Should Summary Judgment be Granted?

Abstract
This article discusses (and criticizes) the recent change from "shall" to "should" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to describe the standard by which a federal district court is to decide a "properly made and supported" motion for summary judgment. The article concludes that the text of Rule 56, which formally provided that such a motion "shall" be granted, cannot plausibly be construed as meaning "should"; that this change was not supported by those authorities cited by the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee; and that, as a normative matter, "should" is an inappropriate standard in this context. Federal district courts generally should not have the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment, and current Rule 56 should be amended accordingly.

Keywords
Summary judgment, Civil procedure, Federal courts, Litigation

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SHOULD SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .......................................................................................... 85

I. The Change from “Shall” to “Should” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ......................................................... 89
   A. The Prior Usage and Meaning of the Term “Shall” in the Rules Generally and in Rule 56 .......................... 89
   B. The Elimination of “Shall” and the Substitutes Therefor ................................................................. 92
   C. The Justification for the Change from “Shall” to “Should” in Rule 56 .............................................. 95

II. Should “Should” Be the Standard? .................................................... 100

Conclusion ........................................................................................... 119

Postscript .............................................................................................. 120

Appendix A—Former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ............... 123
Appendix B—Current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ............... 125

“Courts must apply judgment, to be sure. But judgment is not discretion.” 1

INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 2007, the long-awaited “restyling” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure finally took effect. 2 The primary purpose of

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the Restyle Project was to bring greater clarity and consistency to the Rules.\(^3\) Substantive change generally was to be avoided.\(^4\) Nonetheless, given the breadth of the Restyle Project—in which no rule was unaffected\(^5\)—the extent of the change was considerable. Doubtless, it will take years for the bench and bar to assimilate the new terminology.

Whether the Restyle Project was worthwhile is debatable. Certainly, some changes of this nature were desirable; many of the

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2. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (U.S. 2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/ERCv07p.pdf. The restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) actually was accomplished in four parts. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/Excerpt_JC_Report_CV_0906.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2008). In concert with the restyling of the Rules themselves, the Illustrative Forms that accompany the Rules also were restyled. Id. at 4. Moreover, some of the revisions made in the course of restyling were regarded as possibly resulting in “substantive” (as well as stylistic) changes. Those revisions were separated from the more general restyling revisions, but they became effective on the same date. See id. at 3. Finally, stylistic changes made to Rules added or amended effective December 1, 2006, also were completed as a separate set. Id. at 3–4. Collectively, these revisions will hereinafter be referred to as the “Restyle Project.”

3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“The language of Rule 56 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”); see also Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761, 1761 (2004) (describing the purpose of the restyling project as being “to translate present text into clear language that does not change the meaning”). Professor Cooper served as the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during the Restyle Project. See id. at n.\(^*\).

Though unstated, there might have been other purposes of the Restyle Project as well. For example, it appears that the Advisory Committee also sought to correct obvious errors and oversights, at least to some extent. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“Former Rule 56(a) and (b) referred to summary-judgment motions on or against a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim, or to obtain a declaratory judgment. The list was incomplete. Rule 56 applies to third-party claimants, intervenors, claimants in interpleader, and others. Amended Rule 56(a) and (b) carry forward the present meaning by referring to a party claiming relief and a party against whom relief is sought.”).

4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (describing the limited purpose of the Restyle Project); see also Cooper, supra note 3, at 1780 (“Deliberate substantive changes, even slight changes, must be addressed by other means.”). Again, obvious exceptions were those revisions expressly identified as potentially resulting in some substantive change. See supra note 2 (discussing this aspect of the Restyle Project).

5. Actually, the text of Rule 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”) was not changed, but the title (or “caption”) was. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (repealed 2007) (“Commencement of Action”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (“Commencement an Action”).
provisions formerly in effect were horribly drafted, terminological inconsistencies abounded, and oversights were evident. Many of these problems have been corrected, and, for the most part, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Advisory Committee") should be commended. Indeed, unlike some, the author of this Article is willing to concede that, on balance, the changes were positive.

The Restyle Project was not a complete success, though. In some instances, the Advisory Committee failed to make desirable changes. In other instances, the changes made by the Advisory Committee—contrary to the stated purposes of the project—likely resulted in substantive change. But rather than engage in a general critique of this project, this Article will focus on just one aspect: the change

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7. See, e.g., id. at 100 (discussing places where the former Rules used the words "case" or "lawsuit" rather than the more appropriate term "action").
8. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note (discussing the obvious omissions in the applicability of former Rule 56(a), (b)).
10. For example, in many instances, ambiguity remains because the same words are used to express more than one meaning. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (using "may" to express both permission and possibility); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d) (using "action" to describe both the court's ruling and the proceeding itself). In other instances, the Rules continue to use different words to express the same concept. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a), (b) (interchanging "court" with "judge"); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2)(b) (interchanging "case" with "action"). In still other instances, internal inconsistencies remain unaddressed. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) ("A motion asserting [defenses (1) through (7)] must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed."), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2), (3) (permitting the assertion of defenses (1), (6), and (7) by motion, post-pleading); compare FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) (prescribing the personal jurisdictional reach of the district courts), with FED. R. CIV. P. 82 ("These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts . . . ."). And in some instances, the changes that were made seem incomplete. For example, former Rule 81(e) defined state "law" as including "the statutes of that state and the state judicial decisions construing them." FED. R. CIV. P. 81(e) (repealed 2007). Rule 81(d)(1) now defines state "law" as including "the state's statutes and the state's judicial decisions." FED. R. CIV. P. 81(d)(1). But does not state law, for purposes of the Rules, include more than state statutes and judicial decisions? If so, why are those other authorities not described? Why is this term not defined in terms of what it is, rather than what it includes? Why is it defined at all? All of the above concerns were raised with the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure prior to the conclusion of the Restyle Project. See Letter from Bradley Scott Shannon, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-009.pdf.
11. The change that is the subject of this Article arguably falls into this category. See infra Part I.C (arguing that the change from "shall" to "should" in Rule 56 is substantive); see also Hartnett, supra note 9, at 164 ("[T]he Advisory Committee has not cleared up all of the ways the proposed restyled rules might change the meaning of the existing rules.").
from “shall” to “should” to describe the standard by which a federal district court is to decide a proper—i.e., “properly made and supported”—motion for summary judgment. For whereas previously summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith” following the filing of a proper motion therefor, now such a judgment only “should be rendered.” This seemingly innocent change might well result in a radical transformation of federal summary judgment practice, a significant aspect of modern federal civil litigation.

The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. In Part I, the Article will discuss the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56, starting with a discussion of the prior usage and meaning of “shall” in the Rules generally and in Rule 56 in particular. The Article will then discuss the Advisory Committee’s elimination of “shall” from the Rules and the various terms substituted in its place. In particular, the Article will discuss the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 and the Advisory Committee’s justification for that change. Part II will consider what might be the ultimate issue: the normative efficacy of utilizing a discretionary summary judgment standard. The Article will conclude that, as a textual matter and as a matter of Supreme Court precedent, “shall,” as used in Rule 56, cannot plausibly be construed to mean “should.” Further, because the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was not justified by those authorities

12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). In other words, a “proper” motion for summary judgment, as that term is used in this Article, is a motion where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).


14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). In order for readers to fully appreciate the nature and scope of this change, the full text of former and restyled Rule 56 is reproduced in Appendices A and B, respectively.

15. The change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was almost completely unopposed. In fact, when restyled Rule 56 as proposed by the Advisory Committee was released for public comment, the author of this Article was the only person who formally objected. See 2005 Civil Rules Comments Chart, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV%20Rules%202005.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2008) (describing the comments received on the restyled Rules as proposed).

16. See infra notes 95–104 and accompanying text. This change also could have a dramatic impact on state court practice, though whether any state adopts this language remains to be seen. Of course, to the extent the states decline to adopt Rule 56 as restyled, this change could have a dramatic impact on the federal-state court balance.

cited by the Advisory Committee, this change should be regarded as substantive, not stylistic. More importantly, “should” is an inappropriate standard for deciding a motion for summary judgment; a district court should have no discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 therefore should be amended to reflect what was and should be a district court’s obligation in this regard.

I. THE CHANGE FROM “SHALL” TO “SHOULD” IN FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

A. The Prior Usage and Meaning of the Term “Shall” in the Rules Generally and in Rule 56

Prior to the Restyle Project, “shall” was a term that “permeate[d] the rules.” 18 What did “shall” mean? The best answer, of course, is that the meaning of “shall” depended (at least to some extent) on the particular context in which it was used19 because, as with many words, “shall” is a word with more than one meaning.20

So let us consider a single (and presumably uncontroversial) example. Former Rule 4(c)(1), the rule governing service of process, provided: “A summons shall be served together with a copy of the complaint.” 21 As used in that rule, what was the most likely meaning of the term “shall”? Surely, the idea was that service of a summons together with a copy of the complaint was mandatory—i.e., that the person responsible for serving process was required to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint more or less simultaneously.22

18. Cooper, supra note 3, at 1766. In fact, according to a Westlaw search conducted just prior to the effective date of the restyled Rules, “shall” appeared in the Rules 510 times.
19. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (invoking the “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and indeed, of language itself)” to find “that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used”).
20. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2085–86 (1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] (defining “shall” alternatively as meaning “a command or exhortation,” “what is inevitable,” and “determination”). Even when confined to law, “shall” can have several meanings. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “shall” alternatively as meaning “[h]as a duty to” or “is required to,” “[s]hould,” “[m]ay,” “[w]ill,” and “[i]s entitled to”). Of course, this does not mean that “shall,” at least as it is used in the Rules, can reasonably mean anything. Moreover, it is one thing to consider how a word can be used; it is quite another to consider how, in any given context, it is ordinarily used. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242–43 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the distinction between a word’s possible meanings and ordinary meanings).
22. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1407 (explaining that “shall” imparts “the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically
It should come as no surprise, then, that in a similar context, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In *Anderson v. Yungkau*, the Court was called upon to interpret a former version of Rule 25(a), which provided: “‘If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within 2 years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.’”

