A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering

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A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering

SUSAN D. CARLE* AND SCOTT L. CUMMINGS†

ABSTRACT

This essay takes a new look at legal ethics issues salient to “movement lawyers” who maintain a sustained commitment to social movement goals and collaborate with social movement organizations over time to achieve them. The essay provides a historical overview of movement lawyering, tracing its development to current practice in which movement lawyers work in collaboration with mobilized social movement groups, though not always in traditional lawyer-client relationships. As this analysis reveals, contemporary movements employ a sophisticated array of strategies, which may pull lawyers away from traditional representation paradigms. We argue that the legal ethics literature on movement lawyering must adapt to these new developments. To advance this project, we highlight two under-explored ethical dimensions of movement lawyering practice, which we term intra-movement dissent and temporality.

The concept of intra-movement dissent spotlights the contested nature of social movements and the need for lawyers to take sides in disputes over goals and strategies. Conventional applications of legal ethics rules do not provide sufficient guidance to movement lawyers in such scenarios. Even lawyers who are trying their best to be movement-centered will inevitably confront situations in which they must exercise discretion without clear direction, such as in choosing which groups to represent within movements and how to resolve internal disagreements. The concept of temporality focuses attention on movement lawyers’ commitment to a long-term vision of social change. We suggest that movement lawyers should be able to identify long-term movement goals as their primary loyalty and negotiate non-traditional relationships with specific clients and other movement stakeholders to advance those goals. Our primary aim is to highlight the need for more context-specific attention from scholars and practitioners to address legal ethics principles of key importance in guiding movement lawyers.

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INTRODUCTION

In the lawyering and legal ethics literatures, scholars over the past decade have begun to focus more attention on “movement lawyering.” This focus has tracked activity on the ground as lawyers and activists motivated by social movement goals have played prominent roles in the United States political and legal system—symbolized by the legal mobilization against President Trump’s Muslim Travel Ban. There, lawyers responded to social media calls to action by showing up at airports to help detained immigrants while filing lawsuits to block implementation of Trump’s executive order. As this suggests, lawyers associated with contemporary social movements are responding to immediate political challenges, such as the upsurge in racial bigotry and religious intolerance, while also learning how to interact with new movement organizations that use sophisticated digital strategies as well as more traditional forms of grassroots mobilization.

Within this environment, movement lawyering has generated scholarly and practice-based interest as a potential model of legal activism that promotes struggle by marginalized groups while avoiding problems of political overreach and overinvestment in court-based reform. Much of the current scholarly interest in movement lawyering focuses on its relation to progressive activism. Yet...
movement lawyers today work to further ideological visions spanning the far left to the far right, addressing a wide scope of specific issue areas. While fully aware of this, we focus on lawyering in connection with progressive social movements, which has drawn the most intense scholarly scrutiny.

Overall, progressive scholars and practitioners have reacted hopefully to the emergence of what we argue is a distinctive model of movement lawyering. They see this model as a means of deploying legal expertise to contribute to movement success while minimizing risks to client autonomy and movement power that previous generations of scholars identified as sources of concern. Indeed, one of the promises of the movement lawyering model lies in its potential resolution of long-standing ethical concerns about lawyers whose pursuit of ideological commitments over specific client interests creates tension with professional duties of client loyalty. Despite this promise, however, little work has been done to explore the professional choices movement lawyers confront in practice and how legal ethics principles apply.

As movement lawyering aspires to collaborative client relationships in the pursuit of long-term reform, it plays out within a professional framework defined by standard legal ethics principles. These principles are expressed in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which

6. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS I (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do]. See also Radiolab Presents: More Perfect—The Imperfect Plaintiffs, RADIOLAB (June 28, 2016), http://www.radiolab.org/story/more-perfect-plaintiffs/ [https://perma.cc/6D7V-ZPMC] (describing how Edward Blum, a right-wing non-lawyer activist, engineered two key civil rights cases before the Supreme Court in the span of several years).

serve as the template for nearly all states’ professional codes. The Model Rules draw a clear line between lawyer and client objectives, and between lawyer and client values. Rule 1.2 makes clear that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation,” and that such representation “does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.” The rules further stress the importance of single-minded attention to a client’s immediate interests, prohibiting lawyers from representing a client when such representation would be “materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer,” and prohibiting current representation that poses a substantial risk to the confidences of former clients without their consent. Although the rules exhort lawyers to engage in pro bono service and encourage participation in legal services and law reform organizations, they give no guidance on how to choose clients from within a social movement constituency with competing interests. Nor do the rules address lawyers’ duties in relation to the development of legal principles and promotion of interests that may be realized only far in the future.

Consider the following example. A lawyer commits herself to representing the Movement for Black Lives (MBL), which is a specific organization that grew out of the Black Lives Matter movement and has its own issue platform, emphasis, and priorities. On referral from MBL, the lawyer agrees to handle an individual client’s police brutality case. As the litigation proceeds, the client begins to prefer a large damages award whereas MBL would prefer prospective injunctive relief to prevent such incidents in the future. MBL, for example, would prefer to obtain an injunction that defines new police department policies on the use of force and prohibits striking persons who are in restraints. The lawyer accordingly faces a classic conflict of interest she must resolve. The movement lawyer’s reason for being in the case is to further the MBL’s vision, even though her attention at the time is devoted to a particular client’s individual interests. Or, as is more likely, she may have dual motivations: She wants both to help her client achieve his objective of compensation for his injury and to further the interests and objectives of MBL in preventing police violence in the future. What distinguishes her as a movement lawyer is her commitment to MBL’s vision of a better world achieved

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8. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) & (b) (2016) [hereinafter Model Rules].
9. Model Rules R. 1.7(a)(1). If a conflict exists, lawyers must decide whether they “will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client.” Model Rules R. 1.7(b)(1). If the lawyer decides she can provide representation, she must then discuss the situation with the affected clients, including the risk of having to withdraw from the representation if an unresolvable conflict arises, and obtain the client’s informed consent before proceeding. Model Rules R. 1.7(b)(4).
through strategies for social change. Her orientation to practice involves more than simply representing clients subject to police abuse. In this instance, the lawyer, owing responsibilities both to the movement and to a particular client, finds herself pulled toward two inconsistent objectives simultaneously. She faces a choice between fighting for a higher damages award for her particular client and for the stronger prospective injunctive relief the movement desires, but finds herself unable to successfully obtain both given limits the defendants have imposed. This conflict is one of the hardest ethical issues movement lawyers confront yet its appropriate resolution remains contested, underscoring the need for more sustained inquiry on the ethics of movement lawyering.

Our essay offers a new perspective by focusing attention on the contemporary practice of movement lawyering in order to highlight the particular ethical challenges it raises. We also provide some preliminary ideas about how these challenges might be resolved. In this sense, we seek to both deepen theoretical understanding of movement lawyering and provide guidance to those who practice it. Toward this end, our essay advances three central aims.

