as impacting discrete and insular minorities. Murphy, supra note 21, at 1404–05. While I consider equal protection principles as relevant to an analysis of the liberty consequences of targeted noncustodial restraints, see supra Part II.A.2, I am skeptical that equal protection
Given these costs, courts should demand more than a mere rational relationship between the government's stated interest and the restraint being imposed. Reviewing courts should instead engage in a searching assessment of how a particular scheme furthers the stated governmental interest, how it burdens liberty interests, and whether there are reasonably available and less burdensome ways of furthering the relevant government interest. Unless the burden is proportional to the government interest, it should not survive. If there are other reasonably available and less intrusive alternatives, they should be applied.226

A searching inquiry into the No Fly List, for example, reveals the way it burdens, albeit without extinguishing, long-recognized interests in interstate travel, association, and pursuit of employment of one's choosing. Among the many questions that the courts should ask: Is there a sound basis for concluding that individuals who meet the (still secret) criteria pose a threat to aviation security? Is the restriction on travel—and all of the related intrusions on individual liberty—proportionate to the interest in aviation security? Are there reasonably available alternatives, such as extensive body and luggage searches or deployment of air marshals, for protecting against the threat? Ultimately, the courts should be pushing the Executive toward a narrow tailoring of restraint to need.

Courts also should examine how these answers change over time. It might be legitimate, for example, to prevent a suspected terrorist from boarding a plane soon after the government learns of his involvement in a nascent terrorist plot. But why is it legitimate for the restraint to last months or years in the absence of sufficient evidence to bring a criminal charge for an inchoate conspiracy or attempt crime? What might be permissible as a stopgap measure might not still be justified months or years later.

analysis will do much work without a separate and independent determination that the scheme also infringes certain fundamental liberty interests. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 962 n.35 (2002) (offering an interesting analysis of the interaction between equal protection, fundamental rights, and substantive due process).

226 This approach tracks the careful interest balancing suggested by Justice Stephen Breyer in, among other places, his dissenting opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. 554 U.S. 570, 693 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1336–37 (2007) (suggesting that even strict scrutiny has in many instances collapsed into such a proportionality test, in which courts balance interests and assess marginal risks). But see Steiker, supra note 5, at 777 (warning of the many limits of proportionality analysis as a check on preventive restraints). While I do not intend to suggest that such a balancing test analysis will fully counter the incentives toward overreach and expansion discussed in Part II, such an approach provides a way, consistent with current doctrine, to set some outer limits as to what is constitutionally permissible when the state seeks to restrain preventively.
At least one recent ruling has demonstrated that courts are well positioned to engage in the type of searching inquiry and analysis I suggest here. As discussed in Part I.C, in In re Taylor, a California appellate court examined a challenge to residential restrictions imposed on paroled sex offenders in San Diego. Drawing on a well-developed lower-court record, the appellate court examined in detail the practical effect of the restrictions, highlighting the ways the restrictions relegated such offenders to less than three percent of the city's residences, prohibited offenders from living with family members, and effectively rendered many offenders homeless. It concluded that the restrictions significantly burdened the right to travel, were not narrowly tailored to a compelling government need, and were therefore unconstitutional. While the court concluded that such restrictions can still be imposed based on an individualized assessment of threat and need, it ruled that they can no longer be applied to all registered sex offenders without a particularized assessment of the risk posed. While the ruling is, as of this writing, suspended pending review by the California Supreme Court, it offers precisely the approach I suggest here.

Procedural Limits

In addition to ensuring that the substantive criteria for being subject to a particular restraint are appropriately tailored to need, courts should demand heightened procedural protections in the application of any restraints that survive a substantive challenge. Applying the prevailing Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, procedural requirements will vary depending on three key factors: the extent of the deprivation and individual interest affected; the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and the governmental interests at stake, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional procedural safeguards. A proper calibration of the liberty interest should tip the scale in favor of increased procedural requirements. Given the preventive nature of these restraints and the obvious difficulties in predicting the future,
the risk of error also ought to be understood as high, thereby pointing to the value of, and need for, additional procedural safeguards.

