The key players in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations were driven to establish a new institution for intellectual property enforcement because the traditional venues for such matters, the WTO and WIPO, had become inhospitable forums. Yet given the significant division in U.S. domestic economic interests over ACTA’s provisions and the lack of solid theoretical or empirical evidence supporting claims made by proponents of the agreement, it is puzzling that ACTA has commanded the support of the U.S. executive, even across two administrations from opposing political parties. I show why this support cannot be explained as a result of the aggregation of domestic economic interests, or as a result of rational policymaking. I then argue that an irrational but captivating “policy paradigm” better explains the support of the U.S. executive.
Michael, Gabriel. 2010. ACTA, Fool: Explaining the Irrational Support for a New Institution. PIJIP Research Paper no. 7. American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC.