Abstract
Antitrust law governs and guides how regulatory agencies should scrutinize unfair, monopolistic corporate behavior. However, when several different agencies are tasked with enforcing the same legal principles, different interpretations of such principles inevitably arise.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) acts as the main body that enforces antitrust actions in the domestic airline industry, but there is an exception to the general rule. Congress delegated the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) the authority to grant antitrust immunity to international airline alliances, which form when domestic and foreign airlines partner to increase flight services between their respective nations.
However, as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 41309, Congress limited antitrust immunity to alliances that serve a public benefit that cannot be reasonably achieved through other means. Lacking antitrust expertise, or perhaps rejecting the DO’s expertise, the DOT has leniently granted antitrust immunity to international airline alliances, and such immunity grants have served as one of many catalysts to the modern monopolization of the commercial air space The DOT’s loose antitrust monitoring has exacerbated the impacts of the gradual deregulation of the industry, harming consumers of air travel, which is becoming a necessary service for many Without reforming the DOT’s approach to antitrust immunity grants, at least in principle, the aviation market and its consumers face the brunt of predatory monopolistic behaviors, authorized from the very governmental bodies that should be protecting them.
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