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Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?

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ARTICLE

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: IS IT TIME FOR A LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION?

ERIC GOTTWALD*

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INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen years, developing nations have signed over fifteen hundred bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") in an effort to attract foreign direct investment ("FDI") by creating a more stable and transparent investment environment for foreign investors.¹

BITs provide foreign investors with powerful new rights to protect their investments against expropriation and other forms of discrimination and the ability to sue governments directly through an innovative form of dispute settlement known as investment treaty

In the last five years, there has been an explosion in the number of investment treaty arbitration claims filed against developing nations, challenging a wide array of sensitive government regulations and routinely seeking millions and even billions of dollars in damages. Mounting an effective defense to these claims is essential for a developing nation, as even a single successful investor claim could wreak havoc on its economy, weaken its capacity to regulate in the public interest, and damage its reputation as a desirable investment location.

While the number of investor claims is growing, there are new concerns over how well-prepared developing nations are to cope with the challenge of litigating these claims.

Investment treaty arbitration is a complex form of litigation that demands much in the way of resources and legal expertise. Due to financial and administrative barriers, many developing nations do not have the legal expertise within their government service to defend investment treaty claims. As a consequence, most developing nations are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms who


3. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard: Treaty Disputes, AM. LAW. FOCUS EUR., Summer 2005, available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html. This survey documents fifty-nine investment treaty arbitrations with stakes of at least $100 million, with eighteen over $1 billion. A sampling of these claims include: 1) France Telecom’s $2.9 billion claim against Lebanon over its contract to construct and run a Lebanese mobile phone network; 2) A Canadian mining company’s $1 billion claim against Venezuela for the expropriation of its gold mine; 3) Multiple claims relating to Argentina’s currency crisis collectively worth tens of billions of dollars; 4) U.S. cellular communications company Motorola’s $2 billion claim against the Republic of Turkey over its investment in a Turkish mobile phone system; and 5) A German consortium’s $500 million claim against the Philippines over the termination of a concession to build a new airport terminal.

4. See Victor R. Salgado, Comment, The Case Against Adopting BIT Law in the FTAA Framework, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1025, 1053–59 (discussing the economic hardships that Argentina now faces as a result of numerous arbitration claims filed by investors who claim that Argentina’s decision to end the one-to-one ratio between the peso and the U.S. dollar violated the terms of their BIT commitments).
charge the same premium market rates that wealthy individual investors and corporations pay for their services. Meanwhile, developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel are left to contend with scattered and incomplete legal authority resources with no organized legal assistance from the international community. Unfortunately, these concerns are far from theoretical: in interviews done for this article, developing nation lawyers report not having access to fundamental sources of law and arbitration doctrine, or having to go to extraordinary lengths to obtain it.

This article argues that developing nations' unequal access to legal authority and expertise threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration process. Part I reviews the history, significance, and content of the bilateral investment treaty—the type of international agreement largely responsible for providing foreign investors with powerful new rights. Part II looks at the rise of investment treaty arbitration and its impact on developing nations. Part III examines the serious barriers to the effective participation of developing nations in investment treaty arbitration. Part IV investigates how these barriers operate in practice, through two case studies based on interviews with current and former developing nation officials who have litigated investor-state arbitration cases. Finally, Part V argues for the creation of a Legal Assistance Center, modeled on a similar effort at the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), to ensure that developing nations have access to the legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a competent defense to investor treaty arbitration claims.

I. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY MOVEMENT

Over the last three decades, international investment law has undergone a remarkable amount of change. From the perspective of the foreign investor, international investment law now offers far more legal protection against expropriation and other forms of discrimination at the hands of a host state than in the 1970s. The

primary tool effecting this change is the BIT, an agreement between two countries that creates rules to govern investments made by the nationals of one country into the territory of the other. This part examines the origins of the BIT, its development, and the set of rights it provides foreign investors.

A. ORIGINS OF THE BIT MOVEMENT

The origins of the BIT lie in the post-World War II efforts by capital-exporting states, chiefly the United States and European nations, to create a more rigorous international law of investment to protect the rapidly expanding investments of their companies and nationals abroad. Even as foreign direct investment began to take off in the period following World War II, foreign investors who sought the protection of international law found only scattered treaty provisions and contested principles of customary international law. Without the protection of international law, investors had no assurances that a host state would not unilaterally change the terms of an investment contract or laws and regulations affecting the investment. At the same time, international law did not offer foreign investors an effective enforcement mechanism to challenge host states that injured or expropriated their investments. The only other option for aggrieved foreign investors

7. As late as the 1970’s, for example, many Latin American nations held the view—known as the “Calvo doctrine”—that states were only required to provide aliens with the same treatment that they gave to nationals. This was in direct conflict with the view of most developed nations, generally accepted today, that a breach of international law can arise if a state does not respect the “minimum standard of protection” under customary international law with regard to the treatment of foreign investors. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) [hereinafter BITs in the Mid-1990s].
8. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68–70 (summarizing the deficiencies in international investment law before the BIT gained prominence).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 69.
11. Additionally, domestic courts were unattractive to foreign investors because many automatically applied their own national law even when international law was clearly applicable. See UNCTAD & Int’l Ctr. for Settlement
was to seek "diplomatic protection" by persuading their home government to espouse their claim against the host state at the International Court of Justice. However, this process is by its nature more political than legal and is available only at the discretion of an investor's home state.

Given the shortcomings of the customary international law, the United States and other capital-exporting nations turned to signing investment treaties to provide a source of clear and certain rules on foreign investment. The treaty movement began with Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCNs"), agreements that addressed numerous subjects beyond investment including trade, maritime, and consular relations. Despite containing some protections for investment, FCNs soon fell out of favor, as they contained only limited commitments and did not provide investors with the ability to initiate a claim directly against a host state.

With the failure of several early efforts to create a multilateral international treaty on foreign investment, the United States and Europe turned to negotiating BITs with individual developing nations. Unlike FCNs, BITs were focused solely on protecting FDI
and contained an effective dispute resolution mechanism. Since the signing of the first BIT in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, nearly 2400 BITs have been signed by over 175 nations, making it the most popular form of international agreement for protecting foreign direct investment.\(^\text{18}\) Initially, the vast majority of BITs were concluded between a developed and developing nation.\(^\text{19}\) However, developing nations are increasingly signing BITs with one another,\(^\text{20}\) reflecting the emergence of some firms from developing nations as major regional and global investors.\(^\text{21}\) In addition to BITs, there are a handful of regional investment agreements that are part of wider trade and investment agreements like NAFTA and MERCOSUR. For all practical purposes, the increasingly dense network of BITs and regional agreements has displaced customary international law as the primary source of international law in the area of foreign investment.\(^\text{22}\)

As major capital-exporters, developed nations sign investment treaties primarily to protect the investments abroad of their nationals and companies. Developing nations, meanwhile, sign investment treaties in an effort to promote FDI.\(^\text{23}\) The basic assumption behind