Such a recalibrated *Mathews* balancing should yield a set of minimal procedural safeguards in the imposition of preventive restraints, including transparency as to the criteria justifying the pre-crime restraint, postdeprivation notice, a meaningful opportunity to challenge the restraint before an independent adjudicator, and individualized, periodic reviews of any restraint that imposes an ongoing deprivation.\(^{233}\) This is consistent with the tailored, adjudicatory model of pre-crime restraints described in Part I.D. Where applicable, the Executive should provide an unclassified summary of classified information relied on in making the underlying designation decision or grant cleared counsel access to the classified information—something that courts have already begun to demand in the context of the terrorism-related financial sanction regime.\(^{234}\)

Absent a compelling justification otherwise, restraints should be presumptively time limited. At a minimum, there ought to be an effective mechanism by which targets may rebut a presumption of continuing dangerousness or apply for some sort of exemption.\(^{235}\)

To be clear, such safeguards can hardly be expected to offer an equal counterweight to the risk aversion of adjudicators and legislators and many other incentives in favor of overbreadth and overreach.\(^{236}\) They can, however, provide important protections on the margins, minimizing cases of misidentification and providing relief for those who would not or could not possibly commit the types of crimes the restraints are designed to protect against—such as, for example, physically disabled sex offenders.

3. *The Cumulative Effect*

In some cases, a series of partial restraints might each individually pass constitutional muster yet together operate as a comprehensive set

\(^{233}\) This final qualification is meant to distinguish restraints such as stop-and-frisks, which are relatively fleeting, from restraints like the No Fly List or revocation of an employment license, which have ongoing and significant impacts on where one can go and what they can do. I do not argue that every stop-and-frisk should to be subject to judicial review. If, however, a particular individual were designated a presumptively dangerous individual and subject to a stop-and-frisk on a daily basis as a result, that would be a case for which independent oversight is warranted.

\(^{234}\) *See supra* Part I.A.

\(^{235}\) This will undoubtedly add to the costs of administering such restraints. In some limited instances, the state may be able to demonstrate that the administrative burden of regular reviews or delisting mechanisms is excessively high relative to the individual interest at stake. But in most cases, regular reviews and delisting mechanisms should be understood as essential moderating influences on the state’s impulse to manage risk through targeted restraint.

\(^{236}\) *See supra* note 226.
of restraints akin to total imprisonment. Professor Gabriel Chin, for example, has persuasively argued that the combination of collateral consequences imposed on convicted criminals is akin to the imposition of civil death. 237 Professor Michelle Alexander has made a similar point, describing the combination of collateral consequences as the new Jim Crow. 238 The combination of nonpunitive restraints imposed on persons who have not even been convicted of a crime can have a similarly dramatic effect.

Because each regime operates in isolation, often with specific and discrete means of implementation and review, individuals lack an effective mechanism to challenge the combined effect of such restraints even in cases amounting to de facto imprisonment. 239 This should change. Congress should enact a cause of action providing a mechanism for targets to challenge the combined effect of such restraints. In the interim, courts could begin to recognize a cause of action in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim of constructive imprisonment. Named defendants would include those responsible for each discrete restraint as well as the attorney general of the implementing sovereign. 240 The attorneys general should have the responsibility of defending—or mitigating—the combined operation of the restraints within their jurisdiction.

C. To Legislatures and the Executive Branch

In Part II.B, I described in detail the ways in which legislatures and Executive Branch officials are pushed to manage risk, err on the side of caution, and expand restraints in response to real or perceived security threats, even if the expansions provide only a false sense of security. At some point, however, the restraints become so expansive that they are no longer limited to the “other” and become a concern of “us.” This in turn often triggers the kind of self-reflection and political action that can lead to change.

This happened in Georgia, for example, when Wendy Whitaker, a white woman who was subject to onerous registration requirements and residential limits based on a consensual act of oral sex engaged in as a teenager, became a poster child for the excessive restrictions imposed on sex offenders. Her story, and litigation, prompted the Georgia legislature to pass a law allowing certain offenders to petition the court for removal from the registry—a change she ultimately bene-

237 Chin, supra note 14.
238 Alexander, supra note 39, at 178–79.
239 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1378–79 (raising concerns about the cumulative effect of multiple restraints imposed by a multitude of actors).
240 Legislation is likely needed, particularly given that in many instances the restraints are imposed by multiple sovereigns. See id.
fited from.\textsuperscript{241} Similarly, when former Senator Edward M. Kennedy asserted in 2004 that he was on a No Fly List, based on several instances in which he had been stopped and questioned before flying, Congress suddenly became interested, at least briefly, in reviewing alleged errors associated with the No Fly List.\textsuperscript{242}

In other instances budgetary concerns yield the impetus for change. Lake Forest, California, for example, lifted restrictions on sex offenders entering public parks and beaches in order to avoid the costs of defending legal challenges.\textsuperscript{243}

These moments provide important opportunities for legislatures and Executive Branch officials to take steps to rein in otherwise overbroad statutes, regulations, and practices. They also point to the need for more responsible dialogue and analysis to accurately match the risk and restraint from the outset. Certain key principles ought to guide the decision making.