Interpreting this rule, the Court held:

In contrast to the discretion of the court to order substitution within the two-year period is the provision of Rule 25(a) that if substitution is not made within that time the action “shall be dismissed” as to the deceased. The word “shall” is ordinarily “the language of command.” And when the same Rule uses both “may” and “shall,” the normal inference is that each is used in its usual sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.

It is equally unsurprising that the Court has reaffirmed this interpretation in other contexts several times since.

Let us now consider Rule 56 and summary judgment. Former Rule 56(c) provided:

*Webster’s Dictionary*, supra note 20, at 2085 (explaining that “shall” is “used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory”); see also 1A NormaL SInGer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 25.4 (6th ed. 2002) (“Unless the context otherwise indicates the use of the word ‘shall’ (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory intent.”). This meaning of “shall” also has normative support. See *Black’s Law Dictionary*, supra note 20, at 1407 (explaining that only this mandatory sense “is acceptable under strict standards of drafting”); Joseph Kimble, *The Many Misuses of Shall*, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 61, 64 (1992) [hereinafter Kimble, The Many Misuses] (“Every single authority on legal drafting . . . insists that shall must be used . . . to recite an obligation in a contract, or to give a command in a statute.”). Professor Kimble served as the Style Consultant for the Restyle Project. Memorandum from Joseph Kimble, Style Consultant, Thomas Cooley Law School, to All Readers (Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Kimble Memo] in Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Style Revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at x (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pdf.

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Admittedly, in *Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), the Court rejected the notion that the inclusion of “shall” in a restraining order “made enforcement of restraining orders [by law enforcement officers] mandatory.” *Id.* at 760. But the Court based its interpretation on the unique nature of the order at issue, the relevant statutory scheme, and the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion.” *Id.* at 761. Notably, the Court failed to mention *Yungkau* or any of the other cases cited above.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{27}

Similarly, former Rule 56(e) provided:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.\textsuperscript{28}

As used in former Rule 56, what did “shall” mean? Certainly, if a motion for summary judgment was “made and supported as provided in this rule,”\textsuperscript{29} a district court was permitted to grant the motion, but was it required to?

Yes; the context in which this term is used strongly suggests a mandatory result, and nothing in former Rule 56 itself indicates to the contrary. For if, in this situation, the moving party was “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,”\textsuperscript{30} then was not a district court required to grant the motion? And why must an adverse party respond to a proper motion for summary judgment\textsuperscript{31} if a district court had the power to deny that motion in any event?

Moreover, though it does not appear that the Supreme Court has confronted this precise issue, on several occasions the Court has suggested courts are required to grant a proper summary judgment motion. For example, in \textit{Celotex Corp. v. Catrett},\textsuperscript{32} the Court stated that

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{27} FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{28} FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{29} Id.
\textsuperscript{30} FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007).
\textsuperscript{31} FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (repealed 2007). It also might be observed that, as with the rule at issue in \textit{Yungkau}, former Rule 56 used both “may” and “shall,” thus permitting a sound inference that the latter usage was mandatory. \textit{See supra} text accompanying note 25 (describing this inference).
\textsuperscript{32} 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at 322; \textit{see} Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, \textit{Judicial Discretion To Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging}, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 103
Similarly, in *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.* the Court stated that the standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge *must* direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. . . .

. . . In essence, . . . the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party *must* prevail as a matter of law. 35

In sum, considering the text of former Rule 56 and language in prior Supreme Court opinions, there is little question that “shall,” when used in connection with a district court’s duty with respect to a proper motion for summary judgment, meant that the court was required to grant the motion.

B. The Elimination of “Shall” and the Substitutes Therefor

Despite the clear meaning of “shall” in the contexts discussed above, the Advisory Committee regarded this term as ambiguous, and therefore problematic. 36 As a result, as part of the Restyle Project, the Advisory Committee substituted what it regarded to be less ambiguous terms. Specifically, it “replace[d] ‘shall’ with ‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one the context and established interpretation make correct in each rule.”

(2002) (“The Celotex opinion is surely correct that the ‘plain language’ of Rule 56 mandates that courts enter summary judgment when the movant has demonstrated that no disputed issues of material fact exist.”).

34. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

35. *Id.* at 250–52 (emphasis added). One might keep in mind that, strictly speaking, the *Celotex* and *Liberty Lobby* Courts were simply discussing the language of Rule 56 as then in force, meaning this language probably should not be taken as making any normative statement about how a motion for summary judgment ought to be decided in the absence of any express direction. Nonetheless, if the issue is the meaning of Rule 56 prior to restyling, that meaning seems fairly clear.

36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (“The restyled rules minimize the use of inherently ambiguous words. For example, the word ‘shall’ can mean “must,” “may,” or something else depending on context. The potential for confusion is exacerbated by the fact that ‘shall’ is no longer generally used in spoken or clearly written English.”); see also Cooper, *supra* note 3, at 1766 (“Ambiguity nowhere presents a more pervasive problem than arises from ‘shall.’”); Kimble, *The Many Misuses, supra* note 22, at 61 (“[S]hall is the most misused word in the legal vocabulary.”).

37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note; see also Bryan A. Garner, *The Art of Boiling Down*, 9 Green Bag 2d 27, 31 (2005) (observing that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already “have been stripped of the chameleon-hued word”). Mr. Garner also had his hand in the restyling of the Rules. See Kimble Memo, *supra* note 22 (stating that Garner’s work was used as a guide for drafting the restyled Rules).
The term most frequently substituted for “shall” was “must.” Consider again Rule 4(c)(1), which formerly provided that “[a] summons shall be served together with a copy of the complaint.” As restyled, Rule 4(c)(1) now reads: “A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” In this context, “must” makes sense, for though “shall” and “must” do not mean exactly the same thing, “must” comes very close (and probably closer than any other single word) to expressing the idea being conveyed in Rule 4(c)(1)—the requirement that a summons and a copy of the complaint be served together.

In a few places, the Advisory Committee substituted “may,” rather than “must,” for “shall.” For example, former Rule 33(a) provided that leave to serve more than twenty-five interrogatories on another party “shall be granted,” though only “to the extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2).” Restyled Rule 33(a) simply provides that such leave “may” be granted. Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to understand how “shall” could be interpreted as meaning “may.” In the context of restyled Rule 33(a), though, the use of “may” seems fairly unobjectionable, as former Rule 33(a) expressly provided that the decision whether to permit the service of more than twenty-five interrogatories was dependent upon the

38. Comparisons between the former and restyled Rules are difficult because in some places, redundant material was eliminated or condensed, whereas in others, new provisions were added for greater clarity. But it is estimated that “must” was substituted for “shall” approximately 340 times.
41. Ideally, “shall” should be used to connote a duty, whereas “must” is more directory, and should used to express a condition precedent. See Kimble, The Many Misuses, supra note 22, at 64–67 (explaining the common misuses of the word “shall” by lawyers). Thus, by eliminating “shall” in favor of “must,” “we do give up a potentially useful distinction, or at least we have to make the distinction in other ways.” Id. at 70.
42. See Webster’s Dictionary, supra note 20, at 1492 (defining “must” as “is commanded or requested to”); see also Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act § 4(a) (1995) (“Shall and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation, requirement, or condition precedent.”); Kimble, The Many Misuses, supra note 22, at 64 (“[I]n legal usage shall is close in meaning to must.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. It is estimated that “may” was substituted for “shall” approximately twenty-nine times.
46. “May” usually expresses either permission or probability. See Webster’s Dictionary 1396 (defining “may” as “having permission to” and “be in some degree likely to”). Of course, these are not the only meanings of “may,” and certainly “shall” can be used in ways that coincide with such meanings, but that is not the way that “shall” ordinarily is used.
consideration of a number of factors, and thus had always involved some measure of discretion.

Finally, in a handful of places, the Advisory Committee changed “shall” to “should.” For example, former Rule 1 provided that the Rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,” but Rule 1 now provides that the Rules only “should” be so construed and administered. As with “may,” it is somewhat difficult to understand how “shall” could be thought to mean “should.” Even in the context of Rule 1, it is not clear when the Rules should not be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of an action. Perhaps the notion is that these goals (“just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive”) might, at times, conflict (e.g., that which is “just” might be neither “speedy” nor “inexpensive”), meaning that Rule 1 (like Rule 33(a)) necessarily calls for some measure of discretion. To this extent, then, this particular use of “should” might be regarded as unobjectionable, or at least tolerable.

