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by Karen Hansen-Kuhn**

Introduction

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world’s resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

—President Barack Obama

More than any U.S. president in history, Barack Obama has focused public attention on global hunger and the need to bolster food production by small-scale farmers in developing countries. He championed this cause at the 2009 G-8 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy, where he called on world leaders to commit $20 billion to address food security, promising $3.5 billion from the United States. After a series of consultations among various government agencies and civil society organizations, the Obama Administration launched the Feed the Future initiative in April 2010. This program emphasizes the importance of small-scale farmers, especially women, in country-led programs and a multiagency “whole of government” approach to global food security.

Conversely, trade talks are gaining new momentum. After a two-year lull following the collapse of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) talks in 2008, G-20 leaders have called for a resumption of the negotiations in 2011, with WTO Director General Pascal Lamy calling for completion of draft modality texts by the end of March. The United States is also promoting its own ambitious agenda of regional and bilateral trade talks. Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership continue to advance and to expand to even more countries in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and South Korean governments recently resolved remaining differences over market access for automobiles in the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”). That agreement, along with pending bilateral agreements with Panama and Colombia, could be introduced for Congressional approval in 2011.

The food, finance, and climate crises are all evidence of how much the world has changed since the era of free trade accords began, but the U.S. agricultural trade agenda remains essentially the same as the approach first adopted in the 1990s under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). Recent reports of rising food prices and riots in some countries add new urgency to the imperative to get these policies right.

U.S. trade policy must start from our goals rather than our tactics. Ending global hunger, enhancing incomes and employment, and encouraging a transition to climate friendly agriculture should be the goals of U.S. agricultural, economic, and development policy. Trade policy should be a tool to support those goals rather than a loose cannon that shoots them down.

From Dumping to Volatility: The Lessons of Trade Liberalization

Much of the international debate on trade and agriculture over the past decade has focused on U.S. (and EU) agricultural subsidies but have not addressed the systemic causes of dumping, i.e., exporting at below the cost of production. Floods of cheap imports, especially during the harvest, can be devastating for developing-country farmers. As of 2003, dumping margins for U.S. commodity crops supported under the Farm Bill included wheat exports at an average price of twenty-eight percent below the cost of production, corn at ten percent, and rice at twenty-six percent below the cost of production. Today, recurring bouts of rising food prices have decreased the extent of dumping, but deregulated trade continues to present challenges for stable local food markets.

Over the last few decades, U.S. agricultural policy has changed from a system of supply management to one more dependent on free-market forces. This process culminated in the 1996 Farm Bill, which removed the last vestiges of supply management and enacted policies to encourage farmers to increase the volume of production to compensate for lower prices, with a strong focus on creating new markets overseas for U.S. commodities. That system soon resulted in a series of crises in rural...
areas and the enactment of emergency payments, later codified as the current system of agricultural subsidies. Commodity prices skyrocketed during 2007 and 2008, and farmers were better able to cover their costs of production, reducing counter-cyclical payments from the U.S. government to farmers, which rise to compensate farmers when prices are low for those crops. As a result of this increase in commodity prices, U.S. agricultural subsidies dropped from more than twenty-four billion dollars in 2005 to just over twelve billion dollars in 2009. In many countries, locally grown food suddenly became cheaper than imports, but after decades of neglect of agricultural sectors, production levels were too low to be able to fully meet domestic demand. Concerns over dumping have been overtaken by alarm over food-price volatility, as wild swings in prices make planning more and more difficult for farmers around the world.

The precise causes of the 2008 food price crisis and the recent bouts of price swings are still the subject of much debate. They include rising demand, extreme weather conditions, and excessive financial institution speculation on commodity markets. New limits on commodity speculation in the United States and EU are imperative to decrease the wild price swings experienced in recent years. However, policymakers in developing countries also need new ways to manage trade flows, so they can rebuild fragile agricultural sectors.

Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides a telling example of the dangers of this approach for food security and rural livelihoods. The agreement eliminated trade barriers for most sectors, with tariffs on corn and beans phased out over fourteen years. In fact, the Mexican government accelerated the tariff reduction schedule, and United States exports of corn to Mexico nearly quadrupled compared to the pre-NAFTA levels. Mexican agricultural exports to the United States also increased at an average of ten percent a year, but the benefits of those sales did not trickle down to rural communities. Many Mexican farmers were unable to compete with the cheap imports, and more than two million have left the agricultural sector since NAFTA began, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent. Since job creation in other sectors of the economy has been weak, rural poverty has increased and many people have been forced to migrate to cities in search of elusive manufacturing sector jobs or to the United States in search of better opportunities.

There is little evidence that the growth in U.S. exports under NAFTA has helped family farmers in this country either. The number of Americans employed in agriculture has dropped since the agreement began (as has manufacturing employment). The relationship between employment and trade is complex, even in the United States, as job creation from export growth can be offset by job losses resulting from imports that compete with domestic production. The kind of production also matters as large-scale agro-industrial production for export generally employs fewer people than smaller-scale, locally oriented production. As smaller-scale producers have been forced to seek off-farm income, larger producers and corporations have increased their share of production. Over the last twenty-five years, there has been a marked shift in the size of U.S. farms, with very small farms (with annual sales less than ten thousand dollars) and very large farms (sales exceeding one million dollars) increasing by thirty-eight and 243 percent, respectively. The number of small, but commercially viable farms (sales between ten and two hundred and fifty thousand dollars) dropped by forty percent, from half of total farms in 1982 to less than a third in 2007. The percentage of U.S. agricultural production controlled by the top four firms in a given sector has increased substantially, rising from seventy-two percent of beef packing in 1990, for example, to 83.5 percent in 2005.

Since NAFTA, U.S. agricultural production, both for domestic use and exports, has increased while rural employment and livelihoods have faltered. While a substantial portion of corn production is now directed to domestic ethanol production, exports of corn, wheat, and other commodity crops have continued to grow. According to the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) estimates, agricultural bulk export volumes increased eight percent in 2010 over 2009 levels, while the bulk export values increased seventeen percent. The recent surge in U.S. farm income is instructive. Net farm income increased twenty-six percent in 2010 over the 2000–2009 average, triggered, according to some analysts, by rising exports. However, the USDA also notes that, [a] second feature of the 2000–2009 decade is the high and persistent levels of volatility in agricultural commodity and input (feed, fuel, and fertilizer) markets. The volatility is reflected in the patterns of farm income during the decade. Net farm income increased in 6 of the 10 years, posting an average increase of 26.6 percent in the years with increases in farm income and an average decline of 23.5 percent in the other years (2002, 2005, 2006, and 2009). These wild swings in prices and incomes destabilize rural communities and contribute to increasing corporate concentration. Whether in the United States or overseas, agricultural policies that stabilize prices at levels nearer the cost of production could provide consistent signals and incentives to help farmers stay on their land and produce stable food supplies.

These problems are not unique to the NAFTA partners. In country after country, trade liberalization in agriculture has weakened local production and undermined rural livelihoods. Women produce sixty to eighty percent of food in many developing countries. They are particularly vulnerable to the risks created by dumping and volatile markets, since their access to productive resources is often already precarious. The emphasis on agricultural exports in the 1990s tended to result in a shift away from food production for household consumption, which tended to be controlled by women, to cash crops, which tended to be controlled by men. The U.S. Feed the Future initiative recognizes the vital importance of women’s contributions to food security and would direct more resources to women farmers. If the point of the U.S. global hunger policy is to improve food security and rural livelihoods for women and men, then...
appropriate trade mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure that they can stay on their land.

Haiti is another stark example of how trade policies can undermine food security. As recently as the 1980s, Haiti produced eighty percent of the rice it needed for domestic consumption. Under structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), among others, Haiti lifted import controls and reduced public support to agriculture. Today, it imports eighty percent of its rice needs and receives substantial food aid for recurring food shortages.

In March 2010, former President Bill Clinton testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the push to export rice to Haiti had been a grave mistake, stating:

Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, until the last year or so when we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank goodness, they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing the finger at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what I did. Nobody else.

Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the U.S. government has in fact started to rethink this policy. The President’s 2010Trade Policy Agenda clearly stated the intention to expand U.S. exports, even to developing countries. While Least Developed Countries (“LDCs”) are not being asked to agree to any new commitments to reduce tariffs under the Doha Round, there is no indication that United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) is reconsidering the wisdom of the previous rounds of tariff reductions.

A better approach would be to explicitly exempt low-income food import-dependent countries from U.S. export promotion goals and to allow flexibility to establish tariff rates adequate to protect their vulnerable agricultural markets. The LDCs, as defined by the United Nations, include some forty-eight least-developed countries, thirty-one of which are also members of the WTO. It includes such countries as Haiti, Senegal, and Bangladesh, many of which experienced food riots during the 2008 price spike. The United States does not have free-trade trade agreements with any of these countries, so this would be a relatively simple first step.

A second step would be to more carefully consider poverty and hunger within middle-income countries. USTR has entered into a series of discussions with India, Brazil, South Africa, and China, both to enlist their support to restart the WTO talks, and to press them to liberalize their own markets. Each of these countries is unique, but they all face challenges in local food production. According to research prepared for the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Development Report, there are more poor people in India than in the twenty-six African countries combined, and suicides by farmers who have lost their land are devastating evidence of the fragility of their agricultural system.

Developing countries in the G-33 have argued for WTO exemptions for Special Products and for the establishment of a new Special Safeguard Mechanism to protect food security and livelihoods and to advance rural development. While WTO members (including the United States) committed to the principle of protecting local markets to advance food security at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, in practice this has been a central point of contention in the WTO talks. The G-33’s insistence on these mechanisms (as well as United States intransigence on subsidies) was one of the key factors in the collapse of the WTO talks in 2008. A better approach would be to work with developing countries to consider the best ways to implement these mechanisms and other necessary measures to advance food security goals over export promotion.

THE TRADE RULES NEEDED TO RESPOND TO CLIMATE AND FOOD CRISSES

Agriculture has always been subject to unpredictable weather patterns, pests, and diseases. These risks are exacerbated by climate change, which is already causing changes in growing seasons and increases in droughts and flooding. These effects will become more frequent and more devastating in years to come, making it even more important to support flexible and innovative new approaches in developing countries. Efforts to strengthen local agricultural production in ways that respond to these challenges and benefit local communities and plans to foster regional cooperation in times of crisis are critical.

National and regional coordination of food reserves is emerging as an important tool to confront volatility in food supplies. The UN Comprehensive Framework for Action on the Global Food Crisis (a multiagency effort to coordinate donor policies) recognizes the importance of reserves. Reserves and other measures to limit price volatility and supply availability will be at the center of the agenda at the May 2011 G-20 Agriculture Ministers summit and the fall Committee on World Food Security meeting.

Several groupings of countries are already taking action to implement regional reserves systems. “In March 2010, Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) agreed to support the establishment of a system of national grain reserves.” In October, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) plus Japan, China, and Korea committed to establish a regional emergency rice reserve, building on a pilot program that has been operating for several years. In December, West African nations meeting in the Club du Sahel explored proposals to coordinate national food reserves systems to assist each other in cases of crop failures or other crises.

A system of food reserves does not replace international trade, but it can be an important means to stabilize national and regional food supplies. Food reserves can be supported or
constrained by trade rules that govern public support to agriculture. WTO rules and U.S. trade policy discourage public management of food supplies, but there is some degree of flexibility that would not prevent countries from starting to implement such programs. Food reserves do require public support to buy and sell stocks. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture limits how much governments can spend to support agriculture. While the establishment of a grain reserve in the United States could raise overall support beyond those limits, developing countries would be unlikely to exceed the limits included under current rules.