First, we provide an overview of movement lawyering, offer a definition, and assess its relation to familiar concepts of lawyering for social change that have defined the so-called “post”-civil rights era. We argue that, although there is much conceptual and practical overlap, the idea of movement lawyering as multi-faceted legal advocacy in the service of mobilized social movement constituencies presents a distinctive vision of legal practice that carries with it specific ethical challenges.

Second, we introduce two concepts that fundamentally shape movement lawyers’ ethical choices and responsibilities: intra-movement dissent and temporality. Intra-movement dissent draws attention to the inherent conflicts over goals and strategies that define social movement struggle, which require that lawyers have a principled mechanism for making representational choices in the first instance and resolving internal disputes. Temporality is the idea that movements work toward social impact over the long term, which requires that lawyers have a process for planning and a commitment to implementation over time, even in the face of short-term disagreement or setback. Both concepts, at bottom, raise the specter of conflicts of interests—either between different interests within a social movement or between short-term client interests and long-term movement objectives. Neither concept is adequately addressed by standard legal ethics principles and both have been overlooked in treatments of movement lawyering.

Third, in light of the value of long-term social movements and the impossibility of neatly resolving conflicts within them, we suggest that lawyers have crucial leadership roles to play in social movement campaigns beyond client-centered counseling, and that standard ethics principles require revision to better facilitate

the positive contributions of lawyers who take sides on issues of social import and dedicate themselves to the pursuit of long-term solutions. We conclude by highlighting the need for more systematic scholarly inquiry on the ethics of movement lawyering.

I. MOVEMENT LAWYERING: CONTINUITY AND DIFFERENCE

Understanding the emergence of “movement lawyering” as a professional category, and assessing its distinctiveness, requires situating it in relation to alternative models of lawyering for social change, which have been much debated since the advent of “public interest lawyering” in the 1970s. At a basic level, the project of naming a distinctive approach to practice, like movement lawyering, requires identifying something to define it against—an alternative mirror held up to reflect what is different and unique about the new model. This definitional project always raises questions about whether the new model is really new or rather repackages old concepts and practices. In this part, we suggest that both perspectives are true. Contemporary movement lawyering builds upon concepts and practices of the past and also strives for new ways of thinking about and navigating the relationship between law and social change.

We define movement lawyering as the use of integrated advocacy strategies, inside and outside of formal lawmaking spaces, by lawyers who are accountable to mobilized social movement groups to build the power of those groups to produce or oppose social change goals that they define. This definition draws upon recent developments in legal practice and scholarship. Activist lawyering, on both the political left and right, has been influenced by the rise of new social movements and the resurgence of old ones in the new millennium. On the left, prominent examples include the successful legal and political campaign to achieve marriage equality, culminating in the Supreme Court’s sweeping decision in Obergefell v. Hodges; the legal challenge to the detention of terrorism suspects at Guantánamo as part of the so-called War on Terror; the contentious campaign to win protected legal status for undocumented youth, called Dreamers, during the Obama presidency against the backdrop of failed efforts to secure comprehensive immigration reform; and the nationwide mobilization against police violence, sparked by the killings of unarmed black men in Ferguson, Missouri, Baltimore, Maryland, and elsewhere, fueling a broader Black Lives Matter movement to challenge racial subordination through...
criminalization and related debt collection practices. These efforts have been matched, and in some cases surpassed, by conservative constituencies, some backed by powerful corporate patrons, which have adopted the strategies and tactics of their progressive counterparts to press for goals that oppose progressive values. These conservative campaigns advance the causes of reducing taxes, opposing gun control, overturning Obamacare, undoing campaign finance regulation, and promoting the free speech rights of white supremacists and Christian extremists.

Social science and legal scholars have documented and analyzed these social movement developments, while seeking to draw normative lessons from them. Sociologists have examined how law affects the opportunity structure for movement action and how activists can use law as a tool to reshape social norms and strengthen movement bargaining power. In the legal academy, scholars have plunged deep into the theoretical and empirical literature on social movements to explore how movement mobilization shapes lawyering activity and lays the groundwork for legal transformation. In this “social movement turn,” legal scholars have presented a decentered view of democratic reform, turning away from earlier emphases on lawyers and courts in the vanguard of civil rights-era change, and focusing instead on how social movements take the lead in changing “hearts and minds”—forging a path along which lawyers and courts then follow.

This scholarly focus on social movements generally and movement lawyering in particular can be understood as a response to criticisms of the role of law and

lawyers in progressive social change. The concept of “public interest” lawyering, as it came to be defined during the 1970s, was associated with the practice of representing clients, primarily in litigation, whose interests were underrepresented in the legal and political system by virtue of their marginalized status.

Public interest lawyering during this period was understood and undertaken as a progressive project on behalf of racial justice, women’s rights, environmental justice, and other causes. However, as success in the 1970s gave way to retrenchment and reversal beginning in the 1980s—with lawyers confronted by more hostile courts and the rise of a conservative public interest law counter-movement—scholars articulated two central critiques that have cast a long shadow over progressive practice ever since.

One critique highlights how the asymmetrical power between public interest lawyer and client—whether a vulnerable individual or diffuse class—enables lawyers to pursue their own political vision over client interests, undermining the core professional tenet of client accountability. Derrick Bell articulated this critique in a ground-breaking article in which he charged civil rights lawyers with “serving two masters.” Specifically, Bell argued that the lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), who handled the remedial phases of school desegregation in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, skated close to violating their ethical duties to their clients. They did so, in Bell’s view, by pushing for the movement ideal of complete school integration over the desires of clients—African American school children and parents speaking on their behalf. These clients, Bell explained, preferred winning more resources to improve their own local, still largely segregated, schools over being transported to white schools in other parts of town. Agreeing with Justice Harlan’s position against the NAACP in an earlier case, Bell claimed that the “divided allegiance” of lawyers employed by social movement organizations “has developed in a far more idealistic and dangerous form,” and that lawyers working for idealistic motives, rather than pecuniary ones, needed the most ethical policing. In Bell’s words: “[i]dealism, though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control.”

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32. Id., at 512.

33. Id. at 505.

34. Id. at 504.
In the scholarly dialogue *Serving Two Masters* spawned, some commentators critiqued 1970s-style public interest lawyering as insufficiently self-reflective. Critics faulted lawyers (who were usually socially privileged, white, and male) for dominating clients and client groups, substituting their own perspectives for those of affected communities, and, in general, using their privilege in ways that were in tension with the community empowerment goals of the movements they purportedly served. Public interest lawyers lost sight of the appropriate line between lawyer and leader, neglecting to ensure that they served as agents rather than principals. In this regard, Bell and others portrayed public interest lawyers as untethered from the interests of the vulnerable communities they claimed to represent—contending that lawyering had become yet another way of dominating vulnerable communities through patronizing, know-it-all interventions. It was in response to these concerns about accountability that scholars advocated a client-centered approach, in which lawyers deferred to their clients’ stated aims, articulated after active dialogue and counseling.