Whether the problems associated with “shall” were as dire as those perceived by the Advisory Committee is debatable. Given its pervasiveness, it is difficult to believe the original drafters of the Rules lacked a firm understanding as to what “shall” meant in the various contexts in which they used it. There is also some question as to whether the replacement terms selected by the Advisory Committee for the restyled Rules truly mean the same thing as “shall,” even in seemingly uncontroversial applications, and any change in

47. It is estimated that “should” was substituted for “shall” approximately fourteen times.
50. Though “shall” and “should” both impose something of a duty, the latter is usually considered to impose a weaker obligation. See Webster’s Dictionary 2104 (providing the example, “you should brush your teeth after each meal”). Certainly, the use of both “must” and “should” in the restyled Rules indicates a distinction between these terms. See also id. at 1599 (explaining the distinction between “must” and “should”).
51. This does not mean, though, that even this use of “should” is appropriate. For a discussion of some of the other problems associated with the use of “should,” see infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
52. Ironically enough, the Supreme Court used “shall” in its order approving the restyled Rules. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2 (ordering “[t]hat the foregoing amendments . . . shall take effect on December 1, 2007, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced”) (emphasis added). It is difficult to believe the Supreme Court also did not understand what “shall” meant.
terminology is likely to result in some level of disruption. At the same time, “must,” “may,” and “should” are no less clear than “shall.” Thus, to the extent that the meaning of the restyled Rules is reasonably consistent with that of the former Rules, the changes made by the Advisory Committee still may be regarded as positive. Trouble arises, though, when the new term selected by the Advisory Committee results in a discernable—even substantive—change in meaning.

Consider, again, Rule 56: as a textual matter, and as suggested by the Supreme Court, the granting of a proper motion for summary judgment was mandatory under the former Rule 56. But did the Advisory Committee change “shall” to “must” in Rule 56? No. Instead, it changed “shall” to “should.” So now, even when a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, it need not be granted. Such a motion may be granted—indeed, it should be granted—but it does not have to be granted. And this seems clearly wrong—or at least it seems to go beyond mere restyling.

C. The Justification for the Change from “Shall” to “Should” in Rule 56

Given the dubious nature of the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56, one might be tempted to ask how (or why) the Advisory Committee arrived at the decision to make such a change. Part of the answer might lie in the manner in which the Advisory Committee viewed its role with respect to the Restyle Project. Though one might have expected it to opt for more literal translations there are indications that the Advisory Committee saw its role as being to conform the Rules to established practice.

53. See Shannon, supra note 6, at 81 (discussing the problems potentially associated with the exchange of seemingly synonymous words).
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)(2). Actually, in several instances, “shall” was changed to “must” even within Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (describing the time by which a motion for summary judgment is to be served); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1) (describing the manner in which partial summary judgments are to be regarded at trial); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) (describing the requirements for supporting or opposing affidavits); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) (describing the consequences for submitting affidavits in bad faith). It is at least somewhat difficult to understand how the meaning of “shall” could shift as it is used within this rule.
55. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (explaining that the choice of the term to replace “shall” was based, in part, on “established interpretation”). Certainly, the notion that established practice might have been at work in the restyling of Rule 56 is reflected in the note accompanying restyled Rule 56, which explains:

Former Rule 56(c), (d), and (e) stated circumstances in which summary judgment “shall be rendered,” the court “shall if practicable” ascertain facts existing without substantial controversy, and “if appropriate, shall” enter summary judgment. In each place “shall” is changed to “should.” It is
Whether importing established practice is an appropriate approach to restyling the Rules seems debatable. Should the courts, in effect, be permitted to amend the Rules (which are, after all, rules and not just guidelines or suggestions) in this fashion? Arguably not. Federal courts are duty-bound to abide by the Rules, which are regarded as having essentially the same binding force as a federal statute. It, therefore, seems that any changes that might be considered substantive, vis-à-vis actual rule text, might be more appropriately accomplished through the formal (and traditional) amendment process.

Even assuming that established practice should be incorporated into the Rules, there is still the pronounced question whether the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 truly reflected established practice. Did it? Was it in fact “established” that a district court had discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment? Let us examine the authorities cited by the Advisory Committee more closely.

established that although there is no discretion to enter summary judgment when there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, there is discretion to deny summary judgment when it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256–257 (1948). Many lower court decisions are gathered in 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2728. “Should” in amended Rule 56(c) recognizes that courts will seldom exercise discretion to deny summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Similarly sparing exercise of this discretion is appropriate under Rule 56(e)(2). Rule 56(d)(1), on the other hand, reflects the more open-ended discretion to decide whether it is practicable to determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue.

FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. Professor Cooper further explains:

There is a real risk that meaning will be changed in choosing whether to substitute “must” . . . for “shall.” This risk may occur even when it is clear that “shall” was originally intended to mean “must.” Actual practice may have added some measure of discretion. The dilution of the original command may reflect that practice has shown a better way: discretion is more useful, even more important, than the drafters understood.

Cooper, supra note 3, at 1777–78.

56. See Shannon, supra note 6, at 86 n.83 ("One also might consider the very choice of the word rules, as opposed to guidelines, suggestions, and other, similar terms.").


58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (2000). Certainly, the number of amendments made to the Rules in recent years, as well as the frequency in which the Rules have been amended, show that the Advisory Committee knows how to initiate the formal amendment process and that it is not afraid to do so.

59. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.
The Advisory Committee cites *Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co.* as support for the proposition that a district court properly may deny a motion for summary judgment even in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. *Kennedy* involved questions regarding the application of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of contractors hired by the War Department. The defendant contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court began by observing that this case involved “an extremely important question, probably affecting all cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of their employees immediately, and ultimately affecting by a vast sum the cost of fighting the war.” The Court then stated:

We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the District Court that tribunal lacked power or justification for applying the summary judgment procedure. But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this Court should draw inferences with caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and practice.

We consider it the part of good judicial administration to withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive statement of agreed facts. While we might be able, on the present record, to reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of the judicial process to provide.

Thus, “without intimating any conclusion on the merits,” the Court vacated—not reversed—the judgments below and remanded the case to the district court “for reconsideration and amplification of the record in the light of this opinion and of present contentions.”

The *Kennedy* Court thus held only that it considered it unwise to decide issues of great importance based on a scant district court record.
It did not hold that a district court has the discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The Kennedy Court also gave no indication that it intended to essentially overrule its then very recent decision in Yungkau regarding the usual meaning of “shall” in the Rules.

Though not mentioned by the Advisory Committee, some might observe that the Court has in fact stated that a district court may deny a motion for summary judgment when it has “reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.” Whether this statement should be taken as an endorsement of discretionary summary judgment is far from clear. But even if it is, it should also be observed that the only authority cited in support of this proposition was Kennedy, and we now know that the Kennedy Court made no such holding. Moreover, as it appeared in Liberty Lobby, this statement was clearly dicta, for it had nothing to do with the holding in that case. Finally, this statement seems contrary to other language in that opinion that suggests an absence of discretion in this context.

The Advisory Committee also stated that many lower courts have held that a district court has the discretion to deny a valid motion for

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67. In Supreme Court jurisprudence, such a tack is hardly unique. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984) (“We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity—a potentially far-reaching modification of existing law—in the absence of a more complete record.”).

68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the Kennedy Court did state in a footnote that Rule 56 provides that the trial court may award summary judgment after motion, notice and hearing, provided the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 334 U.S. at 252 n.4 (emphasis added). Though some might interpret this footnote as authority for the proposition that a grant of summary judgment is discretionary, the better interpretation is that the Court was simply acknowledging what a trial court is permitted to do in this context. After all, the Court did not say that summary judgment may be denied in this context, and certainly this language is as consistent with a mandatory reading of Rule 56 as it is with a discretionary reading. More significantly, in a later footnote, the Court stated: “Rule 56 requires that summary judgment shall be rendered if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact * * *.’ See note 4.” Id. at 257 n.7 (emphasis added). In light of this later footnote, it would be difficult to conclude that the Court regarded the district court’s obligation here as anything other than mandatory.

70. See id. at 255.
71. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding in Kennedy).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing other aspects of the Liberty Lobby decision).
summary judgment. It is true that some decisions to this effect can be found in the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee. But what the Advisory Committee failed to mention is that other lower federal courts have held that a district court has no such discretion. Thus, even among the lower federal courts, the results here are mixed—presumably not the sort of authority on which to make a change that is “intended to be stylistic only.” That some lower courts have reached a contrary conclusion does not support the notion that this issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Kennedy.

In sum, prior to the Restyle Project, it was not at all established that a district court had discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment. Thus, even if one regards it appropriate to make “stylistic” amendments based on established practice, there is substantial doubt that the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 in fact reflected established practice.

