Abstract
INTRODUCTION: The Second Amendment ensures that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In a country with more civilian-owned firearms than people—and more gun dealers than McDonald’s, Burger King, Subway, and Wendy’s locations combined—it is no surprise that Americans pride themselves on their right to bear arms. However, a majority of the American population favors stricter gun laws and regulations, a position that seems sensible given that mass shootings are an all-too-familiar occurrence in the United States. The enshrinement of the right to bear arms in the Constitution limits the laws and regulations that elected officials can enact to confront the Nation’s gun violence epidemic. The Second Amendment codified a preexisting right long recognized in English law. While the right to bear arms is broad, it is not unlimited. Thus, states may regulate Second Amendment rights, provided the regulations comply with constitutional constraints. Recently, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Supreme Court refined the legal standard for assessing statutory regulations that burden an individual’s Second Amendment right to bear arms. Under the Bruen Court’s standard, only firearm regulations that comport with history and tradition will pass constitutional muster. However, the Third Circuit recently misinterpreted the Bruen standard, illuminating a significant circuit split among the courts of appeals. In Range v. Attorney General United States, the Third Circuit erred in concluding that the principles underlying the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation do not support the categorical disarmament of nonviolent felony offenders like Mr. Range. The statutory regulation at issue in Range, Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act (“Section 922(g)(1)”), prohibits the possession of firearms by individuals convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. The Range decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent in Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and strays dangerously far from recent decisions in sister circuits. This Comment argues that the federal statute disarming felony offenders is constitutional as applied to nonviolent offenders, including the appellant in Range. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of case law analyzing firearm regulations that burden an individual’s Second Amendment right. Part II also provides background on the historical tradition of categorically disarming citizens. Part III examines the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Range under the Bruen standard and considers it in light of the history and tradition of categorical disarmament. Part III then discusses the significance of the Range decision, considering its significant departure from the rulings of other courts of appeals. Part III further asserts that the language of prior Supreme Court decisions independently supports the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1). Part IV recommends that courts reject as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1) and emphasizes the importance of the statute in curtailing gun violence. Part V concludes by reiterating that the Third Circuit’s decision is both inconsistent with other courts of appeals and in direct contrast with Supreme Court jurisprudence.