First, Executive Branch officials and legislatures should engage in a more thorough accounting of the precise governmental interest at stake and the liberty consequences of proposed restraints, closely tailor the restraint to the need, and consider less restrictive means of achieving the same goals. While the incentives often push in favor of expanding targeted prevention, a combination of budgetary pressures, commitment to responsible governance, and pressure from civil society can help promote this type of searching inquiry.

Second, undifferentiated, rule-based restraints imposed by the Executive Branch alone should be categorically avoided. The Executive Branch should not be able to conclude, for example, that some percentage of men and women from East Asia between the ages of eighteen and thirty pose a risk to aviation security and therefore anyone who fits that profile can be permanently barred from flying.\textsuperscript{244}

To the extent that Executive Branch–imposed restraints are permitted, they should be based on an individualized fact-finding process.

\textsuperscript{241} Bill Rankin, \textit{Restricted by Registry No More}, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2010, at 1B. Her lawsuit also prompted several other changes in the law, most of which are designed to alleviate the retroactive consequences of the restrictions. \textit{See H.R. 571, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess.} (Ga. 2010).


\textsuperscript{244} Such a policy would obviously trigger equal protection concerns. \textit{See Dorf, supra} note 225, at 960. These same principles also ought to protect against the imposition of the No Fly List on all persons who have blue eyes and a dimple based on statistical evidence suggesting that persons with blue eyes and a dimple are more likely to pose a threat to aviation security.
with a well-developed administrative record, consistent with an adjudicatory model of pre-crime restraints. There also should be transparency as to the criteria for imposing the restraint, post-deprivation notice, and an opportunity for meaningful review. Additional means of circumscribing executive discretion should be considered, including executive audits of the type suggested by Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuellar\textsuperscript{245} and vigorous oversight by inspectors general.

Third, undifferentiated, rule-based restraints following a criminal law adjudication of guilt should be imposed only if the following criteria are met: there is a sound, empirical basis for the legislature to conclude that individuals who have been adjudicated guilty of a particular offense are likely to commit whatever future bad act the restraint is designed to prevent; the restraint is effective in reducing the risk posed; and individualized assessments would either be ineffective (because of difficulties in predicting) or excessively burdensome (because of the administrative costs) relative to the liberty interests at stake.

Fourth, restrictions on seemingly innocuous activity—such as going to the park or buying groceries—should demand a higher showing of need than restraints on access to inherently dangerous items or knowledge—such as access to guns, the piloting of planes, or security clearances.

Fifth, given their future-oriented nature and associated risks of error, all such restraints ought to be subject to regular reviews. At a minimum, there ought to be a meaningful opportunity for a targeted individual to seek an exemption or otherwise establish that he or she does not pose the type of risk the restraint is intended to protect against.

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Some likely will object that these proposed limits will be overly burdensome, preventing the state from taking needed steps to deal with dangerous individuals. But this framework does not prohibit the use of necessary restraints. Rather, the restraints must be tailored and proportionate to a compelling government objective, implemented in a manner consistent with the preventive purpose, and subject to meaningful external oversight. Procedural requirements will doubtless increase the administrative burden on the government, but they are essential to ensure that deprivations of liberty based on a targeted assessment of dangerousness do not persist longer than necessary to serve the preventive purpose. There is, in fact, a persuasive argument that such measures may in fact increase public safety by forcing legisla-

\textsuperscript{245} See Cuellar, \textit{supra} note 191, at 125–31.
tors and Executive Branch officials to define and pinpoint perceived threats with more accuracy and by eliminating the false security associated with overbroad restraints that are pervasive but often ineffective.

Conversely, some will argue that these recommendations are unduly permissive, allowing "punitive" or "radical" prevention to persist when it should be prohibited altogether. This is a reasonable objection, but it fails to grapple with the pervasive use of, acceptance of, and legitimate government interest in both physical and nonphysical forms of prevention. Once one accepts, for example, that narrowly targeted and time-limited preventive detention is permissible in limited situations—a view that I hold—then analogous (or less restrictive) noncustodial restraints must similarly be permitted. The question remains one of setting the appropriate limits.