Before leaving this subpart, one might be further tempted to ask: Why, if it had not previously been established that a district court had discretion to deny a proper summary judgment motion, the Advisory Committee nonetheless made this change? And why did it make this change in this manner? Unless one believes that the Advisory Committee believed what it wrote with respect to the law of summary judgment, the answers to these questions are unclear. One can speculate that the answer to the first question might be that this was a change the Advisory Committee simply desired; it might have thought district courts should have more decisional latitude, either

74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.
76. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 104 (“Federal courts of appeals are currently split over whether judges must grant summary judgment if it is technically appropriate.”).
77. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. Moreover, the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee also states that “[i]n some situations, the court may have an obligation to grant summary judgment.” 10A Wright et al., supra note 75, at 524 (emphasis added). It is somewhat difficult to understand how a district court could have an obligation to grant a proper motion for summary judgment in some situations but not in all.
78. Indeed, though Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner are quite sympathetic to the notion of discretionary summary judgment, see infra notes 138–148 and accompanying text, even they admit “the Kennedy decision itself is somewhat contradictory.” Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 102.
79. To be clear, the author of this Article is not suggesting that the members of the Advisory Committee engaged in some form of bad faith, or that the Advisory Committee’s note to restyled Rule 56 is a sham. However, given the weakness of the authorities cited by the Advisory Committee, one can hardly help but suspect that there was something else motivating this change.
generally or as to summary judgment in particular. As for the second question, perhaps the Committee thought this change might be accomplished more easily (and more quickly) if regarded as restyling, rather than substantive. Regardless, these questions, as interesting as they might be, are now moot, for even if not established previously, it is now firmly established that we live in a world of discretionary summary judgment.

II. SHOULD “SHOULD” BE THE STANDARD?

Though the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was not justified by the text of that rule or by Supreme Court precedent, the normative question remains unanswered: Irrespective of how we got here, should “should” be the standard with respect to summary judgment?

Before answering this question, it might be observed that “should” is a rather curious standard for use in a rule. To see why this is so, let us consider a different example. Suppose the following law has

80. As Professor Cooper once remarked:
Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult—as it almost always is—to foresee even the most important problems and to determine their wise resolution. Reliance on discretion is vindicated only when district judges and magistrate judges use it wisely most of the time and in most cases. The ongoing revisions of the Civil Rules time and again reflect an implicit judgment that confidence is well placed in the discretionary exercise of power by federal trial judges. In a wonderful way, there may be an interdependence at work—the very fact that there is discretionary authority to guide litigation to a wise resolution may enable us to attract to the bench judges who will use the authority wisely. It is not clear beyond dispute, but let us assume that the open-textured reliance on trial-judge discretion is working well.

81. It also might be observed that although some restyling amendments were deemed substantive, see discussion supra note 2, the changes made to Rule 56 were not among them. Regardless of whether the changes made to Rule 56 should have been deemed substantive, it is probably safe to presume that their inclusion in that group would have drawn more attention to those changes.

82. This does not mean that the use of the word “should” is always illegitimate in this context. In fact, even prior to the Restyle Project, it appears that the term “should” was used in the Rules approximately thirty-five times, and many of those uses were uncontroversial. For example, former Rule 56(f) provided:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

As used in this subdivision, “should” simply meant “if,” and in fact, restyled Rule 56(f) now uses the latter. But this is far different usage from that currently found in Rule 56 regarding the standard to be applied to a decision on a motion for summary judgment.
been proposed to a state legislature: “All motor vehicles should be driven at or below the posted speed limit.” Should a rational legislator vote in favor of such a law? Is it enough that the legislator believes driving at or below posted speed limits is a good idea? Or should the legislator also consider how a rational driver is supposed to apply this standard? What would be a sufficient reason for exceeding the posted speed limit? Superior driving ability? Greater fuel economy? Would it be enough if the driver were to say, “Well, maybe I should drive the posted speed limit, but I just feel like driving a little faster today”? And if a law enforcement officer were to disagree with the decision made by the driver and issue a citation, on what basis would a court determine who was right? The general unworkability of such a standard—not to mention the potential for injustice—seems manifest.

Now consider the use of “should” in Rule 56. Why should summary judgment be discretionary? On what basis may a properly made and supported motion for summary judgment properly be denied? Rule

83. Such a statute is not purely hypothetical. For example, Montana Code § 61-8-303 (1) once provided: “A person operating . . . a vehicle . . . on a public highway . . . shall drive . . . in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation . . . .” State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Mont. 1998) (emphasis added by the court).

84. Cf. Stanko, 974 P.2d at 1138 (holding former Montana Code § 61-8-303(1) unconstitutionally vague). Even aside from unconstitutionality, practical problems with the Montana’s statute abounded. As two legal scholars concluded shortly after the law’s enactment:

Enforcement is perhaps the biggest problem with the [Montana statute]. Although ticket revenues have increased, roadside confrontations, accident investigations and court appearances also have increased, depleting the already scant resources of the Highway Patrol and judiciary. Furthermore, the subjective standard has proven an onerous task to administer. Arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement by the police, prosecutors, and judges impedes citizens’ compliance and the law’s effectiveness.


85. In other words (to reframe the issue), should the “test” used in deciding a motion for summary judgment appear more like a rule, or more like a standard? Much, of course, has been written on the rule-standard dichotomy. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Bullication of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803 n.1 (2005) (collecting authorities on this issue). As a result of this scholarship, it appears that the issues here are not whether one is superior to the other, or even whether the choice of one over the other sufficiently constrains those charged with its enforcement, for it now seems established that both have their place in the legal firmament and that rules tend to become “standardized” over time, and vice versa. Rather, the issue is which—a rule or a standard—is most likely to produce the “best” overall results in any given context, understanding that there will likely be pros and cons associated with either choice. Thus, the burden should be on those who favor discretionary summary judgment (and it seems fair to place the burden on that group, given the historically contrary presumption) to prove that a more
56(f) has long provided that the resolution of a motion for summary judgment may be postponed if the party opposing the motion is then unable to present facts in support of its position. Reasonable requests for postponing the resolution of a motion for summary judgment not covered by Rule 56(f) presumably may be accommodated by continuing the hearing on that motion. Is there any legitimate reason for denying (even temporarily) a proper motion for summary judgment that is not covered by these procedures? An affirmative answer is difficult to imagine.

A second problem with restyled Rule 56 relates to the rather open-ended nature of the standard provided. Though Rule 56 now expressly permits a district court to deny a proper motion for summary judgment, it provides no guidance as to what might constitute a legally sufficient reason for doing so. Presumably, such a motion could not properly be denied for any reason. After all, the rule specifies that the motion “should” be granted, not simply that it “may” be granted, and even the latter would be construed as constraining the district courts to some extent. The Advisory standard-like approach to summary judgment is superior to a more rule-like approach.

86. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 n.20 (1998) (“The judge does . . . have discretion to postpone ruling on a defendant’s summary judgment motion if the plaintiff needs additional discovery to explore ‘facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.'” Rule 56(f).”). Though Rule 56(f) also states that the motion may be denied in this situation, this language—which might be new, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (repealed 2007) (providing only that the district court “may refuse the application for judgment”)—should not be interpreted as providing the opposing party a free pass to a trial, as such a ruling would vitiate the entire procedure. See also infra note 132 and accompanying text.

87. At least to the author of this Article. Others have attempted to formulate arguments along that line, though. For a discussion of these arguments (and some possible responses thereto), see infra notes 107–155 and accompanying text.

88. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977) (defining “discretion” as “making decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority”); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (defining “discretion” as “the power to choose between two or more courses of action each of which is thought of as permissible”). In other words, such exercises of discretion—which might be referred to as exercises of “legal” discretion—should be distinguished from pure or “personal” discretion. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2022 n.10 (2007) (“When someone has complete freedom to choose based purely on personal preference without any constraint, we do not usually refer to this as an exercise of ‘discretion’ . . . .”). Still, a decision-maker in this context would be afforded considerable latitude. See id. at 1965.

Thus, the exercise of “legal” discretion also should be distinguished from what some, including Justice Scalia, see supra note 1 and accompanying quote, might simply refer to as the exercise of judgment. Cf. Dworkin, supra, at 34 (“Sometimes we use ‘discretion’ in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of
Committee’s note accompanying Rule 56 further suggests that the exercise of this discretion should be “sparing.”\cite{89} Regrettably, the word “sparing” failed to find its way into the text of Rule 56, and the rule otherwise provides no express basis for cabining the discretion conferred. And as one prominent legal scholar has cautioned that “[d]iscretion can be quite dangerous . . . when it is unbounded.”\cite{90}

The most obvious concern with a discretionary standard for summary judgment is that it “increases the opportunity for judges to base their decisions on personal biases or other impermissible reasons rather than on the merits of the motion.”\cite{91} Even exercises of discretion in the name of case management could “diminish certainty and increase litigation costs.”\cite{92} Moreover, “even if such management resulted in the promotion of substantive justice, it [might] do so in a haphazard way, because the ultimate outcome would depend upon
the individual judge’s skill as a case manager rather than the judicial application of substantive rules of law.”93

The absence of any express guidance as to how to apply restyled Rule 56 also leads to another problem: because a district court now has the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment, an appellate court presumably may overturn such a decision only for an abuse of discretion.94 But just as the reasons why a proper motion for summary judgment properly may be denied are difficult to discern, so are the bases for determining whether those reasons are legally insufficient. As a result, appellate review of district court rulings on motions for summary judgment has now been made much more complicated,95 and the results in such cases have been made much harder to predict.96

But the most significant problem with discretionary summary judgment might be its effect on the modern federal civil procedure scheme. For the discretion at issue here does not relate to some non-

93. Id. at 118.
94. See id. at 93. By contrast, it was well established that the standard of review of a decision rendered pursuant to former Rule 56 was de novo. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.41[3][a], at 56-339 to -341 (3d ed. 2008) (“The appellate court’s review of the appropriateness of a grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, using the same standard employed by the district court in its determination as to whether or not summary judgment was appropriate.”) (footnote omitted). Of course, given that the standard of review was de novo, one might (again) wonder how former Rule 56 could be construed as discretionary.
95. As Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner explain:

   If such a denial were to fall within one of the rare exceptions to the final judgment requirement, the nature of the review by the court of appeals would itself depend on the question of whether the denial is within the trial court’s discretion. If the denial were within the trial court’s discretion, then, in a case in which the denial was based on the trial court’s discretion, the standard of review would be whether the trial court has abused that discretion. . . . Moreover, if discretion can play a role in the denial of a motion for summary judgment, that fact could impact an appeal even when a trial court has granted the motion. In an extremely rare case, the appellate court could conceivably hold that a trial court abused its discretion by not denying the motion.

Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 93. Thus, at the district court level, the resolution of a motion for summary judgment has now become a two-step process: 1) may the motion be granted, and 2) should it be granted. At the appellate court level, a similar two-step process will be employed. Additional briefing along these lines can be expected.

96. The appellate courts also are going to be hampered by the fact that there is currently no rule requiring the district courts to justify the denial of a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule [56] . . . .”). An amendment to Rule 56 has been proposed that would solve this problem, at least to some extent. See proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”). Regrettably, the proposed rule’s use of the term “should” apparently renders the obligation to provide reasons no greater than the obligation to grant the motion in the first instance.
dispositive matter, such as the discretion to change the number of interrogatories a party may propound. Rather, this discretion relates to a dispositive matter—specifically, the ability to deny a judgment, on the merits, in favor of a party that is otherwise “entitled” to it. This is a remarkable development. As one legal scholar explains:

To be sure, district judges necessarily exercise wide latitude on many issues that arise in the course of the pretrial process, if for no reason other than those issues require careful consideration of the unique aspects of a particular case. But we have never ceded to such an individualized judging model basic policy choices that are manifested in our procedural system.

Equally remarkable is the effect this approach to summary judgment might have on modern federal court practice. As explained by the Court in Celotex:

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Before the shift to “notice pleading” accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources. But with the advent

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97. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46 (describing the change from “shall” to “may” in Rule 33). This is not to say that a district court’s exercise of discretion with respect to such matters cannot have a profound impact on the course of the litigation; sometimes it can. But it is a difference in kind, if not also in degree, from the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment.


99. Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1357 (2005). Indeed, aside from those instances in which a district court is empowered to dispose of an action in the face of egregious conduct by one of the parties, see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (“Failure to Make a Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery”), this development might be unprecedented. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (“If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain . . . the clerk . . . must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing . . . .”) (emphasis added). Even a judgment as a matter of law, a procedure that is thought to include some measure of discretion, ultimately must be granted if appropriate. See infra notes 130–152 and accompanying text. Admittedly, an action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction possibly may be recommenced in state court, see Shannon, supra note 6, at 131–33, and parties may be granted relief from any judgment under certain circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). But these facts typically do not (and should not) have any bearing on the decision whether to dispose of the action in the first instance.
of “notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.100

Thus, “[a]llowing judges discretion to deny summary judgment when it would technically be appropriate does not come without a price.”101 Most obviously, such a decision would “burden the courts’ already overcrowded dockets,” because the “[p]arties will be required to continue with a case that otherwise would have ended or have been limited in scope.”102 And, at the pleading stage, the institutionalization of discretionary summary judgment seems likely to result in the application of additional pressure on the district court.


101. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 120.

102. Id.; see Redish, supra note 99, at 1339–41 (discussing the many problems associated with “unnecessary trials” caused by the improper application of the summary judgment procedure). This also supplies the response to those who might argue that the denial of a proper motion for summary judgment results in little harm to the moving party. For even if the denial was wrongful, the moving party is unlikely to be fully vindicated. As Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner explain:

[A] denial of summary judgment is virtually unappealable. Such a decision is interlocutory in nature and, in the federal system, with rare exceptions, only a final judgment can be appealed. Once a case has proceeded to trial and final decision, the preliminary ruling denying summary judgment is unlikely to be given serious consideration on appeal. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 92–93 (footnotes omitted). Conceivably, some parties with meritorious summary judgment motions might nonetheless decide to forego this procedure entirely, for if the court is likely to deny the motion in any event, the cost might not be worth the risk.
courts to scrutinize the parties’ claims ab initio—precisely the sort of practice the Rules have sought to avoid.

In the face of these concerns, one might wonder how discretionary summary judgment can be justified. Perhaps the most prominent proponents of this view are, again, the authors of the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee. The treatise authors begin their defense of discretionary summary judgment by observing that Rule 56(c) “establishes the standard for granting summary judgment by providing that a court may enter judgment only when it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The authors explain—and on this point they surely are correct—that the “district court has no discretion to enlarge its power to grant summary judgment beyond the limits prescribed by the rule,” meaning “[i]t may grant a Rule 56 motion only when the test set forth therein has been met and must deny the motion as long as a material issue remains for trial.”

“On the other hand,” the authors continue, in most situations in which the moving party seems to have discharged his burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists, the court has discretion to deny a Rule 56 motion. This is appropriate since even though the summary-judgment standard appears to have been met, the court should have the freedom to allow the case to continue when it has any doubt as to the wisdom of terminating the action prior to a full trial.

So when, precisely, would such an exercise of discretion be appropriate? According to the treatise authors,

103. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 2106 (observing that the recent revival of Rule 12 practice “may reflect dissatisfaction with summary judgment’s ineffectiveness as a tool for dealing with unfounded contentions”). Indeed, some have read the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), as a partial response to the district courts’ collective failure to apply the summary judgment procedure as originally intended. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 305, 307 (2007) (“Justice Souter argued that a rigorous pleading standard was needed to curb the abuse of discovery, since neither pretrial management nor summary judgment had proven particularly effective.”).
104. See Redish, supra note 99, at 1339 (“Especially in light of the federal courts’ longstanding commitment to a notice pleading system, under which pleading motions are able to perform only an extremely limited role as a gatekeeper against unjustified lawsuits, summary judgment stands as the only viable postpleading protector against unnecessary trials.”).
105. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (citing 10A Wright et al., supra note 75). See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
106. 10A Wright et al., supra note 75, at 517 (quoting Rule 56(c)).
107. Id. at 517–18.
108. Id. at 525–26.
federal courts [may] exercise their discretion to deny summary judgment when the non-moving party has failed to offer any counter-affidavits or to provide any explanation under Rule 56(f) as to why opposing affidavits are unavailable. Although in theory summary judgment normally should be granted in these situations, if the opposing party is suffering from some handicap that prevents him from satisfying Rule 56(e) or Rule 56(f), such as if the opposing party is a prisoner unrepresented by counsel, a court should be hesitant to grant summary judgment.\textsuperscript{109}

Certainly, it would not be unreasonable for a district court to make some minimal inquiry as to why the nonmoving party failed to present anything in response to a proper motion for summary judgment before deciding that motion. But why should a failure to respond be a ground for denying the motion? Even if the court is somehow able to determine that the non-moving party is suffering from some “handicap,” what sort of “handicap” would be sufficient? And how is a court to know whether this is the reason for the failure to respond, as opposed to there simply being no factual basis for opposing the motion? Is a court to presume that contrary evidence nonetheless exists? And if so, that the non-responsive party will be able to properly present it at trial? The answers—or lack of satisfying answers—to these and related imponderables compel the conclusion that there is nothing unjust about granting a motion for summary judgment when the non-moving party, after having received reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, does nothing.\textsuperscript{110} If necessary and appropriate, relief from such a judgment may be sought.\textsuperscript{111} But prior to the entry of a judgment, a district court must presume that the lack of any response whatsoever is due to the lack of any legitimate basis for opposing the motion, and not due to some other reason.

The treatise authors also argue that a court “should” consider the “good faith” of a non-moving party that fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment on what some might view as technicalities.\textsuperscript{112} Examples provided include if opposing evidence offered “is defective in form but is sufficient to apprise the court that there is important and relevant information that could be proffered to defeat the

\textsuperscript{109} Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
\textsuperscript{110} Indeed, Rule 56 seems to require this result. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970) (“If respondent had met its initial burden . . . , Rule 56(e) would then have required petitioner to have done more than simply rely on the contrary allegation in her complaint.”); see also supra note 33.
\textsuperscript{111} See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
\textsuperscript{112} 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 528–29.
motion,” or if the opposing party “has complied with Rule 56(f),” in which case “the court has discretion to decide whether the reasons offered for the failure to come forward with countering evidence are sufficient to preclude summary judgment.”

Undoubtedly, when the requirements of Rule 56(f) have been met, the opposing party may—perhaps even should—be given more time to present its evidence. Indeed, for the poorly represented, Rule 56(f) is probably a vastly under-utilized procedure. Moreover, at least as to some litigants, a district court probably should provide some guidance as to how to meet “technical” requirements, such as how to present evidence in a proper form. Regardless, such assistance should not amount to a free pass to trial. There must be a day of reckoning, and if, after a reasonable amount of time, the opposing party still is unable to present contrary evidence in proper form, a proper motion for summary judgment must be granted. There is, again, no reason for believing that the result at trial will be better.

