Document Type

Amicus Brief

Publication Date

1-21-2025

Case Name

Thomas Perttu v. Kyle Brandon Richards

Abstract

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: "The right to trial by jury is 'of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right' has always been and 'should be scrutinized with the utmost care." SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2128 (2024) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). The Seventh Amendment reflects and enshrines that tradition, providing that in "[s]uits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. Const. amend. VII (quoting Dimick; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11 (1999) (Section 1983 suits for damages are suits at common law for Seventh Amendment purposes).

The Seventh Amendment thus precludes judges from deciding questions that would have been assigned to juries in suits at common law. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2128-29. Вecause Respondent asserts that a judge may decide the truth of a factual allegation central to a prisoner's legal claim so long as the question is also relevant to the defendant's exhaustion defense under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), this case presents a novel and serious constitutional question whether the Seventh Amendment would permit that allocation of authority. See Petr. Br. 14 (admitting the defense has no clear pre-amendment analog); Resp. Br. 40-41 (arguing that the best analogy is to a plea in discharge, which was subject to a jury trial).

However, before resolving that constitutional question, this Court must first decide whether Congress intended to pose it or, instead, meant for juries in PLRA cases to decide merits question in every instance even if the Seventh Amendment might permit a different rule. That question of statutory interpretation is governed by this Court's decision in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). There, the Court held that when the PLRA is "silent" on the details of how its exhaustion provision should be administered, "the usual practice should be followed" even if one could hypothesize reasons why departing from the normal course might better serve the statute's purposes. Id. at 212.

The tradition in our federal system is to "distribut[e] trial functions between judge and jury... under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment." Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). Consistent with that tradition, the usual practice is to allow jurors to decide all factual questions necessary to resolve the merits of a legal claim, even when some of those questions may overlap with issues a judge could decide alone. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-511 (1959) (“[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances... can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination" of an issue by a judge). Accordingly, although judges typically decide threshold issues such as subject-matter jurisdiction, when deciding those questions requires resolving a factual dispute that also goes to the merits of a legal claim, the court submits the factual question to the jury. See ibid.; Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1907) (applying rule to jurisdictional defense).

There is no indication that Congress intended the PLRA's exhaustion defense to depart from the usual practice dictated by Beacon Theatres and thereby to draw the statute's constitutionality into question. As in Jones, the statute is silent on the relevant question. And Jones instructed that "courts should generally not depart from the usual practice under the Federal 7 Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns." 549 U.S. at 212.

Petitioner's policy objections are misplaced in any event. Petitioner overstates how often disputed facts concerning exhaustion also bear on the plaintiff's claim on the merits. And on the unusual occasions when they do overlap, courts have multiple tools to avoid a jury trial on meritless, unexhausted claims, including through mandatory screening for frivolous complaints and summary judgment when no reasonable juror could find the claims exhausted. Courts routinely use those tools to dismiss unexhausted claims without the need for a trial. The Beacon Theatres rule thus will only require a jury trial when a prisoner presents significant evidence that unconstitutional conduct has rendered administrative exhaustion unavailable. To the extent practical policy issues emerge from that application, Congress is the body to decide whether a departure from the usual practice is warranted. Unless and until Congress adopts petitioner's preferred procedures, the usual practice should prevail.

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