Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Journal
Antitrust
Volume
27
Issue
2
Abstract
"Most Favored Nation" contractual provisions have come under scrutiny in recent years by antitrust authorities in both the US and EU. MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers and buyers. The literature has recognized that there may be efficiency rationales for these arrangements but the literature has also recognized that these arrangements have anticompetitive potential. In this paper, we distill the economics literature on MFNs to explore both possibilities.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Baker & Judith A. Chevalier,
The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions,
27
Antitrust
(2013).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1120
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