\(^{18}\) See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89.
\(^{19}\) See id.
\(^{20}\) The largest percentage of total BITs signed during 2004 were between developing nations (39%), followed closely by BITs between developed and developing nations (37%). By the end of 2004, BITs between developing nations accounted for 25% of total BITs concluded. See UNCTAD, Research Note: Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1 (Aug. 30, 2005) http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/websiteit20051_en.pdf [hereinafter Recent Developments].
\(^{21}\) See id. at 4 (recognizing that the increase also stems from increased investment cooperation between developing nations).
\(^{22}\) See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 4.
\(^{23}\) The extent to which BITs actually attract increased flows of foreign direct investment is not clear. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89; see also Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment?, 22–23 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121, 2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/00094916_0309110400680586_RENDER/PDF/multi0page.pdf (finding little evidence that BITs stimulate additional FDI to developing nations). But see Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 111 (finding that BITs have a particularly strong effect on encouraging FDI to developing nations).
an investment treaty is that the existence of a treaty with clear, enforceable rules will attract more FDI by offering a more stable investment environment.\textsuperscript{24} With the decline in lending from commercial banks and official aid programs during 1980s and 1990s, FDI has become the most important source of external capital for developing nations,\textsuperscript{25} offering a host of potential benefits, including job creation, technology transfers, and integration into global networks of production.\textsuperscript{26}

However, by signing a BIT a developing nation assumes obligations that may be detrimental in the long-run. As capital importers, developing countries bear most of the risk of investor litigation inherent in signing a BIT. Moreover, BIT obligations can lead to a loss of “national policy space” for host states by creating legal obstacles that restrict its ability to change key economic and regulatory policies in the future.\textsuperscript{27} Hence, when deciding whether or not to sign a BIT developing nations must carefully weigh the potential benefits of increased foreign direct investment against the increased exposure to litigation from investors.\textsuperscript{28}

**B. HOW DO BITs PROTECT INVESTMENT?**

Bilateral investment treaties contain two key innovations that make them a popular investment promotion device. First, they provide investors with a clear set of investment protection standards that have the status of international law. Second, they offer investors

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} See Salacuse & Sullivan, \textit{supra} note 5, at 77.
\item \textsuperscript{25} See \textit{World Investment Report} 2003, \textit{supra} note 1, at 85 (asserting that foreign direct investment provides a viable solution for countries seeking to provide more long-term benefits and stability to their economies in the wake of fewer aid options and increased financial crises); \textit{see also} Salacuse & Sullivan, \textit{supra} note 13, at 77.
\item \textsuperscript{26} However, the potential benefits from foreign direct investment are far from automatic. \textit{See World Investment Report} 2003, \textit{supra} note 1, at 87–88. In order to maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment, developing nations must create the right domestic policy environment, including maintaining a skilled workforce and sound infrastructure that allows them to become suppliers to the foreign enterprise. \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{See id.} at 93 (recognizing that this danger is only increasing as the scope of BITs moves beyond their traditionally “narrow coverage”); \textit{see also} \textit{BITs in the Mid-1990s}, \textit{supra} note 7, at 7.
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{See id.} (presenting some of the common advantages and disadvantages for developing countries entering into a BIT).
\end{itemize}
direct access to a binding, neutral form of investment dispute resolution to enforce their treaty rights. Together, these innovations operate to restrain host state governments in how they treat foreign investors and investments.

There is substantial uniformity in the core content of most BITs.\(^{29}\) Virtually all BITs address four substantive areas: "the scope and definition of foreign investment; admission and establishment; national treatment in the post-establishment phase; . . . guarantees and compensation in the event of expropriation; . . . and dispute settlement."\(^{30}\) BIT standards of treatment can be broken down into specific standards that address discrete issues and general standards that apply to all aspects of a foreign investment. Specific standards frequently address issues like the right to transfer capital out of the host state, performance requirements, and the employment of non-host state personnel.\(^{31}\) For conceptual clarity, the general treatment standards can be further classified as creating either absolute or relative standards for host state conduct.\(^{32}\) Absolute standards compare the host state’s conduct against an external minimum standard usually drawn from customary international law. These include protection from unlawful expropriation and the requirements that states provide investors with "fair and equitable treatment," "full protection and security," and "treatment in accordance with customary international law."\(^{33}\) Relative standards, on the other hand, measure host state conduct by reference to how the host state treats other groups of similarly situated investors. These include national treatment,\(^{34}\) which requires host governments to treat foreign investors no worse than their own nationals, and most favored nation ("MFN"),\(^{35}\) which requires states to provide the highest level of treatment offered to the investors of any third-state.

\(^{29}\) See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 1, at 89 box III.1.

\(^{30}\) Id.

\(^{31}\) Id.


\(^{33}\) See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 53–65 (providing a comprehensive overview of both the absolute and relative standards ordinarily found in BITs).

\(^{34}\) See, e.g., U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 31, art. 5.

\(^{35}\) See id. art. 3.
Of course, the substantive rights and standards contained in investment treaties mean nothing if investors cannot effectively enforce them. One of the principal goals of the investment treaty movement was to provide investors with the means to effectively enforce their treaty rights.36

II. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

With the proliferation of BITs, an increasing percentage of global FDI is protected by one or more investment treaty and foreign investors have more opportunities to sue governments. This part considers investment treaty arbitration as an innovative form of dispute settlement, the recent sharp rise in investor claims, the actual treaty arbitration process, and the impact of investment treaty arbitration on developing nations.

A. THE RISE OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

Prior to the advent of investment treaty arbitration, investors had very limited options for redressing violations of international law that negatively impacted their investments.37 Since investors had no standing under customary international law to bring a claim directly against a state, their only recourse was to pursue the matter within the host nation's courts or attempt to persuade their own government to espouse their claim directly with the host government.38

In order to address these limitations, investment treaties contain investor-state arbitration clauses which allow investors to sue states directly to enforce their treaty rights.39 In essence, the arbitration clause serves as a standing unilateral offer by a state to arbitrate any

36. See generally Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 70 (stating that foreign investors now rely on an established set of international legal rules that provide enforcement through international tribunals).

37. See id. at 69–70 (suggesting that international law provided no mechanism for foreign investors to pursue claims when host countries failed to follow their investment contract agreements). This gave investors little assurance that the host country would not unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. Id.

38. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.

39. An investor-state arbitration clause became virtually a standard BIT provision during the 1980s and 1990s, the period when the vast majority of BITs were negotiated. See BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 7, at 94.
claims arising out of investments made by the nationals of the other state party to the treaty. Investors "accept" this offer by initiating arbitration under the relevant arbitration rules. This means that foreign investors can directly enforce treaty rights without first having to convince a government bureaucracy to espouse their claim and avoid the risk of their dispute getting consumed by the dictates of larger foreign policy considerations. The significance of this innovation in dispute settlement should not be overlooked. At the WTO, by way of comparison, only states have a cause of action against other states for violations of trade law. This mechanism provides investment treaties with a practical significance by allowing investors to enforce their treaty rights by initiating compulsory arbitration with a binding, enforceable award.