The authors of the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee next argue that “[j]udicial discretion also comes into play in evaluating the material that has been made available to the court.” For example, “although the general rule is that difficult legal issues do not preclude summary judgment, . . . difficult or complicated legal issues should not be adjudicated upon an inadequate record.”

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113. Id. at 529.
114. Cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (citations omitted)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
115. See supra note 86 (arguing the same point).
116. Prior to the Restyle Project, some refuge from “technical” requirements might have been sought in Rule 1, which used to provide that the Rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (repealed 2007). Regrettably, “shall” was changed to “should” here also, see FED. R. CIV. P. 1, apparently relieving the district courts of any firm obligation along these lines. A second problem with the application of Rule 1 is that the supposed “justness” of a denial of a proper motion for summary judgment must be balanced against the effect of such a decision on the speed and cost of the eventual determination of the action. That is going to be a difficult burden to meet. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of restyled Rule 56 on docket load and speed).
117. 10A Wright et al., supra note 75, at 529.
118. 10A Wright et al., supra note 75, at 529; accord Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 121 (arguing that discretionary summary judgment would enable judges to “forego investing scarce time and resources into cases that are particularly complicated or complex, or intertwined with issues not appropriate for summary judgment”). Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner go so far as to propose the following cost-benefit balancing test:

In deciding whether to deny summary judgment, judges should conduct a balancing test, taking into account the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant relative to the efficiency concerns of the federal judiciary. If the
exercising its discretion to deny the motion in such a situation, a district court would permit development of a fuller record and would save time if disposition of the motion would require the same time and effort as a plenary trial.\textsuperscript{119}

It is difficult to dispute the notion that “difficult or complicated legal issues”—or any legal issues, for that matter—“should not be adjudicated upon an inadequate record.”\textsuperscript{120} The sad reality, though, is that the record—even at trial—is never perfect, and that cases are probably decided on “inadequate” records daily.\textsuperscript{121} But this is all beside the point; at summary judgment, either the motion is “properly made and supported”\textsuperscript{122} or it is not, and if it is, that motion is to be granted unless the opposing party can properly “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”\textsuperscript{123} Nothing in Rule 56 expressly permits a court to await a “fuller factual foundation,”\textsuperscript{124} nor should it.\textsuperscript{125}

Regarding the cost-benefit argument—i.e., the notion that a motion for summary judgment may be denied whenever a court determines that deciding the motion would take more time than

\begin{itemize}
\item burden on the court in deciding summary judgment would be substantially greater than the adverse effect of a denial on the movant, then a denial may be appropriate, without determining the existence of a factual dispute. In evaluating the costs and benefits of denying summary judgment, courts should consider such factors as whether the claim involves motive, state of mind, or credibility, whether the matter is particularly complex, and whether issues ripe for summary judgment are intertwined with issues not proper for summary adjudication.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Id.} at 95.

\textsuperscript{119} See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 529-30.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.} at 529. Indeed, this was essentially the holding of the Supreme Court in \textit{Kennedy}. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text (analyzing Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948)).

\textsuperscript{121} At least this is true at the district court and court of appeals levels. To the extent the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary, see, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.”), it might have the luxury of deciding only cases having “adequate” records. Again, that seems to be what the Court was saying in \textit{Kennedy}. See supra notes 59–68. The lower federal courts (and particularly the district courts), however, have little choice but to “decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction,” Herbert Wechsler, \textit{The Courts and the Constitution}, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965), no matter how poorly that issue is presented.

\textsuperscript{122} FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{124} 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 530.

\textsuperscript{125} As for the “intertwined issues” argument (see supra note 118), is this not an appropriate use of partial summary judgment? See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(1) (“If summary judgment is not rendered on the whole action, the court should, to the extent practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue . . . . The facts so specified must be treated as established in the action.”). Alas, following the “restyling” of Rule 56(d), a district court only “should” perform this exercise—and even then, only if “practicable”—meaning partial summary judgments also might be harder to come by.
trying the case—this might make sense, if Rule 56 expressly so provided. It does not. The sad reality again is that many motions (summary judgment and otherwise) take more time to decide than they are “worth,” and yet the Rules provide no express exception of this nature. It also seems doubtful this is a route the federal courts ought to take, as there are doubtless better ways of dealing with motions that are not “worth” the cost. Moreover, even were Rule 56 construed to include such a cost-benefit exception, one should consider the difficulty of comparing the “burden on the court” with the “adverse effect of a denial on the movant.” For example, how does a court know how long it will take to decide a motion for summary judgment until it actually decides it? Or how long it would take to try a case until it is tried? How much time is the court to devote to estimating these figures? How does the court know whether there will be a trial, even if the motion is denied? And even if it did take as long to decide a motion for summary judgment as it would to try the case—an extremely dubious proposition—is there anything terribly wrong with that, at least so long as the motion is granted?

The treatise authors further argue that the timing of the motion should also be considered by a district court when deciding whether to deny summary judgment, because “further development of the case [might be] needed in order to be able to reach its decision.”

One situation in which this may occur is with respect to a summary-judgment motion made prior to the close of the pleadings. Although the motion may be decided at this point, in some situations completion of the pleadings would serve to clarify the issues. . . . In a related vein, even after the pleadings are closed courts have denied summary judgment without prejudice to renewing the motion after discovery or at trial, a procedure that occasionally has led to a subsequent grant of the motion. Courts

126. For example, one might start with the economically remarkable nature of the federal judiciary and the fact that a relatively modest filing fee enables parties to impose a potentially enormous burden on the system. Perhaps the parties should be required to bear a larger share of this cost.

127. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 95.

128. For one thing, it should be acknowledged that “[d]efendant’s motions for summary judgment are far more common than plaintiffs’ motions.” Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886 (2007). A defending party typically need prevail only as to a single element of a claim, thus obviating the need to hear the claiming party’s entire case. Moreover, aside from oral argument, summary judgment motions typically are decided on a paper record, which tends to take much less time to consider than a record produced through live testimony.

129. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 530.
also have reserved their ruling on a motion for summary judgment until after the trial of a separate issue. Indeed, when the motion is pressed for the first time at trial, the court may ignore it and proceed with the trial.\footnote{130}

It is readily conceded that a court may deny a motion for summary judgment made at trial, though such a motion makes so little sense it barely warrants discussion. For in this instance, the discretion to deny the motion would come not from Rule 56, but from other sources, as the denial would be based solely on the lateness of the motion.\footnote{131} Conversely, what sense does it make to deny a motion for summary judgment because it was made “too soon”? Is not the timing of such a motion clearly prescribed in Rule 56(a) and (b)? And is not this “problem” adequately addressed by Rule 56(f)? In other words, is not a brief postponement, rather than outright denial (or postponement until trial), the more appropriate course?\footnote{132} Moreover, why is it so important to await the responsive pleading, which typically is regarded as irrelevant in this context?\footnote{133} And would not a denial in this context potentially obviate what is often regarded in practice as a salutary and cost-saving procedure?\footnote{134}

\footnote{130}{Id. at 531 (footnotes omitted).}

\footnote{131}{Such a motion, in other words, would be denied summarily, prior to any consideration of the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(E) (empowering the district courts to issue pretrial orders regarding the “timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56”). Thus, it seems unlikely such a motion (as well as any renewed motion) would even be made, as most competent district courts, pursuant to Rule 16, utilize some form of pretrial scheduling order requiring that motions for summary judgment be made much sooner. Of course, if for some reason the court were to consider the motion and decide that it is meritorious, what sense would it make to deny it as untimely?}

\footnote{132}{Cf. 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2740, at 408 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the question “whether a court may permanently deny a summary-judgment motion and set the case for trial even though there has been no showing that a genuine issue of fact exists” as “interesting,” though acknowledging that “[i]n only one early reported case has Rule 56(f) been relied upon to issue an order of that type”).}

\footnote{133}{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading”). Presumably, this would not be the case in the unlikely event that the defending party admits all or almost all of the allegations in the claiming party’s pleading, but the lack of a responsive pleading would not prevent the defending party from making the same admissions at summary judgment (and if that is the defending party’s intent, the action is likely to settle in any event).}

\footnote{134}{Summary judgment is frequently sought early in the proceedings by one or both parties in actions involving predominantly legal, as opposed to factual, disputes precisely so that they may achieve a swift resolution at a relatively low cost. For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly has approved of the use of this procedure in the area of qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (“Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. . . . As a result, we repeatedly have stressed the}
Finally, the treatise authors observe that Rule 56 authorizes a district court to make interlocutory summary adjudications and to enter a partial summary judgment. 135 “By using these alternatives to a total grant or denial of summary judgment,” they argue, “the court is able to shape the litigation and make certain it progresses in an orderly fashion.” 136 Moreover, “[c]ourts sometimes have exercised their discretion to deny summary judgment on only a portion of the case when they feel that a more expeditious approach would be to adjudicate the entire case at one time.” 137

One must agree that Rule 56(d) indeed provides for partial summary judgment where appropriate, but if a grant of full summary judgment is justified, how does a grant of partial summary judgment render the progression of the litigation more “orderly”? And why is the delayed adjudication of the entire action “at one time” more “expeditious” than the adjudication of only that portion of the action that remains in dispute? The answers to these questions are eluding.

