Document Type

Article

Publication Date

January 1999

Volume

13

Issue

1

Abstract

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the federal courts transformed antitrust rules and the federal enforcement agencies altered their case selection criteria in response to theories developed by industrial organization economists. These developments in economic thinking, often associated with the Chicago school, led current antitrust law and practice toward a greater skepticism about the relationship between market concentration and market power and a greater recognition of the possible efficiency-enhancing role of vertical agreements (contracts between firms and their customers or suppliers) than was present in the 1950s and 1960s.This survey will begin where those developments leave off by highlighting more recent developments in antitrust economics that have influenced the way the federal antitrust enforcement agencies analyze five issues: efficiencies from mergers, entry conditions, practices facilitating coordination, exclusionary practices, and the unilateral competitive effects of mergers.

Share

COinS