The second critique of public interest lawyering questioned the effectiveness of litigation and adjudication in fundamentally altering entrenched structures of social power. In this vein, critics suggested that the pursuit of law reform through courts at best wasted resources and at worst harmed social movements by coopting their message and energy, and often producing backlash. Political scientist Stuart Scheingold offered one of the most potent versions of what he termed the “myth” of rights-based litigation strategies: “Without support of the real power holders, . . . litigation is ineffectual and at times counterproductive. With that support, litigation is unnecessary.”

Beginning in the 1990s, law and social science scholars developed two important alternative concepts of activist lawyering that responded to these foundational critiques. One response was to move away from the model of top-down litigation associated with public interest lawyering toward a model of “community” or “collaborative” lawyering, in which lawyers engaged in “formal or informal collaborations with client communities and community groups to identify and address client community issues.” Responding to concerns about lawyer accountability, community lawyering embraced central principles of client-centeredness:

35. For a discussion of this critique, see Cummings, *Puzzle of Social Movements*, supra note 28.


37. *Id.*


“enlisting the client in active problem solving, empowering the client to make decisions, and taking account of legal and non-legal impacts of problems.”

Famous examples of this approach included Gerald López’s concept of rebellious lawyering, which sought to mesh client and community autonomy with bottom-up reform so that community members could become the agents of their own change, and Lucie White’s account of community-based legal mobilization in South Africa challenging what she called the “third dimension” of power. Critics of community lawyering responded that by limiting its scope to the community level, the model gave up on broad social change goals for a “micropolitics” of client empowerment. William Simon’s critique of the clinic-based, client-centered model provided another, far more biting, call for redirection. Simon’s argument was that lawyers necessarily exercise power over clients, because legal representation involves numerous opportunities for exercising discretion and professional judgment. Simon proposed that lawyers, recognizing this, should focus on cultivating their professional judgment and sense of justice in exercising discretion in this manner.

The second alternative to public interest lawyering sought to avoid thorny debates over the meaning of the “public interest” in order to spotlight what motivated lawyers to engage in social change. The concept of “cause lawyering,” introduced by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, focused on the rejection of professional neutrality in the pursuit of “something to believe in.” In this model, the lawyers’ social change objectives moved “from the margins to the center of their professional lives,” as cause lawyers expressed “a determination to take sides in political and moral struggle.” The cause lawyer, in this view, was a “moral activist” who shared “with her client responsibility for the ends” of the representation. This framing divorced the model from any particular conception

42. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 14, at 305.
43. López, supra note 36.
47. Id.
49. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 5.
of the public good. At the same time, it recognized the inevitability of conflict between the lawyer’s commitment to cause and client. In this sense, cause lawyering—premised on the lawyer’s “thick identification” with social change goals—accepted departures from client-centeredness in the pursuit of broad-based reform.

The contemporary movement lawyering concept builds upon, but is ultimately distinct from, these concepts. As a matter of legal practice, activist lawyers have long aligned themselves with social movement causes and sought to collaborate with movements rather than run them. Lawyers have further sought to advance social movement objectives through a wide variety of law-related strategies, many of them not focused on litigation in high profile courts. In this sense, contemporary movement lawyering represents less a dramatic break with the past than a reconceptualization of practice that emphasizes different features of advocacy and distinctive aspects of lawyer relationships with clients and constituencies.

Movement lawyers in contemporary practice follow the leadership of grassroots actors in designing social movement campaigns, often using multiple legal strategies consciously crafted to complement and advance political goals. The new focus on social movements thus points toward an affirmative vision of lawyering that seeks to promote popular mobilizations to change law and society through “contentious politics,” which alter the distribution of resources and the balance of power within democracy. Recent accounts of movement lawyering emphasize lawyer accountability to mobilized social movement organizations that have the resources and political power to advance campaigns. In this context, there is less concern about lawyers dominating vulnerable clients because social movement groups are organized and sophisticated—able to assert power in collaborations with lawyers.

Movement lawyers represent or collaborate with social movement organizations through collective processes of power mapping and campaign design in which movement stakeholders identify targets, tactics, and goals. Movement campaigns typically have multiple, interconnected purposes: achieving discrete policy wins, building public support, strengthening grassroots participation, reinforcing the organizational capacity of the movement itself, and striving for lasting, long-term results.

56. See, e.g., Ashar, Movement Lawyering, supra note 18; Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 4.
In supporting movement campaigns, lawyers use an integrated advocacy approach, in which litigation plays an important (though not central) role. For example, litigation may be deployed for its indirect effects on political mobilization and public opinion rather than as a tool to make change directly. Movement lawyers also use a range of other skills: educating community members about their rights, advising and defending protestors, researching and drafting policy language, writing legal opinions to support policy positions, counseling movement organizations on legal levers that may be pulled to exert pressure on policy makers or private actors in negotiating contexts, and devising mechanisms for monitoring the enforcement of policy. Historically, lawyers have always done all of this, but the new movement lawyering vision brings this work to the fore. By expanding the meaning of legal problem solving, movement lawyering recognizes the risks of narrowly framed litigation to the overall effectiveness and durability of complex social change efforts.

As an example of integrated advocacy, Nan Hunter’s analysis of the drive for marriage equality shows how LGBT rights lawyers deployed new “technologies of advocacy,” shifting away from a litigation-first model toward what she terms a “campaign” model built around messaging through sophisticated media strategies toward the goal of state-by-state same-sex marriage victories. The existence of strong movement institutions—lobbying groups, think tanks, and communications firms—was key to the success of this approach.

Movement lawyers think of themselves as broadly accountable to social movements, which are themselves represented by specific organizations and their leaders. In this sense, movement lawyers maintain accountability to democratically led organizations that claim to stand in for broader movement interests. At times, these organizations are movement lawyer clients, while at others such organizations are simply part of the larger movement infrastructure that develops collective goals and strategies. The point is that there is engagement, formal and informal, between movement lawyers and organizational leadership that shapes what movement lawyers do.

Movement lawyering responds to critiques of the past by positing a more accountable and effective model of mobilizing law for transformative social change. Movement lawyers participate in the formulation and strategize about the achievement of the causes they pursue, but their role is anchored in relationships with extant social movement organizations that have ultimate decision-making authority and legitimate claims to represent the interests of movement

58. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn, supra note 1. Social movements used litigation campaigns for organization building well before the 1970s. See, e.g., CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that during the long historical stretches in which courts were hostile to social movement goals, activists did not naively expect success from courts, but saw filing cases as a means of raising public awareness and mobilizing activism).