Price bands could be a bigger issue for U.S. trade policy. Most reserves systems operate so that when prices reach predetermined floors or ceilings the government intervenes. If it has buffer stocks, it could release those reserves onto the market to reduce high prices or confront local food shortages. It would purchase grains when prices are low, particularly during the harvest. These price bands are often coordinated with trade policy, with tariffs on imports triggered when prices fall, and reduced when they rise. While WTO rules generally limit such measures, in practice, many developing countries have some degree of flexibility in the application of tariff rates. Since many of them have agreed to bound tariff rates (ceilings) that are higher than the actual applied rates, they could utilize the difference in tariff rates (“water” in WTO lingo) to operate a price band and still comply with WTO rules.

The G-33’s proposals for a Special Safeguard Mechanism would institutionalize price bands as a legitimate tool to combat volatility. USTR has argued against these measures at the WTO, pressing for reductions in bound tariff rates and opposing the G-33’s proposal for a Special Safeguard Mechanism. In negotiations for a US-Andean Free Trade Agreement, the United States insisted on the dismantling of the system of price bands established under the Andean Pact. Those negotiations were later narrowed to a bilateral agreement between the United States and Peru, which liberalized all trade in agricultural goods and eliminated the Peruvian government’s participation in the regional price band.

The conflicts between trade rules and food reserves could emerge in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”). The TPP talks currently include Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. The Philippines, Canada, and Japan have also expressed interest in joining the talks. Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines are also members of ASEAN and are participating in the Emergency Rice Reserve System, as is South Korea.

**INTEGRATING NUTRITION IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT**

Improving food security means increasing both the quantity of food available to local consumers and ensuring that its nutritional quality is adequate. The administration’s Feed the Future initiative lists two central objectives: accelerating inclusive agriculture sector growth, and improving nutritional status. U.S. trade policy focuses on harmonizing food safety standards (both to generate new market opportunities and to ensure consumer safety), but it does not consider the nutritional value of the kinds of food systems encouraged by liberalization of trade and investment.

The debate on nutritional quality is already underway within the United States, where concerns about rising obesity rates and food safety have increased demand for organic foods and locally grown fruits and vegetables. There is a growing public recognition that Farm Bill supports for corn, soy, wheat, and rice have shifted diets towards processed foods and meats rather than healthier alternatives. U.S. trade policy should also reflect this new thinking in the kinds of food production encouraged by liberalized trade and the innovations needed to improve nutritional outcomes.

Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides some important lessons. Since the agreement’s inception in 1994, Mexican imports of corn and soy used for animal feed, as well as of processed snack foods, soda and other foods characteristic of unhealthy diets, have skyrocketed. Liberalization of trade and investment rules has also spurred sharp increases in U.S. investment all along the Mexican supply chain, including food processing, supermarkets and fast food restaurants. Obesity rates in Mexico have risen to rates similar to those in the United States. Among OECD countries, Mexico is now tied with the United States for the highest per capita obesity rates in the world. The phenomenon of increasing malnutrition occurring at the same time as over-nutrition is escalating in many countries around the world as people just above the poverty line consume increasing amounts of meats, processed foods and other relatively low-cost, high-calorie foods.

The United States cannot legislate consumer demand in other countries, but it could assure that its trade policy does not preclude governments from implementing changes in local food systems to improve the quality of food available to consumers. A government might decide, for example, to procure fresh food for anti-poverty programs from local farm cooperatives rather than importing it from a multinational corporation (along the lines of Brazil’s successful Zero Hunger program). Depending on how the government has listed the implementing agencies in its trade commitments, these kinds of programs could conflict with procurement rules that aim to prevent discrimination against foreign suppliers.

Some types of food security programs could also be the target of investor lawsuits. Like nearly all U.S. trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA allows foreign investors to sue governments for compensation for regulatory changes or programs that undermine their expected profits. One section of the investment chapter bans certain “performance requirements” on foreign investors, including the requirement to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content in production. Thus, for example, if the Mexican government were to require tortilla manufacturers in Mexico to use a certain percentage of locally grown (and more expensive) corn in their produc-
tion, U.S. companies that own tortilla operations there could sue for compensation.

Most trade agreements include recourse to state-to-state dispute resolution.87 The investor-state provision allows companies to bypass that mechanism, as well as local court systems, to sue governments directly.88 Most environmental, labor, and other public-interest groups have argued against this provision in most bilateral trade agreement the United States has negotiated since NAFTA.89

These concerns are not just theoretical. The U.S.-based Metallacld corporation was awarded $15.6 million in compensation when it sued the Mexican government over a local community’s refusal to reopen a toxic waste facility.90 A subsidiary of the U.S.-based Bechtel corporation sued the Bolivian government when it cancelled the privatization of a water distribution system in the wake of widespread public protests over excessive user fees.91 In 2010, Phillip Morris filed an investor-state suit against the Uruguayan government over rules on health warnings on cigarette packages.92 Even when such suits are unsuccessful, they have a chilling effect on local efforts to balance public interests with private profits.

Some trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties include tentative first steps that could start to address that imbalance. The United States-Peru FTA, for example, establishes some general exceptions for measures designed to protect public health, safety and the environment, but these exceptions do not apply to the chapter on investment.93 This kind of exception should be applied more broadly to specifically exempt public interest laws from challenges.94

Unfortunately, current U.S. trade policy seems to be headed in the opposite direction, affirming the Bush era approach. News reports indicate that the United States is pressing Australia, which refused to include the investor-state provision in its FTA with the United States, to reconsider that position in the talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 The recently signed US-Korea FTA resorts to the old approach as well, with only limited exceptions to protect the public good.96

**Recommendations**

Ultimately, the U.S. government should take a comprehensive set of acts that will alleviate these problems. It should review provisions in existing trade agreements that undermine food security and launch a process to reform them.97 The administration should explicitly exempt Least Developed Countries from U.S. export-promotion goals, and work with developing countries to establish trade rules that support price bands and other mechanisms to promote stable food supplies. On an intergovernmental level, it should support proposals at the WTO and in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership for Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms to advance food security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Lastly, the United States could establish exceptions to investment and procurement provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to protect public health and food security.

**Conclusion**

Rather than continuing with the same tired approaches used in recent decades, it is time for a truly twenty-first century approach to trade policy, one that starts with a clear commitment to strengthening food systems and rural livelihoods in the South and North. It is not enough to consider changes in trade balances or growth in exports in particular sectors. We must examine how those changes affect our societies and environments, both in the North and South.

The 2008 food price crisis led to a reexamination of agricultural development policies and the conclusion that decades of neglect of public investment in the sector had been a mistake.98 President Obama took a leadership role in the 2009 G-8 meeting, committing to scale up food security spending and calling on other countries to do the same.99 The Feed the Future initiative and increases in U.S. government spending on food security are evidence of a commitment to redress that mistake and chart a new course to decrease global hunger.

Sadly, that effort will likely collide with the administration’s push to double U.S. exports and negotiate new trade agreements along the same lines as the past. Spending to increase production by smallholder farmers will be undercut by floods of U.S. exports. Efforts to establish food reserves could be undercut by trade rules that restrict governments’ abilities to manage supplies.100 Programs to encourage consumption of healthy, locally grown foods could collide with investor protections that fail to balance public and private interests.101 Decades of expansion of agricultural exports have not helped U.S. farmers either. Farm incomes have been on a rollercoaster ride that has thrown farmers overboard, increasing corporate concentration.102 There is no reason to expect that expanding the same failed policies of the past will have better outcomes now.

Instead, trade and food security policy should focus on rebuilding local food systems in the North and South. This does not mean abandoning trade or closing markets, but considering ways to ensure that trade complements, rather than substitutes for, local food production. The U.S. government should work with developing countries to determine the best ways to structure price bands and other trade protections to achieve food security and development goals, rather than blocking progress on these new approaches.