Investors are increasingly initiating arbitration to redress alleged violations of investment treaty rights by host governments. The number of investment treaty arbitration disputes filed at the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") and other arbitration fora has exploded in recent years. As of November 2005, the cumulative number of known claims reached 219, compared with just 75 in 2000. The vast majority of these arbitrations have been either administered by ICSID or held on an ad-hoc basis under the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") rules.

41. See id. at 234.
43. See generally Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2277 (1997) (asserting that the WTO’s “nations only” policy cripples the effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism).
45. Of the two hundred and nineteen known investment treaty claims, one hundred and thirty-two have been administered by ICSID, sixty-five under the UNCITRAL Rules, and only twenty-two under other arbitration rules. See id. at 1-2 fig. 2.
The rise in investment treaty claims can be attributed to several factors. With the long-term rise in FDI and the increasingly dense network of BITs, there are simply more opportunities for disputes to arise that are covered by an investment treaty. Moreover, the increased frequency of larger arbitration awards will likely encourage more investors to utilize investment treaty arbitration clauses. Arbitration practitioners predict the volume of claims to continue to grow as investors and lawyers become more aware of the rights contained in BITs and other investment treaties. Indeed, many lawyers already advise investors on how to structure their investments to take advantage of one or even multiple investment treaties.

B. OVERVIEW OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS

At the outset of a dispute, most investment treaties present investors with a choice between litigating in the host state’s courts or some form of investment treaty arbitration. Since investors remain dubious of the impartiality of host state’s courts, they invariably choose to arbitrate the dispute. Most investment treaties provide investors with a choice between arbitration conducted by ICSID or ad-hoc arbitration administered under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. There are important differences between these two forms of arbitration with regard to the transparency and supervision of the proceedings. As an institution specifically designed to handle investor-state disputes, ICSID offers facilities to conduct the arbitration proceedings and support during the proceedings from its staff. Ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, on the other hand, takes place on a de-localized and unsupervised basis. Investors sometimes prefer ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL

46. See id. at 3.
47. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1538–39 (“exponential explosion of claims under a variety of investment treaties”).
48. See id. at 1535.
49. See id. at 1542.
51. See Selecting the Appropriate Forum, supra note 11, at 15–18.
52. See id. at 26.
rules because it offers more flexibility to structure the proceedings, enhanced privacy, and the possibility of interim damages.53

The arbitration process begins when a foreign investor files a claim with one of the arbitration facilities designated in the investment treaty.54 Both parties then participate in the selection of the arbitration tribunal, with each party selecting one arbitrator and jointly appointing a third to serve as chairman.55 From there, the exact order of the process will depend on the relevant arbitration rules and the parties' preferences.56 Ordinarily, the parties submit memorials outlining their case, then exchange evidence, submit additional written submissions, debate issues of law and fact during oral hearings, and the tribunal ultimately determines if an award is justified.57 ICSID tribunals value well-organized and well-researched written submissions, and generally a party can gain the most influence through the written portion of the case.58 The oral hearings are shorter by comparison, and primarily offer an opportunity to present witnesses and respond to the arbitrators' principal questions and concerns.59 Opportunities to challenge tribunal awards are very limited: the investment treaty arbitration system has no appellate review and there are very limited grounds for annulment.60

53. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1548–49.
54. See id. at 1543.
55. See id.
56. At the outset of the dispute, the parties and the tribunal chairman generally hold a procedural meeting where the parties have broad flexibility to determine the format of the proceedings, including the timing and number of pleadings and whether to dispense with oral hearings. See, e.g., ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, R. 20, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (April 2006) available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
57. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1544–45.
59. See id. at 84.
60. A party's options for challenging an award vary depending on whether it was rendered under ICSID Convention or under another set of arbitration rules. See Franck, supra note 42, at 1545–57. However, none of the available methods generally permit review of the merits or correction of legal errors. Instead, opportunities for annulment are generally limited to a handful of procedural deficiencies. Id.
C. THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION ON DEVELOPING NATIONS

As net importers of global capital, developing nations have borne the brunt of the burden of defending the growing number of investment treaty claims. According to U. N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") data, nearly two-thirds of the 219 known investment treaty claims have been filed against developing nation governments.61 Thirty-seven different developing nations are known to have been defendants in investment treaty arbitration, with several facing multiple claims.62 Argentina has faced an incredible forty-two claims, with Mexico a distant second at seventeen.63 Developing nations’ experience with investment treaty arbitration is almost exclusively as defendants: there are only eleven known instances where developing nation firms have filed investment treaty claims.64 Due to the confidentiality surrounding non-ICSID arbitrations, the actual number of claims against developing nations is likely to be significantly higher.65

Defending investment treaty arbitration claims poses a number of challenges for developing nations, including the cost of litigation, the possibility of a large adverse award, and even new limitations on its freedom to implement government policies deemed inconsistent with treaty obligations.66 While information on the size of investor claims is often sporadic, some of the known awards against developing nations involve substantial sums. For example, the Czech Republic was ordered to pay $270 million plus substantial interest to a Dutch-based broadcasting firm after the tribunal found the media regulatory authorities had violated the terms of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.67 In 2002, Ecuador was ordered to pay $71 million to

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62. See id. at 3.
63. See id.
65. See Latest Developments, supra note 44, at 3.
66. See id. at 7–8.
Occidental, a U.S.-based energy company, after a tribunal found an administrative change in its tax code violated the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.68 More recently, an ICSID tribunal awarded a U.S. energy company $133 million in 2005 after finding Argentina in breach of the Argentina-U.S. BIT as a result of measures taken by the Argentine Government in response to that country’s financial crisis.69

The wave of investor lawsuits has far-reaching implications for developing nations’ freedom to regulate in the public interest. Investors have turned to investment treaty arbitration to challenge a wide variety of government measures in a number of sensitive areas, including the provision of water, electricity, waste disposal, and sanitation services to the public. In at least nine cases, foreign investors that provided water and sewage in developing countries have filed investment treaty claims to resolve their differences with state and local regulatory authorities.70 Other treaty-based investor lawsuits have challenged the denial of a permit to operate a waste disposal facility,71 the decision of the tax authorities regarding a value-added tax formula,72 the revocation of a permit to operate an industrial factory near protected wetlands,73 and the licensing of cellular telecommunications.74


69. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award ¶ 2 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1257.


III. THE CASE FOR REFORM: ENSURING THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING NATIONS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

Given that the vast majority of investment treaty claims are filed against developing nations, it is critical that they be able to actively participate in the dispute settlement process. In reality, developing nations face a network of barriers that discourage their full participation in the treaty arbitration process. This section examines three barriers to the effective participation of developing nations in the treaty arbitration process: a lack of affordable access to legal expertise, a lack of transparency in the arbitration process, and uncertainty over the meaning of key treaty rights.