Although movement lawyers use the legal tools at hand to advance movement causes, they do so in the context of a “participatory, power-sharing process within the lawyer/client relationship,” in which lawyers lend their support to produce the “cultural shifts that make durable change possible.” Lawyers do not simply defer to what non-lawyers think about social movement goals and tactics—part of being a movement lawyer is having a stake and a view, and providing leadership to advance the cause. Yet, in doing so, movement lawyers engage with movement leadership in a collaborative fashion.

This collaborative role, however, raises its own ethical challenges, which the movement lawyering literature has not addressed. The rest of this essay focuses on two important and under-explored ethical issues. First, social movements are inevitably complex and conflictual. Movement lawyers are therefore constantly confronted with the need to make representational choices in a context of intra-movement dissent, in which social movement organizations divided on a host of issues clash over goals and strategies. How movement lawyers choose to align themselves within a contested social movement field focuses ethical attention on the issue of accountability at the point of client selection and throughout cycles of social movement contention. Second, because social movements are focused on achieving a future state of affairs, with their scope of vision often extending very far ahead of the present day, there is a crucial temporal dimension to movement lawyering. How movement lawyers pursue goals over the long-term, navigate trade-offs with short-term client interests, adapt in the face of setback, and confront counter-mobilization are core ethical challenges.

II. INTRA-MOVEMENT DISSENT: TAKING SIDES IN CONTESTED CAUSES

The first ethical challenge focuses on conflicts within the social movement constituency lawyers seek to represent. Whom should lawyers represent within “the movement”? Because social movements are internally contested, lawyers who align themselves with social movements are necessarily forced to make decisions to represent the interests of particular factions over others. Social movements in American politics express very different ideas about how social change could produce a better world, so there are many conflicting movement lawyering perspectives. For instance, as Hunter reveals in the marriage equality movement, lawyers were essential strategists in developing the public relations campaign that shifted the frame from preventing discrimination to promoting love. See Hunter, supra note 59.

Kathleen M. Erskine & Judy Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead: The Role of Lawyers in the Struggle for a Living Wage in Santa Monica, California, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 277 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).

See generally DAVID S. MEYER, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA 130–32 (2007) (noting splits within social movement coalitions between more institutionally oriented and more radical groups as movements gain greater access to policy making).
visions. However, the point we highlight here is that even within a particular social movement, there are conflicts over how to frame the ultimate movement goals and which strategies to pursue. As Sameer Ashar describes in his analysis of movement lawyering in the fight for immigrant rights, there was significant conflict between mainstream and radical immigration groups over whether to prioritize a stand-alone bill for Dreamers or pursue comprehensive immigration reform during the Obama administration. As this example suggests, intra-movement conflict is the norm, with mainstream movement actors more inclined toward incremental reform within existing democratic processes, while radicals push for more fundamental restructuring outside of normal political channels, and a host of other players take positions along multiple other axes. Movement lawyers have to make representational choices in the context of these disagreements and thus inevitably take sides in intra-movement debates over what ends to pursue and the appropriate means for doing so.

The movement lawyering model seeks to address this problem by situating lawyers in contexts in which other stakeholders influence their decisions about whom to represent and how to do so, and then emphasizing advocacy for mobilized clients that have the power and authority to hold lawyers to account. In this way, movement lawyers seek to address conflicts in the social movement context by representing clients that, in turn, legitimately represent the movement’s constituency. Lawyers do so by representing a movement organization directly, representing an individual at the direction of a movement organization (or coalition) to advance the movement’s goals, or initiating a class action as part of a strategy designed in conjunction with movement organizations. In each case, lawyers are accountable to “a movement, not a class.”

Yet this framing of movement representation raises substantial questions at the core of legal ethics, to which movement scholars have paid insufficient attention. What does it mean to represent a movement? Who has organizational or individual standing to speak legitimately on a movement’s behalf? How do lawyers select among conflicting movement viewpoints about goals and strategies? And what happens when there is only a weak or even non-existent movement infrastructure? Taking these questions as a point of departure, the remainder of this

66. Ashar, Movement Lawyering, supra note 18.
67. See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent, supra note 7, at 190–91 (discussing conflict between moderate NAACP lawyers and more radical lawyers representing the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).
68. Guinier & Torres, supra note 7, at 2782.
69. See Martha R. Mahoney, “Democracy Begins at Home”—Notes from the Grassroots on Inequality, Voters, and Lawyers, 63 Miami L. Rev. 1 (2008) (detailing the role of lawyers in advancing the right to vote in the absence of political participation and grassroots organization).
part offers preliminary observations about the deeper accountability challenges of movement lawyering and how scholars and practitioners might think about them going forward.

One observation relates to the exercise of ethical judgment by lawyers in their representational choices—or the criteria by which movement lawyers make decisions about client selection. Movement lawyers seek to advance movement goals by representing clients that share or express those goals. Ideally, there would be a collective process to determine and revise goals or, at least, an ongoing set of conversations between movement lawyers and organizational representatives that would guide lawyer choices about which clients to represent and how.70 However, that is not always the case and the movement lawyering literature often equates the lawyer’s representation of particular movement organizations with representation of the movement writ large. But this obscures important ethical issues.

For one, the representation of organizational clients raises concerns about lawyers preferring some group interests over others. Standard conflicts of interest principles tend to treat organizational clients as a “black box.”71 Commentators, however, have shown how this standard conception may gloss over internal disagreements in which more powerful organizational actors silence important dissenting views.72

In addition, no existing legal ethics principle holds movement lawyers accountable for the choice of whom to represent in the first instance. Generally, a lawyer’s ethical discretion at the point of client selection is considered to be at its apex. A lawyer can select a client for most any reason at all, subject to prohibitions against discrimination.73 Although Model Rule 1.2 affirms that representation of a client does not mean that the lawyer necessarily espouses that client’s worldview or values,74 it of course does not prohibit a lawyer from choosing a client precisely because that lawyer does in fact espouse the client’s values or political orientation. The question is whether that specific choice is made in a principled fashion that adequately accounts for competing positions within movements.

70. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 4, at 1658.
71. MODEL RULES R. 1.13.
73. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(g).
74. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(b).
Movement lawyers intervene in complex environments, in which decision-making is diffuse and contested. Sometimes work on behalf of coalitions may give lawyers more claim to “represent the movement,” yet coalitions comprised of multiple organizations with different levels of power and resources can submerge internal schisms and sometimes may even give an air of legitimacy to groups that do not genuinely reflect the range of constituent interests. Lawyers who work within coalitions, serving on leadership committees without representing the coalition as a whole, may find themselves called on to influence decision-making, yet have for guidance only their own values or those of movement organizations with which the lawyers are most closely aligned. Lawyers may be called upon to exercise their best judgment about what a still-amorphous movement would regard as in its best interests. In these scenarios, the “client” who should give the lawyer direction within client-centering lawyering theory may be mute or non-existent.