Added to the evidence of the past is the challenge of the future. Climate change and the end of cheap oil is a dispositive factor in determining food security and trade policy.103 Innovative new approaches that build on local knowledge to reduce reliance on agrochemicals and imported inputs are not just exciting, they are imperative.104 Trade and development policies must create the necessary policy space for these innovations rather than insisting on the extension of twentieth century models of industrial agriculture and dependence on imports.

**Endnotes:** Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food Security Goals on page 36

1 Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009). The transcript may be accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.

2 See Phil Stewart & Daniel Flynn, G8 Pledges $20 Billion in Farm Aid to Poor Nations, Reuters (July 10, 2009, 1:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/10/us-g8-summit-idUSTRE5662V220090710 (noting that the money pledged would assist in addressing the lack of seeds, irrigation, and mechanisms for farmers in Africa to obtain a fair price for their produce).

3 See Press Release, USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah Announces 20 Feed the Future Initiative Focus Countries, USAID (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2010/pr100424.html (stating that the focus of Feed the Future would be to target the causes of hunger and reduce poverty, hunger, and undernutrition particularly in twenty focus countries).


7 See Kelly Olson, South Korea: U.S. Sign Revisions to Free Trade Deal, Bloomberg (Feb. 11, 2011, 6:18 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-10/south-korea-us-sign-revisions-to-free-trade-deal.html (noting however, that the issue involving beef was not included in the agreement).


10 E.g., Reports: Egyptian and Tunisian Riots Were Driven in Part by the Spike in Global Food Prices, Climate Progress (Jan. 30, 2011, 3:36 PM), http://climateprogress.org/2011/01/30/egyptian-tunisian-riots-food-prices-extreme-weather-and-high-oil-prices/ (noting that Egyptians and Tunisians were unhappy with the dramatic increase in the price of rice, cereals, cooking oil, and sugar);


12 See generally Antonio La Vina et al., World Resources Inst., Agric. Subsidies, Poverty and the Environment: Supporting a Domestic Reform Agenda in Developing Countries (Jan. 2007), http://pdf.wri.org/aspe_domestic_reform.pdf (arguing that a reform agenda should accompany a subsidy reform).

13 See Victoria Tauli-Corpuz et al., Third World Network, The Impact of Globalisation and Liberalisation on Agriculture and Small Farmers in Developing Countries: The Case of the Philippines 53 (Apr. 2006), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/par/vicky_ifad_paper.rev_21_april_2006.doc (“When more cheap, subsidized importation of chicken and chicken parts become the norm, the poultry industry in Alamitos could also be engulfed in a serious crisis.”).


16 Id. at 9 (noting that the U.S. government agricultural subsidies rose from seven to thirteen billion dollars in the 1990s to over twenty billion dollars by 1999).


18 Id.


20 Id. (listing the increased demand for food, global financial volatility, and the declining agricultural productivity in developing countries as among the contributing factors).


24 Id.

25 Id. at 27–28.


27 Id. at 36.


30 Id.


32 See Great Lakes Comm’n For the U.S. Army Corps Of Engineers, The Potential Impacts of Increased Corn Production for Ethanol in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Region 7–11 (2007), http://www.glc.org/tributary/pubs/documents/EthanolPaper121807FINAL.pdf (discussing the rise in both energy prices and corn production, which has been influenced at least in part by the expansion of ethanol and biodiesel production).


Id.


Id. at 9-10.

Id. at 10.


The President’s 2010 Trade Policy Agenda at 12, http://www.usstrade.gov/webfn_send/1673 (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (stating that the purpose of this expansion was “to stimulate market-led growth in the poorer countries of the world and to lift their national income levels”).

Least Developed Countries, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/whtewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_charp2_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (stating also that twelve more least-developed countries are currently negotiating to join the WTO).


“More Poor” in India than Africa, BBC (July 13, 2010, 1:18 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10690407 (presenting the findings of a study finding the Indian states have 421 million “poor” people).

