Abstract
The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) in hiring processes has created a significant accountability gap in employment discrimination law. While federal statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act focus on finding liability for traditional employers, they fail to adequately address the unique role of third-party AI vendors whose algorithms often drive discriminatory outcomes. This Comment examines the emerging legal landscape through the lens of Mobley v. Workday, where the District Court for the Northern District of California recognized that AI vendors can function as “agents” of employers under existing anti-discrimination statutes. This Comment argues that courts can address algorithmic discrimination without new legislation by applying two established common law doctrines: agency theory and joint enterprise liability. Agency theory holds principals responsible for discriminatory actions by their agents, while joint enterprise liability imposes shared accountability on parties who collaborate toward a common purpose with mutual control.
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