Though not cited by the Advisory Committee, additional arguments in favor of discretionary summary judgment are offered by Professor Jack H. Friedenthal and Joshua E. Gardner in what appears to be the leading article on this subject. 138 Friedenthal and Gardner observe that “[i]n considering whether judges should have discretion to deny an otherwise appropriate motion for summary judgment, consideration must be given to the policies and purposes served by summary judgment, concerns of judicial activism, and costs and benefits to plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary.” 139 They then argue that “aggressive use of Rule 56 may unduly burden both the court and the parties to the case. Preparing, arguing, and ruling upon summary judgment motions increase litigation costs and consume judicial resources.” 140 In other words, “the incorrect use of the summary judgment procedure obviously increases delay and expense in the final disposition of litigation and thus aggravates the very problem the procedure was devised to solve.” 141

There are several possible responses to this argument. First, to the extent that an “aggressive” use of Rule 56 may be deemed “incorrect,”

135. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 531–32.
136. Id. at 532.
137. Id.
138. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33.
139. Id. at 115.
140. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. (quoting John A. Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 Ind. L.J. 467, 467 (1958)).
it seems that there are already procedures (not to mention monetary disincentives) in place to deal with that problem. Second, as for the notion that an “incorrect” use of summary judgment causes delay, this seems highly unlikely in a world where trial dates are assigned irrespective of what might precede them. The competent district court will schedule the deadline for motions for summary judgment far enough in advance of trial so as to avoid any delays of this nature. Third (and most importantly), how do concerns regarding the “aggressive” or “incorrect” use of Rule 56 justify the denial of a proper motion for summary judgment? Indeed, how could a proper motion for summary judgment be deemed “incorrect”?

Friedenthal and Gardner also argue that modern courts “have recognized an additional, more controversial, use for summary judgment as a tool to ‘ease docket pressures by enhancing the case management power of the federal courts.’” The meaning of this argument is not entirely clear; perhaps the idea is that district courts today are more likely to encourage the use of summary judgment, or are more inclined to grant summary judgment sua sponte. If that is the point, then these also seem to be means of promoting litigation efficiency, if not also fairness. On the other hand, to the extent these authors are suggesting that district courts, simply to “ease docket pressures,” are now granting motions for summary judgment that fail to meet the requirements of Rule 56, this would be an argument for greater appellate court scrutiny of summary judgment rulings, not discretionary summary judgment.

142. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 114–18 (1990) (discussing other possible means of discouraging the unwarranted use of this procedure, including fee shifting).

143. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing a district court’s authority to issue pretrial orders to set the schedule for proceeding).

144. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 117 (quoting Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers To Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern Era of Summary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689, 704 (1996); see id. at 104 (“In an atmosphere in which summary judgment is favored, it appears increasingly important to allow courts discretion to deny motions that they believe are inappropriate under all of the circumstances, lest meritorious cases be ‘automatically’ eliminated when they should have gone to trial.”).

145. The same response may be given to those concerned that this problem might be confined only to certain areas of the law or to certain litigants. For example, one legal scholar recently argued that the relatively high rate of summary judgments in favor of defendants in employment and discrimination cases should cause the courts to “exercise all discretion in favor of trial.” Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 777 (2007). But it seems that the better solution is greater awareness of the problem, coupled (again) with heightened appellate court scrutiny.
Friedenthal and Gardner further argue that “fears of an increase in judicial activism seem overstated.” 146 Rather,

allowing the trial court discretion to deny summary judgment constitutes discretion as creativity, a form of institutionally recognized discretion justifying appellate court deference . . . [that] is permissible . . . as an exercise of equitable discretion in the individual case, and therefore does not threaten the preexisting rule structure. This notion . . . is consistent with the intentions of the committee that designed the Federal Rules in 1938, and [sic] consciously chose to leave much to the intelligence, wisdom, and professionalism of those who would apply the Rules. 147

Friedenthal and Gardner add that allowing such discretion over summary judgment “seems no more threatening than the discretion judges already exercise in denying an otherwise proper motion for judgment as a matter of law,” and that “it makes little sense to allow judges discretion in denying motions in the former category and not the latter.” 148

To rebut these arguments, merely stating that fears of an increase in judicial activism seem overstated does not mean that discretionary summary judgment cannot result in an increase in judicial activism or that such an increase might not in fact occur. Moreover, though the Advisory Committee that drafted the original Rules might have incorporated some degree of “equitable discretion,” it should be recognized that the same committee consciously omitted such discretion from its version of Rule 56. 149

Further, though it does appear that a district court has some measure of discretion with respect to the resolution of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the discretion inherent in Rule 50 is limited to the timing of the granting of such a motion. 150 A proper

146. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 118.
147. Id. (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
148. id. at 118–19 (footnote omitted). Friedenthal and Gardner also analogize motions for summary judgment to motions for a new trial and for a temporary restraining order (see id. at 118–19), as well as to criminal sentencing (see id. at 115–16 n.153), though those examples seem far less apposite.
149. See 1 F.R.D. CXXV–CXXVII (1941) (setting forth original Rule 56).
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”). Rule 50(b), which governs renewed motions for judgments as a matter of law, further provides:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law [following trial] and may include an alternative or joint
motion for judgment as a matter of law made pre-verdict properly may be granted at that juncture, or it may be denied, in which case it is deemed preserved. But if it is denied, and if the jury returns a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law must be granted. Generally speaking, there is no exercise of discretion at this later stage in the proceeding, lest a gross injustice remains unresolved. Thus, summary judgment (at least formerly) and judgment as a matter of law differ operationally only in that a final ruling on the latter motion may be delayed pending the outcome of the trial. Under both procedures, a proper motion ultimately must prevail.

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request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).

151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), 50(b). As the Supreme Court explained:

[T]he District Court's "denial of [a] preverdict motion cannot form the basis of [an] appeal, because the denial . . . was not error. It was merely an exercise of the District Court's discretion, in accordance with the text of the Rule and the accepted practice of permitting the jury to make an initial judgment about the sufficiency of the evidence.


152. See 9 MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 50.06[5][b], at 50-36–37 (3d ed. 2008) ("[A] court must grant judgment as a matter of law if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant under controlling law.") (emphasis added and citations omitted). Admittedly, a renewed motion need not be granted where the initial motion is made prior to the close of all the evidence and the nonmoving party's case somehow improves following the admission of additional evidence. However, this is a relatively rare occurrence.

153. Consider also that the standard of review for a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is de novo, see 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 152, § 50.92[1], at 50-128—meaning (again) that this issue is considered a question of law, and not a matter left to the discretion of the district court.

154. Actually, it is somewhat unclear why there should be any discretion to deny a proper pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, despite the fact that such a denial is only temporary. Indeed, there are indications that this was not always the recognized practice. See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 447 (1871) ("[I]t is settled law that it is error to submit a question to a jury in a case where there is no evidence upon the subject."); Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 299, 300 (1835) ("Where there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the court are bound so to instruct the jury, when requested . . . . "). As explained by the Improvement Co. Court:

When a prayer for instruction is presented to the court and there is no evidence in the case to support such a theory it ought always to be denied, and if it is given, under such circumstances, it is error; for the tendency may be and often is to mislead the jury by withdrawing their attention from the legitimate points of inquiry involved in the issue. Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party. . . . [I]n every case, before the evidence is left to
the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.

81 U.S. at 448. Such an approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the text of Rule 50, which could be interpreted as requiring the entry of a proper pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, while at the same time preserving for post-trial reconsideration an erroneous (and interlocutory) denial of such a motion.

The same treatise that endorses discretionary summary judgment justifies the current practice with respect to judgments as a matter of law as follows:

The court has power under the rule to grant judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case. Nevertheless it has been said to be the better and safer practice to defer a ruling upon the motion until both sides have finally rested. . . . The exercise of restraint may prevent the entry of an erroneous judgment.

Even at the close of all the evidence, it may be desirable to refrain from granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law, despite the fact that it would be possible for the district court to do so. If judgment as a matter of law is granted and the appellate court holds that the evidence in fact was sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new trial must be had. If, on the other hand, the trial judge submits the case to the jury, even though he or she thinks the evidence insufficient, final determination of the case is expedited greatly. If the jury agrees with the trial court's appraisal of the evidence, as a matter of law, the case is at an end. If the jury brings in a different verdict, the trial court can grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Then, if the appellate court holds that the trial court was in error in its appraisal of the evidence, it can reverse and order judgment on the verdict of the jury, without any need for a new trial.


[While a district court is permitted to enter judgment as a matter of law when it concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient, it is not required to do so. To the contrary, the district courts are, if anything, encouraged to submit the case to the jury, rather than granting such motions.]

Unitherm Food Systems, 546 U.S. at 405.

The pragmatic appeal of this approach is difficult to deny. But there are problems as well. As Professor Cooper himself once explained:

Direction before the jury has a chance to return a verdict, however, has advantages which ensure its continued employment. The more obvious advantages lie in the direction of "efficiency"—the directed verdict obviates the need for argument, instructions, and what may be a lengthy jury deliberation. Some cases may call so clearly for a directed verdict that these advantages easily outweigh the potential advantages of judgment notwithstanding the verdict . . . . An advantage more difficult to evaluate is that direction before the jury has had an opportunity to deliberate changes the nature of the confrontation between judge and jury. Although the directed verdict is a clear exercise of a control which might have been avoided by awaiting rendition of the verdict, there is an offsetting uncertainty whether the control has functioned so as to do anything more than expedite a result which any jury would inevitably reach anyway. Judgments notwithstanding the verdict, on the other hand, place the fact of control in stark relief—the jury's actual verdict has been superseded by an exercise of judicial power.

Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 903 n.1 (1971). In other words, the granting of a pre-verdict
Friedenthal and Gardner conclude by arguing that “the costs associated with discretionary denials of summary judgment can be outweighed by the benefits to the administration of justice.” In particular, they would require district courts “provide a written explanation for their denials of technically appropriate motions for summary judgment.” Though “[t]his requirement would clearly contribute to the workloads of the already overburdened judiciary,” “the ‘cost’ of a written decision would ultimately result in a ‘benefit’ to litigants in terms of guidance on their case and in a ‘benefit’ to the judiciary itself in terms of legitimacy.”

Regrettably for Friedenthal and Gardner, the Rules do not require an explanation for a discretionary denial of summary judgment. But even if they did, it is not at all clear that the benefits of such a rule would outweigh the costs. It is also unclear that such a rule would add to the legitimacy of the judiciary. Consider, for example, how an order of this nature might read:

The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that those facts, as well as the relevant law, favor the moving party. Nonetheless, because [insert discretionary reason], the Court concludes that the moving party’s motion for summary judgment should and will be denied, meaning trial will proceed as scheduled. Of course, based on the record as it now stands, the Court has no doubt that the moving party will prevail at that trial. Indeed, if the evidence proffered at trial were to mirror that presented in conjunction with this motion, the moving party would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

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156. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 120.
157. Id. at 122.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 96 (discussing the effect of Rule 52(a) (3)).
Such an order would provide some guidance to the parties in the action. Whether it would add to the legitimacy of the federal courts is another matter.

**CONCLUSION**

Discretionary summary judgment is but the latest example of the growing use of discretion in the Rules, and the battle over the proper role of discretion in the Rules is but part of the larger battle over the proper role of discretion in law generally. Though discretion might have its virtues, it also must be recognized that discretion “often concentrates unbridled power in few hands, fails to create clear or predictable guidelines, and permits disparate treatment of like cases.” As one legal scholar explains:

The most prominent drawbacks of discretion hardly need elaboration. Discretion makes it easier than rules usually do for decision-makers to consult illegitimate considerations, and it does nothing to keep them from making “mistakes”. Less prominently, discretion may have untoward psychological effects on decision-makers. Discretion is a kind of power, and power corrupts. Discretionary power seems conducive to an arrogance and carelessness in dealing with other people’s lives that judges already have too many incentives to succumb to.

And regardless of the appropriateness of discretion as to minor procedural matters, its use is inappropriate when it comes to

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160. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., *Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging*, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 191, 193 (2007) (“If one theme can fairly be said to dominate in the rounds of Civil Rule amendments adopted since [1982], that theme is the authorization of both numerous specific measures that district courts can use and the wide discretion they have in pretrial litigation management.”); see also Bone, *supra* note 88, at 1962 (“Federal district judges exercise extremely broad and relatively unchecked discretion over many of the details of litigation.”); Judith Resnik, *Managerial Judges*, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 411 (1982) (discussing the “broad discretion of the trial judge who assumes a managerial role”).

161. See Roscoe Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* 54 (rev. ed. 1954) (“Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less trained intuition of experienced magistrates.”); Bone, *supra* note 88, at 1966 (“Determining the optimal degree of discretion is an issue that pervades all law and legal regulation . . . .”)


summary judgment. As Professor Redish explains, “[v]est[ing] such
case-by-case discretion in trial courts effectively precludes overall
normative choices on issues that are central to the litigation matrix,” and “any value that might be served by predictability in procedural
decisionmaking . . . is undermined by ceding so much power over
summary judgment to the district judge in the individual case.”  

Thus, summary judgment, where proper—i.e., where the material
facts are essentially undisputed and the law favors the moving party—
must be granted. Just as with trial itself, there can be no “discretion”
beyond the judgment always inherent in the ascertaining of the
relevant law and the application of law to fact. Stripped of its veneer,
it is an unwillingness to deprive parties of a trial and to devote the
time necessary to decide the issues raised in a motion for summary
judgment that drive the discretionary summary judgment movement.
Yet, neither of these considerations can supply the need for this
document. If the district courts are unwilling to apply this procedure
properly, perhaps its elimination would be the better course. But
so long as summary judgment is retained, it must be applied as
designed.

POSTSCRIPT

The Advisory Committee recently proposed sweeping
amendments to Rule 56. On August 8, 2008, the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure released proposed
Rule 56 for public comment. “After the public comment period,
the proposed amendments will be reconsidered in light of the
comments received.” To the extent the amendments finally
approved by the Advisory Committee are approved by the Standing
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, they
“will take effect on December 1, 2010, unless Congress affirmatively
acts to defer or reject them.”

164 Redish, supra note 99, at 1357.
165 At least one legal scholar has advocated precisely that. See generally John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007).
169 Id.
A substantial portion of the Advisory Committee Report accompanying proposed Rule 56 is devoted to the issue whether “should” should be retained, or whether that term should be replaced by “must.” Though proposed Rule 56 retains the use of “should,” the Advisory Committee clearly is divided on this issue, and the choice of the proper term seems to be in flux.

Many of the arguments made by the Advisory Committee in support of retaining “should” have already been addressed in this Article. A few responses, though, to those that have not:

The Advisory Committee argues that “should” should be retained because a change to “must” might signal a change in the “standard for granting summary judgment”—a matter that the Advisory Committee has deemed off-limits—rather than the “procedure for presenting and deciding a summary-judgment motion.” But the argument that the use of “must” might result in a changing of the standard for granting summary judgment assumes that the choice between “should” and “must” has some bearing on that issue. Arguably, it does not, for in either situation, a district court may only grant the motion if the established standard (no genuine issue as to any material fact) has been met. Strictly speaking, the “should”/“must” issue concerns only the issue whether courts should be given the discretion to deny a motion that otherwise meets the established standard. And as to that issue, the Advisory Committee’s observation that from 1938 to 2007, the Rule said “shall,” speaks volumes. Thus, to the extent the “should”/“must” issue is considered to be part of the standard for granting summary judgment, the established standard, at least until 2007, was that an otherwise proper motion must be granted.

The Advisory Committee also argues that perhaps this issue might be resolved by using a word (or words) other than “should” or “must.” It seems, though, that, following the Restyle Project, the Advisory Committee has little choice but to use “must,” “should,” or

171. Indeed, the summary provided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts states:

Comment is especially sought on whether to retain the current language carrying forward the present Rule 56 language that a court “should” grant summary judgment when the record shows that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, recognizing limited discretion to deny summary judgment in such circumstances.

SUMMARY, supra note 168, at 1-2.
172. 2008 Report, supra note 166, at 23.
173. Id. at 45.
174. See id. at 24.
“may.” And as even the Advisory Committee believes that “may” does not accurately reflect the pre-restyle meaning of this provision, it further seems that the Advisory Committee has little choice but to decide which term—“should” or “must”—is the more appropriate term in this context.

Finally, the Advisory Committee argues that although a proper motion for summary judgment might have to be granted in some actions (such as those involving a valid official immunity defense), the discretion to deny such a motion should remain in others. But this approach would take Rule 56 down a non-transsubstantive road it ought not go. If an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment must be granted in some cases, that is simply evidence that it must be granted in all. Both the goose and the gander are entitled to the same sauce; indeed, Rule 56, even today, provides no less.

175. See id. at 46.
APPENDIX A—
FORMER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56**

RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.

(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.

(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and the trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

** The version of Rule 56 reproduced here is the version that was in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the restyle amendments, December 1, 2007. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2. To the extent current Rule 56 is deemed inapplicable, this version presumably would control. See infra note *** (describing the effective date of the restyled Rules).
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
APPENDIX B—
CURRENT FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56***

RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(a) By a Claiming Party. A party claiming relief may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim. The motion may be filed at any time after:
   (1) 20 days have passed from commencement of the action; or
   (2) the opposing party serves a motion for summary judgment.

(b) By a Defending Party. A party against whom relief is sought may move at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.

(c) Serving the Motion; Proceedings. The motion must be served at least 10 days before the last day set for the hearing. An opposing party may serve opposing affidavits before the hearing day. The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on the Motion.
   (1) Establishing Facts. If summary judgment is not rendered on the whole action, the court should, to the extent practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue. The court should so determine by examining the pleadings and evidence before it and by interrogating the attorneys. It should then issue an order specifying what facts—including items of damages or other relief—are not genuinely at issue. The facts so specified must be treated as established in the action.

   (2) Establishing Liability. An interlocutory summary judgment may be rendered on liability alone, even if there is a genuine issue on the amount of damages.

(e) Affidavits; Further Testimony.
   (1) In General. A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is referred to in an affidavit, a sworn or certified copy must be

*** This restyled version of Rule 56 “shall take effect on December 1, 2007, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.” Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2.
attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit an affidavit to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or additional affidavits.

(2) Opposing Party’s Obligation to Respond. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.

(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) deny the motion;

(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or

(3) issue any other just order.

(g) Affidavit Submitted in Bad Faith. If satisfied that an affidavit under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court must order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, it incurred as a result. An offending party or attorney may also be held in contempt.