A more compelling critique focuses on the limits of either court review or legislative or Executive Branch restraint. This Article's proposed framework rests on the assumption that one of two things will happen: either (i) targeted individuals will challenge the restraints, cases will be heard on the merits, courts will engage in a searching and thorough analysis of the individual interest at stake, and they will set meaningful and appropriate limits; or (ii) legislatures and executives will independently rein in the use of such restraints on their own.

There is ample room for skepticism that either will occur. But likely imperfection in implementation is not a reason to abandon all hope for reform. If taken seriously, the proposed framework should provide litigants with persuasive arguments as to why their cases should be heard and provide courts with a better set of tools to evaluate them. Notably, this framework does not demand what would likely be an unrealistic overhaul of existing doctrine. Instead, it provides courts and litigants with the analytic tools to understand, evaluate, and limit this expanding set of pre-crime restraints while applying the governing doctrinal framework.

Meanwhile, civil society can play an important role in raising the profile of the otherwise invisible targets of such measures by highlight-

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246 Harcourt, supra note 206, at 254–57.
247 Janus, supra note 119, at 32–34.
249 A related but different critique is premised on concerns about activist courts second-guessing legislative judgments. This, of course, raises a much broader debate about the proper role of the judiciary. As is apparent from this Article, I adopt a view of the judiciary as playing an important countermajoritarian role, even if only a modest one. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision-Making, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 283, 303 (2010) (describing a third legislative chamber theory of judicial review that functions by "nudg[ing] the legal system off of a rights-under-protective point and onto a somewhat less under-protective or slightly overprotective point").
ing any excesses or abuses, and by promoting a more responsible de-
bate. If asked whether the government should be able to keep
dangerous terrorists off airplanes, most people would answer yes. If,
however, the question is whether the Executive should have unreview-
able discretion to label someone a suspected terrorist and perma-
nently bar him from flying, the unanimity fades. In reframing the
questions to better reflect the liberty interests and risks of error associ-
ated with pre-crime restraints, civil society can help to rein in the in-
centives for overreach and expansion. 250

Legislators and Executive Branch officials also should take note
of the ways in which overreach can ultimately yield to judicial invalida-
tion or political backlash, divert limited resources from where they are
needed most, and, if excessively broad, be so inconsistently enforced
that serious threats may fall through the gaps. This should yield
self-discipline in both the design and the implementation of such
restraints.

Finally, it is also worth noting that there are an array of other
risk-management tools available that do not target particular individu-
als or classes of individuals with affirmative restraints that may be
equally, if not more, effective in reducing risk—including, for exam-
ple, mental health treatment, investment in childhood education, and
public education campaigns. Legislators and Executive Branch offici-
als should not assume a static world in which ratcheting up targeted,
coercive prevention is the only means of enhancing community safety;
supplementary and alternative forms of managing risk ought to be
invested in and employed. 251

CONCLUSION

Noncustodial pre-crime restraints are a pervasive part of our legal
landscape. They have ballooned over the last two decades and are
likely to grow, particularly as technological advances and other inno-
vations make it increasingly easy to monitor and control without
resorting to the prison cell. 252 But while there is an extensive litera-
ture on both punishment and preventive detention, 253 there has been

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251 See supra note 224; see also Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 13 Unbound 109, 124–32 (2013) (describing the possibility of alternative order-maintaining functions that do not involve coercive restraints).

252 See supra Part II.A.

253 See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
insufficient attention to the array of noncustodial, nonpunitive restraints designed to prevent future bad acts.

This Article highlights three such regimes—the No Fly List, the targeted financial sanction regime, and the restrictions imposed on purportedly dangerous sex offenders—as illustrative of the growth of the preventive state. It demonstrates how certain noncustodial restraints so fully restrict the capacity to lead a free and meaningful life that they ought to be treated as a form of de facto imprisonment. It also exposes the ways in which all pre-crime restraints create inherent risks of error, abuse, and overreach; stamp their targets with a badge of inferiority; and fail to respect their targets’ moral autonomy. This Article calls on courts, legislatures, and the Executive Branch to meaningfully and reasonably limit their use and offers a framework for doing so.