The key point is, given the organizational diversity and conflict that defines social movement environments, lawyers must make choices about which groups to represent or which interests within complex organizations to support, and such choices ultimately require taking sides. This picture of organizational and ethical complexity challenges the common framing of movement lawyering, which depicts social movements as having coherent interests they can communicate to lawyers in determinate ways. Specific movement organizations may approach lawyers with coherent interests, but this begs the question of which interests such organizations advance and how representative the organizations are. Are there, for example, marginalized constituencies within the social movement, as Tomiko Brown-Nagin explores in depth in her study of civil rights lawyering in post-

Brown Atlanta? If so, what are the movement lawyers’ responsibilities to notice and rebalance inequities of organizational power? If marginalized constituencies leave one social movement organization to form a rival group, what are the movement lawyer’s obligations to follow, challenge, ignore, or otherwise respond to this development? What are movement lawyers’ obligations to seek to keep peace within social movement factions or, alternatively, to encourage debate about and resolution of important points of contention?

75. See, e.g., Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 46, at 1107 (“Poor people are not more likely than non-poor people to have consensus about their interests.”).
76. BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 7, at 385–429 (discussing the work of welfare rights mothers’ leagues to redeem the promise of Brown v. Board of Education to improve educational opportunity for poor children).
77. In one historical case study, the social movement organization’s lawyer left the more conservative organization to form a more radical one. See CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE, supra note 7, at 186–93 (discussing National Afro-American Council lawyer Frederick McGee’s actions in proposing and then helping found a more radical organization called the Niagara Movement).
78. See Ellmann, supra note 72, at 1151–52. In his important work on ethics issues in representing client groups, Ellmann argues that lawyers should monitor the fairness of group decision-making processes and “intervene on behalf of those becoming victims” if necessary. Id. at 1152. This helpful framework does not
Because lawyers in social movements have to exercise judgment in choosing sides in contentious intra-movement debates, it can be tempting to identify the “movement lawyer” as the lawyer associated with movement interests with which one feels most politically sympathetic. In this sense, labeling someone a “movement lawyer,” and casting others outside that category, may be more a political judgment than a professional one. When scholars criticize lawyers for lacking accountability to movements, they may actually be suggesting that those lawyers have chosen to represent the wrong side in intra-movement disputes.

One assumption of the movement lawyering model is the existence of mobilized groups to hold lawyers to account. But what happens when a movement lacks strong organizational capacity? In this context, one of the important exercises of lawyer discretion is to support the formation of client groups in the first instance—so that the lawyer has an entity toward which to be accountable. Such client construction involves activities akin to community organizing, where lawyers enter communities or approach members of constituencies the lawyers believe should have a cause or claim to pursue in the interests of social justice. This client construction can involve building organizations, recruiting members for lawsuits, or some combination of both. Often individual cases and organization-building synergistically interact. As history shows, there are many times when, due to a lack of favorable conditions for political mobilization, legal advocacy may precede—and help spark—social movement activism. While the NAACP’s Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, for example, were courageous movement lawyers by all accounts, their legal challenges to Plessy did more to galvanize organizational development in the racial justice movement than respond to the instructions of a well-organized group. They saw themselves as part of the leadership responsible for charting the movement rather than as external agents responding to direction from it, and they were nothing if not highly opinionated about how the movement should develop.

explain how the lawyer is to decide, other than through resort to her own ethical and political values, which constituencies are victims and which are factions whose positions deserve to lose. Ellmann also discusses the lawyer’s potential role as mediator in intra-group disputes, again flagging this problem but not fully resolving how it can be addressed from a client-centered perspective. See id. at 1155–56. See also id. at 1161–62 (discussing whether lawyers should ask dissenting sub-groups to leave organizations while lawyers stay with the original group); id. at 1158 (noting that lawyers must judge the impact of interventions they may make on group autonomy).

79. See, e.g., GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE (2012) (documenting Marshall’s bravery in representing criminal defendants in towns in which he barely escaped lynching mobs); GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1984) (arguing that Houston developed a vision of social movement lawyering he hoped to pass on to future generations of lawyers).


81. See id.
More recently, lawyers used test case techniques in the campaign against anti-sodomy laws, at times with little correlation to the situation of the real plaintiffs involved. But in these cases, at least, lawyers found willing clients. Similar questions are presented in situations researchers have documented in which movement lawyers work in communities to create organizations that will then advance legal and political claims. Professor Tony Alfieri’s reflection on his work with African American churches in Miami, Florida is a case in point. His article on Inner-City Antipoverty Campaigns focuses on how a lawyer is supposed to decide when and how to become engaged in community struggle in the first instance. How should movement lawyers go about deciding which communities to enter, cast the pitch for building movement organizations, and select campaign priorities? As Alfieri points out, deciding to intervene requires having criteria governing when outsider legal-political interventions should be mounted by lawyers who are not from affected communities and on what terms lawyers should structure engagement and collaboration with local residents and representatives. He reviews a set of rules or judgments that lawyers have developed over time about case selection and argues in favor of lawyers making long-term commitments to specific neighborhood groups and staying faithful to those groups even when their views conflict with other neighborhood representatives.

In all of these contexts, lawyers following a movement-centered model will work hard to stay in sync with the desires and articulated interests of the constituencies they work with, just as community organizers do. Their success in doing so comes not from standard ethical rules but from training in self-reflection and prudence. Such training involves cultivating skills, which may be first taught in law schools, in areas such as close listening, consultation, collaboration, mindfulness, fair-mindedness, and sensitivity to context and nuance. All of these qualities are part of the ethical apparatus that movement lawyers should bring to bear on their work.

III. Temporality: Pursuing Long-Term Impact

A second critical feature of movement lawyering practice is the relationship of lawyers’ work to time, or what we call temporality. In the standard legal ethics

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83. See Lithwick, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Id.
framework, lawyers conceive of the fundamental point of their work as achieving the discrete objectives of a specific client (whether individual or group), after which time they terminate their representation of the client. To be sure, many lawyers, both in the private and nonprofit sectors, represent repeat player clients over time, helping them—in Marc Galanter’s famous phrase—to “play for rules” by strategically litigating some cases to judgment while settling others in order to shape legal doctrine in favor of repeat player interests.89 However, standard legal ethics analysis tends to treat these representations just like any other, in which lawyers should defer to clients about the resolution of each discrete representation. This atemporal approach ignores the fact that such lawyers’ work can profoundly affect the future of law and society more broadly—often in completely unanticipated ways.90 Although the Model Rules invite lawyers to consider the impact of client work on others, including the court, third parties, and society as a whole,91 they do not call on lawyers to consider what impact their work will have on the world after their particular client representation ends, even though the impact may often extend far longer than the defined endpoint of a matter. Indeed, the one area in which the rules address long-term obligations of lawyers is confidentiality—a duty to clients, rather than the public interest, that lasts forever.92 Other duties, such as client loyalty, terminate when the client representation ends.93

Movement lawyering, in contrast, is fundamentally about mobilizing law to change the direction of society far into the future—to achieve some vision of an improved state of affairs in relation to which a particular client’s legal matter represents a stepping stone. Movement lawyers typically see themselves as belonging to the movement,94 contributing legal skills just as others provide non-legal support.95 Put simply, the movement lawyer’s central aim is to mobilize law to cause future social change (or to stop it). Although the movement lawyer’s efforts may not bear fruit until a far distant point, the pursuit of future impact is the motive force behind the movement lawyers’ work—even if the precise vision of that impact is blurry or contested.

90. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor (1995) (tracing how advocacy by lawyers for clients opposed to the labor movement ended up ushering in the New Deal and expanding labor rights.)
91. See, e.g., Model Rules R. 2.1.
92. See Model Rules R. 1.6.
93. See Model Rules 1.9 (discussing former client conflicts rules, which focus on preserving client confidentiality).
95. For example, non-lawyer members of a movement may be organizing new chapters, leading rallies, lobbying policy makers and legislators, or raising funds through grassroots outreach or by writing foundation grants. Still others may be writing newsletters or magazine articles, contacting press outlets, speaking to the media, appearing at the meetings of organizations, or speaking at other events.
In this pursuit of long-term impact, the movement lawyer chooses clients with interests and goals that overlap with, but may not always be identical to, the interests and goals of the movement with which the lawyer is affiliated. The movement lawyer’s focus on future impact may motivate her to make short-term decisions that are inconsistent with specific client interests in order to achieve the long-term goal. For example, as highlighted in the Movement for Black Lives example in the introduction, a lawyer may prefer injunctive relief favored by the movement organization over her individual client’s desire for a large damages award.

Standard legal ethics analysis has treated this tension as a conflict between a lawyer’s commitment to cause and her obligations to a client’s case. Even in the classic test-case strategy, in which lawyers seek to carefully select cases to build precedent over time, it is standard to view lawyers’ ethical obligations as running to the particular clients in the discrete precedent-building cases. This conception of the lawyer’s duty to short-term client interests in particular matters, as opposed to long-term movement interests, is precisely what gives rise to the conflicts concern captured by Bell’s “serving two masters” critique discussed earlier.

We would suggest, however, that legal ethics should permit movement lawyers to count the long-term movement’s interest as a legitimate goal to pursue. In this regard, we suggest that long-term movement goals be treated akin to a consentable client conflict. Lawyers routinely address potential conflicts of interest between two clients in initial retainer agreements. This is often done by specifying a withdrawal procedure through which a “secondary” client gives informed consent that, in the case of an unresolvable conflict with the lawyer’s “primary” client, the lawyer will withdraw from representing the secondary client. In the context of movement lawyering, a movement lawyer should similarly be able to agree to represent a specific client only to the extent that the client’s interests remain consistent with those of the broader movement constituency—which is effectively the lawyer’s “primary” client.

Surfacing this temporal dimension of movement lawyers’ work provides a counterweight to Bell’s serving two masters critique. In the school desegregation context, Bell argued that LDF lawyers should have taken seriously the wishes of parents who advocated against integration and in favor of enhancing school quality in segregated communities—pursuing those parents’ local objectives rather than the NAACP’s national objective of complete school integration.

But there is another way to look at this scenario. The lawyers involved were also representing the wing of the civil rights movement, embodied in LDF, which had fought for across-the-board school desegregation for at least a generation. Lawyers whose primary loyalty was to the principles espoused by LDF would have different obligations than those Bell assumed paramount: Their obligations

96. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 13, at 319.
were to follow the ideals of the movement they represented. Through a long and complex historical process involving generations of activism and accompanying sacrifice, that movement had won hard-fought victories. As a result of this historical process, the organization with which the lawyers were affiliated stood for the principle that equal citizenship on the basis of race could only be achieved through complete student integration. From this perspective, accepting anything less would have constituted a retreat to the discredited “separate but equal” doctrine and undermined the strength of other ongoing efforts to promote racial equality in schools and other institutions. Why were the LDF lawyers who handled the post-

Why were the LDF lawyers who handled the post-Brown remedial litigation not entitled to give voice to the collective effort that produced this view of what the post-Brown remedial plan should be?

Many objections can be (and have been) raised about whether “the movement”—or at least a particular leadership segment of it—made the right judgment in choosing school integration over other approaches to improving the education of African American students. However, our point here is not to weigh in on that debate. Instead, we are suggesting that Bell was wrong to assume that LDF lawyers were not ethically permitted to view school desegregation as the proper goal they used as their ultimate guidance. To the contrary, we believe that lawyers representing the long-term goals of a complex, multi-decade movement would be justified in regarding those goals as primary. Such lawyers should not be required to abandon those goals based on the different wishes of particular individual clients, especially when doing so would undercut the lawyers’ long-term efforts to build and defend legal precedent in favor of a reform vision such as the challenge to the “separate but equal” doctrine. The lawyers Bell wrote about were members of an intergenerational line of activists who had carried out the full school integration battle. Instead of abandoning their school integration goal, the LDF lawyers’ appropriate recourse was to have withdrawn from representations where a parent group wanted to pursue a course other than integration, using a standard conflicts analysis after having secured advance informed consent to this course of action at the outset.

From this perspective, one need not conclude that movement lawyers are ethically required to place clients’ interests ahead of long-term movement interests. Lawyers who represent both an individual and a movement effectively have dual clients, just as lawyers in standard lawyering arrangements often do. Movement lawyers should be entitled to handle that situation the same

98. Mark Tushnet traces the history of that battle in Tushnet, supra note 80.
99. We recognize that in a desegregation suit brought as a class action, other options, like the creation of subclasses with separate representation, might be possible.
way that lawyers in standard arrangements would, by explaining to their client that dual representation carries the risk that diverging interests may arise even when interests seem convergent at the start of a representation. The lawyer should lay out her planned course of action if irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise between a client and a movement organization in the course of the representation, such as between parent desires for local school resources versus LDF’s integration goal. This may require the lawyer to withdraw from the client representation in the case. In Bell’s scenario, for example, the LDF lawyers could have explained to the parents in the remedial litigation cases that the lawyers’ goal was to work for school integration consistent with LDF’s instructions, and that parents should sign up for representation only if that was the remedy they wanted too. If a divergence of goals arose as the litigation proceeded, the LDF lawyers should have discussed this divergence with the parents and figured out how to proceed. If they could not resolve the conflict in goals, the LDF lawyers should have sought to withdraw from representing the parents, in order to maintain their commitment to LDF’s long-term goal of school integration. These lawyers should have sought alternative counsel for the parents. If they could not find alternative counsel, their ethical dilemma would become greater, as is always the case in “last lawyer in town” scenarios. This situation illustrates the importance of obtaining informed consent from clients at the outset, so that a foreseeable conflict between client and movement goals does not arise as a surprise well into the litigation.