A. ACCESS TO LEGAL EXPERTISE

In any form of litigation, a party’s lawyers’ level of expertise will likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of the dispute. The importance of having access to legal expertise is only magnified in a specialized area of the law like investment treaty arbitration with which most lawyers have little familiarity. Expertise in this field is generally limited to a close-knit community of lawyers and arbitrators who work for one of a handful of major international law firms with specialty practices in this area.\(^7\) Hiring one of these firms offers a number of significant advantages. First, lawyers in these firms litigate investment treaty arbitration cases more frequently than other parties, gaining valuable experience and professional contacts in the process. Second, the firm offers significant “institutional memory” with regard to past arbitration awards, the relevant arbitration rules, arbitrator selection, and general litigation tactics.\(^6\)

\(^7\) Some of the few major global law firms with specialty practices in this field include: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Paris), Allen & Overy (London), White & Case (Washington DC), and Covington & Burling (Washington DC).

\(^6\) The Arbitration Practice web-site of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, a leading international firm for investor-state arbitration states:

Our international arbitration practice consists of over 80 practitioners worldwide with an unrivalled track record of conducting international arbitrations under all major institutional rules to the highest professional standards, no matter where or under what law or language—from French to
Some partners and lawyers in the major international firms have served as arbitrators in other cases, providing unique insight into the process. Knowledge gained from participating in past arbitrations, including those that go unpublished or settle before an award, can provide extra leverage in persuading governments—particularly those with minimal experience in the arbitration process—to settle investor claims. Lastly, a firm will have the best possible access to both published and unpublished sources of legal authority via in-house law libraries, support staff, and informal professional networks.

The foreign investors who initiate investment treaty arbitration claims invariably hire one of the major international law firms with specialty practices in investment treaty arbitration. Developed nations tend to have the resources and legal expertise in their government ministries to ably defend themselves in investment treaty arbitration. Due to a lack of expertise and resources within their...
own government service, many developing nations are forced to hire outside counsel to defend investment treaty claims.

These firms may demand fees matching those charged to their other clients, including private corporations, wealthy individual investors, and more prosperous governments. Hourly rates for these elite firms can range from $400–$600 or more an hour per lawyer. Considering a claim is likely to be handled by a team of lawyers and the arbitration process frequently takes two or more years to complete, the legal bill can be staggering. One study found that average legal costs for governments range between $1 to $2 million per year. Meanwhile, the average cost for hiring a three judge panel of arbitrators runs $400,000 or more. The Czech Republic is reported to have spent $10 million to defend against two treaty claims related to the regulation of its media sector. More recently, the Czech Republic announced it would spend $3.3 million in 2004 and $13.8 million in 2005 to defend against more than a half-dozen investor claims. Clearly, the cost of treaty arbitration is beyond the means of many developing nations, particularly the Least-Developed Countries ("LDCs").

approximately one hundred and thirty permanent attorneys and about seventy support staff. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3433.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). The United States has faced nine different investment treaty arbitration claims brought under NAFTA’s investment chapter, but has not lost a claim to date. Id.

81. See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 64, at 14 (noting that the expected legal fees incurred by the Czech Republic for one case were over $13.8 million one year).

82. See id.

83. See id.; see also ICSID, Schedule of Fees, (July 6, 2005), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/schedule/fees.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (finding that in 2005, ICSID increased the daily fee payable to ICSID arbitrators from $2,000 to $3,000). This figure is exclusive of additional costs for travel, meals, lodging, and administrative expenses. Id.


Not all developing nations hire outside counsel, whether for financial or tactical reasons. This may mean that the task of defending an investment treaty claim falls to government attorneys without the experience or resources to mount a vigorous defense. In some cases, this can lead to shocking disparities in the quality of legal representation between investor claimants and developing nation defendants. For example, the Seychelles' Attorney General, who had no prior experience with investor-state arbitration, reports defending a recent ICSID claim without access to a reliable internet connection, Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, or basic treatises on ICSID or investment arbitration.\(^{87}\) Likewise, when Argentina first began defending investment treaty claims, the Solicitor General’s office did not have access to fundamental substantive law or arbitration doctrine.\(^{88}\) During its first investment treaty cases, Argentina’s attorneys had to fly to Washington, DC ahead of ICSID arbitration hearings to conduct the necessary legal research and even spent their own money to buy copies of key arbitration treatises.\(^{89}\)

Over the course of time, some developing nations have been able to build up considerable expertise in defending against investment treaty arbitration claims. Argentina, for example, has defended many of the claims filed against them without resort to outside counsel, building up substantial expertise in defending treaty claims in the process.\(^{90}\) Building up that expertise, however, takes time and may require the diversion of resources from other pressing legal and regulatory matters.\(^{91}\) Smaller, poorer developing nations are far less likely to have the financial or human resources to build the in-house capacity to defend investment treaty claims. What’s more troubling, the efforts of developing nation lawyers to acquire the requisite expertise “on the job” are frustrated by the lack of transparency surrounding the treaty arbitration process.

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87. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
88. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
B. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Investment treaty arbitration is characterized by a lack of transparency at every stage of the arbitration process. Without the consent of the parties to the arbitration—the investor and the state—there is generally no public access to the pleadings, evidence, hearings, or even the tribunal award. This section looks at how two aspects of this opacity—problems with finding past arbitral awards and the lack of third party participation—hinder developing nations' full participation in the arbitration process.

1. Access to Arbitral Case Law

Developing country counsel seeking to find relevant precedent are forced to engage in a kind of legal scavenger hunt through scattered and incomplete sources for past arbitral awards. While there is no formal rule of stare decisis in investment treaty arbitration, lawyers and arbitrators often consider and cite prior arbitral awards as a form of authority when confronted with similar issues of law or fact. Access to this arbitral case law is particularly vital in a field like public international investment law where there are relatively few decided cases and every decision draws new lines.

The first barrier to finding relevant precedent is a lack of public knowledge that an investment treaty dispute exists: of the major arbitral fora, only ICSID maintains a public registry of claims. The UNCITRAL Secretariat does not even maintain internal records of the cases brought under the UNCITRAL rules. Even when the existence of a claim is made public, the tribunal award may not be


published. Despite their importance as a source of law, none of the investment treaty arbitration fora publish awards without the consent of both parties.96 While many awards are eventually made public by one or both of the parties, some nonetheless remain unpublished.

Meanwhile, at least some of the unpublished awards are informally traded within a “magic circle” of law firms and arbitrators that work in this field.97 The existence of these “hidden” awards provides arbitration insiders—the firms and practitioners within this informal professional network—with the unfair advantage of having access to a wider array of authority to fight and win their cases.98 At the same time, those without the resources to hire one of the major multinational firms are deprived of relevant authority to defend against investor claims.99 As outsiders, developing nations are faced with scattered and incomplete sources of authority, raising the difficulty and risk of litigating without assistance from outside counsel.

2. Third Party Participation

Given its origins in international commercial arbitration, it is not surprising that investment treaty arbitration has not traditionally welcomed the participation of outside parties. Tribunal hearings under ICSID and the other arbitral institutions remain private unless

96. See ICSID Convention, supra note 92, art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188 (prohibiting the publication of an award without the consent of the parties); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 92, art. 32(5). It should be noted that ICSID Arbitration Rule 48(4) allows ICSID to publish excerpts from the legal holdings of awards when the consent of the parties cannot be obtained and the award is unavailable from another source. See ICSID Convention, supra note 92, art. 48(4), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188. However, these excerpts are a poor substitute for access to the full text of an award because it is often difficult to assess the significance of an isolated statement of the law or passage when removed from its factual context.