Karen Hansen-Kuhn, ActionAid Int’l USA, Policies and Priorities: Salvaging Special Products from the Wreckage of Global Trade Talks 5 (Nov. 2006), http://actionaaidusa.org/assets/pdfs/food_rights/policies_priorities_fall2006_bplan.pdf (stating even countries that are not classified as least-developed countries such as Kenya are experiencing high-levels of poverty and a fragile economy as a result of climatic challenges).

See id. at 1 (stating that “Special Products are agricultural commodities that are particularly important for achieving national development goals,” and that Special mechanisms allow qualified countries to “adjust trade protections in the face of import surges”).

See Developing Countries, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/rgs_bkgnd14_devcoopcnt_e.htm (Dec. 1, 2004) (noting that developing countries wish to identify some products as “special products,” to make lower tariff reductions on these products); Aileen Kwa, Why the SSM Became a Major Issue at the WTO, SouthCentre, http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1285%3Asb46a12&catid=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (noting that “most developing countries want a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) in the WTO to defend small farmers from import surges” but that agricultural exporting countries will counter by arguing that it affects their exports and defining a special safeguard mechanism as an instrument proposed by a number of countries that “would allow countries to impose a safeguard (i.e. an additional duty) if i) agricultural import volumes are increasing rapidly so that they surpass a certain volume trigger level or ii) if prices of the imported products are on the decline, and go below a certain price level”).

See Kwa, supra note 53.

See generally Heikki Lehtonen & Sanna Kujala, Agrifood Research Finland/Economic Research, Climate Change Impacts on Crop Risks and Agricultural Production in Finland, MITT (2007) http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/9259/1/sp07le01.pdf (analyzing the changes in agricultural production due to climate change).

E.g., Christoph Müller et al., Climate Change Risks for African Agriculture, PNAS Early Edition, Feb. 8, 2011 (reviewing the impact of climate change on African agriculture and food security).

See High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, Comprehensive Framework for Action (July 2008), http://www.un.org/issues/foodtaskforce/Documentation/CFA%20Web.pdf (emphasizing the importance of establishing physical or virtual humanitarian food reserves to provide better access to food stocks).


Id.


The Agreements, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/whtewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_charp2_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (“Developing countries do not have to cut their subsidies or lower their tariffs as much as developed countries, and they are given extra time to complete their obligations. Least-developed countries don’t have to do this at all.”) Many of them, however, have already implemented substantial tariff cuts under previous negotiating rounds or as a result of structural adjustment programs.).


See Food & Agric. Org., Policies for the Effective Management of Food Price Swings in Africa 6 (2008), http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easyiol/825/mng_fd_mrks_213EN.pdf (noting however, that “in an environment of increasing prices, ceilings are difficult to defend and therefore, targeting a certain price level may not be practical”).

Id.

Id.

See Arze Guipo, EcoFair Trade Dialogue, Achieving Food and Livelihood Security in Developing Countries: The Need for a Stronger Governance of Imports 49 (Dec. 2006), http://www.ecofair-trade.org/pics/en/EcoFair_Trade_Paper_No2_Guipo_new.pdf (stating that price bands can “stabilize internal prices for agricultural commodities [and] can be calculated according to domestic production and transaction costs of peasant production within a region or country”).


Hansen-Kuhn, supra note 51, at 6.


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Sarah Clarke et al., Exporting Obesity: How U.S. Food and Farm Policy is Transforming the Mexican Consumer Food Environment (discussion draft on file with author).


Id.


Wald, supra note 1.


Karl Russell, Many Want Rare Earths, but Few are Mining Them, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/business/06metrics. html?ref=global (documenting the low number of mines relative to demand, in part because of the extensive environmental damage that results from extraction to industrial application).


See Wald, supra note 1.

These mandates expanded greatly through the 1990 amendments, but the history of broad authority to regulate against endangerment stems from NRDC v. Train, 545 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (recognizing the possibility of the EPA to make an endangerment finding of carbon dioxide under §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act).


The UN Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979). Signatories include nearly all of Europe, Russia, the former Soviet states, Canada, and the United States; the status of ratification may be found at Status of Ratification of The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range

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