In summary, when lawyers formulate long-term social change goals in conjunction with other social movement actors, legal ethics analysis should give more deference to lawyer decisions to prioritize long-term movement ends over the short-term goals of an individual or group client, even though those movement ends may be abstract or contested. Movement lawyers can do this by using retainer agreements with future conflict procedure explanations similar to those commonly used in business practice and securing fully informed consent at the outset from all of the clients in the case. As a matter of best practice, movement lawyers should include a statement in their retainer agreements with individual or group clients that explains the procedures they will use if an unresolvable conflict arises, including the possibility that the lawyer will be required to withdraw from representing the clients or, when there is a non-consentable conflict, from the case altogether. What the lawyer cannot do, we agree in keeping with standard ethics analysis, is to continue to represent a client in a conflict of interest situation but steer that representation toward the movement’s goals when the client objects. The proper course of action in this situation is to withdraw from the client representation or perhaps the entire case when appropriate.

Movement lawyering raises additional questions that future scholarship should address. One set arises from the fact that some of the work that contemporary movement lawyers do may not count as the practice of law. The blurring of the
line between “practicing law” and other work that lawyers do has become an important topic in business law ethics analysis, but has not gained sufficient attention in the movement lawyering context. In one example that raises this issue, movement collaborations may involve the use of contracts other than retainer agreements, such as memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between a lawyer (or group of lawyers) and leaders of movement organizations. The goal of an MOU is to clarify that the parties do not intend to enter a lawyer-client relationship, but rather to structure a different kind of relationship.

Where the MOU is designed to structure relationships among movement stakeholders in strategic decision-making contexts that do not involve the traditional practice of law, they are permissible devices to promote collaboration. Movement organizational leaders and lawyers may choose to work together but not enter a client-lawyer relationship for a host of legitimate reasons. For example, movement leaders may choose to involve lawyers in a relationship that does not involve giving legal advice. The judgment the movement may be seeking from affiliated lawyers may be political and strategic or relate to public relations, media, policy, or legislative strategies. Generally, parties should be entitled to give life to their informed choice to structure relationships with each other in these contexts without invoking lawyer-client duties.

The topic of whether movement leaders and lawyers can imagine and give life to relationships other than the traditional client-lawyer representation on which the Model Rules focus brings to mind a chapter from David Luban’s classic book, Lawyers and Justice. In this chapter, Luban takes on the problem of movement lawyers “manipulat[ing] their clients and put[ting] the interest of the cause above those of the client” by handling cases to serve “the political theories of the lawyers themselves.”

Accepting for the sake of argument that movement lawyers do, in fact, engage in manipulation, Luban proceeds to defend such action as justified by the context of the relationship. Key to Luban’s defense is the idea that movement lawyers are not acting as traditional lawyers when collaborating with other movement actors in advancing a political cause. They are instead, in Luban’s terms, acting in “political comradeship.” Just as actors in political contexts sometimes engage in manipulating or deceiving their political comrades with respect to tactical matters—while remaining true to the deeper, shared political goals—Luban

100. See, e.g., Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243 (2014) (discussing the ways in which business lawyers increasingly do work that is not the practice of law); Tanina Rostain, Legal Ethics: The Emergence of “Law Consultancies,” 75 FORDHAMS L. REV. 1397 (2006) (examining the growing practice of lawyers in the business sector providing law “consultancies” rather than legal representation).

101. LUBAN, supra note 13, at 317.

102. Id. at 317.

103. Id.

104. Id. at 325.
argues so too may movement lawyers acting as political actors engage in acts of client manipulation. 105 This is because, in political contexts, all the actors are comrades rather than holding sharply divided roles of client versus lawyer. We do not believe movement lawyers should ever “manipulate” clients (nor do we believe Luban thinks this; rather, he is imagining an extreme scenario in order to drive home his point). But the development of new forms of collaboration between movement constituencies and movement lawyers, as we discussed above, may now be giving reality on the ground to Luban’s idea of “political comradeship.” Although he was interested in a different issue—whether the movement ends justified the means lawyers used to pursue them—he highlights the important point that movement lawyers operate in a political context that requires rethinking ethical concepts that apply in standard legal representation. We believe that idea usefully reframes movement lawyers’ obligations in ways that lend support to more flexible understandings of permissible relationships between lawyers and other movement actors, such as agreements to collaborate that do not involve traditional legal representation.

We have argued that focusing on the long-term scope of movement lawyers’ goals highlights the fact that movement lawyers’ loyalty runs to a set of ideas or a vision rather than to particular clients. But what happens when that vision is challenged or no longer appears politically viable? In this regard, part of Bell’s critique was that lawyers had set an agenda that was no longer consistent with the views of a significant segment of the constituency the lawyers claimed to represent. Were LDF lawyers acting within their ethical rights in following an agenda that had been set through the work of prior generations of activists? Note that here temporality reaches back in history as well as forward into the future: Do movement lawyers have the ethical discretion to listen to the historical echo of the voices of figures who set a movement on its path but are no longer around?

In this context, temporality is double-edged. It can, on the one hand, give credence to the ongoing implementation of long-term movement goals (i.e., integration in the classic post-Brown LDF example) or it can serve as an argument for changing course in the face of changing conditions (i.e., resistance to busing, violence against school children, and judicial disinclination to remedy segregation across district lines, in the same example). It is here that movement lawyers are caught in the changing tide of internal movement politics, in which dissenting views come to the fore and sometimes take hold in ways that change a movement’s course. We thus return to a key question: What should lawyers do when that happens?

When possible, movement lawyers should be guided by the decision-making processes movements adopt to develop—and also change—end goals. But these

105. *Id.* at 326–29, 337, 340.
processes may sometimes be underdeveloped or unsteady. In these situations, movement lawyers should do their best to take direction from a movement’s chosen leaders. Yet movement lawyers should also be attentive to issues or problems in movement leadership structures that may duplicate patterns of domination in the larger society, and should attend as well to the voices of those who may be shut out of movement leadership. Rather than pretending to exercise no influence, they should seek to use it prudently, as all lawyers aim to do when they serve clients in the role of “trusted counselor.”

Movement lawyers must strive to exercise excellent judgment, one of the highest forms of specialized skill the best lawyers develop through experience and training. From this perspective, there is nothing inherently wrong with movement lawyers having a seat at the decision-making table in relation to a social movement, provided that their perspectives are added to, rather than considered to be superior to, those of others taking part in a collaborative process (or “political comradeship,” in Luban’s terms).