97. See Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 2003, http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_56.htm (complaining that access to arbitration decisions is only for the prominent law firms and that all types of lawyers should have equal access to these decisions).

98. See id.

99. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 26 (finding that the lack of resources of developing countries to hire large law firms to handle arbitration, creates an unfair competitive advantage for wealthier nations).
both parties consent to the presence of a third party. Access to the pleadings, evidence, and awards is therefore limited to the parties to the dispute. None of the major arbitral institution rules explicitly allow for the submission of amicus briefs from third parties. In one instance, an UNCITRAL tribunal concluded it had the authority to accept amicus briefs from several non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").

While greater third party participation in investment treaty arbitration has been justified by noting the public interest in the issues in dispute, it also has the potential to indirectly promote developing nations' participation in the dispute settlement process. As the Seychelles' experience shows, we cannot assume that developing nations have access to the relevant legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a vigorous defense. Amicus briefs from NGOs and other informed parties may be able, in certain cases, to supplement a developing nation's defense, ensuring that the tribunal has all of the relevant arguments and precedent before it to make an informed decision.

Some have raised concerns that allowing amicus participation and access to hearings could overwhelm the resources of the tribunal, increasing the costs of the dispute and the breadth of issues that each party must address in its arguments. While these are legitimate concerns, tribunals have methods at their disposal to limit third party

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100. See ICSID Rules, supra note 56, R. 32(2) (requiring consent of parties to third party participation in oral hearings); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 92, art. 25(4) ("Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise.").

101. In Methanex v. United States, a NAFTA-based claim under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, a Canadian Corporation sued the United States to recover profits lost as the result a California statute banning MTBE, a gasoline additive shown to pollute the groundwater and linked to cancer in laboratory animals. See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1345-47 (Aug. 3, 2005). Three NGOs, two from the U.S. and one based in Canada, petitioned the tribunal for amici status to argue that the California ban was not tantamount to expropriation or in violation of other NAFTA investment protection standards. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶¶ 1–8, (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6039.pdf. In deciding to accept the amicus briefs, the tribunal reasoned: “There is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial parties.” Id. ¶ 49.
participation before it becomes too burdensome. NAFTA tribunals, for example, consider a number of factors before accepting an amicus brief, including the degree to which the submission would offer a perspective or knowledge on a factual or legal issue relevant to the arbitration that is different from the parties to the dispute, whether it addresses issues within the scope of the dispute, and the third party’s and the public’s interest in the dispute. The prospect of a tribunal facing an overwhelming number of relevant third-party briefs is remote at best. WTO panels, where amici briefs are now permitted, have not reported problems with an overwhelming number of amici submissions. Furthermore, because potential amici often realize that their influence is maximized when they unite to produce a single brief clearly stating their concerns.

C. UNCERTAINTY OVER THE MEANING OF KEY TREATY STANDARDS

Key provisions of investment treaties are often written in deliberately vague language in an effort to capture FDI in all its forms. This open-ended approach can be an asset in a field like foreign investment where it is impossible to predict what new investment vehicles and structures investors will utilize in tomorrow’s business world. However, too much indeterminacy can be a burden for both foreign investors and states, who cannot anticipate how to comply with the law. Only with the recent rise in investment treaty claims have tribunals begun to further define the meaning of key BIT standards. Adding to the confusion, in several instances investment treaty tribunals have come to different

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104. See id.

105. See BITs and Development, supra note 70, at 27; see also ICSID, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ¶¶ 2–7 (Oct. 22, 2004) available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf (explaining that the number of cases before the ICSID has risen drastically since 2002).
conclusions over the meaning and application of these standards even when confronted with the same set of facts.\textsuperscript{106}

While the uncertainty surrounding BIT standards affects both investors and states, developing nations are less well-equipped to mitigate the risks of litigating in such a challenging environment. Developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel may not have access to the "hidden awards" and other forms of legal authority that may be able to provide valuable guidance on how a treaty provision has been applied in similar factual settings.\textsuperscript{107} From a strategic point of view, the uncertainty over treaty standards may make developing nations more prone to settling even spurious investor claims rather than bear the expense of litigation and the risk of a financially devastating award.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{IV. TALES FROM THE FRONT: DEVELOPING NATION EXPERIENCES}

To date, at least thirty-seven developing nations have faced investment treaty arbitration.\textsuperscript{109} During research for this article, I had the privilege of interviewing current and former government officials of Argentina and the Republic of the Seychelles with first-hand experience in defending their respective countries in ICSID arbitrations. Their stories reveal the difficulties developing nations may experience locating relevant precedent and other basic forms of legal authority. The Seychelles' experience,\textsuperscript{110} in particular, is an

\begin{footnote}{106. See Franck, \textit{supra} note 42, at 1558–82 (describing the Lauder Arbitrations, where a Stockholm tribunal and a London tribunal decided factually identical disputes differently).}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{107. See \textit{supra} notes 112–14, and accompanying text (describing how major multinational law firms have access to otherwise unavailable unpublished awards and share these amongst themselves).}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{108. See \textit{BITs and Development}, \textit{supra} note 70, at 28.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{109. See \textit{supra} note 62, and accompanying text.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{110. The investor claim against the Seychelles was based on a contract ICSID arbitration clause, not a bilateral investment treaty. It is nevertheless relevant because the problems the Seychelles encountered in finding legal expertise and authority would have existed regardless of the basis for the investor claim. In fact, defending a treaty-based claim is likely to be even more demanding because it requires an understanding of current trends in public international investment law. See CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, ¶¶ 3–6 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDCvSeychellesAward_001.pdf [hereinafter}

\end{footnote}
alarming illustration of how smaller developing nations who cannot afford outside counsel may defend themselves without access to basic legal authority, with potentially disastrous results. Taken together, these disturbing reports show that the barriers discussed in part III and not merely theoretical and call for some response from the international community.

A. CDC v. Seychelles

On August 22, 2002, the Commonwealth Development Corporation ("CDC"), a U.K.-owned development finance company, lodged a Request for Arbitration with ICSID against the Republic of the Seychelles under a contract-based ICSID arbitration clause. The request alleged that the Republic failed to honor two loan guarantees it had given as security for a loan to its Public Utility Corporation ("PUC") to purchase electric generators. Both loan guarantees provided that any dispute arising from the contract would be settled according to U.K. law.

CDC was represented by a team of lawyers from Allen & Overy, a major international law firm based in London with a specialty practice in investor-state arbitration. The Seychelles was represented solely by its Attorney General, Mr. Anthony Fernando. The Republic had never been sued by a foreign investor before, and Mr. Fernando had no prior experience litigating ICSID or other investor-state claims. His office had an unreliable internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, and no treatises on ICSID or investment arbitration. Though several major

CDC Group, Award].

