The use of empirical methods in antitrust has been growing at an exponential rate. It is now commonplace for multiple regression and other statistical methods to be utilized in merger cases, especially those involving predictions of the price increases that may result from the strategic decisions of the merging firms. These methods are also prominently employed in civil nonmerger investigations by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies (including price fixing, monopolization, and exclusive dealing cases) and in private litigation (including damage claims and class action suits). This article surveys the methodologies that have been used and the range of questions that they address. It also provides a critical examination of the growing set of statistical tools that are available for use in antitrust analysis.
Jonathan Baker & Daniel Rubinfeld,
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique,
American Law and Economics Review
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1921