Abstract
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination by employers but exempts “bona fide private membership clubs” that are tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c). Despite this seemingly clear statutory language, there is a notable lack of appellate decisions interpreting this exemption under Title VII. This scarcity of precedent has led to inconsistent approaches across circuits. For example, the Fifth Circuit has drawn heavily from the Private Club Exemption under Title II of the Civil Rights Act while the Seventh Circuit has treated the two exemptions as entirely distinct. This Comment argues that the Title II and Title VII exemptions— while enacted to protect First Amendment rights of association—are textually and historically similar and should be interpreted comparably. However, because the Title VII context involves an employer-employee relationship and implicates core issues of economic vulnerability and workplace protections, courts should apply the exemption more narrowly in employment cases. The Comment surveys the current fragmented judicial landscape and proposes a stricter genera lrule that analyzes how secluded clubs’ members are from the public. It further argues that clubs should bear the burden of proving they qualify for the exemption and should be required to affirmatively disclose their exempt status to employees.
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