111. The Republic of the Seychelles, located northeast of Madagascar, is an Indian Ocean archipelago with a population of roughly 80,000. See CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, ¶ 2 (June 29, 2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CDC-Seychelles-Annulment-Decision.pdf [hereinafter CDC Group, Annulment Proceeding].

112. See CDC Group, Award, supra note 110, ¶¶ 7–9.

113. See id. ¶ 4.

114. See id. cover page.

115. See id.


117. See id.
international law firms offered to represent the Republic, at $400–
600 per hour per lawyer their fees would have exhausted his office
budget in just weeks.\textsuperscript{118} In the end, Mr. Fernando, a civil law lawyer
by training whose daily work typically involves criminal,
constitutional, and administrative law, defended the Republic with
only his wits, a copy of the ICSID Convention and Rules, and two
outdated English contract law treatises.\textsuperscript{119}

On December 17, 2003, the tribunal, composed of a single
arbiter, found the Seychelles had no valid defense to CDC’s
default claim under U.K. contract law.\textsuperscript{120} In the award, the tribunal
noted that the Seychelles’ counter-memorial failed to comply with
the tribunal’s initial directions\textsuperscript{121} and one of its principal defenses
relied on a long-since overruled case in English contract law.\textsuperscript{122} The
tribunal awarded CDC the full outstanding principal, interest, and
eighty percent of its legal costs for a total of £2,446,701, or roughly
$4.6 million.\textsuperscript{123} It also held that, under the terms of the 1990 and
1993 loan agreements, interest would continue to accrue at nine
percent per annum or a total of roughly $1,000 per day.\textsuperscript{124}

On March 30, 2004, the Republic filed for annulment of the award
under ICSID Article 52(1), asserting that “the Tribunal manifestly
had exceeded its powers, that it had seriously departed from a
fundamental rule of procedure, and that the Award failed to state the
reasons on which it was based.”\textsuperscript{125} On June 29, 2005 an Annulment
Committee composed of three arbitrators rejected all three of the
Republic’s grounds for annulment, concluding in harsh tones that the
claim was “fundamentally lacking in merit.”\textsuperscript{126} Despite expressing
reservations about the effect that the ruling might have on the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{118} See id.
\bibitem{119} See id.
\bibitem{120} See \textit{CDC Group}, Award, supra note 110, ¶ 61.
\bibitem{121} See id. ¶ 26 (listing a failure to provide “written statements of witnesses
and expert reports on which the Republic intended to rely” as the ways the counter-
memorial failed to comply).
\bibitem{122} See id. ¶¶ 58–59 (citing National Westminster Bank Plc v. Morgan [1985]
\bibitem{123} See id. ¶ 62.
\bibitem{124} See id.
\bibitem{125} \textit{CDC Group}, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 111, ¶ 15.
\bibitem{126} Id. ¶ 89.
\end{thebibliography}
Seychelles’ economy, the Committee awarded CDC the full costs of its counsel (£83,345) and held that the Republic should bear all the costs associated with ICSID and the Committee, as well as its own expenses.

B. THE VIEW FROM ARGENTINA

Perhaps more than any other nation, Argentina understands the financial and administrative challenge of defending investment treaty arbitration claims. In January of 2002, facing an imminent default on its massive foreign debt, Argentina passed emergency economic legislation that, among other things, ended parity between the U.S. dollar and Argentine peso, converted dollar deposits and loans to pesos, and removed the right of public utilities to raise rates or charge in dollars. These measures have resulted in massive losses for foreign investors who hold the majority of Argentina’s public debt and own many of the privatized utility companies. In just the year 2003, there were twenty lawsuits filed by transnational corporations against Argentina claiming violations of BITs. As of December 2004, Argentina was a defendant in an unprecedented thirty-seven pending investor-state arbitration claims—thirty-two of which are filed at ICSID—worth over $16 billion dollars.

Ignacio Suarez worked for Argentina’s Solicitor General’s office from 2000-2003. He became interested in the field while completing his LLM from Harvard Law School and later working for a French law firm on a number of investor-state arbitration cases. When he started in 2000, Argentina was a defendant in only one ICSID proceeding and he was the sole lawyer with any experience in the investor-state arbitration field. Having come from working for

127. See id.
128. See id. ¶ 91.
130. See id. at 16–17.
131. See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 64, at 5.
132. See id.
133. See Telephone Interview with Carlos Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, Latin America Specialist Advisor (Mar. 23, 2005).
134. See id.
135. See id.
a major international law firm, the lack of access to legal resources was a real surprise: the office did not have a subscription to Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, or any of the major arbitration reporters.\textsuperscript{136} To prepare for his first ICSID cases, he would fly to Washington, DC three to five days before a hearing just so he could conduct the necessary legal research at ICSID and local law schools.\textsuperscript{137} On one trip, he spent over $1,000 of his own money to buy hard copies of the most important arbitration treatises to take back to the Solicitor General's office.\textsuperscript{138} Hiring outside counsel was not a viable option due to their high fees and the overriding importance that Argentina adopt a consistent, unified position on key issues likely to arise in all the arbitration cases arising out of the emergency economic measures.\textsuperscript{139}

Three years later, with the experience of litigating several ICSID cases under its belt, Argentina's Solicitor General's office looked more like an investor-state arbitration practice you might find at one of the major international law firms. In 2003, the office had at least ten lawyers working on investment treaty arbitrations, many with substantial experience in international commercial litigation, degrees from top law schools, and ready access to all the necessary legal materials.\textsuperscript{140} Yet, even with the added legal firepower, the Solicitor General's office is overwhelmed by the unprecedented number of investment treaty claims filed by foreign investors.\textsuperscript{141}

V. THE SOLUTION: A LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

No system of dispute resolution is perfect. Quite frequently, there are significant differences in the level of resources and legal talent available to parties in any form of litigation. In the world of international commercial arbitration, the quality of each party's representation is not a major concern, since the consequences are

\textsuperscript{136} See id.
\textsuperscript{137} See id.
\textsuperscript{138} See id.
\textsuperscript{139} See id.
\textsuperscript{140} See id.
\textsuperscript{141} See id.
generally limited to the private parties involved. However, the situation is quite different in investment treaty arbitration, where a state is the defendant and an adverse award has the potential to affect the lives of millions of citizens. This is why it is essential that the international community establish some mechanism to ensure that developing nations have, at a minimum, affordable access to the legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a competent defense to investor claims. Drawing from the success of a similar effort at the WTO, this Part argues for the creation of a Legal Assistance Center for developing nations in investment treaty arbitration and reviews the spectrum of services it might provide.

A. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER

How would a legal assistance center for developing nations benefit the practice of investment treaty arbitration? First and foremost, it would bolster the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration process by ensuring that developing nations have affordable access to basic legal authority and expertise. As an adversarial process, the legitimacy and effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration requires that both parties have a minimum access to legal authority and expertise. If one side does not have access to adequate legal expertise or authority, it cannot fully present its case and the tribunal is deprived of all the information it needs to make an informed and just ruling. A dispute resolution process that is seen to be unfairly tilted toward investors will undermine the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration and perhaps developing nations’ willingness to enter into future investment treaties.