In the same vein, movement lawyers should recognize the power and discretion they exercise in a vast array of professional decisions, including how they frame the issues in case representations or other matters in which they take part, and which movement values, or interpretation of those values, they propound and follow. In these respects, movement lawyers inevitably may be making ethical decisions unconstrained by particular clients, because a movement lawyer’s overall career involves the exercise of ethical decision-making toward long-term goals. In this pursuit, movement lawyers ally with some organizations representing submovements or branches of movements but not others. They may create organizations or bring movement activities to communities that did not have them before. They may choose to represent some clients and pass over others. They may become close to and have the ear of some leaders more than others. They may translate movement goals into legal demands and in doing so inevitably alter them to some extent.

Focusing on long-term impact also spotlights the issue of what constitutes the appropriate time frame for judging success. Because political struggles do not have firm start or endpoints, and because each move within such struggles tends to elicit responses by counter-movements, the temporal frame of impact assessment is never obvious. How do movement lawyers decide when to start and stop measuring social change in relation to a pre-defined goal? There is no obvious answer in many cases. The choice of endpoints, which may be artificial, can affect one’s ultimate assessment. Legal mobilization does not occur in a neat and linear fashion, and the time frame of analysis has important evaluative implications.

106. For a thoughtful analysis of the ethics issues that arise in representing inchoate groups, see Tremblay, supra note 72.
107. See MODEL RULES preface (emphasizing the lawyer’s importance as client counselor). See also MODEL RULES R. 2.1 (noting the broad scope of the lawyer’s role as advisor to the client).
108. See Alfieri, supra note 84.
109. See Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 1.
Consider the movement for same-sex marriage. If one were to study the movement before the mid-2000s, it would look much worse than it does now with the success in *Obergefell v. Hodges*.\(^{110}\) And apparent victories at one point in time can slide backwards as well. Take the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the retrenchment in *Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder*.\(^{111}\) Or consider *Roe v. Wade*,\(^{112}\) which had a positive short-term effect on access to abortion, though the longer-term picture has been decidedly more mixed.\(^{113}\) Moreover, as time passes, the number of other intervening variables that may have explanatory power for why social change occurs increases—and thus evaluating a social movement’s impact becomes more difficult.

In staying committed to long-term social movement goals in a changing world, movement lawyers must strive to be highly reflective about their work in representing a vision with which they identify and to which they have decided to devote their efforts. In thinking about their role over the long haul, movement lawyers are not violating their ethical duties. To the contrary, they are acknowledging their context in order to guide their work in relation to core values of respect for others, empathy, self-reflection, and “other-regarding” behavior\(^{114}\)—values at the heart of professionalism.\(^{115}\)

**CONCLUSION**

This essay has sought to initiate a deeper conversation on the ethical issues confronting today’s movement lawyers. Toward that end, we have examined the ethical context of movement lawyering—one shaped by long-term, repeat-play dynamics, in which there is both significant intra-movement dissent and mobilized opposition. From this perspective, we have offered a preliminary account of the ethical challenges facing movement lawyers, spotlighting the fundamental conflicts that shape movement lawyering from the point of client selection through the pursuit of long-term causes. The goal of this effort has been to link movement lawyering practice and scholarship with the field of legal ethics. We hope to spark a more robust conversation in which specific ethical issues get deeper analysis. We urge scholars to consider whether traditional ethics analysis is always best suited to the type of legal practice in which movement lawyers engage.


\(^{114}\) An “other-regarding” orientation is an orientation that places emphasis on other persons’ needs, either in addition to or in lieu of one’s own self-interest.

\(^{115}\) Indeed, many of these characteristics turn out to be salient in the developing ethics literature on lawyers and leaders, which may also capture some of what we are striving towards in arguing for conceiving of movement lawyers as engaged in relationships that are somewhat different from the typical client-driven, lawyer-as-agent paradigm. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, *Lawyers as Leaders* (2013).
Although our effort has been preliminary, it has produced a set of starting points for future reflection. We have suggested, first, that movement lawyering, while building on old foundations, aspires to a new practice ideal defined by integrated advocacy for mobilized clients. This aspiration, we have argued, carries forward ethical tensions that need fuller exploration. Such exploration implicates the long-standing debate within legal ethics about whether rules of professional conduct should aspire to unify the profession—binding everyone to the same standards of conduct in order to promote uniform behavior and professional cohesion—or whether the application of the rules should be more context-specific, recognizing that specific forms of practice may raise different ethics concerns.116

Our view is that movement lawyering should not be shoehorned into standard ethical paradigms. Instead, scholars should help define appropriate legal ethics principles tailored to this practice context. Those principles should not be completely subsumed under the principles that guide standard lawyering arrangements.117 Standard principles provide a starting point that should apply in important respects, such as on matters involving integrity, honesty, and fairness to third parties. Yet in other respects, standard ethics rules may be ill-suited to the important values movement lawyering pursues.

As we have argued, standard ethics gives insufficient guidance to how lawyers should think about selecting social movement clients and engaging with organizational leaders in contexts of intra-movement dissent. Movement lawyers may be required to act without clear client direction when they first begin to mobilize a community or organize a new group, as well as when constituencies they represent do not have strong procedures in place to provide for giving instructions or making decisions. These scenarios call on movement lawyers to engage in ethical considerations that are not well articulated in traditional legal ethics rules.

In addition, we have questioned the standard view that movement lawyers must always prioritize specific clients’ short-term interests over a movement’s long-term goal—a principle that would leave the long-term goal without effective representation. Instead, movement lawyers should be permitted to assert their primary loyalty to the representation of the movement goal, at the same time that they wish to represent individual or organizational clients. Under this practice arrangement, movement lawyers must ensure informed consent and authentic collaboration by affected clients.

116. Cf. Susan D. Carle, The Settlement Problem in Public Interest Law, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 40 (2018) (arguing that ethics problems raised by settlement in public interest cases differ in some regards from those in cases in which clients are paying lawyers for their services); Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 135–36 (2006) (arguing that ethics concerns for lawyers who represent clients with little power are different from those for lawyers who represent clients with great power).

117. For a classic discussion of the importance of recognizing that practice contexts may alter legal ethics considerations, see David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 511 (1990).
We have suggested that in pursuing authentic collaboration, movement lawyers must strike a fine balance between norms of deference and the exercise of leadership. Movement lawyers should carefully listen to and consider the views of individuals and groups who will be affected by movement lawyering work. And movement lawyers should be humble and sensitive to the dangers of abusing their professional status. Yet at the same time, lawyers have important contributions to add to movement design and execution. Toward that end, lawyers should offer their skills and expertise to movements in such a way as to achieve the most effective results possible. They should, in short, aspire to work in partnership with other movement stakeholders—those in the lead and those on the ground—dedicating themselves to helping advance movements to win democratically accountable change over time.