Challenges to the Independence of Inspectors General in Robust Congressional Oversight

Authors

Fernando R. Laguarda, American University, Washington College of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Winter 2021

Journal

Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy

Volume

19

Issue

1

First Page

211

Last Page

262

Abstract

Congressional oversight of the Executive is among the chief responsibilities of the legislative branch. Inspectors General ("IGs") are among the most important tools available to Congress because they are "hard-wired" into the Executive itself. The value of IGs to Congress depends on their expertise in the workings of their host agencies and their "independence" from those agencies. But "independence" is not a statutorily defined term. As the agencies, and sometimes Congress itself, expand the role of IGs to engage in activities that parallel the regulatory programs of their host agencies, IG independence is compromised and the value IGs provide to Congress can be undermined. This article seeks to further a project of scholarship on IGsfocusing on the statutory framework within which they operate and the conflicting imperatives that affect their work.

Recommended Citation

Fernando R. Laguarda, Challenges to the Independence of Inspectors General in Robust Congressional Oversight, 19 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 211 (2021).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/2162