A legal assistance center would not only promote fairness for developing nations, but also lead to a more efficient and effective arbitration process. Better informed developing nation counsel will make more cogent legal arguments, enhancing the quality of the

142. See Catherine A. Rogers, Emerging Dilemmas in International Economic Arbitration: The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 992 (2005) (recognizing that arbitration decisions “are generally regarded as affecting only the specific parties involved and not ... the public at large”).

143. See Advisory Centre on WTO Law [ACWL], Dispute Settlement, http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute_e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (describing the reasons behind the creation of the ACWL; specifically to provide legal assistance to developing nations in WTO dispute settlement proceedings).
arbitration process and the ultimate result. Developing nation counsel who understand the real legal issues at stake are less likely to make irrelevant or frivolous arguments, saving the tribunal, opposing counsel, and investors' time and money. For example, in CDC v. Seychelles, the tribunal found the Seychelles' initial pleadings were confusing and failed to comply with its instructions, forcing it to grant an extension for clarification. Moreover, the tribunal strongly hinted that the Seychelles' application for annulment bordered on the frivolous, reflected in its decision that the Seychelles pay all of the CDC's costs associated with the annulment process. If the Seychelles had access to affordable outside legal advice, it is entirely possible these costly errors could have been avoided.

Even if a Legal Assistance Center would enhance the legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration, is it a practical or realistic proposal? How should it be funded? What services should it offer? For some guidance on these questions, we can look to international trade law and recent efforts to provide developing nations with enhanced access to the WTO's dispute settlement process.

B. THE ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW AS A POTENTIAL MODEL

The international community recently confronted the question of how to provide developing nations with effective access to international dispute mechanisms with regard to the WTO's dispute settlement process. One of the developing nations' chief complaints that emerged from the failed 1999 Ministerial Talks in Seattle was unequal access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The substance of the complaints related to two familiar issues: a lack of WTO trade law expertise within their own

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144. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
146. See ACWL, supra note 160 (offering that the ACWL was created to help developing countries participate in the multilateral trade system).
147. See John H. Jackson, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Keynote Address at the Inauguration of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law: Perceptions About the WTO Trade Institutions (Oct. 5, 2001), http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=7192a684-8dac-4d91-974d-4f4f9ed3a682.
governments and no mechanism to help offset the prohibitive cost of obtaining private legal counsel. These charges were taken seriously because they implied the dispute mechanism was tilted toward wealthier developed nations, undermining a basic sense of fairness that is at the heart of the legitimacy of any dispute resolution mechanism.

In 1999, at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, a coalition of developed and developing nations signed the Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law ("ACWL"), which entered into force in July of 2001. The ACWL was established in Geneva in July 2001 "as a unique inter-governmental organization, independent of the WTO." It is funded and controlled by the developed and developing countries that both co-own and co-administer it.

The purpose of the ACWL is to "provide legal training, support and advice on WTO law and dispute settlement procedures to developing countries." The Centre offers members three principal services for free or at subsidized rates:

1. legal advice on WTO law, including the compatibility of proposed legislation and government measures;

2. support to parties in WTO dispute settlement proceedings;

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148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Founding members of the ACWL include: Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.
153. See id.
154. ACWL, supra note 151, art. 2(1).
(3) and training of government officials in WTO law through seminars and internships.155

Membership in the ACWL is open to both developing and developed nations.156 However, the services of the Centre are only available to developing nations, economies in transition, and least-developed countries.157 The Centre’s fee structure seeks to promote membership in the ACWL, while maintaining access for the poorest nations regardless of membership. Membership incentives include discounts on services and a higher priority access when the Centre is asked to assist multiple parties in a dispute.158 Fees for services rendered in dispute settlement proceedings are billed at hourly rates on a sliding scale based on the country’s share of world trade and GDP, with least developed nations billed at only $25 per hour.159 ACWL members and all least developed countries receive free legal advice regarding WTO law, not to exceed a certain maximum level of hours determined by the Management Board.160 The Centre maintains a roster of external counsel161 for referrals at points when demand for its services is too high, a conflict of interest exists, or it lacks the necessary expertise in a highly technical case.162 The

155. See ACWL, Training, http://www.acwl.ch/e/training/training_e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (describing paid internship opportunities at the ACWL for trade lawyers from least developed nations).

156. As of May 2005, the Centre has thirty-seven members: ten developed country members, and twenty-seven members entitled to the services of the ACWL.

157. See ACWL, supra note 152 (specifying that ACWL does not provide legal assistance to developed nations).


162. See Friedrich Roessler, Executive Director of the ACWL, Speech
current staff of the Centre consists of an Executive Director, Deputy Director, six lawyers, and two support staff.\textsuperscript{163}

C. A PROPOSED LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER

To be effective, a Legal Assistance Center does not need to rival the resources, expertise, or services of the major international law firms. Instead, it should aim to provide developing nations with high-quality information, legal advice, and training on an affordable basis. In this manner, the Center will fill a niche by providing developing nations with an option between the risk of relying solely on an in-house defense and the expense of hiring outside counsel.

1. Services

The shape and size of a Legal Assistance Center would of course depend, in part, on the type of services it offers to developing nations. A Legal Assistance Center could offer developing nations a spectrum of services, including: 1) a repository for access to all relevant legal authority; 2) training to enhance the capacity of developing nations to negotiate future BITs and defend themselves against investor claims; 3) legal advice or representation on a range of matters, including the compatibility of proposed legislation with BIT obligations and assistance in defending actual investor claims. A closer look at each of these potential services will help clarify their relative costs and purpose.

i. Repository for Legal Authority

At a minimum, a Legal Assistance Center should serve as a repository for relevant legal authority, including published and unpublished tribunal awards, arbitration treatises and journals, and other academic commentary. A facility like this could serve as a "one-stop" library for developing nations, greatly simplifying the task of finding relevant legal authority and ensuring, at a minimum,

\textsuperscript{163} Delivered at the Inauguration of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (Oct. 5, 2001), http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=7e0114b4-1819-45ab-9cceed494179ace633.

\textsuperscript{163} See ACWL, About Staff, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/staff_e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
that all parties have access to basic legal authority. Library staff might also maintain a list of qualified counsel who have expressed an interest in assisting developing nations on a pro-bono basis or at a reduced rate.

\[ ii. \text{ Training to Enhance Capacity} \]

A long term goal of a Legal Assistance Center should be to build developing nations’ in-house capacity to negotiate BITs and defend investment treaty claims. The potential benefits of training programs are twofold. First, they will allow developing nation counsel to develop at least some expertise with emerging developments in public international investment law and the relevant arbitration rules. Secondly, they will provide a forum where developing nation counsel can share experiences and strengthen professional relationships with Center staff. In this manner, training will serve a preventative function, ensuring that developing nations are not totally unfamiliar with treaty arbitration and can make informed decisions on whether they should settle or litigate an investor claim.

