Document Type

Amicus Brief

Publication Date


Case Name

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo


The principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law has been a pillar of this Court's administrative law doctrine for more than a century. This Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), formalized one version of that principle, creating the two-step framework that is now subject to a multifaceted attack. Among other things, Chevron's opponents argue that the doctrine is at odds with the original public meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. This is wrong, and the text and history of that landmark statute provide no basis for overruling the Chevron doctrine. The story of the APA begins with its text-specifically, the first sentence of Section 706, which instructs that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Though for many years this Court barely even mentioned this provision when reciting the standard of review for questions of law, Petitioners purport to discern in its text a clear command that judicial review of such issues be de novo.