There appears to be great demand for training programs from developing nations who have faced investment treaty claims. UNCTAD, together with Organization of American States and the Canadian Agency for International Development, recently held a seminar on managing investment disputes in Washington, DC, for several countries from Latin America who are facing investment treaty claims.\textsuperscript{164} The course examined the substantive treaty-based standards that give rise to most investment treaty disputes, as well as key jurisdictional concepts, through case studies and insights from experienced arbitration practitioners. The course was well-received, with participants from Central America calling upon the UNCTAD Secretariat to set up a facility to assist in the actual management of investor-state disputes for the region, through capacity-building, supply of information and research, and institutional support.\textsuperscript{165} The Legal Assistance Center could build on this success, partnering with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{164} See UNCTAD, \textit{Advanced Seminar of Managing Investment Disputes}, (Nov. 3–11, 2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/dite_pcbb_ias42_en.pdf
  \item \textsuperscript{165} See id. at 3.
\end{itemize}
UNCTAD and other organizations to organize future training sessions.

The Center also might consider paid internships as an innovative way to provide developing nation personnel with invaluable practical experience with the investment treaty arbitration process. The ACWL recently launched a Secondment Programme for Trade Lawyers, a program where government trade lawyers from least-developed countries and eligible ACWL Members join the staff of the ACWL as paid trainees for a period of nine months. The Programme aims to “provide the participants with both theoretical training and practical experience in WTO law and an opportunity to participate actively in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.” There has been an overwhelming response to the program, with fifty-two applications received from ACWL members and LDC non-members.

iii. Legal Representation

Access to legal authority is an important first step, but legal expertise is required to interpret that authority and marshal the relevant facts into an effective defense. Likewise, training programs can be an effective way to build long term capacity, but they are no substitute for actual legal assistance in defending a concrete, pending investor claim. Developing nations with no prior experience in investment treaty arbitration nor the means to afford outside counsel may need some form of subsidized legal representation to effectively defend an actual investor claim. A Legal Assistance Center has several options to provide developing nations with access to affordable legal expertise.

As a first step, the Center could provide developing nations with forms of legal advice short of full representation. For example, the

167. Id.
Center could offer legal opinions on the text of a proposed BIT, the compatibility of a proposed law with a current investment treaty, or a preliminary analysis of the merits of a potential investor claim. With the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of key investment treaty provisions, developing nations may need assistance in clarifying whether proposed or current government measures may expose them to liability. Likewise, the Center might offer expert legal opinions on proposed treaty language to ensure that developing nations are aware of the full implications of specific treaty provisions. In this manner, the Center will serve an important preventative function, allowing developing nations to steer clear of disputes in the first place rather than litigating after the fact. A similar service offered by the ACWL has been used extensively by member nations.169 In the same vein, the Center could offer a preliminary analysis of the legal merits of an investor’s claim at the outset of a dispute, allowing developing nations to make an informed decision whether to settle or hire outside counsel.

At the most ambitious end of the spectrum, the Legal Assistance Center could provide developing nations with direct legal representation during the arbitration proceedings. Borrowing from the successful ACWL dispute settlement assistance program,170 lawyers from the Center could work alongside developing nation counsel on everything from drafting effective pleadings to presenting oral arguments before the tribunal. The involvement of Center staff would vary with the needs of each client, but would always seek to merely assist developing nation counsel as opposed to replacing them during the proceedings. Offering this kind of full, direct legal representation would provide developing nations with a true low-cost alternative to hiring one of the major international firms. However, it would also be very resource intensive, limiting the number of clients the Center could realistically serve at any given time.

169. See ACWL, supra note 158.
170. See ACWL, Dispute Settlement, http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute_e.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (documenting the fact that the ACWL has provided direct legal representation to developing nations in at least fourteen different WTO disputes, at both the Panel and Appellate level).
2. Location

At first glance, the most obvious location for a Legal Assistance Center might appear to be ICSID, the institution that facilitates the majority of investment treaty arbitrations.\(^{171}\) As a World Bank institution, ICSID already has a development orientation and a talented, multilingual staff of lawyers and support personnel familiar with investment treaty arbitration. However, ICSID is not well-suited to play host to a Legal Assistance Center due to limitations related to its core mission as a neutral dispute settlement facility: investors would question its objectivity and developing nations would be unlikely to seek advice from an institution whose core mission prevents it from being an advocate for their interests. Due to these limitations, it is difficult to see ICSID hosting anything more ambitious than a repository for legal authority or perhaps a legal referral center.

A different, more plausible home for a Legal Assistance Center is with the UNCTAD. “Established in 1964, UNCTAD promotes the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy.”\(^{172}\) UNCTAD already sponsors seminars for developing nations on effective BIT negotiation tactics, the management of investment treaty arbitration disputes, and an on-line guide to ICSID arbitration.\(^{173}\) However, UNCTAD has some limitations of its own. As a U.N. organization, it may be susceptible to political pressure from the wealthier nations who fund most of its programs. Hosting a Legal Assistance Center that provides direct legal representation to developing nations may attract opposition from developed nations if they perceive it as a threat to their investors.


Rather than seeking to fit within another organization's mandate, a Legal Assistance Center could be created as a wholly new, independent inter-governmental institution. Of course, this would require leadership in getting the organization off the ground and locating funding sources. Financial support from sympathetic industrial nations and private foundations may be necessary to raise the initial pool of capital needed to launch the Center and sustain it during its first years. Sustaining the Center over the long term will likely require some combination of grants, fees for legal services, and possibly membership contributions. The Centre might consider soliciting donations for an endowment to ensure its long-term financial stability and independence.

CONCLUSION

Even as the popularity of investment treaty arbitration has grown, its legitimacy is threatened by reports from developing nations of a lack of affordable access to the legal authority and expertise needed to defend investor claims. Due to a lack of relevant legal expertise within their own government ministries, many developing nations are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms at a cost of millions per year. Meanwhile, those who cannot afford outside counsel face scattered, incomplete sources of precedent and have nowhere to turn for affordable legal assistance. Given that even a single lost claim could wreak havoc on a developing nation's economy, something must be done to fill this void in legal services. A Legal Assistance Center would bolster the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration by providing developing nations with an alternative, low-cost option for obtaining legal assistance. Better

174. See Andrea Greisberger, Enhancing the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: Why the United States and European Union Should Support the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 37 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 827, 840 (2004) (indicating that the financial support of the nine developed nations who signed the “Agreement establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law” was critical to creating the $8 million dollar fund used to launch the ACWL).
175. See id. at 842 (noting that part of the ACWL annual operating budget comes from its endowment fund of approximately $20 million).
176. See discussion supra Part V.A (arguing that the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration depends on each party having adequate representation).
177. See supra text accompanying note 94.
178. See supra text and accompanying note 100.
prepared developing nation counsel will make more cogent legal arguments, allowing the tribunal to clearly identify the issues in the case and produce a well-informed award. By ensuring that developing nations have affordable access to legal authority and expertise, investment treaty arbitration will more perfectly fulfill its mission of providing a truly neutral and just form of dispute settlement.